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Bills/119th Congress · House

H.R. 2504

Introduced

The U.S.-European Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act of 2025

Sponsor
DWilliam R. Keating· Massachusetts
Introduced
March 31, 2025
Policy area
International Affairs
Latest action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 43 - 3.March 26, 2026
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2504 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2504

To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen 
United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian 
malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 31, 2025

Mr. Keating (for himself, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Huizenga) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen 
United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian 
malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``The U.S.-European Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation Act of 2025''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation initiated 
a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which has severely threatened 
energy security in the United States, Europe, and around the 
world.
(2) The security of Ukraine's energy grid has been vital to 
Ukraine's success in its defense of its territory and ensuring 
the Ukrainian government can effectively provide goods and 
services to Ukrainian citizens.
(3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power plants with 15 
reactors, primarily Russian-designed water-water energetic 
reactor (VVER) reactors.
(4) Russia, in its war of aggression against Ukraine, has 
systematically targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure through 
heavy shelling and targeted attacks, particularly in the winter 
months when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulnerable.
(5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have illegally 
occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, the largest 
nuclear power plant in Europe, and Russian forces have 
surrounded the station with landmines, further threatening 
regional security.
(6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been built across 
Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
(7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs and fuel 
services to spread malign influence and threaten United States 
and European energy security.
(8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent of the total 
uranium conversion infrastructure worldwide and in 2020, had 
the largest uranium enrichment capacity at close to 46 percent.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear power 
industry, the Department of State should prioritize the 
utilization of products and services from the United States, 
and then prioritize products and services from Europe and other 
allied or partner countries, including Canada, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not directly 
competing with the United States;
(2) the United States and its allies must focus on 
cooperation, including capacity building and early-stage 
project support, to expand the nuclear industry in Europe in a 
way that maintains nonproliferation, security, and safety 
standards and aligns with international obligations and 
treaties while combating Russian and Chinese malign influence; 
and
(3) the United States should continue to pursue the 
Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small 
Modular Reactor Technology program as a means of helping 
partner countries meet their clean energy needs with scalable, 
flexible, secure, and safe nuclear power programs.

SEC. 4. STRATEGY.

(a) Strategy Required.--The Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Energy and the heads of other relevant Federal 
departments and agencies, shall develop a strategy to strengthen United 
States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign 
influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(1) An overview and assessment of the Secretary of State's 
efforts to broaden participation by United States nuclear 
industry entities in Europe and promote the accessibility and 
competitiveness of United States, European, and partner 
technologies and services against Russian and Chinese 
technologies in Europe.
(2) An overview of different nuclear reactor types that are 
currently deployed or under regulatory review in Europe, 
including large light-water reactors, small modular light-water 
reactors, and non-light-water reactors, and--
(A) what role, if any, each reactor type could have 
in reducing Russia's influence over European energy 
supply by 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050;
(B) challenges that each reactor type may face with 
rapid deployment, including costs, market barriers to 
first-of-a-kind designs, supply chain constraints, and 
regulatory requirements;
(C) the impacts of each reactor type on maintaining 
strong nonproliferation standards, including the 
minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material; and
(D) opportunities for the use of United States, 
European, and partner technologies and services in the 
deployment or potential deployment of each reactor 
type.
(3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are currently 
deployed or under consideration in Europe, including use of low 
enriched uranium, including high assay low enriched uranium, 
and spent fuel reprocessing, along with an analysis of the 
implications of each fuel cycle on--
(A) reducing and eliminating Russia's market share 
in Europe for uranium, conversion, enrichment, and 
reactor fuel between now and 2030;
(B) achieving long-term energy security free of 
Russian influence; and
(C) maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, 
including the minimization of weapons-usable material 
as well as high nuclear safety and security standards.
(4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and fuel cycle 
infrastructure that the United States Government is currently 
funding the development of, and--
(A) the potential, if any, that each of these 
technologies have to decrease or eliminate Russia's 
market share in the United States and Europe for 
nuclear power reactors, uranium mining and milling, 
conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, deconversion, 
and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in the short, 
medium, and long term;
(B) the impact of these technologies on the 
minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material, 
including the use of highly enriched uranium or 
plutonium fuels; and
(C) an assessment of the use cases for each of 
these designs and fuel cycles.
(5) An overview of the United States Government's 
diplomatic engagements regarding the nuclear energy sector in 
Europe.
(6) A list of countries in Europe with active nuclear power 
programs, and--
(A) an analysis of each country's nuclear energy 
policy;
(B) an overview of existing areas of cooperation 
with regards to nuclear energy between each country 
and--
(i) the United States;
(ii) other European and friendly countries; 
and
(iii) adversarial countries including China 
and Russia;
(C) an overview of potential areas for future 
cooperation between each country and the United States 
with regards to nuclear energy; and
(D) a summary of fuel types used in each country's 
nuclear power programs.
(7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influence in the 
European nuclear energy sector.
(8) An overview of how the United States Government is 
working with allies and partners to counter Russian malign 
influence within the European energy sector to include steps 
taken to counter Russian influence in the mining and milling, 
conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as well 
as in reactor construction.
(9) An overview of how the United States Government 
balances the urgent strategic need for collaboration with 
allies and partners on countering Russia's influence on nuclear 
energy in Europe, with commercial competitiveness issues that 
may arise between United States companies and companies in 
Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
(10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Russia's energy 
sector, to include an overview of strengths and vulnerabilities 
of the conglomerate.
(c) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees the strategy required by 
subsection (a).
(d) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, so 
long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified 
strategy.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated $30,000,000 for each of 
fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to support critically needed engagement 
in Europe consistent with the strategy required by section 4(a) on 
countering Russian malign influence and with a particular focus on 
responsible nuclear power program capacity building, early stage 
nuclear power project support, and countering Russian disinformation 
campaigns.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate;
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of the Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
of the Senate.
(2) High assay low enriched uranium.--The term ``high assay 
low enriched uranium'' means uranium enriched so that the 
concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is 
between 5 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.
(3) Low enriched uranium.--The term ``low enriched 
uranium'' means fuel in which the weight percent of U-235 in 
the uranium is less than 20 percent.
<all>

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