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Bills/119th Congress · House

H.R. 3919

Introduced

Advanced AI Security Readiness Act

Sponsor
RDarin LaHood· Illinois
Introduced
June 11, 2025
Policy area
Armed Forces and National Security
Latest action
Referred to the House Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select).June 11, 2025
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3919 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 3919

To direct the Director of the National Security Agency to develop 
strategies to secure artificial intelligence related technologies.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 11, 2025

Mr. LaHood (for himself, Mr. Moolenaar, Mr. Gottheimer, and Mr. 
Krishnamoorthi) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To direct the Director of the National Security Agency to develop 
strategies to secure artificial intelligence related technologies.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Advanced AI Security Readiness 
Act''.

SEC. 2. AI SECURITY PLAYBOOK.

(a) Requirement.--The Director of the National Security Agency, 
acting through the Artificial Intelligence Security Center (or 
successor office), shall develop strategies (in this section referred 
to as the ``AI Security Playbook'') to defend covered AI technologies 
from technology theft by threat actors.
(b) Elements.--The AI Security Playbook under subsection (a) shall 
include the following:
(1) Identification of potential vulnerabilities in advanced 
AI data centers and among advanced AI developers capable of 
producing covered AI technologies, with a focus on 
cybersecurity risks and other security challenges that are 
unique to protecting covered AI technologies and critical 
components of such technologies (such as threat vectors that do 
not typically arise, or are less severe, in the context of 
conventional information technology systems).
(2) Identification of components or information that, if 
accessed by threat actors, would meaningfully contribute to 
progress made by the actor with respect to developing covered 
AI technologies, including with respect to--
(A) AI models and key components of such models;
(B) core insights relating to the development of 
advanced AI systems, including with respect to training 
such systems, the inferences made by such systems, and 
the engineering of such systems; and
(C) other related information.
(3) Strategies to detect, prevent, and respond to cyber 
threats by threat actors targeting covered AI technologies.
(4) Identification of the levels of security, if any, that 
would require substantial involvement by the United States 
Government in the development or oversight of highly advanced 
AI systems.
(5) Analysis of how the United States Government would be 
involved to achieve the levels of security identified in 
paragraph (4), including a description of a hypothetical 
initiative to build covered AI technology systems in a highly 
secure governmental environment, considering, at a minimum, 
cybersecurity protocols, provisions to protect model weights, 
efforts to mitigate insider threats (including personnel 
vetting and security clearance adjudication processes), access 
control procedures, counterintelligence and anti-espionage 
measures, contingency and emergency response plans, and other 
strategies that would be used to reduce threats of technology 
theft by threat actors.
(c) Form.--The AI Security Playbook under subsection (a) shall 
include--
(1) detailed methodologies and intelligence assessments, 
which may be contained in a classified annex; and
(2) an unclassified portion with general guidelines and 
best practices suitable for dissemination to relevant 
individuals, including in the private sector.
(d) Engagement.--
(1) In general.--In developing the AI Security Playbook 
under subsection (a), the Director shall--
(A) engage with prominent AI developers and 
researchers, as determined by the Director, to assess 
and anticipate the capabilities of highly advanced AI 
systems relevant to national security, including by--
(i) conducting a comprehensive review of 
industry documents pertaining to the security 
of AI systems with respect to preparedness 
frameworks, scaling policies, risk management 
frameworks, and other matters;
(ii) conducting interviews with subject 
matter experts;
(iii) hosting roundtable discussions and 
expert panels; and
(iv) visiting facilities used to develop 
AI; and
(B) to leverage existing expertise and research, 
collaborate with a federally funded research and 
development center that has conducted research on 
strategies to secure AI models from nation-state actors 
and other highly resourced actors.
(2) Nonapplicability of faca.--None of the activities 
described in this subsection shall be construed to establish or 
use an advisory committee subject to chapter 10 of title 5, 
United States Code.
(e) Reports.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the AI 
Security Playbook under subsection (a), including a summary of 
progress on the development of Playbook, an outline of 
remaining sections, and any relevant insights about AI 
security.
(2) Final report.--Not later than 270 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the Playbook.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (2)--
(A) shall include--
(i) an unclassified version suitable for 
dissemination to relevant individuals, 
including in the private sector; and
(ii) a publicly available version; and
(B) may include a classified annex.
(f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in subsection (b)(4) shall be 
construed to authorize or require any regulatory or enforcement action 
by the United States Government.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate.
(2) The terms ``artificial intelligence'' and ``AI'' have 
the meaning given the term ``artificial intelligence'' in 
section 238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 10 
U.S.C. note prec. 4061).
(3) The term ``covered AI technologies'' means advanced AI 
(whether developed by the private sector, the United States 
Government, or a public-private partnership) with critical 
capabilities that the Director determines would pose a grave 
national security threat if acquired or stolen by threat 
actors, such as AI systems that match or exceed human expert 
performance in relating to chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear matters, cyber offense, model autonomy, persuasion, 
research and development, and self-improvement.
(4) The term ``technology theft'' means any unauthorized 
acquisition, replication, or appropriation of covered AI 
technologies or components of such technologies, including 
models, model weights, architectures, or core algorithmic 
insights, through any means, such as cyber attacks, insider 
threats, and side-channel attacks, or exploitation of public 
interfaces.
(5) The term ``threat actors'' means nation-state actors 
and other highly resourced actors capable of technology theft.
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