H.R. 4107

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4107 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 4107

To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and 
for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 24, 2025

Mr. Messmer (for himself, Mr. Fallon, Mr. Harrigan, Mr. Wittman, Mr. 
Crenshaw, Mr. McCormick, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Bergman, Mr. 
Luttrell, Mr. Jackson of Texas, Mr. McGuire, Mr. Van Orden, Mr. Yakym, 
Mr. Finstad, Mr. Mast, Mr. Shreve, Mr. McDowell, Mr. Baird, Mr. Hamadeh 
of Arizona, Mr. Mills, Mr. Steube, Mrs. Houchin, Mr. Begich, Mr. 
Gimenez, and Mr. Stutzman) introduced the following bill; which was 
referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the 
Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, and Transportation and 
Infrastructure, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and 
for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Ground and Orbital Launched Defeat 
of Emergent Nuclear Destruction and Other Missile Engagements Act of 
2025'' or the ``GOLDEN DOME Act of 2025''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) Findings.--
(1) Missile defense review.--Congress finds that the 2022 
Missile Defense Review found the following:
(A) Since the release of the 2019 Missile Defense 
Review, missile-related threats have rapidly expanded 
in quantity, diversity, and sophistication.
(B) United States national security interests are 
increasingly at risk from wide-ranging missile arsenals 
that include offensive ballistic, cruise, and 
hypersonic weapons.
(C) In support of the homeland missile defense 
mission, continued modernization and expansion of all 
current deployed systems with capabilities guarding 
against the homeland threat, including the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, will remain essential 
to our comprehensive missile defeat approach. In 
addition, the United States will also continue to 
improve defensive capabilities to address the threat of 
evolving hypersonic missile, cruise missile, and 
unmanned system strikes by any adversary against the 
homeland.
(D) The continued evolution and progress of 
missiles and unmanned systems as a principal means by 
which adversaries seek to project conventional or 
nuclear military power makes missile and unmanned 
system defense a core deterrence-by-denial component of 
an integrated deterrence strategy.
(E) Missile and unmanned system defense 
capabilities add resilience and undermine adversary 
confidence by introducing doubt and uncertainty into 
strike planning and execution, reducing the incentive 
to conduct small-scale coercive attacks, decreasing the 
probability of attack success, and raising the 
threshold of conflict.
(F) Should deterrence fail, missile defense 
capabilities sufficient to negate long-range missile 
threats of any type are among the most critical 
national security capabilities for the United States.
(2) Congressional commission on the strategic posture of 
the united states.--Congress finds that, in its October 2023 
report, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 
of the United States recommended the following:
(A) The United States should develop and field 
homeland integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) that 
can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and 
China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay 
ahead of the North Korean and Iranian threat.
(B) The Secretary of Defense should direct 
research, development, test and evaluation into 
advanced integrated air and missile defense 
capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, 
sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on 
sensor architectures, integrated command and control, 
interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, 
unmanned systems, and area or point defenses. The 
Department of Defense should urgently pursue deployment 
of any capabilities that prove feasible.
(3) Commission on the national defense strategy.--Congress 
finds the following:
(A) In its July 2024 report, the Commission on the 
National Defense Strategy found the following:
(i) There is an increasing threat from 
expanding ability of China, Russia, and North 
Korea to deliver nuclear weapons against the 
United States, including the territories of the 
United States.
(ii) The military planners of the 
Department of Defense and United States 
Northern Command need to prepare for a worst-
case scenario in which nuclear and other 
strikes are launched against the United States, 
which could be done in large numbers with 
specialized delivery systems.
(B) In the report described in subparagraph (A), 
the Commission shared the same threat assessment about 
missile attacks as the Commission on the Strategic 
Posture of the United States and agreed with the 
recommendation that the United States should enhance 
missile defense for the homeland.
(4) Policy.--Congress finds that it is the policy of the 
Federal Government that--
(A) the Federal Government will provide for the 
common defense of the citizens of the United States and 
the United States by deploying and maintaining a next-
generation missile defense shield;
(B) the Federal Government will deter and defend 
the citizens and critical infrastructure of the United 
States against any foreign attack on the United States 
homeland; and
(C) the Federal Government will guarantee the 
secure second-strike capability of the Federal 
Government.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as the advanced long-range missile and unmanned system 
threat continues to evolve, the threat of attack by ballistic, 
cruise missile, hypersonic missile, and unmanned system remains 
a significant threat to the United States with potentially 
catastrophic consequences;
(2) China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its 
conventional forces to include ballistic missile systems posing 
an increasing threat to citizens, forces, and allies of the 
United States;
(3) over the past 40 years, the sophistication and quantity 
of threats, including ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and 
unmanned systems has become substantial;
(4) contending only with rogue nation threats and 
accidental or unauthorized missile launches is no longer 
sufficient in the current and reasonably foreseeable future 
threat environment;
(5) by empowering the United States with a second-strike 
capability, the Golden Dome will deter adversaries from attacks 
on the homeland;
(6) to improve capabilities to defend adequately against 
increasing numbers and sophistication of threats to the 
homeland, rapid development and deployment of space-based 
sensors and interceptors which take advantage of lower cost and 
technical commercial advances in recent years must be among the 
Defense Department's highest priorities;
(7) there is a need to fully integrate undersea, ground, 
air, and space-based sensors, interceptors, and command nodes 
through a secure and redundant communications architecture;
(8) there is a need to clearly delineate and appropriately 
empower the leaders and agencies responsible for development, 
integration, and execution of the Golden Dome;
(9) the United States must make achieving total domain 
awareness, from the seafloor to Outer Space to cyberspace, to 
provide early warning and defeat of missile threats from both 
the northern and southern hemispheres across all warfighting 
domains a top priority;
(10) a central component of Golden Dome will be the network 
and command and control systems;
(11) substantial command and control and fire control 
capabilities exist now, but require investment to support any 
Golden Dome reference architecture;
(12) a flexible, open-architecture approach for the Golden 
Dome will support spiral development;
(13) Golden Dome prioritizes the defense of United States 
citizens in the homeland against all air and missile threats 
from all countries and requires prioritization of critical 
assets to inform the Commander of United States Northern 
Command and the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific 
Command;
(14) significant additional missile defense modeling and 
simulation tools that measure friendly and adversary effects, 
such as kinetic, non-kinetic, directed energy, are required;
(15) the Executive order directs the ``acceleration of the 
deployment of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space 
Sensor layer'' (HBTSS) and is encouraged by the fact that HBTSS 
has already been demonstrated successfully on-orbit by the 
Missile Defense Agency and is in active production with Space 
Development Agency; and
(16) the space-based sensor industrial base has available 
capacity to accept the additional orders necessary to respond 
to the Executive order's explicit direction to accelerate the 
deployment of HBTSS.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Commercial solution.--
(A) In general.--The term ``commercial solution'' 
means a product, other than real property, that--
(i) is of a type customarily used by the 
general public or by nongovernmental entities 
for purposes other than governmental purposes; 
and
(ii)(I) has been sold, leased, or licensed 
to the general public; or
(II) has been offered for sale, lease, or 
license to the general public.
(B) Inclusion of commercial products, components, 
and services.--The term ``commercial solution'' 
includes commercial products, components, and services 
in alignment with the Federal Government's preference 
for the acquisition of commercial products and 
commercial services, as set forth in sections 1906, 
1907, and 3307 of title 41, United States Code, and 
sections 3451 through 3453 of title 10, United States 
Code, which establish acquisition policies more closely 
resembling those of the commercial marketplace and 
encourage the acquisition of commercial products and 
commercial services.
(2) Congressional defense committees.--The term 
``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given such 
term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(3) Golden dome.--The term ``Golden Dome'' shall means the 
holistic missile defense architecture described in this Act.
(4) Missile.--The term ``missile'' means a ballistic, 
hypersonic, cruise, hypersonic cruise, or loitering munition.
(5) Program manager.--The term ``Program Manager'' means 
the Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager appointed under 
section 4(a)(4)(A).
(6) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
of Defense.
(7) Unmanned system.--The term ``unmanned system'' means a 
remote-operated or autonomous unmanned system of any size 
maneuvering in land, sea, air, or space that is capable of 
single attacks, swarm attacks, or sensor and data collection 
and reconnaissance.

SEC. 4. IMPROVING UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

(a) Development of a Holistic Missile Defense Strategy; Golden Dome 
Administration.--
(1) Development of a holistic missile defense strategy.--
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a holistic missile 
defense strategy informed by discussions with and suggestions 
from such other government agencies as the Secretary deems 
necessary to determine which critical infrastructure must be 
defended, against which adversaries, and from which specific 
capabilities, including from both missiles and unmanned 
systems.
(2) All-domain awareness.--The strategy developed pursuant 
to paragraph (1) shall include plans for a system of layered 
sensors from the seafloor to space and cyberspace to provide 
persistent all-domain awareness.
(3) Integrated, redundant command and control.--The 
strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include 
plans for integrated, secure, open, and redundant command and 
control software and technology architecture for the nationwide 
missile defense system and shall designate a clear human chain 
of command for control of such systems and responses.
(4) Leadership.--
(A) Establishment of a golden dome direct report 
program manager.--There is established a Golden Dome 
Direct Report Program Manager, who shall be appointed 
by the Secretary from among the general officers of the 
Army, Air Force, Space Force, or flag officers of the 
Navy and Marine Corps.
(B) Grade.--The individual serving as the Program 
Manager, while so serving, shall have the grade of 
general without vacating the permanent grade of the 
officer and will be placed directly under the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of 
Defense order of precedence.
(C) Responsibilities.--The Program Manager shall be 
responsible for the acquisition, contracting, 
development, testing, and initial operations and 
sustainment of Golden Dome.
(D) Reporting and authority.--Subject to the 
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the 
Program Manager shall--
(i) report directly to the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense;
(ii) have the acquisition authorities 
equivalent to Defense Acquisition Executives, 
including milestone decision authority, 
contracting authority, direct hiring authority, 
direct liaison authority with congressional 
oversight committees, original classification 
authority, expedited military construction 
authority, and technical authority for missile 
defense of the homeland;
(iii) have full authority to budget for 
Golden Dome and perform oversight of funds 
identified to be in support of Golden Dome 
across all categories of budget authority, 
regardless of reprogramming thresholds; and
(iv) establish Golden Dome program elements 
and programs consistent with the format used by 
the President for submittal of the budget of 
the President pursuant to section 1105(a) of 
title 31, United States Code, to facilitate 
oversight by Congress.
(E) Exception from certain manual and directive.--
Programs or projects carried out under the authority of 
this section shall not be subject to the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual 
and Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, or 
successor manuals and directives. The Program Manager 
shall use all lawful acquisition and procurement 
methods necessary outside of this process to carry out 
the accelerated implementation and execution of Golden 
Dome.
(F) Protection from intervention.--Unless otherwise 
directed by the President, the Secretary, or statute, 
no officer other than the Secretary of Defense may 
intervene to exercise, authority, direction, 
interference, including unreasonable delays in 
answering requests for information or other requests 
relating to the implementation or execution of Golden 
Dome or its subsystems, or control over the Program 
Manager in the discharge of responsibilities specified 
in subparagraph (C) and authority specified in 
subparagraph (D).
(G) Authority to work with other federal 
agencies.--
(i) In general.--The Program Manager may 
work with other Federal agencies, including the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, and the various elements of the 
intelligence community, to expedite research, 
testing, and execution of any Golden Dome-
related systems.
(ii) Priority for decision requests.--In 
any case in which a Federal agency receives a 
decision request under clause (i) relating to 
the planning and implementation of Golden Dome, 
the head of the Federal agency shall prioritize 
the decision request.
(5) Leveraging distributed, advanced, additive 
manufacturing.--The Secretary shall develop and implement a 
plan for leveraging distributed, advanced, or additive 
manufacturing to rapidly develop technologies and munitions 
critical for the strategy required by paragraph (1).
(6) Leveraging commercial solutions.--To the maximum extent 
practicable, the architectures developed by the Department of 
Defense as part of Golden Dome shall use commercial solutions, 
including subcontracting by prime contractors at all tiers to 
incorporate commercial items or nondevelopmental items as 
components of items, supplied to the Department of Defense for 
rapid deployment.
(7) Testing requirements.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of Defense and the 
Program Manager shall ensure that a robust testing 
regime is established for all kinetic and nonkinetic 
interceptors or similar systems throughout the system's 
lifecycle. To the maximum extent practicable, testing 
shall include execution of end-to-end missile defense 
detection, tracking, and destruction techniques that 
exercise multiple components of the Golden Dome system.
(B) Testing schedule.--
(i) In general.--In carrying out 
subparagraph (A), the Secretary and the Program 
Manager shall ensure that, not later than 540 
days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, a demanding testing cadence begins, 
commencing with a virtual exercise commencing 
on or before the date that is 540 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(ii) Test plans.--Not later than 90 days 
before carrying out a test under this 
paragraph, the Secretary and the Program 
Manager shall present to the congressional 
defense committees a detailed plan for the 
test.
(iii) Briefings.--In any case in which the 
Program Manager fails to conduct a test under 
this paragraph in accordance with a timeline 
specified in this paragraph, the Program 
Manager shall provide the applicable 
subcommittees of the congressional defense 
committees an in-person briefing in each month 
for with the test is delayed.
(C) Live-fire exercise requirement.--At a minimum, 
kinetic and nonkinetic systems deemed to be mission 
essential by the Secretary to the capabilities of 
Golden Dome shall be tested on a semiannual basis in a 
live-fire exercise, starting after the virtual test 
described in clause (i).
(D) Participants.--
(i) Required participation.--Each exercise 
under this paragraph shall include the 
following participants:
(I) The Program Manager.
(II) A representative from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
(III) A representative from each of 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and 
Space Force.
(IV) A representative from the 
National Security Agency.
(V) Representative from North 
American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) or United States Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM).
(VI) A representative from Indo-
Pacific Command.
(ii) Invited for participation.--For each 
exercise under this paragraph, the Program 
Manager shall invite the participation of the 
following:
(I) A representative from the Coast 
Guard.
(II) A representative from the 
Federal Aviation Administration.
(III) A representative from the 
congressional defense committees.
(E) Waivers.--
(i) In general.--Pursuant to a request 
submitted to the Secretary under clause (ii), 
the Secretary may waive the requirement in 
subparagraph (B) for an individual system.
(ii) Requests.--The Program Manager may 
submit to the Secretary a request for a waiver 
of the requirement in subparagraph (B) for an 
individual system.
(iii) Congressional notification.--Not 
later than 14 days after granting a waiver 
under clause (i), the Secretary shall provide 
the congressional defense committees an in-
person briefing of the waiver with a detailed 
explanation of the reasons for the decision of 
the Secretary to grant the waiver.
(F) Annual reports.--Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less 
frequently than once each year thereafter, the 
Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of such 
government agencies as the Secretary considers 
relevant, submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report detailing key regulations 
preventing rapid, iterative testing of systems vital to 
Golden Dome.
(b) Accelerating Development of Non-Kinetic Capabilities.--The 
Secretary shall use all authorities available to the Secretary to 
accelerate development of non-kinetic capabilities to negate missile or 
unmanned system threats prior to launch or after launch. Such 
capabilities may include cyber (offense and defense), supply chain 
interdiction, artificial intelligence-driven battle management, 
electromagnetic spectrum, directed energy weapons, and high-power 
microwave defense options capable of defeating large-scale missile or 
unmanned system attacks.
(c) Accelerating Development of Information Fusion Platform Using 
Artificial Intelligence To Detect Threats.--The Secretary shall use all 
authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate development and 
rapid prototyping of high technology readiness level (TRL) capabilities 
in order to acquire and field an information fusion, software-centric 
platform that utilizes machine learning and artificial intelligence 
technologies capable of delivering air, land, space, and maritime 
domain awareness and early warning capabilities for homeland defense 
across disparate novel and legacy systems. Such platform shall employ a 
common data layer that can support the rapid integration of new sensors 
and effectors across all tiers of the integrated air and missile 
defense system.
(d) Acceleration of Development for Proliferated Warfighter Space 
Architecture of Space Development Agency.--
(1) In general.--In support of Golden Dome, the Director of 
the Space Development Agency shall use all authorities 
available to the Director to accelerate development and rapid 
fielding of satellites and associated systems for tranches 3, 
4, and 5 of the proliferated warfighter space architecture of 
the Agency.
(2) Status of space development agency.--The Space 
Development Agency shall remain an independent element of the 
United States Space Force, and shall be exempt from the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System requirements 
process.
(e) Accelerating Space Sensor Layer for Golden Dome.--The Secretary 
of Defense shall, acting through the Program Manager and in 
coordination with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the 
Director of the Space Development Agency, use all the authorities 
available to the Secretary to accelerate the deployment of the 
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor by procuring, not later 
than December 1, 2025, at least 40 space vehicles with Hypersonic and 
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor payloads.
(f) Requirement for Next Generation Interceptor Fielding and Silo 
Construction.--The Program Manager shall, with support from the Missile 
Defense Agency, take such actions as may be necessary to expand Next 
Generation Interceptor production and silo construction at Fort Greely, 
Alaska, to field up to 80 interceptors at Fort Greely for defense of 
the United States. Interceptor testing and initial fielding shall be 
completed not later than January 1, 2028.
(g) Requirement for Combatant Commands To Account for Missile 
Defense Interceptors and Sensor Requirements in Their Annual 
Requests.--For each fiscal year beginning after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, each commander of a combatant command shall 
include the missile defense interceptor requirements, terrestrial-based 
sensor requirements, space-based sensor requirements, and counter-
unmanned system requirements of the combatant command of the commander 
in the supporting information for the Department of Defense submitted 
along with the budget of the President to Congress for such fiscal year 
pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.
(h) Accelerating Development of Glide Phase Interceptor.--
(1) Use of authorities to accelerate development.--The 
Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the 
Secretary to accelerate development of the Glide Phase 
Interceptor to defend against hypersonic threats to the United 
States homeland.
(2) Report on potential for parallel development.--Not 
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the 
Secretary and the Program Manager a report on the potential for 
parallel development of capabilities, revised program schedule, 
and the risk associated with pursuing only one alternative for 
the Glide Phase Interceptor.
(i) Accelerating Production and Fielding of Ground Mobile 
Interceptors.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available 
to the Program Manager to accelerate the production and fielding of 
ground mobile interceptors and radars for forward deployment and 
homeland defense as the Secretary and President consider appropriate.
(j) Accelerating Development of Resilient Positioning, Navigation, 
and Timing for Missile Defense Systems.--The Program Manager shall use 
all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate 
development and fielding of resilient positioning, navigation, and 
timing (PNT) solutions that can operate effectively in ground 
positioning system (GPS)-denied environments. Such solutions may 
include the following:
(1) Quantum-enhanced inertial navigation and atomic clock 
technologies to maintain continuous positioning, navigation, 
and timing functionality in ground positioning system-degraded 
or denied scenarios.
(2) Enhanced terrestrial-based navigation systems for 
greater assured positioning in ground positioning system-
contested environments.
(3) Robust data fusion techniques that integrate multiple 
positioning, navigation, and timing sources, such as radar-
based tracking, vision-aided navigation, and low-Earth orbit 
(LEO) signals, to sustain operational effectiveness during 
electronic warfare (EW) attacks or cyber intrusions.
(4) Commercially available, field-proven alternative 
positioning, navigation, and timing solutions that leverage 
advanced sensor fusion, artificial intelligence-driven error 
correction, and resilient positioning, navigation, and timing 
processing to provide assured navigation for mobile and fixed 
defense platforms, including those currently deployed in 
hypersonic tracking and integrated air and missile defense 
applications.
(k) Accelerating Development of Autonomous Agents To Defend Against 
Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Systems.--The Program Manager shall use 
all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate 
development of autonomous agents to cost-effectively defend the United 
States homeland and forward-deployed armed forces against raids of both 
large cruise missiles and unmanned systems as the Secretary considers 
appropriate.
(l) Accelerating Development and Fielding of Low-Cost Scalable 
Interceptor.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available 
to the Program Manager to accelerate development, test, and fielding of 
a low-cost scalable interceptor that can augment existing production 
lines and provide resiliency to the integrated air and missile defense 
system.
(m) Accelerating Development and Deployment of Space-Based Sensors 
and Interceptors.--
(1) In general.--The Program Manager shall use all 
authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate 
development and deployment of proliferated space-based sensors 
and interceptors capable of ballistic and hypersonic missile 
intercept.
(2) Requirement.--The Program Manager shall ensure that 
development and deployment described in paragraph (1) will--
(A) substantially avail itself of commercial space 
capabilities to reduce cost and time to deploy;
(B) ensure that space-based interceptors and 
ground-based interceptors are fully integrated; and
(C) provide an autonomy layer that supports time-
critical targeting through advancements in information 
technology and mitigates latency issues.
(n) Report To Reduce Cost Savings Per Round for Space-Based 
Interceptors.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit a feasibility study to 
the congressional defense committees outlining multiple methods for 
reducing the cost per round of various space-based interceptors 
including kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities and informed by 
traditional and nontraditional defense technology companies.
(o) Accelerating Modernization of Certain Terrestrial Domain 
Capabilities.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available 
to the Program Manager to accelerate modernization of terrestrial-based 
radar capabilities, including those located at or known as Cobra Dane, 
Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), Upgraded Early 
Warning Radar (UEWR) in Greenland and Cape Cod, Homeland Defense Radar 
and Maui Space Surveillance Complex in Hawaii, and the Alaska Radar 
System.
(p) Modernization of Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack 
Characterization System.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities 
available to the Program Manager to accelerate the modernization and 
digitization of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization 
System (PARCS) to improve detection of intercontinental and sea-
launched missile threats, as well as improve space domain awareness 
capabilities.
(q) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Southern 
Hemisphere-Facing Early Warning Radar System.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall 
submit to Congress a report detailing a site selection and proposed 
program execution plan for a southern hemisphere-facing early warning 
radar system capable of detecting threats from next generation complex 
missile attacks.
(r) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Highly Flexible 
Missile Defense Sites.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to Congress a 
report detailing a plan for a highly flexible, and if necessary mobile, 
terrestrial missile defense network capable of defending critical nodes 
across the United States, including noncontiguous States and 
territories, from likely attack vectors.
(s) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Construction of 
Alaska-Based Aegis Ashore System.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to 
Congress a report detailing a site selection and proposed program 
execution plan for an Alaska-based Aegis Ashore missile defense system.
(t) Completion and Certification of Aegis Ashore System in 
Hawaii.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the 
Program Manager to accelerate completion and certification of an Aegis 
Ashore system based in Hawaii.
(u) Acceleration of Munitions Production for Missile Defense.--The 
Program Manager, working with the Services, shall use all authorities 
available to the Program Manager to accelerate production of critical 
munitions used for missile interception, including Standard Missile 3 
Blocks IB and IIA and PAC-2 and PAC-3 munitions, to ensure their 
availability as an additional sub-layer of the Ground-based Midcourse 
Defense system.
(v) Expedited Military Construction Authority.--
(1) Waiver of regulations.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may waive all legal 
requirements the Secretary, in such Secretary's sole 
discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious 
construction, deployment, testing, and operation of Golden 
Dome, including mission and life support. Any such decision by 
the Secretary shall be effective upon being published in the 
Federal Register.
(2) Federal court review.--
(A) In general.--The district courts of the United 
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all 
causes of action or claims arising from any action 
undertaken, or any decision made, by the Secretary 
pursuant to paragraph (1). A cause of action or claim 
may only be brought alleging a violation of the 
Constitution of the United States. The court shall not 
have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in 
this subparagraph.
(B) Time for filing of complaint.--Any cause or 
claim brought pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be 
filed not later than 60 days after the date of the 
action or decision made by the Secretary. A claim shall 
be barred unless it is filed within the time specified.
(C) Ability to seek appellate review.--An 
interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of 
the district court may be reviewed only upon petition 
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.
(w) Acceleration of Integrated Air and Missile Defense Technology 
Exchanges.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, in collaboration with 
the Secretary of State, look for and exploit opportunities to 
accelerate technology exchanges and transfers of integrated 
missile defense technology, including over the horizon radar 
with trusted allies under current defense agreements and 
arrangements.
(2) Utilizing partner technology.--The Secretary may 
utilize the technology of trusted partners to fill capability 
gaps in Golden Dome that are identified as an urgent need by 
the Program Manager.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
be construed to require the Secretary to exchange technology 
with a foreign country if the President or the Secretary 
determines that doing so would present a grave national 
security threat to the United States.
(x) Development and Securing of Supply Chains Critical to Missile 
Defense.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, in collaboration with 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 
Secretary of the Interior, identify critical shortages and 
vulnerabilities in supply chains critical to missile and 
unmanned system defense component production and shall use all 
authorities available to the Secretaries to develop and secure 
such supply chains.
(2) Advanced data analytics techniques and artificial-
intelligence-driven supply chain mapping tools.--In carrying 
out paragraph (1), the Secretary may leverage advanced data 
analytics techniques and artificial-intelligence-driven supply 
chain mapping tools to assess supply chain vulnerabilities 
related to missile defense and unmanned systems defense 
systems, and other critical technologies.
(y) Authorization for Procurement and Fielding of Dirigibles to 
Support Missile Defense.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Army may procure and 
field such dirigibles, including airships and aerostats, in 
support of the missile defense of the United States homeland 
from ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and unmanned 
systems as the Secretary of Defense determines are necessary to 
the defense of the United States from long-range missile 
threats.
(2) Requirements.--The requirements of paragraph (1) 
cover--
(A) high altitude air defense systems to detect, 
characterize, track, and engage current and emerging 
advanced missile and unmanned system threats; and
(B) both short-term and long-term solutions that 
leverage the innovative dirigible and associated sensor 
development that the Armed Forces, partners of the 
United States, such as Israel, and United States 
industry have undertaken during the 30-year period 
ending on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Consideration.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the 
Secretary of the Army shall consider the use of dirigibles in 
supporting resilient military and emergency communication 
networks in a crisis.
(z) Requirement for Acceleration of Procurement and Fielding of Air 
Moving Target Indicator Systems.--The Program Manager shall use all the 
authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the 
procurement and fielding of air moving target indicator (AMTI) systems 
capable of detecting, tracking, and distinguishing airborne moving 
targets from stationary or cluttered backgrounds.
(aa) Requirement for Accelerated Development and Expansion of 
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System.--The Program Manager shall use 
all the authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the 
development and expansion of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance 
System to detect and track undersea threats like submersibles that 
carry missiles near United States shorelines.

SEC. 5. PROTECTION OF THE SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE.

(a) Finding.--Congress finds that robust competition in the space 
industrial base is essential to assuring United States space 
superiority and the ability of the United States Space Force to provide 
national security mission-critical space warfighting systems and 
operations across the joint force.
(b) Requirement To Maximize Competition.--Chapter 382 of title 10, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
``Sec. 4821. Preservation of space industrial base
``(a) In General.--The head of an agency shall, to the maximum 
extent practicable--
``(1) ensure that space acquisitions employ procedures that 
maximize competition;
``(2) ensure that mission-critical national security space-
based systems that deliver tactical data from low Earth orbit 
within a program and across the Armed Forces shall be procured 
from an open competition allowing for competition between 
multiple vendors, and those vendors' products shall comply with 
interfaces and standards that maximize resilience and 
interoperability with Department of Defense systems; and
``(3) ensure that a contract or other agreement for a 
mission-critical space-based tactical data delivery system 
acquired or contracted as-a-service must require the 
performance, cost, and speed of delivery of the capability to 
be demonstrably competitive to any existing program currently 
delivering that capability which it seeks to replace or 
substitute, and use reasonable best efforts to avoid the as-a-
service contract if the agency head believes in good faith that 
it will result in a major contraction in the space an 
industrial base available to support the Department of Defense.
``(b) Implementation.--The head of an agency shall, to the maximum 
extent possible, ensure that acquisition, contracting, and other 
procurement officials develop guidance--
``(1) to achieve and act in accordance with the 
requirements of subsection (a) and with the intent to deliver 
mission-critical space-based tactical data delivery systems in 
accordance with government standards and interfaces; and
``(2) to prevent the major reduction and consolidation of 
the space industrial base.''.

SEC. 6. PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES ASSETS FROM INCURSIONS.

Section 130i of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting 
``(1) Notwithstanding'';
(B) by striking ``any provision of title 18'' and 
inserting ``sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 
119 and 206 of title 18''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
``(2) The Secretary of Defense shall delegate the authority under 
paragraph (1) to take actions described in subsection (b)(1) to the 
commander of a combatant command, the Secretary concerned, or such 
other official of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense 
considers appropriate.'';
(2) in subsection (b)(1)(B), by inserting before the period 
at the end the following: ``, including through the use of 
remote identification broadcast or other means'';
(3) in subsection (e)(4)--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and 
inserting a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as 
subparagraph (D); and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the 
following new subparagraph:
``(C) would support another Federal agency with 
authority to mitigate the threat of unmanned aircraft 
systems or unmanned aircraft in mitigating such 
threats; or'';
(4) by redesignating subsections (g), (h), (i), and (j) as 
subsections (h), (j), (k), and (l), respectively;
(5) by inserting after subsection (f) the following new 
subsection:
``(g) Exemption From Disclosure.--Information pertaining to the 
technology, procedures, and protocols used to carry out this section, 
including any regulations or guidance issued to carry out this section, 
shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5 and 
any State or local law requiring the disclosure of information.'';
(6) by inserting after subsection (h), as redesignated by 
paragraph (4), the following new subsection:
``(i) Applicability of Other Laws to Activities Related to the 
Mitigation of Threats From Unmanned Aircraft Systems or Unmanned 
Aircraft.--Sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of 
title 18, and section 46502 of title 49, may not be construed to apply 
to activities of the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard, whether 
under this section or any other provision of law, that--
``(1) are conducted outside the United States; and
``(2) are related to the mitigation of threats from 
unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft.'';
(7) in subsection (k), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``subsection (j)(3)(C)'' 
and inserting ``subsection (l)(3)(C)''; and
(ii) by striking ``December 31, 2026'' and 
inserting ``December 31, 2030''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) by striking ``180 days'' and inserting 
``one year''; and
(ii) by striking ``November 15, 2026'' and 
inserting ``November 15, 2030''; and
(8) in subsection (l), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs,'' after ``the Committee on the 
Judiciary,''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting 
``the Committee on Homeland Security,'' after 
``the Committee on the Judiciary,'';
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as 
paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively;
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following 
new paragraph (3):
``(3) The term `combatant command' has the meaning given 
that term in section 161 of this title.''; and
(D) in paragraph (4), as redesignated by 
subparagraph (B)--
(i) in clause (viii), by striking ``; or'' 
and inserting a semicolon;
(ii) in clause (ix), by striking the period 
at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following 
new clauses:
``(x) protection of the buildings, grounds, 
and property to which the public are not 
permitted regular, unrestricted access and that 
are under the jurisdiction, custody, or control 
of the Department of Defense and the persons on 
that property pursuant to section 2672 of this 
title;
``(xi) assistance to Federal, State, or 
local officials in responding to incidents 
involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or 
chemical weapons, high-yield explosives, or 
related materials or technologies, including 
pursuant to section 282 of this title or the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et 
seq);
``(xii) activities permitted by section 
2692(b) of this title; or
``(xiii) emergency response that is limited 
to a specified timeframe and location.''.

SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act 
$23,023,100,000 for fiscal year 2026, of which--
(1) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to SM-3 Block 1B;
(2) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to SM-3 Block IIA;
(3) $1,000,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to development, testing, and additional 
procurement of ground mobile interceptors and radars;
(4) $1,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to PAC-2 and PAC-3 Munitions and MM-104 
Patriot batteries;
(5) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to Alaska-based Aegis Ashore station 
construction;
(6) $460,000,000 shall be available for Next Generation 
Interceptor production and expansion of missile interceptor 
fields available at Fort Greely, Alaska, to up to 80 units with 
the Next Generation Interceptor;
(7) $260,000,000 shall be available for construction of an 
additional Next Generation Interceptor site in the continental 
United States as the Secretary deems necessary;
(8) $250,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to completion and certification of Hawaii 
Aegis Ashore system and upgrades to the Maui Space Surveillance 
Complex;
(9) $100,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to Space Development Agency satellite 
sensors;
(10) $750,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to modernization of terrestrial-based domain 
awareness radars;
(11) $2,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to research and development relating to non-
kinetic missile defense capabilities across the military 
departments;
(12) $ 5,900,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to research and development and deployment of 
space-based missile defense and sensor networks;
(13) $3,100,000,000 shall be available for the requirements 
of this Act relating to procurement of Hypersonic and Ballistic 
Tracking Space Sensor space vehicles;
(14) $63,100,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to Missile Defense Complex (MDC) and Fire 
Team Readiness Facility (FTRF);
(15) $50,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to procurement and fielding of dirigibles;
(16) $750,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to innovation and modernization of all domain 
sensor capabilities, of which $76,000,000 shall be available to 
procure and rapidly field a high technology readiness level 
machine learning and artificial intelligence information and 
data fusion platform;
(17) $450,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to counter-hypersonic programs for advanced 
glide phase interceptors;
(18) $1,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to research, development, and deployment of 
positioning, navigation, and timing systems;
(19) $ 90,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to procurement and fielding of the Integrated 
Undersea Sensor System;
(20) $2,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
this Act relating to procurement and fielding of air moving 
target indicator systems;
(21) $100,000,000 shall be available for requirements 
relating to integrated command and control software and 
technology architecture;
(22) $75,000,000 shall be available for the development and 
fielding of a new low-cost, highly scalable ground interceptor; 
and
(23) $125,000,000 shall be available for the development 
and fielding of autonomous agents to defend against cruise 
missile threats and unmanned systems.
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