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Bills/119th Congress · House

H.R. 5274

Introduced

Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act

Sponsor
DWilliam R. Keating· Massachusetts
Introduced
September 10, 2025
Policy area
International Affairs
Latest action
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.September 10, 2025
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5274 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 5274

To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States 
and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

September 10, 2025

Mr. Keating (for himself, Ms. Malliotakis, and Mr. Goldman of New York) 
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for 
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States 
and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Western Balkans 
Democracy and Prosperity Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
Sec. 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans.
Sec. 6. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives.
Sec. 7. Promoting cross-cultural and educational engagement.
Sec. 8. Peace Corps in the Western Balkans.
Sec. 9. Young Balkan Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 10. Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western 
Balkans.
Sec. 11. Sense of Congress regarding an interim agreement.
Sec. 12. Reports on Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and 
campaigns in the Western Balkans.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic 
of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the 
Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in 
the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability, 
and prosperity of that continent.
(2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the 
Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for 
democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens 
and residents of those seven countries.
(3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and 
the seven countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable 
and sustainable economic growth and development in the region.
(4) The reforms and integration with the European Union 
pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to 
significant democratic and economic progress in the region.
(5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and 
unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in 
neighboring European Union countries.
(6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting 
demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in 
population decline in all seven countries.
(7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms 
could help enable investment and employment opportunities in 
the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide 
powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging 
broader participation in a political process that increases 
trade and prosperity for all.
(8) Existing regional economic efforts, such as the Common 
Regional Market, the Berlin Process, and the Open Balkan 
Initiative, could have the potential to improve the economic 
conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion 
and transparency.
(9) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign 
Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and 
facilitating opportunities for United States trade and 
investment.
(10) Corruption, including among key political leaders, 
continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of 
the greatest impediments to further economic and political 
development in the region.
(11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans 
undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions, 
including the integrity of its elections.
(12) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on 
information and communication technology infrastructure 
increases risks to the functioning of government and the 
delivery of public services.
(13) United States Cyber Command, the Department of State, 
and other Federal agencies play a critical role in defending 
the national security interests of the United States, including 
by deploying cyber hunt forward teams at the request of partner 
nations to reinforce their cyber defenses.
(14) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and 
ICT infrastructure is a national security priority for the 
United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs 
across the Federal Government that support cybersecurity.
(15) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political 
environments marked by autocratic control or partisan conflict.
(16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and 
natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their 
economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits 
their aspirations for European integration.
(17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on 
Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the 
national interest of the United States.
(18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans 
could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition, 
democracy, and economic integration with Europe.
(19) In March 2022, President Biden launched the European 
Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic 
resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human 
rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia's war 
of aggression.
(20) The parliamentary and local elections held in Serbia 
on December 17, 2023, and their immediate aftermath are cause 
for deep concern about the State of Serbia's democracy, 
including due to the final report of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, which--
(A) found ``unjust conditions'' for the election;
(B) found ``numerous procedural deficiencies, 
including inconsistent application of safeguards during 
voting and counting, frequent instances of 
overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, and 
numerous instances of group voting''; and
(C) asserted that ``voting must be repeated'' in 
certain polling stations.
(21) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe also noted that Serbian officials accused primarily 
peaceful protestors, opposition parties, and civil society of 
``attempting to destabilize the government'', a concerning 
allegation that threatens the safety of important elements of 
Serbian society.
(22) Democratic countries whose values are in alignment 
with the United States make for stronger and more durable 
partnerships.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is a sense of Congress that the United States should--
(1) encourage increased trade and investment between the 
United States and allies and partners in the Western Balkans;
(2) expand United States assistance to regional integration 
efforts in the Western Balkans;
(3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in 
the Western Balkans, especially enterprises owned by and 
employing women and youth;
(4) work with allies and partners committed to improving 
the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic 
and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the 
Western Balkans;
(5) increase United States trade and investment with the 
Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries' 
efforts--
(A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy 
sources and fossil fuels;
(B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency, 
and conservation; and
(C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and 
more reliable sources of energy, including renewables, 
as appropriate;
(6) continue to assist in the development, within the 
Western Balkans, of--
(A) strong civil societies;
(B) public-private partnerships;
(C) independent media;
(D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive 
governance, including equal representation for women 
and youth;
(E) political stability; and
(F) modern, free-market based economies;
(7) support the expeditious accession of those Western 
Balkans countries that are not already members to the European 
Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred 
to in this section as ``NATO'') for countries that desire and 
are eligible for such membership;
(8) support--
(A) maintaining the full European Union Force 
(EUFOR) mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in 
the national security interests of the United States;
(B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to 
review their mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to ensure they are playing a proactive role 
in establishing a safe and secure environment, 
particularly in the realm of defense;
(C) working within NATO to encourage contingency 
planning for an international military force to 
maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, especially if Russia blocks 
reauthorization of the mission in the United Nations; 
and
(D) a strengthened NATO headquarters in Sarajevo;
(9) continue to support the European Union membership 
aspirations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia by supporting meeting the 
benchmarks required for their accession;
(10) continue to support the overarching mission of the 
Berlin Process and locally-driven initiatives that are 
inclusive of all Western Balkans countries and remains aligned 
with the objectives and standards laid out by the European 
Union as requirements for accession to the European Union;
(11) continue to support the cultural heritage, and 
recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans;
(12) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United 
Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions 
designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align 
efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment 
to upholding democratic values;
(13) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO 
member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts focused 
on regional integration and cooperation, including through the 
Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on May 2, 2003;
(14) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence 
campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive activities 
targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with 
government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists, 
civil society organizations, and industry leaders;
(15) develop a series of cyber resilience standards, 
consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness 
Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with 
partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on 
cybersecurity and ICT infrastructure;
(16) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States 
commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for 
international law as the sole path forward for the countries of 
the Western Balkans; and
(17) prioritize partnerships and programming with Western 
Balkan countries that demonstrate commitment toward 
strengthening their democracies and show respect for human 
rights.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives.
(2) ICT.--The term ``ICT'' means information and 
communication technology.
(3) Western balkans.--The term ``Western Balkans'' means 
the region comprised of the following countries:
(A) The Republic of Albania.
(B) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(C) The Republic of Croatia.
(D) The Republic of Kosovo.
(E) Montenegro.
(F) The Republic of North Macedonia.
(G) The Republic of Serbia.
(4) Western balkans country.--The term ``Western Balkans 
country'' means any country listed in subparagraphs (A) through 
(G) of paragraph (3).

SEC. 5. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE WESTERN BALKANS.

(a) In General.--Each person listed or designated for the 
imposition of sanctions under an executive order described in 
subsection (c) as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain 
so designated, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e).
(b) Continuation of Sanctions Authorities.--Each authority to 
impose sanctions provided for under an executive order described in 
subsection (c) shall remain in effect.
(c) Executive Orders Specified.--The executive orders specified in 
this subsection are--
(1) Executive Order 13219, as amended by Executive Order 
13304 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of 
persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the 
Western Balkans); and
(2) Executive Order 14033 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
blocking property and suspending entry into the United States 
of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing situation 
in the Western Balkans), as in effect on such date of 
enactment.
(d) Termination of Sanctions.--The President may terminate the 
application of a sanction described in subsection (a) with respect to a 
person if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that such person--
(1) has not engaged in the activity that was the basis for 
such sanctions, if applicable, during the two-year period 
immediately preceding such termination date; or
(2) otherwise no longer meets the criteria that was the 
basis for such sanctions.
(e) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive the application of 
sanctions under this section for renewable periods not to 
exceed 180 days if the President--
(A) determines that such a waiver is in the 
national security interests of the United States; and
(B) not less than 15 days before the granting of 
the waiver, submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees a notice of and justification for the 
waiver.
(2) Form.--The waiver described in paragraph (1) may be 
transmitted in classified form.
(f) Exceptions.--
(1) Humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under this Act 
shall not apply to--
(A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction 
for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, 
medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or 
for humanitarian purposes; or
(B) transactions that are necessary for, or related 
to, the activities described in subparagraph (A).
(2) Compliance with international obligations and law 
enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this Act shall not 
apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling such 
alien is necessary--
(A) to comply with United States obligations 
under--
(i) the Agreement between the United 
Nations and the United States of America 
regarding the Headquarters of the United 
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, 
and entered into force November 21, 1947;
(ii) the Convention on Consular Relations, 
done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into 
force March 19, 1967; or
(iii) any other international agreement; or
(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity 
in the United States.
(3) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under 
this Act shall not apply to--
(A) any activity subject to the reporting 
requirements under title V of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.); or
(B) any authorized intelligence activities of the 
United States.
(4) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The requirement to block and 
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests 
in property under this Act shall not include the 
authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the 
importation of goods.
(B) Defined term.--In this paragraph, the term 
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade 
substance, material, supply or manufactured product, 
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding 
technical data.
(g) Rulemaking.--The President is authorized to promulgate such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this section (which may include regulatory exceptions), including 
under section 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1704).
(h) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have force or effect 
beginning on the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.

SEC. 6. DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY INITIATIVES.

(a) Anti-Corruption Initiative.--The Secretary of State, through 
ongoing and new programs, shall develop an initiative that--
(1) seeks to expand technical assistance in each Western 
Balkans country, taking into account local conditions and 
contingent on the agreement of the host country government to 
develop new national anti-corruption strategies;
(2) seeks to share best practices with, and provide 
training to, civilian law enforcement agencies and judicial 
institutions, and other relevant administrative bodies, of the 
Western Balkans countries, to improve the efficiency, 
transparency, and accountability of such agencies and 
institutions;
(3) strengthens existing national anti-corruption 
strategies--
(A) to combat political corruption, particularly in 
the judiciary, independent election oversight bodies, 
and public procurement processes; and
(B) to strengthen regulatory and legislative 
oversight of critical governance areas, such as freedom 
of information and public procurement, including by 
strengthening cyber defenses and ICT infrastructure 
networks;
(4) includes the Western Balkans countries in the European 
Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State, or 
any equivalent successor initiative, and considers the Western 
Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for such 
initiative; and
(5) seeks to promote the important role of an independent 
media in countering corruption through engagements with 
governments of Western Balkan countries and providing training 
opportunities for journalists on investigative reporting.
(b) Prioritizing Cyber Resilience, Regional Trade, and Economic 
Competitiveness.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) promoting stronger economic, civic, and 
political relationships among Western Balkans countries 
will enable countries to better utilize existing 
resources and maximize their economic security and 
democratic resilience by reinforcing cyber defenses and 
increasing trade in goods and services among other 
countries in the region; and
(B) United States investments in and assistance 
toward creating a more integrated region ensures 
political stability and security for the region.
(2) 5-year strategy for economic development and democratic 
resilience in western balkans.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, in coordination with the heads of 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a regional economic 
development and democratic resilience strategy for the Western 
Balkans that complements the efforts of the European Union, 
European nations, and other multilateral financing 
institutions--
(A) to consider the full set of tools and resources 
available from the relevant agencies;
(B) to include efforts to ensure coordination with 
multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the 
European Union, the World Bank, and other relevant 
assistance frameworks;
(C) to include an initial public assessment of--
(i) economic opportunities for which United 
States businesses, or those of other like-
minded partner countries, would be competitive;
(ii) legal, economic, governance, 
infrastructural, or other barriers limiting 
United States trade and investment in the 
Western Balkans;
(iii) the effectiveness of all existing 
regional cooperation initiatives, such as the 
Open Balkan initiative and the Western Balkans 
Common Regional Market; and
(iv) ways to increase United States trade 
and investment within the Western Balkans;
(D) to develop human and institutional capacity and 
infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies, 
including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, 
small and medium-sized enterprise development, health, 
and cybersecurity;
(E) to assist with the development and 
implementation of regional and international trade 
agreements;
(F) to support women-owned enterprises;
(G) to promote government and civil society 
policies and programs that combat corruption and 
encourage transparency (including by supporting 
independent media by promoting the safety and security 
of journalists), free and fair competition, sound 
governance, judicial reform, environmental stewardship, 
and business environments conducive to sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth; and
(H) to include a public diplomacy strategy that 
describes the actions that will be taken by relevant 
agencies to increase support for the United States 
relationship by citizens of Western Balkans countries.
(3) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a 
briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that 
describes the progress made towards developing the strategy 
required under paragraph (2).
(c) Regional Trade and Development Initiative.--
(1) Authorization.--The Secretary of State and the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant 
Federal departments and agencies, may coordinate a regional 
trade and development initiative for the region comprised of 
each Western Balkans country and any European Union member 
country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country 
(referred to in this subsection as the ``Western Balkans 
region'') in accordance with this subsection.
(2) Initiative elements.--The initiative authorized under 
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) promote private sector growth and 
competitiveness and increase the capacity of 
businesses, particularly small and medium-sized 
enterprises, in the Western Balkans region;
(B) aim to increase intraregional exports to 
countries in the Balkans and European Union member 
states;
(C) aim to increase United States exports to, and 
investments in, countries in the Balkans;
(D) support startup companies, including companies 
led by youth or women, in the Western Balkans region 
by--
(i) providing training in business skills 
and leadership; and
(ii) providing opportunities to connect to 
sources of capital;
(E) encourage and promote inward and outward trade 
and investment through engagement with the Western 
Balkans diaspora communities in the United States and 
abroad;
(F) provide assistance to the governments and civil 
society organizations of Western Balkans countries to 
develop--
(i) regulations to ensure fair and 
effective investment; and
(ii) screening tools to identify and deter 
malign investments and other coercive economic 
practices;
(G) review existing assistance programming relating 
to the Western Balkans across Federal agencies--
(i) to eliminate duplication; and
(ii) to identify areas of potential 
coordination within the Western Balkans region;
(H) identify areas where application of additional 
resources could expand successful programs to 1 or more 
countries in the Western Balkans region by building on 
the existing experience and program architecture;
(I) compare existing single-country sector analyses 
to determine areas of focus that would benefit from a 
regional approach with respect to the Western Balkans 
region; and
(J) promote intraregional trade throughout the 
Western Balkans region through--
(i) programming, including grants, 
cooperative agreements, and other forms of 
assistance;
(ii) expanding awareness of the 
availability of loans and other financial 
instruments from the United States Government; 
and
(iii) coordinating access to existing trade 
instruments available through allies and 
partners in the Western Balkans region, 
including the European Union and international 
financial institutions.
(3) Support for regional infrastructure projects.--The 
initiative authorized under paragraph (1) should facilitate and 
prioritize support for regional infrastructure projects, 
including--
(A) transportation projects that build roads, 
bridges, railways and other physical infrastructure to 
facilitate travel of goods and people throughout the 
Western Balkans region;
(B) technical support and investments needed to 
meet United States and European Union standards for air 
travel, including screening and information sharing;
(C) the development of telecommunications networks 
with trusted providers;
(D) infrastructure projects that connect Western 
Balkans countries to each other and to countries with 
which they share a border;
(E) the effective analysis of tenders and 
transparent procurement processes;
(F) investment transparency programs that will help 
countries in the Western Balkans analyze gaps and 
establish institutional and regulatory reforms 
necessary--
(i) to create an enabling environment for 
trade and investment; and
(ii) to strengthen protections against 
suspect investments through public procurement 
and privatization and through foreign direct 
investments;
(G) sharing best practices learned from the United 
States and other international partners to ensure that 
institutional and regulatory mechanisms for addressing 
these issues are fair, nonarbitrary, effective, and 
free from corruption;
(H) projects that support regional energy security 
and reduce dependence on Russian energy;
(I) technical assistance and generating private 
investment in projects that promote connectivity and 
energy-sharing in the Western Balkans region;
(J) technical assistance to support regional 
collaboration on environmental protection that includes 
governmental, political, civic, and business 
stakeholders; and
(K) technical assistance to develop financing 
options and help create linkages with potential 
financing institutions and investors.
(4) Requirements.--All programming under the initiative 
authorized under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) be open to the participation of Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, 
and Serbia;
(B) be consistent with European Union accession 
requirements;
(C) be focused on retaining talent within the 
Western Balkans;
(D) promote government policies in Western Balkans 
countries that encourage free and fair competition, 
sound governance, environmental protection, and 
business environments that are conducive to sustainable 
and inclusive economic growth; and
(E) include a public diplomacy strategy to inform 
local and regional audiences in the Western Balkans 
region about the initiative, including specific 
programs and projects.
(d) United States International Development Finance Corporation.--
(1) Appointments.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, subject to the availability of 
appropriations, the Chief Executive Officer of the United 
States International Development Finance Corporation, in 
collaboration with the Secretary of State, should consider 
including a regional office with responsibilities for the 
Western Balkans within the Corporation's plans to open new 
regional offices.
(2) Joint report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of 
the United States International Development Finance Corporation 
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall submit a joint report to the 
appropriate congressional committees that includes--
(A) an assessment of the benefits of providing 
sovereign loan guarantees to countries in the Western 
Balkans to support infrastructure and energy 
diversification projects;
(B) an outline of additional resources, such as 
tools, funding, and personnel, which may be required to 
offer sovereign loan guarantees in the Western Balkans; 
and
(C) an assessment of how the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation can 
deploy its insurance products in support of bonds or 
other instruments issued to raise capital through 
United States financial markets in the Western Balkans.

SEC. 7. PROMOTING CROSS-CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL ENGAGEMENT.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) promoting partnerships between United States 
universities and universities in the Western Balkans, 
particularly universities in traditionally under-served 
communities, advances United States foreign policy goals and 
requires a whole-of-government approach, including the 
utilization of public-private partnerships;
(2) such university partnerships would provide 
opportunities for exchanging academic ideas, technical 
expertise, research, and cultural understanding for the benefit 
of the United States; and
(3) the seven countries in the Western Balkans meet the 
requirements under section 105(c)(4) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151c(c)(4)).
(b) University Partnerships.--The President, working through the 
Secretary of State, is authorized to provide assistance, consistent 
with section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151c), to promote the establishment of partnerships between United 
States universities and universities in the Western Balkans, 
including--
(1) supporting research and analysis on foreign policy, 
cyber resilience, and disinformation;
(2) working with partner governments to reform policies, 
improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers and 
students, including English language teaching, and to provide 
quality, inclusive learning materials;
(3) encouraging knowledge exchanges to help provide 
individuals, particularly at-risk youth, women, people with 
disabilities, and other vulnerable, marginalized, or 
underserved communities, with relevant education, training, and 
skills for meaningful employment;
(4) promoting teaching and research exchanges between 
institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in 
the United States; and
(5) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded 
institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the 
larger European continent.

SEC. 8. PEACE CORPS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Peace 
Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship, in part 
by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for 
trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect 
the people of the United States with the people of the Western Balkans.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps should submit a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes an 
analysis of current opportunities for Peace Corps expansion in the 
Western Balkans region.

SEC. 9. YOUNG BALKAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that regular 
people-to-people exchange programs that bring religious leaders, 
journalists, civil society members, politicians, and other individuals 
from the Western Balkans to the United States will strengthen existing 
relationships and advance United States interests and shared values in 
the Western Balkans region.
(b) BOLD Leadership Program for Young Balkans Leaders.--
(1) Sense of congress.--The Department of State, through 
BOLD, a leadership program for young leaders in certain Western 
Balkans countries, plays an important role to develop young 
leaders in improving civic engagement and economic development 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro.
(2) Expansion.--BOLD should be expanded, subject to the 
availability of appropriations, to the entire Western Balkans 
region.
(c) Authorization.--The Secretary of State should further develop 
and implement BOLD, which shall hereafter be known as the ``Young 
Balkan Leaders Initiative'', to promote educational and professional 
development for young adult leaders and professionals in the Western 
Balkans who have demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued 
development of the Western Balkans region.
(d) Conduct of Initiative.--The goals of the Young Balkan Leaders 
Initiative shall be--
(1) to further build the capacity of young Balkan leaders 
in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and information 
technology, cybersecurity and digitization, agriculture, civic 
engagement, and public administration;
(2) to support young Balkan leaders by offering 
professional development, training, and networking 
opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, 
innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, 
entrepreneurship, good governance, public administration, and 
journalism;
(3) to support young political, parliamentary, and civic 
Balkan leaders in collaboration on regional initiatives related 
to good governance, environmental protection, government 
ethics, and minority inclusion;
(4) to provide increased economic and technical assistance 
to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and 
strengthen ties between businesses, investors, and 
entrepreneurs in the United States and in Western Balkans 
countries;
(5) to tailor such assistance to advance the particular 
objectives of each United States mission in the Western Balkans 
within the framework outlined in this subsection; and
(6) to secure funding for such assistance from existing 
funds available to each United States Mission in the Western 
Balkans.
(e) Fellowships.--Under the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the 
Secretary of State shall award fellowships to young leaders from the 
Western Balkans who--
(1) are between 18 and 35 years of age;
(2) have demonstrated strong capabilities in 
entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership;
(3) have had a positive impact in their communities, 
organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-
regional and multiethnic cooperation; and
(4) represent a cross-section of geographic, gender, 
political, and cultural diversity.
(f) Public Engagement and Leadership Center.--Under the Young 
Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State shall take advantage 
of existing and future public diplomacy facilities (commonly known as 
``American Spaces'') to hire staff and develop programming for the 
establishment of a flagship public engagement and leadership center in 
the Western Balkans that seeks--
(1) to counter disinformation and malign influence;
(2) to promote cross-cultural engagement;
(3) to provide training for young leaders from Western 
Balkans countries described in subsection (e);
(4) to harmonize the efforts of existing venues throughout 
Western Balkans countries established by the Office of American 
Spaces; and
(5) to annually bring together participants from the Young 
Balkans Leaders Initiative to provide platforms for regional 
networking.
(g) Briefing on Certain Exchange Programs.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide 
a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that 
describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western 
Balkans region.
(2) Elements.--The briefing required under paragraph (1) 
shall--
(A) assess the factors constraining the number and 
frequency of participants from Western Balkans 
countries in the International Visitor Leadership 
Program of the Department of State;
(B) identify the resources that are necessary to 
address the factors described in subparagraph (A); and
(C) describe a strategy for connecting alumni and 
participants of professional development exchange 
programs of the Department of State in the Western 
Balkans with alumni and participants from other 
countries in Europe, to enhance inter-region and intra-
region people-to-people ties.

SEC. 10. SUPPORTING CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER RESILIENCE IN THE WESTERN 
BALKANS.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber 
resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans 
countries will strengthen the region's ability to defend itself 
from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by 
nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign governments, 
that seek to influence the region;
(2) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to 
manipulation can increase opportunities for--
(A) the compromise of cyber infrastructure, 
including data networks, electronic infrastructure, and 
software systems; and
(B) the use of online information operations by 
adversaries and malign actors to undermine United 
States allies and interests; and
(3) it is in the national security interest of the United 
States to support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of 
Western Balkans countries.
(b) Interagency Report on Cybersecurity and the Digital Information 
Environment in Western Balkans Countries.--Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall 
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
contains--
(1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen 
cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans 
countries;
(2) a review of the information environment in each Western 
Balkans country;
(3) a review of existing United States Government cyber and 
digital initiatives that--
(A) counter influence operations and safeguard 
elections and democratic processes in Western Balkans 
countries;
(B) strengthen ICT infrastructure and cybersecurity 
capacity in the Western Balkans;
(C) support democracy and internet freedom in 
Western Balkans countries; and
(D) build cyber capacity of governments who are 
allies or partners of the United States;
(4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing 
between the United States and Western Balkans countries;
(5) an assessment of--
(A) options for the United States to better support 
cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans 
countries through changes to current assistance 
authorities; and
(B) the advantages or limitations, such as funding 
or office space, of posting cyber professionals from 
other Federal departments and agencies to United States 
diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and 
providing relevant training to Foreign Service 
Officers; and
(6) any additional support needed from the United States 
for the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the following 
NATO Allies: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia.

SEC. 11. RELATIONS BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of 
Relations, which was agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia on February 
27, 2023, with the facilitation of the European Union, is a 
positive step forward in advancing normalization between the 
two countries;
(2) Serbia and Kosovo should seek to make immediate 
progress on the Implementation Annex to the agreement referred 
to in paragraph (1);
(3) once sufficient progress has been made on the 
Implementation Annex, the United States should consider 
advancing initiatives to strengthen bilateral relations with 
both countries, which could include--
(A) establishing bilateral strategic dialogues with 
Kosovo and Serbia; and
(B) advancing concrete initiatives to deepen trade 
and investment with both countries; and
(4) the United States should continue to support a 
comprehensive final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia based 
on mutual recognition.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
Government that--
(1) it shall not pursue any policy that advocates for land 
swaps, partition, or other forms of redrawing borders along 
ethnic lines in the Western Balkans as a means to arbitrate 
disputes between nation states in the region; and
(2) it should support pluralistic democracies in countries 
in the Western Balkans as a means to prevent a return to the 
ethnic strife that once characterized the region.

SEC. 12. REPORTS ON RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND 
CAMPAIGNS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS.

(a) Reports Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and every two years thereafter, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the 
Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal 
departments or agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees regarding Russian and Chinese 
malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to 
Balkan countries that seek--
(1) to undermine democratic institutions;
(2) to promote political instability; and
(3) to harm the interests of the United States and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states in the 
Western Balkans.
(b) Elements.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall include--
(1) an assessment of the objectives of the Russian 
Federation and the People's Republic of China regarding malign 
influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to 
Western Balkans countries--
(A) to undermine democratic institutions, including 
the planning and execution of democratic elections;
(B) to promote political instability; and
(C) to manipulate the information environment;
(2) the activities and roles of the Department of State and 
other relevant Federal agencies in countering Russian and 
Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns;
(3) a comprehensive list identifying--
(A) each network, entity and individual, to the 
extent such information is available, of Russia, China, 
or any other country with which Russia or China may 
cooperate, that is supporting such Russian or Chinese 
malign influence operations or campaigns, including the 
provision of financial or operational support to 
activities in a Western Balkans country that may limit 
freedom of speech or create barriers of access to 
democratic processes, including exercising the right to 
vote in a free and fair election; and
(B) the role of each such entity in providing such 
support;
(4) the identification of the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures used in Russian or Chinese malign influence 
operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries;
(5) an assessment of the effect of previous Russian or 
Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns that targeted 
alliances and partnerships of the United States Armed Forces in 
the Western Balkans, including the effectiveness of such 
operations and campaigns in achieving the objectives of Russia 
and China, respectively;
(6) the identification of each Western Balkans country with 
respect to which Russia or China has conducted or attempted to 
conduct a malign influence operation or campaign;
(7) an assessment of the capacity and efforts of NATO and 
of each individual Western Balkans country to counter Russian 
or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried 
out with respect to Western Balkans countries;
(8) the efforts by the United States to combat such malign 
influence operations in the Western Balkans, including through 
the Countering Russian Influence Fund and the Countering 
People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund;
(9) an assessment of the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
Defense, determines are likely to be used in future Russian or 
Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out 
with respect to Western Balkans countries; and
(10) recommended authorities or activities that the 
Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies could 
enact to increase the United States Government's capacity to 
counter Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and 
campaigns in Western Balkans countries.
(c) Form.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
<all>

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