H.R. 5912

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5912 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 5912

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government 
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of 
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost 
adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the 
United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

November 4, 2025

Mr. Krishnamoorthi (for himself and Mr. Moylan) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence 
(Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government 
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of 
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost 
adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the 
United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Defending International Security by 
Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics Act'' or ``DISRUPT 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea are each considered--
(A) a foreign adversary (as defined in section 
825(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 322; 46 
U.S.C. 50309 note));
(B) a country of risk (as defined in section 
6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2488; 
42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes of assessing 
counterintelligence risks posed by certain visitors to 
National Laboratories;
(C) a foreign country of concern (as defined in 
section 10612(a) of the Research and Development, 
Competition, and Innovation Act (Public Law 117-167; 
136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221 note));
(D) a covered foreign country (as defined in 
section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 
U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition 
on operation, procurement, and contracting relating to 
foreign-made light detection and ranging technology; 
and
(E) a covered foreign country (as defined in 
section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 11781; 135 Stat. 2086; 
10 U.S.C. 421 note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy 
and plan to implement certain defense intelligence 
reforms.
(2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Community Annual 
Threat Assessment, the United States faces an increasingly 
contested and dangerous global landscape as the four 
adversaries named in paragraph (1) deepen cooperation in a 
manner that--
(A) reinforces threats posed by each such adversary 
individually; and
(B) poses new challenges to the strength and power 
of the United States globally.
(3) Much of the cooperation referred to in paragraph (2) is 
occurring bilaterally, as the People's Republic of China, the 
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic, 
economic, and military ties in accordance with bilateral 
agreements, which include--
(A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11, 
1961;
(B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
the People's Republic of China, issued on March 27, 
2021;
(C) the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation 
and the People's Republic of China on International 
Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable 
Development, issued on February 4, 2022;
(D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership between the Russian Federation and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed at 
Pyongyang June 18, 2024;
(E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership, signed at Moscow January 17, 
2025; and
(F) traditional relations of friendship and 
cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(4) The most concerning forms of such cooperation with 
respect to the interests of the United States occur bilaterally 
in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples include the 
following:
(A) Transfer and sharing of weapons and 
munitions.--Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
has supplied the Russian Federation with drones and 
ballistic missiles, and the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea has provided artillery ammunition and 
ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Russian Federation 
has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with 
Su-35 fighter jets and air defense assistance.
(B) Transfer and sharing of dual-use technologies 
and capabilities.--Dual-use goods supplied by the 
People's Republic of China have enabled the Russian 
Federation to continue defense production in the face 
of wide-ranging sanctions and export controls intended 
to prevent the Russian Federation from accessing the 
necessary components to fuel its defense industry. In 
turn, reporting indicates that the Russian Federation 
has provided technical expertise on satellite 
technology to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
and is working closely with the People's Republic of 
China on air defense and submarine technology.
(C) Joint military activities and exercises.--The 
military forces of the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea are actively participating in the Russian 
Federation's invasion of Ukraine, and joint military 
exercises between the People's Republic of China and 
the Russian Federation are expanding in scope, scale, 
and geographic reach, including in close proximity to 
territory of the United States.
(D) Coordination.--Coordination on disinformation 
and cyber operations, including coordinated messaging 
aimed at denigrating and isolating the United States 
internationally.
(5) Adversaries of the United States are also cooperating 
in a manner that may circumvent United States and multilateral 
economic tools. Examples include the following:
(A) The continued purchase by the People's Republic 
of China of oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran 
despite sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the United 
States on oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(B) The veto by the Russian Federation of, and 
abstention by the People's Republic of China in a vote 
on, a United Nations Security Council resolution 
relating to monitoring United Nations Security Council-
levied sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea.
(6) Adversaries of the United States are cooperating 
multilaterally in international institutions such as the United 
Nations and through expanded multilateral groupings, such as 
the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa group (commonly 
known as ``BRICS''), to isolate and erode the influence of the 
United States.
(7) Such increased cooperation and alignment among the 
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a significant threat 
to United States interests and national security.
(8) Such increasing alignment--
(A) allows each such adversary to modernize its 
military more quickly than previously anticipated;
(B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in 
capabilities through the sharing among such adversaries 
of critical military technologies, which could erode 
the technological edge of the United States Armed 
Forces;
(C) presents increasing challenges to strategies of 
isolation or containment against such individual 
adversaries, since the People's Republic of China, the 
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now provide 
critical lifelines to each other;
(D) threatens the effectiveness of United States 
economic tools, as such adversaries cooperate to evade 
United States sanctions and export controls and seek to 
establish alternative payment mechanisms that do not 
require transactions in United States dollars; and
(E) increases the chances of United States conflict 
or tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in 
another, thereby posing a greater risk that the United 
States will have to contend with simultaneous threats 
from such adversaries in one or more theaters.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous aspects of 
cooperation between and among the People's Republic of China, 
the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by using the 
threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing such 
cooperation to light, and sharing information with United 
States allies and partners who may--
(A) share the concerns and objectives of the United 
States; and
(B) have influence over such adversaries;
(2) to constrain such grouping from expanding its footprint 
or capabilities across the world; and
(3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that the 
United States could face simultaneous challenges or conflict 
with multiple such adversaries in multiple theaters, including 
by bolstering deterrence across all priority theaters.

SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.

(a) Task Forces on Adversary Alignment.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the 
Secretary of Commerce shall each--
(A) establish a task force on adversary alignment; 
and
(B) designate a point of contact on adversary 
alignment, who shall serve as the head of the task 
force for the applicable department, office, or agency.
(2) Requirements.--Each task force established pursuant to 
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) comprise--
(i) subject matter experts covering each 
of--
(I) the People's Republic of China;
(II) the Russian Federation;
(III) the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
and
(IV) the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea;
(ii) representatives covering all core 
functions of the department, office, or agency 
of the Secretary or Director establishing the 
task force; and
(iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and 
senior management;
(B) ensure that the task force members have the 
requisite security clearances and access to critical 
compartmented information streams necessary to assess 
and understand the full scope of adversary cooperation, 
including how events in one theater might trigger 
actions in another; and
(C) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, submit to the Secretary or 
Director who established the task force, and to the 
appropriate committees of Congress, a report--
(i) evaluating the impact of adversary 
alignment on the relevant operations carried 
out by the individual department, office, or 
agency of the task force; and
(ii) putting forth recommendations for such 
organizational changes as the task force 
considers necessary to ensure the department, 
office, or agency of the task force is well 
positioned to routinely evaluate and respond to 
the rapidly evolving nature of adversary 
cooperation and the attendant risks.
(3) Quarterly interagency meeting.--Not less frequently 
than quarterly, the heads of the task forces established under 
this section shall meet to discuss findings, problems, and next 
steps with respect to adversary alignment.
(b) Report on Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral 
Cooperation Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among, Adversaries of 
the United States.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal 
agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the 
President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the 
Director considers appropriate, and the appropriate committees 
of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
among adversaries of the United States and the resulting risks 
of such cooperation.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
include the following:
(A) A description of the current nature and extent 
of bilateral or multilateral cooperation among the 
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea across the diplomatic, information, 
military, and economic spheres, and an assessment of 
the advantages that accrue to each adversary from such 
cooperation.
(B) An assessment of the trajectory for cooperation 
among the adversaries described in subparagraph (A) 
during the 5-year period beginning on the date on which 
the report is submitted.
(C) An outline of the risks to the United States 
and allied diplomatic, military, intelligence, and 
economic operations, and broader security interests 
around the world, including the following:
(i) The risk of technology transfers 
dramatically increasing the military 
capabilities of adversaries of the United 
States and the impact on the relative balance 
of United States and allied capabilities as 
compared to that of the adversary.
(ii) The risk posed to the United States by 
efforts made by adversaries to establish 
alternate payment systems, in particular with 
respect to the dominance of the United States 
dollar and the effectiveness of United States 
sanctions and export control tools.
(iii) The risk that an adversary of the 
United States might assist or otherwise enable 
another adversary of the United States in the 
event that one or more adversaries become party 
to a conflict with the United States.
(iv) The risk that adversary cooperation 
poses a growing threat to United States 
intelligence collection efforts.
(D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities and 
tension points within such adversary bilateral or 
multilateral relationships, and an assessment of the 
likely effect of efforts by the United States to 
separate adversaries.
(3) Use of other reporting.--The report required by 
paragraph (1) may be completed using reports submitted by the 
Director of National Intelligence to satisfy other statutory 
requirements.
(4) Form.--The report submitted required by paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in classified form.
(c) Report on Strategic Approach.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of 
National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report outlining the strategic 
approach of the United States to adversary alignment and the 
necessary steps to disrupt, frustrate, constrain, and prepare 
for adversary cooperation during the two-year period beginning 
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
include the following:
(A) A detailed description of the methods and tools 
available to the United States to disrupt the most 
dangerous elements of adversary cooperation, including 
the growing connectivity between the defense industrial 
bases of each adversary.
(B) A timeline for using diplomatic engagement, 
intelligence diplomacy, security cooperation, and 
foreign assistance, as appropriate--
(i) to educate allies and partners about 
the increasing risk of adversary alignment;
(ii) to secure the support of allies and 
partners in combating adversary alignment; and
(iii) to assess and help address, as 
appropriate, the vulnerabilities and capability 
gaps of allies and partners to counter threats 
from adversary alignment.
(C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of United 
States methods of economic statecraft, including an 
assessment of the efficiency of the United States 
sanctions and export control enforcement apparatus and 
any accompanying resourcing requirements.
(D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence within the 
priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, 
and the Middle East by--
(i) increasing United States and allied 
munitions stockpiles, particularly such 
stockpiles that are most critical for 
supporting frontline partners such as Israel, 
Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of aggression 
by a United States adversary;
(ii) facilitating collaborative efforts 
with allies for the co-production, co-
maintenance, and co-sustainment of critical 
munitions and platforms required by the United 
States and allies and partners of the United 
States in the event of a future conflict with 
the People's Republic of China, the Russian 
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(iii) more effectively using funding 
through the United States Foreign Military 
Financing program to support allied and partner 
domestic defense production that can contribute 
to deterrence in each such priority theater.
(E) A plan for digitizing and updating war-planning 
tools of the Department of Defense not later than 1 
year after the date on which the report is submitted to 
ensure that United States war planners are better 
equipped to update and modify war plans in the face of 
rapidly evolving information on adversary cooperation.
(F) An assessment of the capability gaps and 
vulnerabilities the United States would face in 
deterring an adversary in the event that the United 
States is engaged in a conflict with another adversary, 
and a plan to work with allies and partners to address 
such gaps and vulnerabilities.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
submitted in classified form.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 
on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Financial 
Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 
of Representatives.
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