H.R. 6275

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6275 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 6275

To require the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report annually on the 
advanced artificial intelligence capabilities of the People's Republic 
of China, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

November 21, 2025

Mr. Moylan (for himself, Mr. Vindman, and Mr. Huizenga) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To require the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report annually on the 
advanced artificial intelligence capabilities of the People's Republic 
of China, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``China AI Power Report Act''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) export controls on artificial intelligence technologies 
and related capabilities must be dynamic and adaptive to 
effectively address the evolving national security challenges 
posed by the People's Republic of China (``China'');
(2) such controls should be regularly updated to reflect 
rapid technological innovations, China's advancing 
capabilities, and emerging methods of diversion, circumvention, 
and avoidance, to ensure the United States maintains its 
strategic advantage and to protect the national security 
interests of the United States; and
(3) to ensure Congress can exercise oversight and, as 
necessary, update export control authorities to enable 
necessary updates to export controls, Congress must be kept 
fully and currently informed of the current and projected 
future states of China's artificial intelligence capabilities.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POWER OF CHINA.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the 
Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the covered agency heads, 
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs of the Senate a report on the advanced artificial intelligence 
capabilities of China, including the efforts by China relating to 
supply chains for advanced artificial intelligence systems.
(b) Components.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall 
also include the following:
(1) An assessment of integrated circuits designed or 
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or 
inference by leading artificial intelligence chip designers in 
China, including Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and Cambricon 
Technologies, that includes--
(A) with respect to such integrated circuits, the--
(i) total processing power;
(ii) integer and floating point operations 
per second at relevant precision levels;
(iii) memory capacity and bandwidth;
(iv) interconnect bandwidth;
(v) power efficiency;
(vi) transistor count and die size;
(vii) process node used per design;
(viii) energy efficiency;
(ix) manufacturing cost and yield 
assumptions;
(x) ability of the integrated circuit to 
effectively run artificial intelligence models 
trained on a different chip designer's 
integrated circuit, including measurements such 
as model inference in tokens per second and 
cost per token with and without a software 
application layer that improves model 
translation ability;
(xi) the capability of the most advanced 
server configuration produced using the chip 
designer's integrated circuits including such 
technical specifications like floating point 
operations per second, memory capacity and 
bandwidth, energy efficiency, and ability to 
function at scale; and
(xii) any future specification that becomes 
relevant to the development of future 
artificial intelligence capability; and
(B) with respect to such chip designers--
(i) the total number and types of 
integrated circuits produced in the year 
preceding submission of such report and the 
projected production number for the year 
proceeding submission of such report;
(ii) the foundries used in the production 
of the integrated circuits;
(iii) the software ecosystem, including any 
parallel computing platforms, programming 
models, or development frameworks that enable 
accelerated computing for artificial 
intelligence training or inference;
(iv) the method and extent to which such 
integrated circuits are used in other 
countries, including in the United States; and
(v) the manufacturer's ability to produce a 
software application layer required to achieve 
an improved token per seconds and cost per 
token rate.
(2) An assessment of leading semiconductor fabrication 
facilities in China that produce logic integrated circuits for 
use in advanced artificial intelligence training or inference, 
including such facilities owned or operated by the 
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, that 
includes, with respect to such facilities, the--
(A) total monthly production capacity per advanced 
process node with non-planar transistors or \16/14\ nm 
and below and the percentage of that monthly production 
capacity dedicated to production of logic integrated 
circuits for use in advanced artificial training or 
inference;
(B) yield for producing such logic integrated 
circuits for use in advanced artificial intelligence 
training or inference at each facility with an 
assessment of that yield in industry relevant terms, 
such as compared to Chinese firms, compared to non-
Chinese firms, or how many are in current industry-
leading datacenters;
(C) most advanced process node under production;
(D) types and volume of semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment used, the country of origin for such 
equipment, and the export control regulatory regime 
under which such equipment was procured;
(E) collaborations, licit or illicit, between 
Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chinese 
firms and the advancements those collaborations produce 
for the Chinese firm;
(F) progress Chinese firms are making at 
indigenizing export controlled technologies;
(G) market share Chinese firms have in China and 
internationally; and
(H) year-over-year trends in leading semiconductor 
fabrication facilities during at least the preceding 5-
year period;
(3) An assessment of leading semiconductor fabrication 
facilities in China that produce memory integrated circuits 
used for advanced artificial intelligence training or 
inference, including such facilities owned or operated by 
ChangXin Memory Technologies or Yangtze Memory Technologies 
Corp., that includes--
(A) with respect to such circuits, the--
(i) most advanced generation of high-
bandwidth memory, including the technical 
specifications and stack height;
(ii) smallest half-pitch and the per-die 
capacity of other dynamic random access memory 
integrated circuits; and
(iii) highest number of layers in three-
dimensional NOT-AND memory integrated circuits;
(B) with respect to such facilities, the--
(i) yield and total monthly production 
capacity for memory integrated circuits, 
including dynamic random access memory such as 
high-bandwidth memory, and NOT-AND memory; and
(ii) types and volume of semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment used, including the 
country of origin of such equipment and the 
export control regulatory regime such equipment 
was procured under.
(C) collaborations, licit or illicit, between 
Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chinese 
firms and the advancements those collaborations produce 
for the Chinese firm;
(D) progress Chinese firms are making at 
indigenizing export controlled technologies;
(E) market share Chinese firms have in China and 
internationally; and
(F) year-over-year trends in China's advanced 
memory integrated circuit production for a minimum of 
the 5 previous years.
(4) An assessment of leading semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment companies in China, including NAURA Technology Group, 
KINGSEMI, Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment Inc., Shanghai 
Micro Electronics Equipment, and Shenzhen SiCarrier 
Technologies Co., Ltd, that includes--
(A) a categorical breakdown of annual unit 
production volume and technical specifications, 
including minimum feature size, throughput, and defect 
rate, of all major equipment classes installed or under 
development for wafer production in foundries in China, 
including--
(i) lithography tools, including 
photolithography, nanoimprint, and electron 
beam lithography tools;
(ii) etch equipment, including wet etching 
and dry etching;
(iii) deposition equipment, including 
chemical vapor deposition, physical vapor 
deposition, and atomic layer deposition;
(iv) cleaning systems;
(v) chemical mechanical planarization 
tools;
(vi) ion implantation and diffusion 
systems;
(vii) wafer inspection, metrology, and 
process control tools;
(viii) back-end packaging equipment, 
including wafer dicing equipment and wire 
bonders;
(ix) capabilities and advancements in 
advanced packaging technologies;
(x) thermal processing equipment;
(xi) bonding equipment, including thermo 
compression bonders and hybrid bonders;
(xii) environmental control systems;
(xiii) laser systems; and
(xiv) reticle and photomask writing and 
inspection tools;
(B) the country of origin and supplier company for 
each piece of semiconductor manufacturing equipment 
used in foundries in China for advanced-node logic or 
high-bandwidth memory production by such companies;
(C) the foreign-sourced subcomponents integrated 
into the semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced 
by such companies, including precision motion stages, 
lasers, electrostatic chucks, optical systems, radio 
frequency generators, or extreme-purity gas handling 
systems;
(D) collaborations, licit or illicit, between 
Chinese firms or their subsidiaries and non-Chinese 
firms and the advancements those collaborations produce 
for the Chinese firm;
(E) progress Chinese firms are making at 
indigenizing export controlled technologies;
(F) market share Chinese firms have in China and 
internationally; and
(G) year-over-year trends in leading semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment companies in China for a 
minimum of the 5 previous years.
(5) An assessment of electronic design automation (EDA) 
software used in the design of integrated circuits for advanced 
artificial intelligence applications in China, including 
software developed or provided by leading Chinese EDA companies 
such as Empyrean Technology Co., Ltd. and Primarius 
Technologies Co., Ltd., that includes--
(A) with respect to such software tools, the--
(i) range of design stages supported, 
including front-end design such as architecture 
and register-transfer level design, logic 
synthesis, verification, physical design, 
place-and-route, timing closure, and final 
signoff;
(ii) compatibility with advanced process 
nodes, including sub-7 nanometer technologies, 
gate-all-around devices, and three-dimensional 
integration;
(iii) capabilities for designing artificial 
intelligence-specific components of such 
integrated circuits, including tensor 
processing cores, systolic array processing 
units, matrix multiplier units, and high-
bandwidth memory interfaces;
(iv) ability to model and optimize for 
power, performance, and thermal constraints in 
artificial intelligence workloads;
(v) scale and performance of the software 
in handling large designs, such as chips 
exceeding 50-100 billion transistors; and
(vi) integration with cloud compute 
resources or distributed workflows for large-
scale artificial intelligence chip development;
(B) with respect to such companies, the--
(i) total market share within China and 
internationally, including the share of 
advanced-node integrated circuits designed or 
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence 
training or inference designs supported by each 
company; and
(ii) types, volume, and origin of critical 
technology components used in software 
development, including intellectual property 
cores, third-party libraries, verification 
suites, and artificial intelligence-assisted 
optimization algorithms;
(C) progress Chinese firms are making at 
indigenizing export-controlled or foreign-origin 
technologies used in EDA, including high-performance 
computing integration, advanced verification engines, 
and proprietary intellectual property cores;
(D) year-over-year trends for China's EDA industry 
over a minimum of the previous 5 years, including 
technology adoption, market share, and software 
capability evolution; and
(E) identification of technical gaps relative to 
leading global EDA providers, particularly in relation 
to artificial intelligence-focused design, advanced 
nodes, and large-scale verification.
(6) An assessment of the advanced artificial intelligence 
models determined by the Secretary to be the most relevant to 
the national security of the United States that were developed 
by artificial intelligence laboratories or companies based in 
China, especially those laboratories and companies affiliated 
with the People's Liberation Army or any university in China, 
including the most advanced models, open-weight and closed-
weight models, based on model size, total compute used during 
training, benchmark performance, and any other advanced 
capabilities the Secretary determines relevant, that includes, 
with respect to each such model--
(A) the number of model parameters;
(B) the total training compute used, measured in 
floating-point operations and their relevant precision 
level;
(C) the model performance on benchmark tasks;
(D) an evaluation of the extent to which the model 
exhibits advanced cyber offensive capabilities, an 
advanced understanding of biological and virological 
application domains, and the ability to substantially 
automate or accelerate artificial intelligence 
research, and a comparison of such models to the most 
advanced artificial intelligence models from United 
States developers;
(E) if the model is open-weight, an evaluation of 
the files provided and the security implications of 
following the developer's deployment instructions;
(F) a description of the algorithmic alignment 
training used;
(G) the type and scale of compute infrastructure 
used in training and inference, including the cluster 
configurations, the number and type of integrated 
circuits specifically designed or optimized for 
advanced artificial intelligence training or inference, 
how such integrated circuits were acquired and from 
which companies, where those clusters are located, and 
how they are being accessed;
(H) the manner and extent to which the model is 
used throughout society in China, including throughout 
the following industries or sectors:
(i) the People's Liberation Army;
(ii) the surveillance and intelligence 
collection functions of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), including the genocide of Uyghur 
Muslims and other religious and ethnic 
minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region;
(iii) the Government of China;
(iv) business and finance;
(v) education;
(vi) healthcare;
(vii) critical infrastructure sectors, 
including the power grid and transportation; 
and
(viii) any other sectors that the Secretary 
determines to be relevant, such as high-risk 
industries where artificial intelligence 
failure would have outsized safety or mission 
consequences.
(I) whether and where such models are deployed for 
public use, including API access or mobile app 
deployment;
(J) the manner and extent to which such models are 
diffused in other countries, including the United 
States;
(K) the alignment of those models to CCP 
propaganda;
(L) the potential of those models to inject or 
create vulnerabilities for users or other ways they 
could be used to further CCP national security 
objectives;
(M) an assessment of global market share of Chinese 
models and the effect that global market share is 
enabling China to set artificial intelligence hardware 
or software standards; and
(N) the total number of tokens inferenced globally 
using the model, the types of hardware utilized for 
such inference and the percent breakdown between 
company of origin for such hardware, and the percentage 
of global inferenced tokens attributable to the model.
(7) An assessment of emerging artificial intelligence 
research in China, based on indicators such as academic 
publications, patent filings, and research funding, including--
(A) the development of novel artificial 
intelligence algorithms and techniques, including 
advancements in reinforcement learning, natural 
language processing, or computer vision, with a focus 
on algorithms and techniques most relevant for 
developing or deploying the most advanced artificial 
intelligence systems;
(B) advancements in hardware designed to enhance 
artificial intelligence capabilities, including custom 
integrated circuits, quantum computing technologies, or 
neuromorphic computing systems, with a focus on 
hardware advancements most relevant for developing or 
deploying the most advanced artificial intelligence 
systems;
(C) the scale and focus of research efforts, 
including the number of researchers, institutions, and 
collaborations involved, and the funding levels and 
sources, with a focus on those most relevant for 
developing or deploying the most advanced frontier 
artificial intelligence systems;
(D) an evaluation of the potential impact of such 
research on future artificial intelligence capabilities 
relevant to national security competitiveness; and
(E) a description of licit or illicit methods or 
tactics such as unauthorized model distillation used by 
Chinese entities to steal non-Chinese artificial 
intelligence related intellectual property.
(8) An assessment of the aggregate public funding and 
capital flows supporting artificial intelligence development in 
China, including--
(A) the sum total of China's national, provincial, 
and municipal investment in artificial intelligence;
(B) subsidies that are underwriting the costs of 
artificial intelligence development in areas such as 
compute, infrastructure, water, and energy;
(C) an assessment of foreign capital investments, 
including the total amount invested and a breakdown by 
entity, including the country of origin and the amount 
invested; and
(D) an assessment of the PRC-based entities that 
have received the funding, including the name of the 
entity and the amount of funding received.
(9) The aggregate artificial intelligence computational 
capacity in China, including--
(A) a detailed analysis of computational capacity 
of the 5 most capable entities in China, including the 
number and types of integrated circuits and server 
systems used and their aggregate computational power;
(B) the countries and companies with respect to 
which China sourced their computational capacity; and
(C) the locations and specifications, including 
energy and computational capacity, of datacenters used 
for advanced artificial intelligence training and 
inference.
(10) An assessment of leading humanoid robot manufacturers 
in China, including Unitree Robotics and Fourier, that 
includes--
(A) with respect to such manufacturers, the--
(i) production capacity per year; and
(ii) unit cost and pricing trends for such 
robots intended for commercial deployment; and
(B) with respect to the humanoid robots produced by 
such manufactures--
(i) the number, type, and country and 
company of origin of the semiconductor 
components, including integrated circuits, used 
to build, run, or train such robots;
(ii) the country and company of origin and 
the technical specifications of critical 
components used in such robots, including 
actuators, sensors, and battery systems, and if 
not Chinese, the progress toward 
indigenization;
(iii) a description of the tasks such 
robots can perform;
(iv) whether such robots are teleoperated, 
operated through hard-coded instructions, or 
function autonomously using artificial 
intelligence models;
(v) whether inference is performed locally 
or via remote cloud services;
(vi) the number of such robots deployed 
across China, including in the military, 
manufacturing, logistics, health care, 
security, and personal assistance sectors;
(vii) the extent to which, and ways in 
which, such robots are diffused in other 
countries, including in the United States; and
(viii) an assessment of the cybersecurity 
and other vulnerabilities of Chinese origin 
robotic systems.
(11) An assessment of the most advanced or widely used 
artificial intelligence-powered applications developed by 
Chinese entities or built on Chinese artificial intelligence 
models, including--
(A) the artificial intelligence models used to 
power these applications, including the company and 
country of origin for each model and whether the models 
are open-weight or closed-weight;
(B) the means of deployment and the extent to which 
such applications are used, including in the United 
States;
(C) the purposes, capabilities, and promoted uses 
of the applications;
(D) an analysis of how data collected or generated 
by the applications is used, including for artificial 
intelligence model training, surveillance, or other 
national security-relevant purposes; and
(E) an evaluation of the potential risks posed by 
these applications to United States national security, 
foreign policy objectives, or data privacy.
(12) An assessment of the regulatory framework governing 
artificial intelligence development, deployment, and usage in 
China, that includes--
(A) the explicit restrictions on artificial 
intelligence models, including laws, regulations, and 
government policies that directly limit or control the 
development, deployment, or use of artificial 
intelligence models in China;
(B) an analysis of the implicit restrictions on 
artificial intelligence models, including censorship, 
data access limitations, or other indirect controls 
that may constrain artificial intelligence model 
capabilities;
(C) how such explicit and implicit restrictions 
impact the development, deployment, and diffusion of 
artificial intelligence models both within China and 
internationally, including the effects on innovation, 
competitiveness, and national security;
(D) an analysis of efforts by the CCP to acquire 
greater insight into advanced artificial intelligence 
and reduce strategic surprise, such as efforts that 
require advanced artificial intelligence developers to 
disclose information about artificial intelligence 
systems or provide models to government entities;
(E) an analysis of efforts in China to assess or 
mitigate national security or public safety threats 
from advanced artificial intelligence systems, 
including efforts to prevent loss of control from 
autonomous artificial intelligence systems; and
(F) the goals for artificial intelligence 
development explicitly and implicitly stated by the 
CCP.
(13) An assessment of China's global artificial 
intelligence standards diplomacy efforts, including--
(A) mapping the fora where Chinese actors aimed to 
shape global standards;
(B) jurisdictions where Chinese-promoted standards, 
model laws, guidance, or procurement criteria have been 
adopted or referenced;
(C) the effects on procurement and vendor 
eligibility; and
(D) opportunities for the United States to shape 
global artificial intelligence standards and counter 
Chinese efforts.
(14) An assessment of the degree to which entities in China 
remotely accessed artificial intelligence computational 
resources, including through cloud services, international data 
centers, or through circumvention or avoidance of United States 
export controls.
(15) An assessment of the methods, pathways, quantities, 
and companies and countries of origin of United States-
controlled integrated circuits specifically designed or 
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or 
inference, including graphics processing units or application-
specific integrated circuits, that have been diverted to 
mainland China, the estimated total compute capacity enabled 
through these chip diversions, and the percent of China's total 
compute capacity enabled through these chip diversions.
(16) An assessment of the effectiveness of United States 
export controls in restricting access by China to artificial 
intelligence-relevant technologies, including an identification 
of loopholes within United States export controls and 
recommendations for legislative and administrative action to 
strengthen export controls and enforcement that is consistent 
with United States national security and foreign policy 
objectives.
(c) Prioritization.--In conducting the assessments required under 
subsection (b), the Secretary shall prioritize the identification and 
analysis of--
(1) semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 
and critical components of semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment that are, or are likely to become, critical to the 
supply chains for the training or inference of the most 
advanced artificial intelligence systems; and
(2) items that enable or could enable advanced model 
performance, are associated with systems that pose significant 
national security or strategic implications to the United 
States, or are likely to be foundational to the development of 
future advanced artificial intelligence systems, including 
those not yet deployed or publicly disclosed.
(d) Reference Class.--Where applicable, the Secretary shall provide 
context to all statistics regarding China's artificial intelligence 
power in the report by presenting China's capabilities and production 
numbers in comparison to relevant United States and partner country 
production numbers and capabilities.
(e) Coordination With Expert Entities.--In carrying out this 
section, the Secretary may consult and coordinate with other Federal 
departments and agencies, private industry or research organizations, 
federally funded research and development centers, national 
laboratories, academic institutions, relevant media outlets, or any 
other entities with expertise in semiconductor technologies, artificial 
intelligence, or national security that the Secretary determines 
relevant.
(f) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form and may contain a classified annex.
(g) Mandatory Unclassified Elements.--In the unclassified portion 
of the report required under subsection (a), the Secretary shall 
include--
(1) the number of integrated circuits specifically designed 
or optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training or 
inference produced by leading entities in China in the year 
preceding submission of such report;
(2) the projected production numbers of integrated circuits 
from China specifically designed or optimized for advanced 
artificial intelligence training or inference, including 
identification of foundries responsible for such production, 
for the year proceeding submission of such report; and
(3) the extent to which and ways artificial intelligence-
relevant technologies in China, including integrated circuits, 
models, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and humanoid 
robots are diffused in other countries, including the United 
States.
(h) Definitions.--In this Act:
(1) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
of Commerce.
(2) Covered agency heads.--The term ``covered agency 
heads'' means the--
(A) Secretary of State;
(B) Secretary of Defense;
(C) Secretary of Energy;
(D) Director of National Intelligence;
(E) Director for the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy; and
(F) head of any other relevant Federal department 
or agency the Secretary determines necessary.
<all>