H.R. 6465

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6465 Introduced in House (IH)]

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119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 6465

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 
States, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

December 4, 2025

Mr. McGovern (for himself, Mr. Garamendi, and Mr. Beyer) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, 
and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 
States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act 
of 2025'' or the ``HALT Act of 2025''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat 
to humanity, a fact that led President Ronald Reagan and Soviet 
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to declare in a joint statement in 
1987 that a ``nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 
fought'', a sentiment affirmed by the People's Republic of 
China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States in January 2022.
(2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 people 
attended the largest peace rally in United States history, in 
support of a movement to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms 
race, a movement that helped to create the political will 
necessary for the negotiation of several bilateral arms control 
treaties between the United States and former Soviet Union, and 
then the Russian Federation. Those treaties contributed to 
strategic stability through mutual and verifiable reciprocal 
nuclear weapons reductions.
(3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, millions 
of people around the world have stood up to demand meaningful, 
immediate international action to halt, reduce, and eliminate 
the threats posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 
and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet.
(4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 
UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT''), entered into force, 
which includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon 
states (commonly referred to as the ``P5''), among other 
things, ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . . 
. and to nuclear disarmament''.
(5) Bipartisan United States global leadership has curbed 
the growth in the number of countries possessing nuclear 
weapons and has slowed overall vertical proliferation among 
countries already possessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted 
by a more than 90 percent reduction in the United States 
nuclear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 31,255 in 
1967.
(6) The United States testing of nuclear weapons is no 
longer necessary as a result of the following major technical 
developments since the Senate's consideration of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as 
the ``CTBT'') in 1999:
(A) The verification architecture of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization 
(commonly referred to as the ``CTBTO'')--
(i) has made significant advancements, as 
seen through its network of 300 International 
Monitoring Stations and its International Data 
Centre, which together provide for the near 
instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives 
tests, including all 6 such tests conducted by 
North Korea between 2006 and 2017; and
(ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days 
a week.
(B) Since the United States signed the CTBT, 
confidence has grown in the science-based Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management Plan of the Department of 
Energy, which forms the basis of annual certifications 
to the President regarding the continual safety, 
security, and effectiveness of the United States 
nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 
leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to 
remark in 2015 that ``lab directors today now state 
that they certainly understand much more about how 
nuclear weapons work than during the period of nuclear 
testing''.
(7) Despite the progress made to reduce the number and role 
of, and risks posed by, nuclear weapons, and to halt the Cold 
War-era nuclear arms race, tensions between countries that 
possess nuclear weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk 
reduction treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 
weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a qualitative 
global nuclear arms race is now underway with each of the 
countries that possess nuclear weapons spending tens of 
billions of dollars each year to maintain and improve their 
arsenals.
(8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the development of 
destabilizing types of nuclear weapons that are not presently 
covered under any existing arms control treaty or agreement and 
the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea have each taken 
concerning steps to diversify their more modest sized, but 
nonetheless very deadly, nuclear arsenals.
(9) The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review was right to label the 
nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile as ``no longer 
necessary'', as that missile, if deployed, would have the 
effect of lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use.
(10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden 
preserved binding and verifiable limits on the deployed and 
non-deployed strategic forces of the largest two nuclear 
weapons powers through the five-year extension of the Treaty 
between the United States of America and the Russian Federation 
on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered 
into force February 5, 2011 (commonly referred to as the ``New 
START Treaty'').
(11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons employment 
strategy of the United States submitted under section 492 of 
title 10, United States Code, determined that it is possible to 
ensure the security of the United States and allies and 
partners of the United States and maintain a strong and 
credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a \1/
3\ reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 
established in the New START Treaty.
(12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President Biden stated, 
``[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of 
today's threats--it's hard to envision a plausible scenario in 
which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States 
would be necessary. Or make sense.''.
(13) On September 23, 2025, President Trump stated in front 
of the United Nations General Assembly, ``We want to have a 
cessation of the development of nuclear weapons . . . . If we 
ever use them, the world literally might come to an end.''.
(14) In light of moves by the United States and other 
countries to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons, a 
global nuclear freeze would seek to halt the new nuclear arms 
race by seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable 
freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of nuclear 
weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
(15) The reckless and repeated nuclear threats by Russian 
President Vladimir Putin since the February 2022 invasion of 
Ukraine by the Russian Federation underscore the need for a 
global nuclear freeze.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

The following is the policy of the United States:
(1) The United States should build upon its decades long, 
bipartisan efforts to reduce the number and salience of nuclear 
weapons by leading international negotiations on specific arms-
reduction measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 
freeze movement.
(2) Building on the 2021 extension of the New START Treaty, 
the United States should engage with all other countries that 
possess nuclear weapons to seek to negotiate and conclude 
future multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk 
reduction agreements, which should contain some or all of the 
following provisions:
(A) An agreement by the United States and the 
Russian Federation on a resumption of on-site 
inspections and verification measures per the New START 
Treaty and a follow-on treaty or agreement to the New 
START Treaty that may lower the central limits of the 
Treaty and cover new kinds of strategic delivery 
vehicles or non-strategic nuclear weapons.
(B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on the 
testing, production, and further deployment of all 
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
(C) An agreement that establishes a verifiable 
numerical ceiling on the deployed shorter-range and 
intermediate-range and strategic delivery systems (as 
defined by the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Elimination of Their Intermediate- Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles signed at Washington December 8, 
1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (commonly 
referred to as the ``Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty''), and the New START Treaty, respectively) and 
the nuclear warheads associated with such systems 
belonging to the P5, and to the extent possible, all 
countries that possess nuclear weapons, at August 2, 
2019, levels.
(D) An agreement by each country to adopt a policy 
of no first use of nuclear weapons or provide 
transparency into its nuclear declaratory policy.
(E) An agreement on a proactive United Nations 
Security Council resolution that expands access by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to any country found 
by the Board of Governors of that Agency to be 
noncompliant with its obligations under the NPT.
(F) An agreement to refrain from configuring 
nuclear forces in a ``launch on warning'' or ``launch 
under warning'' nuclear posture, which may prompt a 
nuclear armed country to launch a ballistic missile 
attack in response to detection by an early-warning 
satellite or sensor of a suspected incoming ballistic 
missile.
(G) An agreement not to target or interfere in the 
nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly 
referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure of another 
country through a kinetic attack or a cyberattack.
(H) An agreement on transparency measures or 
verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic cruise 
missiles and glide vehicles that are fired from sea-
based, ground, and air platforms.
(I) An agreement to provide a baseline and 
continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate number of 
active nuclear weapons and associated systems possessed 
by each country.
(3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts in the 
United Nations Conference on Disarmament toward the negotiation 
of a verifiable Fissile Material Treaty or Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations to another international 
body or fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful 
conclusion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any 
country's production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium 
for use in nuclear weapons.
(4) The United States should convene a series of head-of-
state level summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the 
Nuclear Security Summits process, which saw the elimination of 
the equivalent of 3,000 nuclear weapons.
(5) The President should seek ratification by the Senate of 
the CTBT and mobilize all countries covered by Annex 2 of the 
CTBT to pursue similar action to hasten entry into force of the 
CTBT. The entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 
by the United States will provide critical momentum, will 
activate the CTBT's onsite inspection provision to investigate 
allegations that any country that is a party to the CTBT has 
conducted a nuclear test of any yield.
(6) The United States should--
(A) refrain from developing any new designs for 
nuclear warheads or bombs, but especially designs that 
could add a level of technical uncertainty into the 
United States stockpile and thus renew calls to resume 
nuclear explosive testing in order to test that new 
design; and
(B) seek reciprocal commitments from other 
countries that possess nuclear weapons.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS.

(a) In General.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year 
thereafter, or authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for any fiscal year before fiscal year 2026 and available for 
obligation as of the date of the enactment of this Act, may be 
obligated or expended to conduct or make preparations for any explosive 
nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until such time as--
(1) the President submits to Congress an addendum to the 
report required by section 4205 of the Atomic Energy Defense 
Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) that details any change to the condition 
of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the report 
submitted under that section in the preceding year; and
(2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution of 
Congress that approves the test.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Subsection (a) does not limit nuclear 
stockpile stewardship activities that are consistent with the zero-
yield standard and other requirements under law.
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