H.R. 7208

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7208 Introduced in House (IH)]

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119th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7208

To direct the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report assessing 
vulnerabilities to the electric grid in the United States from certain 
Internet-connected devices and applications, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 22, 2026

Mr. Crenshaw introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on 
Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Government Reform, Ways and Means, 
Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Homeland Security, for a period to 
be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report assessing 
vulnerabilities to the electric grid in the United States from certain 
Internet-connected devices and applications, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Preventing Remote Operations by 
Threatening Entities on Critical Technology for the Grid Act'' or the 
``PROTECT the Grid Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSES.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) the rapid proliferation of high-wattage IoT devices, 
such as electric vehicle chargers, clothes dryers, smart air 
conditioners, water heaters, ovens, and similar appliances, has 
dramatically increased the number of connected devices in 
households in the United States;
(2)(A) smart appliance applications and software platforms 
increasingly serve as remote control interfaces; and
(B) when those applications and software platforms 
originate from companies operating under the jurisdiction or 
direction of foreign adversaries they offer a pathway for 
large-scale, coordinated manipulation of power demand, 
threatening grid stability;
(3)(A) in certain foreign adversary jurisdictions, 
particularly the People's Republic of China, private companies 
are subject to formal political oversight through mechanisms 
such as, in the case of the People's Republic of China, 
embedded Chinese Communist Party committees and executive-level 
Chinese Communist Party leadership; and
(B) those arrangements blur the lines between commercial 
activity and state-directed strategic interests;
(4) further elevating the risk to the United States 
electric grid is the 2017 Cybersecurity Law of the People's 
Republic of China (commonly referred to as the ``Chinese 
Cybersecurity Law''), which mandates that Chinese companies 
store customer data domestically and grant Chinese state 
authorities broad access to those data;
(5) the legal and political structures described in 
paragraphs (3) and (4) increase the likelihood that connected 
home appliances could be leveraged by foreign adversaries to 
target critical infrastructure in the event of a conflict with 
the United States;
(6) companies controlled by foreign adversaries--
(A) are actively pursuing rapid deployment of high-
wattage IoT devices that could be used to attack the 
electric grid in the United States; and
(B) control more than 25 percent of the major 
appliance industry in the United States, which provides 
an established platform for quickly deploying those 
high-wattage IoT devices;
(7) through smart applications, companies controlled by 
foreign adversaries--
(A) are actively collecting detailed consumer data 
on millions of people in the United States; and
(B) have the ability to directly manipulate the 
demand of high-wattage devices on the electric grid;
(8) as a result, foreign adversary-controlled applications 
for high-wattage IoT devices create significant risk of 
coordinated, deliberate, demand-manipulation attacks on the 
electric grid in the United States;
(9) several academic studies from researchers at Princeton 
University, the Georgia Institute of Technology, and the 
University of California, Santa Cruz, point to significant 
risks of manipulation of demand via IoT (commonly referred to 
as ``MaDIoT'') attacks to manipulate power demand on the 
electric grid that could result in large-scale blackouts and 
potential damage to the electric grid;
(10) it is therefore critical to protect energy 
infrastructure in the United States by ensuring that smart 
applications embedded in home appliances are secure and cannot 
serve as an entry point for foreign adversaries; and
(11) failing to address the vulnerabilities presented by 
those smart applications could lead to grid instability, 
frequency imbalances, cascading system failures, and, 
ultimately, catastrophic disruptions that jeopardize both 
public safety and the broader economy of the United States.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to harmonize and reinforce existing national security 
initiatives aimed at securing the domestic information and 
communications technology and services (commonly referred to as 
``ICTS'') supply chain against manipulation of demand, 
especially by the People's Republic of China; and
(2) to direct the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation 
with other relevant Federal officials, to submit to Congress a 
report containing findings and recommendations to ensure that 
network-connected home appliances in households in the United 
States do not serve as a conduit for activities by foreign 
adversaries or jeopardize the stability of the electric grid in 
the United States.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Consumer product.--The term ``consumer product'' has 
the meaning given the term in section 3(a) of the Consumer 
Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2052(a)).
(2) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an 
entity that--
(A) is subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign 
adversary;
(B) is directly or indirectly operating on behalf 
of a foreign adversary; or
(C) is owned by, directly or indirectly controlled 
by, or otherwise subject to the direction or influence 
of, a foreign adversary.
(3) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical 
infrastructure'' has the meaning given the term in subsection 
(e) of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 
U.S.C. 5195c).
(4) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary'' 
means any covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f) of 
title 10, United States Code).
(5) Foreign adversary-controlled application.--The term 
``foreign adversary-controlled application'' means a website, 
desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or 
immersive technology application that is operated, directly or 
indirectly (including through a parent, subsidiary, or 
affiliate (as those terms are defined in section 230.405 of 
title 17, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date 
of enactment of this Act))), by a covered entity.
(6) High-wattage iot device.--The term ``high-wattage IoT 
device'' means any Internet-connected appliance or device that 
is capable of consuming or controlling electrical power at a 
level exceeding 500 watts, regardless of whether the device is 
used or designed for use in residential or commercial 
applications.
(7) IoT.--The term ``IoT'' means Internet of Things.
(8) Relevant federal official.--The term ``relevant Federal 
official'' means--
(A) any Federal official described in section 1(a) 
of Executive Order 13873 (84 Fed. Reg. 22689; relating 
to securing the information and communications 
technology and services supply chain) (as in effect on 
the date of enactment of this Act) (or a designee of 
the applicable Federal official); and
(B) the head (or a designee of the head) of any 
other Federal department or agency that, in the 
determination of the Secretary of Commerce, is relevant 
to the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS POSED BY FOREIGN ADVERSARY-
CONTROLLED APPLICATIONS WITH THE CAPABILITY OF 
CONTROLLING HIGH-WATTAGE IOT DEVICES.

(a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with 
other relevant Federal officials, shall submit to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives a report 
assessing the national security risks associated with foreign 
adversary-controlled applications with the ability to attack or 
undermine critical infrastructure in the United States.
(b) Considerations.--In preparing the report under subsection (a), 
the Secretary of Commerce shall consider, at a minimum--
(1) the extent of deployment of high-wattage IoT devices 
across the United States;
(2) risks relating to foreign adversary-controlled 
applications, especially those incorporated into consumer 
products that could be used to attack or otherwise destabilize 
the electric grid;
(3) potential impacts of those risks and any other relevant 
vulnerabilities on national security, including the risks of 
frequency imbalances, cascading failures, and other disruptions 
to critical infrastructure; and
(4) public comments and input from industry experts, 
domestic producers, importers, consumer groups, and other 
stakeholders regarding the security of, and the extent of 
foreign influence over, foreign adversary-controlled 
applications and high-wattage IoT devices.
(c) Recommendations.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
shall include recommendations for mitigation measures to address any 
identified national security risks, which may include--
(1) an assessment of how Executive Order 13873 (84 Fed. 
Reg. 22689; relating to securing the information and 
communications technology and services supply chain) (as in 
effect on the date of enactment of this Act) may be applied to 
IoT devices, as such devices apply to the electric grid, to 
include restrictions or conditions on transactions directly 
involving foreign adversary-controlled applications in high-
wattage IoT devices;
(2) specifically restricting the procurement by the Federal 
Government of consumer products with a foreign adversary-
controlled application;
(3) certification or labeling requirements for high-wattage 
IoT devices; and
(4) any other proposal, as determined necessary by the 
Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with other relevant 
Federal officials.

SEC. 5. CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13873.

(a) In General.--The provisions of Executive Order 13873 (84 Fed. 
Reg. 22689; relating to securing the information and communications 
technology and services supply chain) (as in effect on the date of 
enactment of this Act) are enacted into law.
(b) Publication.--In publishing this Act in slip form and in the 
United States Statutes at Large pursuant to section 112 of title 1, 
United States Code, the Archivist of the United States shall include 
after the date of approval at the end an appendix setting forth the 
text of the Executive order referred to in subsection (a) (as in effect 
on the date of enactment of this Act).
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