H.R. 8069

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8069 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8069

To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the 
security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea 
fiber-optic cables.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 24, 2026

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina (for himself and Mr. Meeks) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Intelligence 
(Permanent Select), and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the 
security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea 
fiber-optic cables.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 
2026''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA 
INFRASTRUCTURE

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Enhancing United States Government engagement at the 
International Cable Protection Committee 
and other relevant international bodies to 
safeguard United States interests.
Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea 
infrastructure sabotage.
Sec. 105. Report on activities by the People's Republic of China and 
the Russian Federation.
Sec. 106. Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea 
infrastructure.
Sec. 107. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of 
critical undersea infrastructure.
TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE 
EXPERTISE

Sec. 201. Expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise 
at the Department of State.
TITLE III--SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION, 
CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR

Sec. 301. Improving United States Government coordination of subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure.
Sec. 302. Strengthening information sharing between United States 
Government and private sector actors on 
subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the 
term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives.
(3) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term ``appropriate 
Federal agencies'' means the following:
(A) The Department of Commerce.
(B) The Department of Defense.
(C) The Department of Homeland Security.
(D) The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
(E) The Department of State.
(F) The Federal Communications Commission.
(G) The Department of the Treasury.
(H) The Department of the Judiciary.
(I) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined 
by the President.
(4) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical 
undersea infrastructure'' refers to both subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure and subsea energy 
infrastructure.
(5) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency 
committee'' means the entity established under section 301(b) 
of this Act.
(6) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity'' 
means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual, 
organization, or business involved in the operation, 
maintenance, repair, or construction of critical subsea 
infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure 
owners.
(7) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or 
preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause 
defective production, operation, or damage to critical 
underseas infrastructure, including the integrity of data 
transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
(8) Subsea energy infrastructure.--The term ``subsea energy 
infrastructure'' means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other 
equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, 
including--
(A) to transmit electricity, including via subsea 
electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or 
equipment related to the support of offshore energy 
production installations;
(B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen 
between land-based or offshore infrastructure; and
(C) associated landing stations and facilities.
(9) Subsea telecommunications infrastructure.--The term 
``subsea telecommunications infrastructure'' means subsea 
fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, 
or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, 
data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as 
associated landing stations and facilities.

TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA 
INFRASTRUCTURE

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a 
growing threat to United States and allied security and 
economic prosperity.
(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea 
infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including--
(A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea 
telecommunications cables connecting the Norwegian 
mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, 
home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite 
ground station on Earth;
(B) in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of 
the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 
natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast 
of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic 
Sea;
(C) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main 
island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan 
Strait;
(D) in October 2023, the reported damage to the 
Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline 
spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the 
reported damage to subsea telecommunications cables 
connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;
(E) in November 2024, the reported damage to the 
Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications 
cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea 
telecommunications cable in the Central Baltic Sea;
(F) in December 2024, the reported damage to the 
Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity 
interconnection cable and nearby subsea 
telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland;
(G) in January 2025, the reported damage to the 
Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications cable 
connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of 
Korea, and Japan, among other global democracies;
(H) in February 2025, the reported damage to a 
subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main 
island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan 
Strait;
(I) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea 
telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central 
Baltic Sea linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and
(J) in January 2026, the reported damage to the 
Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a 
vessel named the Fitburg.
(3) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the Baltic 
Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network 
to conduct information and threat intelligence sharing among 
private and public sector actors to protect subsea cables.
(4) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an 
EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and 
deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for 
Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in 
the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated 
surveillance approach.
(5) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) 
published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of 
Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to ``build a 
secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network'' and 
``to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, 
maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, 
between ASEAN Member States''.
(6) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United 
States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its 
commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and 
Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for 
digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea 
cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and 
encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners. 
Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote 
resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure 
across the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital 
strategic and economic links between the United States and its 
partners and allies;
(2) according to NATO, ``undersea cables carry an estimated 
$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world's 
oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea; 
and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via 
undersea cables'';
(3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, 
there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected 
sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea 
infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East 
Asia;
(4) the United States Government has an important role to 
play in advancing United States interests in international 
bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea 
infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and 
redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these 
goals;
(5) the United States Government should play a more active 
role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for 
the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical 
Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical 
Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on 
the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime 
security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo-
Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable 
Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations 
such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in 
order to advance United States national security and economic 
interests;
(6) the United States should lead efforts to promote the 
deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure 
networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen 
preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies 
and partners through enhanced information sharing and 
coordination; and
(7) while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other 
associated private sector stakeholders carry significant 
responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the United 
States Government and allied foreign governments need to play a 
greater role.

SEC. 103. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CABLE PROTECTION COMMITTEE AND OTHER 
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFEGUARD UNITED STATES 
INTERESTS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
interagency committee, shall seek to increase United States Government 
engagement in international bodies, including the International Cable 
Protection Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national security 
and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea 
infrastructure.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees that includes the following:
(1) A description of how increased United States Government 
engagement within the ICPC could support United States national 
security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical 
undersea infrastructure.
(2) A description of key objectives for promoting and 
protecting United States national security interests within the 
ICPC.
(3) A description of how the People's Republic of China 
entities leverage their engagement within the ICPC to further 
their strategic interests.
(4) A description of how encouraging other countries and 
regional bodies to join the ICPC can better ensure coordinated, 
consistent global undersea subsea telecommunications 
infrastructure policies.
(5) A description of other international bodies relevant 
for critical undersea infrastructure where the United States 
should increase its diplomatic engagement.

SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA 
INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.

(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary 
of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions 
described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the 
President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of 
sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of 
which knowingly--
(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical 
support, security, or other services that facilitate or 
enable an act of sabotage; and
(2) any foreign person that the President determines 
knowingly--
(A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity 
described in paragraph (1);
(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or 
reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
(C) facilitates deceptive or structured 
transactions to support a vessel or entity described in 
paragraph (1);
(D) provides port or logistics services or 
facilities for technology upgrades or installation of 
equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a 
vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of 
evading sanctions;
(E) provided documentation, registration, or 
flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph 
(1) for the purpose of evading sanctions; or
(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or 
senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing 
sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the 
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, a 
report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the 
sanctions.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all 
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to 
block and prohibit all transactions in all property and 
interests in property of a foreign person described in 
subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are 
in the United States, come within the United States, or are or 
come within the possession or control of a United States 
person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien 
described in subsection (a) shall be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other 
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted 
or paroled into the United States or to receive 
any other benefit under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry 
documentation of an alien described in 
subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of 
when such visa or other entry documentation is 
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under 
clause (i) shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other 
valid visa or entry documentation that 
is in the possession of the alien.
(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 
1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this 
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry 
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in 
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same 
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in 
subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters 
agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this 
section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole 
of an alien to the United States if admitting or paroling the 
alien is necessary--
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the 
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United 
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and 
entered into force November 21, 1947, between the 
United Nations and the United States, or other 
applicable international obligations of the United 
States; or
(B) to carry out or assist authorized law 
enforcement activity in the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity 
subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any 
authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--A requirement to block and 
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests 
in property under this section shall not include the 
authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the 
importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term 
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade 
substance, material, supply or manufactured product, 
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding 
technical data.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'', 
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those terms 
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1101).
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an 
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States 
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United 
States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; 
or
(C) any person in the United States.
(g) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive 
the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the 
waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees--
(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the 
waiver is in the national security interests of the United 
States; and
(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.

SEC. 105. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant 
Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees that includes the following:
(1) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting 
period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and 
maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and the Russian Federation.
(2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and 
activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) 
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including--
(A) a description of GUGI operations and 
capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure 
surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabotage, including 
recent activity trends and development of new weapons 
systems;
(B) a description of GUGI's use of ostensibly 
civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea 
infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and 
potential sabotage;
(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the 
ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and 
equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those 
sanctions; and
(D) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific 
vessels, including vessel names and International 
Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service 
Identity numbers, and related equipment that are 
suspected of engaging in dual-use operations and 
probing of critical undersea infrastructure.
(3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and 
activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), including--
(A) a description of GRU operations and 
capabilities related to physical, electronic, and cyber 
surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical 
undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics;
(B) a description of the use of Russian civilian 
merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a 
list of fishing and merchant vessel names and 
International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile 
Service Identity Numbers believed to be involved in 
surveillance or sabotage activities; and
(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the 
ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and 
equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those 
sanctions.
(4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and 
activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC Coast 
Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN 
Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked 
or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to 
surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea 
infrastructure, including--
(A) a description of recent capability developments 
related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea 
infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and 
littoral purposes; and
(B) a description of the PRC's use of ostensibly 
civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for 
sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea 
infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, 
Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.
(5) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian 
Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of critical 
undersea infrastructure, including--
(A) any current or planned operational coordination 
against United States or allied and partner nation 
targets;
(B) any joint research, development, testing, or 
evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure 
surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capabilities;
(C) any technology transfers or joint training 
related to critical undersea infrastructure 
surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and
(D) any coordination in procurement of advanced 
technologies related to critical undersea 
infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed 
warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the 
Russian Federation.
(6) A list of instances during the previous calendar year 
in which the United States, or allies and partners of the 
United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels, 
either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia, 
around critical undersea infrastructure, including--
(A) any official United States Government response 
to counter the anomalous behavior; and
(B) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies 
and partners.
(7) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities 
are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United 
States-invested cables.
(b) Initial and Subsequent Reports.--The initial report required 
under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022, 
through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports 
required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for 
the reporting period.
(c) Classification.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 106. REPORT ON POTENTIAL SABOTAGE OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA 
INFRASTRUCTURE.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, 
shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives, and the appropriate congressional committees a report 
that includes the assessment of the intelligence community, including 
dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and, if 
applicable, the attribution of the following instances of reported 
sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure:
(1) In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian 
mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.
(2) The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four 
trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas 
pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish 
island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including--
(A) an assessment of the activities of Russian 
military vessels, including those with undersea warfare 
capabilities, at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in 
the months leading up to the incident;
(B) a description of any Russian civilian or 
military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast 
sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or 
underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the 
blast sites;
(C) an assessment of the technical feasibility of a 
small group of divers conducting the Nord Stream 
sabotage using the rental boat ``Andromeda'' in the 
weather and sea conditions present at the time;
(D) an assessment of whether the Russian 
Federation's documented practice of recruiting or 
coercing Ukrainians or other third country nationals to 
conduct sabotage operations on land targets is 
applicable to a maritime context;
(E) an assessment of the fees and penalties for 
failure to honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or 
other Russian entities potentially faced due to the 
throttling of gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 1 
pipeline in 2021;
(F) an assessment of the insurance implications for 
Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and 
Western financiers, depending on the identity of the 
perpetrator;
(G) a description of the law enforcement 
investigations by regional governments, the scope of 
their investigations, and their outcomes;
(H) an assessment of whether any Russian vessels 
documented in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast 
sites in the months leading up to or immediately after 
the incident, including those with undersea 
surveillance or warfare capabilities, were present at 
other suspected sabotage sites either before or after 
the incident in question; and
(I) any information on potential attribution 
received from allied or partner nation communications 
through diplomatic or intelligence channels.
(3) In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure connecting the main island of 
Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
(4) In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to-
Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to 
subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting Estonia and 
Sweden and Finland and Estonia.
(5) In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea telecommunications cable and the 
Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the 
Central Baltic Sea.
(6) In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland-
to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable 
and nearby subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of 
Finland.
(7) In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans-
Pacific Express subsea telecommunications infrastructure 
connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, 
and Japan, among other global democracies.
(8) In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea 
telecommunications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan 
with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait.
(9) In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea 
telecommunications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea 
connecting Liepaja and Sventoji.
(10) In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa 
cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel called 
the Fitburg.

SEC. 107. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF 
CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as international critical undersea infrastructure 
expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper 
installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of 
international subsea cables that have the potential to 
undermine United States and foreign partner national security 
interests;
(2) the United States is uniquely positioned to provide 
technical, material, and other forms of support to 
international partners to enhance the resilience of 
international critical undersea infrastructure;
(3) the United States Government should enhance its 
diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help 
foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and effectively 
install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical 
undersea infrastructure; and
(4) given the importance of critical undersea 
infrastructure to United States and allied energy security and 
prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing 
capabilities designed to target United States and allied subsea 
energy infrastructure.
(b) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.--The Secretary of State 
shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards--
(1) engaging with foreign countries to improve security and 
reduce barriers to the installation, monitoring, maintenance, 
and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; and
(2) working with allies and partners to support the 
development of a multinational fleet of cable repair ships to 
respond rapidly to incidents of sabotage.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years, 
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States 
Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies 
and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the 
monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of international 
critical undersea infrastructure networks, including--
(1) a list of current foreign policies or laws that create 
barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain, 
repair, and protect international critical undersea 
infrastructure networks; and
(2) progress made in the previous calendar year as a result 
of United States engagement with allies and partners.

TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE 
EXPERTISE

SEC. 201. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED EXPERTISE 
AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall assign not fewer than 
10 full-time equivalent individuals, of which not fewer than 5 
individuals shall be assigned to the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital 
Policy to cover subsea telecommunications infrastructure, in order to 
support the Department of State's interagency engagement on matters 
related to critical undersea infrastructure protection, including--
(1) protection and resilience;
(2) coordination with United States allies and partners; 
and
(3) United States engagement in international bodies that 
cover critical undersea infrastructure.
(b) Assignment.--The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy may 
not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the minimum hiring 
requirement outlined in subsection (a).
(c) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after fulfilling the 
hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall 
notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(d) International Cooperation on Critical Undersea Infrastructure 
Sabotage.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on how the United States Government 
plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international 
bodies to spur increased information sharing between allied and partner 
governments and relevant private sector companies on critical undersea 
infrastructure sabotage.

TITLE III--SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION, 
CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR

SEC. 301. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OF SUBSEA 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to a December 2024 Department of Homeland 
Security white paper, ``There currently exists no forum in 
which the full scope of the [subsea] cable industry can 
effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to identify 
and address shared challenges.''.
(2) United States Federal Government responsibilities for 
the protection of subsea telecommunications infrastructure, 
damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and 
emergency response are overseen by various government actors 
through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several Federal 
departments and agencies.
(3) In order for the subsea cable industry to align with 
United States economic and security interests and help industry 
prepare security risk mitigation measures, the United States 
Government must provide the industry a clearer concept of 
operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and 
infrastructure, enhanced and standardized security measures, 
defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and definitive 
cost analysis.
(b) Establishment.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency 
committee (referred to in this Act as the ``interagency committee'') 
comprised of the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead 
United States Government efforts to--
(1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure;
(2) facilitate subsea telecommunications cable licensing 
and permitting; and
(3) address other matters related to subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure deemed appropriate and 
necessary by the President.
(c) Coordination.--The President shall direct the interagency 
committee to conduct an overview of the United States Federal 
Government's operational authorities for subsea telecommunications 
infrastructure security and resilience. The overview shall include--
(1) an interagency concept of operations for partnering 
with non-Federal entities, including subsea telecommunications 
infrastructure owners and operators, to secure and repair 
subsea telecommunications infrastructure systems in a variety 
of crisis scenarios; and
(2) an interagency review and action plan to streamline 
subsea telecommunications infrastructure licensing, funding, 
and permitting processes in order to promote United States 
international leadership in cable connectivity and deployments 
and risk-based prioritization and standardization of additional 
security and resilience assessments.
(d) Analysis of Subsea Telecommunications Infrastructure 
Sabotage.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the heads of 
the relevant Federal agencies to develop strategies to 
coordinate closely within the interagency process and with 
subsea telecommunications infrastructure industry stakeholders 
to review subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, 
including by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data, to--
(A) identify trends;
(B) refine attributions, particularly in cases 
where subsea telecommunications infrastructure has been 
intentionally damaged by malicious actors;
(C) identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure construction;
(D) identify Federal Government functions and 
private sector engagement methods to support the 
security of subsea telecommunications infrastructure; 
and
(E) inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce 
damage to subsea telecommunications infrastructure 
systems.
(2) Strategy elements.--The strategies required under 
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) resourcing requirements;
(B) coordination with United States allies and 
partners and relevant subsea telecommunications 
infrastructure industry stakeholders; and
(C) the necessary technical expertise to make 
attributions for subsea telecommunications 
infrastructure sabotage.
(e) Report.--Not later than 30 days after establishing the required 
interagency committee under subsection (b), the President shall submit 
to Congress a report that includes the following elements:
(1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff the 
interagency committee and United States Federal agencies 
overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).
(2) A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will 
advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b).

SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Public-Private Sector Information Sharing.--Consistent with the 
necessary protections of classified information, the sourcing of 
relevant intelligence material, and privacy and civil liberties, all 
appropriate agencies shall, with the approval of the interagency 
committee and in coordination, as appropriate, with intelligence 
sharing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the 
maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea telecommunications 
infrastructure, issue procedures to establish and promote--
(1) the timely sharing of classified information regarding 
subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and any 
indications of potential sabotage held by members of the 
interagency committee with non-Federal entities that possess 
the necessary security clearances;
(2) the timely sharing between the interagency committee 
and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure sabotage, information 
relating to indications of potential sabotage, or authorized 
uses under this Act, in the possession of the interagency 
committee that may be declassified and shared at an 
unclassified level;
(3) the timely sharing between the interagency committee 
and non-Federal entities of unclassified, including controlled 
unclassified, information regarding subsea telecommunications 
infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential sabotage 
held by members of the interagency committee or non-Federal 
entities;
(4) the timely sharing between the interagency committee 
and non-Federal entities, when and if appropriate, of 
information relating to indications of potential subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure sabotage or authorized uses 
under this title, held by the interagency committee or non-
Federal entities about subsea telecommunications infrastructure 
sabotage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential adverse 
effects from such sabotage; and
(5) the timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and 
performance metrics.
(b) Development of Procedures.--The procedures developed under 
subsection (b) shall--
(1) ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the 
capacity to identify and inform subsea telecommunications 
infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the 
appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent 
with the protection of classified information;
(2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes, 
roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency 
committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing, 
including subsea telecommunications infrastructure-specific 
information sharing and analysis entities; and
(3) require members of the interagency committee and other 
appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea 
telecommunications infrastructure sabotage indicators or 
defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls 
to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such 
information.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with the members of the interagency committee, shall--
(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, submit to Congress the procedures required under 
subsection (b); and
(2) not later than one year after submitting such 
procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to 
Congress a report on the implementation and execution of 
information sharing with private sector actors in the previous 
year pursuant to subsection (a).
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