H.R. 8177

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8177 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8177

To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical 
undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic 
stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics 
employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 2, 2026

Mr. Lawler (for himself, Mr. Min, and Mr. Stanton) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical 
undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic 
stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics 
employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure 
Resilience Initiative Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the 
security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan 
Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and 
around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of 
cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions 
in 2023 and 2025.
(2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea 
infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that 
could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication 
capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of 
critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the 
ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and 
internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, 
and social functions.
(3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical 
undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing 
number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, 
including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to 
Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
(4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical 
undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy 
aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications 
and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or 
other attempt to force unification with the PRC.
(5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly 
the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to 
critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other 
nations, including--
(A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the 
PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut 
internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's 
Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio 
transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 
days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs;
(B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom 
reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei 
and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as 
the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled 
in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near 
where the cable was damaged;
(C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel 
named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast 
guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New 
Taipei; and
(D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained 
the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu 
Islands after an undersea cable in the area was 
severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping 
the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have 
broken the cable''.
(6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage 
to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the 
Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting 
PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in 
several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability 
of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty 
of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable.
(7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure 
constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and 
undermine international security while falling short of direct 
military confrontation.
(8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to 
bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic 
Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad 
Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at 
enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the 
Indo-Pacific.
(9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by 
purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global 
information and communications technology supply chain. Any 
restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security 
would have a direct impact on the world's economy.
(10) To counter the threats described in this section and 
safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the 
United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster 
Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and 
foster international cooperation to protect those critical 
assets.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this section:
(1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical 
undersea infrastructure'' means--
(A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a 
subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed 
on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit 
electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, 
subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related 
to the support of offshore energy production 
installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or 
hydrogen between land-based or off-shore 
infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations 
and facilities; or
(B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, 
including subsea fiber-optic cables and related 
equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, 
and used to transmit communications, data, voice, 
video, or other electronic signals, as well as 
associated landing stations and facilities.
(2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or 
preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause 
defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical 
undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data 
transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.

(a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the 
Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to 
be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' 
(in this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').
(b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and 
resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a 
focus on countering threats from the PRC.
(c) Key Focus Areas.--
(1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In 
carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced 
critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of 
detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, 
including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early 
warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea 
infrastructure from global intelligence networks.
(2) Rapid response protocols.--
(A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, 
the Secretary of State shall--
(i) in cooperation with regional partners, 
establish rapid response protocols for damaged 
critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating 
disruptions; and
(ii) work with allies and partners of the 
United States to help Taiwan and regional 
partners develop the logistical capacity to 
respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea 
infrastructure and minimize downtime.
(B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is 
authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of 
fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out 
subparagraph (A).
(3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out 
the Initiative--
(A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of 
the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard 
of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime 
domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability 
to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or 
activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and
(B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist 
in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the 
Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to 
monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage.
(4) International frameworks for protection.--
(A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, 
the Secretary of State shall seek to establish 
cooperative frameworks with regional and global 
partners to protect undersea cable networks near 
Taiwan.
(B) Elements.--The frameworks established under 
subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the 
United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing 
platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to 
enhance collective security against sabotage.
(5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the 
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support 
the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, 
including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and 
using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to 
natural disasters and sabotage.

SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS.

(a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President 
shall work with like-minded international partners to implement 
strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical 
undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone 
warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to 
adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical 
undersea infrastructure.
(b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded 
international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by 
the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including 
through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and 
participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics 
and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.

SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA 
INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.

(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary 
of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions 
described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the 
President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of 
sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of 
Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including--
(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of 
which knowingly--
(A) commits acts of sabotage; or
(B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical 
support, security, or other services that facilitate or 
enable an act of sabotage; and
(2) any foreign person that knowingly--
(A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity 
described in paragraph (1);
(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or 
reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
(C) facilitates deceptive or structured 
transactions to support such a vessel or entity;
(D) provides port or logistics services or 
facilities for technology upgrades or installation of 
equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a 
vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions;
(E) provides documentation, registration, or 
flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of 
evading sanctions; or
(F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or 
senior leader of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing 
sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the 
sanctions.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all 
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to 
block and prohibit all transactions in all property and 
interests in property of a foreign person described in 
subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are 
in the United States, come within the United States, or are or 
come within the possession or control of a United States 
person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien 
described in subsection (a) shall be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other 
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted 
or paroled into the United States or to receive 
any other benefit under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry 
documentation of an alien described in 
subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of 
when such visa or other entry documentation is 
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under 
clause (i) shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other 
valid visa or entry documentation that 
is in the possession of the alien.
(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 
1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this 
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry 
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in 
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same 
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in 
subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters 
agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this 
section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole 
of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the 
alien is necessary--
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the 
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United 
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and 
entered into force November 21, 1947, between the 
United Nations and the United States, or other 
applicable international obligations of the United 
States; or
(B) to carry out or assist authorized law 
enforcement activity in the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity 
subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any 
authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--A requirement to block and 
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests 
in property under this section shall not include the 
authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the 
importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term 
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade 
substance, material, supply or manufactured product, 
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding 
technical data.
(f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive 
the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the 
waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees--
(1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the 
waiver is in the national security interests of the United 
States; and
(2) a report explaining the basis for the certification.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms 
``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms 
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1101).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives.
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an 
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States 
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United 
States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; 
or
(C) any person in the United States.

SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall 
submit to Congress a report detailing--
(1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to 
critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and
(2) any actions taken in response to such incidents.

SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS.

(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt 
by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by 
force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that 
addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national 
security of the United States.
(b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a 
Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group--
(A) to be chaired by the National Security Council; 
and
(B) consisting of senior officials from the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
United States intelligence community, and such other 
Federal agencies as may be appropriate.
(2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group 
shall--
(A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to 
prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, 
including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure 
of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic 
coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats;
(B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply 
chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and 
security posture of the United States and allies and 
partners of the United States that would be affected by 
a crisis involving Taiwan;
(C) develop integrated contingency plans that 
coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and 
homeland security responses across the Group;
(D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, 
resources, and decision-making processes to execute 
such contingency plans;
(E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or 
coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions;
(F) share risk assessments with allies and partners 
of the United States, as appropriate; and
(G) regularly test and refine contingency plans.
(3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group 
under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the 
Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to 
Congress a classified report that includes--
(A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed 
and planning activities conducted by the Group;
(B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United 
States and allies and partners of the United States to 
respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including 
identification of capability gaps and resource 
requirements;
(C) recommendations for legislative action, policy 
changes, or resource allocation to enhance such 
preparedness; and
(D) a description of exercises conducted and 
lessons learned by the Group.
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