H.R. 8615

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8615 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8615

To combat China's unfair and non-market-oriented trade practices 
related to the shipbuilding industry, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 30, 2026

Mrs. Kim (for herself, Mr. Lawler, and Mrs. Radewagen) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To combat China's unfair and non-market-oriented trade practices 
related to the shipbuilding industry, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Facilitating 
Leadership and Expertise through Exchange and Training in Shipbuilding 
Now Act of 2026'' or the ``FLEETS Now Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
TITLE I--MATTERS RELATING TO SHIPBUILDING AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA

Sec. 101. Strategic ports; United States International Development 
Finance Corporation.
Sec. 102. Briefing and report on China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping 
Heavy Industry and China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation.
TITLE II--MATTERS RELATING TO SHIPBUILDING AND THE UNITED STATES, ITS 
ALLIES AND PARTNERS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Sec. 201. Statement of policy to counter shipbuilding practices of the 
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 202. International shipbuilding coordination responsibility.
Sec. 203. Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space 
Affairs.
Sec. 204. Exchange program for shipbuilding industry experts.
Sec. 205. Maritime investigators.
Sec. 206. Allied maritime framework.
Sec. 207. Maritime group of nations.
Sec. 208. International Maritime Organization.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China (hereafter in this 
section referred to as the ``PRC'') has deployed unfair and 
non-market-oriented practices in the maritime, logistics, and 
shipbuilding sectors to achieve a long-term dominant position 
in the shipbuilding ecosystem. In response, the United States 
Trade Representative launched an investigation under title III 
of the Trade Act of 1974 in April 2024, and reaffirmed its 
allegations in a notice of proposed actions in February 2025.
(2) The PRC's Military-Civil Fusion strategy uses the 
opacity of China's business ecosystem to channel commercial 
activities--including foreign shipbuilding orders--into 
upgrading its naval industrial base. By integrating commercial 
and military production at shared shipyards, the PRC enables 
the transfer of capital, technology, personnel, and supply 
chains to China's defense industrial base, strengthening 
military capabilities through civilian contracts.
(3) The PRC frames its shipbuilding and maritime sectors as 
strategic industries that must be targeted to build economic, 
technological and military power. This targeting necessarily 
means the displacement of foreign firms from existing markets, 
and taking new markets as they present, which diminishes 
competition. The United States has not taken sufficient action 
to counter the PRC and protect United States enterprises.
(4) By achieving dominant market positions, the PRC 
exercises increasing influence over global supply, pricing, and 
access to goods and services.
(5) The PRC's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and 
shipbuilding sectors creates dependencies on China, increasing 
risk and reducing supply chain resilience. The PRC seeks to 
displace foreign competitors throughout the maritime value 
chain in domestic and foreign markets, increasing the world's 
dependence on the PRC for products, services, and technology.
(6) International dependencies on the PRC increases risks 
(potential disruptions, whether natural, accidental, or 
politically motivated) for individual firms and their workers, 
for economic sectors, and supply chain resilience. The PRC has 
demonstrated its willingness to weaponize dependencies for the 
purpose of economic coercion.
(7) The PRC's control over Chinese economic actors in the 
maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors enables China to 
direct and influence commercial behavior in pursuit of market 
dominance in ways that run counter to fair competition and 
market-oriented principles.
(8) The PRC's industrial plans identify a matrix of 
mechanisms that are used to achieve market dominance, including 
government financial support, barriers for foreign firms, 
consolidation policies, measures associated with forced 
technology transfer and intellectual property theft, state-led 
investments, and government procurement.
(9) As a result of the PRC's market distortion, Chinese 
maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors accrue a wide 
range of non-market advantages, such as artificially low costs 
or preferential supply from China's non-market excess capacity, 
including in steel, China's lack of effective labor rights, and 
China's control over digital logistics services.
(10) The PRC's direct intervention in the shipbuilding 
market makes ships built in the United States and elsewhere 
commercially less competitive. Less than one percent of new 
commercial ships are built in the United States and domestic 
shipbuilding is almost exclusively for military use.
(11) In 2024, the PRC accounted for 53.3 percent of the 
global shipbuilding industry and the China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation built more commercial ships by tonnage in 2024 than 
the entire United States shipbuilding industry has built since 
the end of World War II.
(12) The state-owned shipbuilding conglomerates like China 
Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry and China State 
Shipbuilding Corporation are China's largest commercial 
shipbuilding corporations and the primary entities responsible 
for the buildup of the People's Liberation Army Navy into the 
world's largest navy enabling the PRC to increase its capacity 
to undermine United States national security interests.
(13) The shipbuilding capacity of the United States has 
been weakened by decades of neglect, leading to a contraction 
of a once vibrant domestic maritime workforce while 
simultaneously empowering our adversaries, eroding United 
States national security, and reducing American jobs in the 
maritime sector.
(14) Increasing domestic shipbuilding capacity is essential 
to restoring America's maritime strength and self-sufficiency. 
This will require coordinated action across procurement policy, 
capital investment, supplier resilience, and workforce 
development.
(15) According to America's Maritime Action Plan from 
February 2026, the United States does not have the capacity 
necessary to scale up the domestic shipbuilding industry to the 
rate required to meet national priorities.
(16) For decades, the United States strategic position and 
shipbuilding industrial capacity have been weakened, in part, 
by cumbersome Government procurement processes, a lack of 
strategic support for construction of commercial vessels in 
domestic shipyards, and the degradation of Federal financial 
investment in the Maritime Industrial Base.
(17) Strengthening the United States maritime sector 
requires leveraging international and industry partnerships to 
align trade policies to enhance investment in the United States 
maritime sector. By creating clear pathways for foreign direct 
investments in United States shipyards, suppliers, and maritime 
infrastructure, the United States can expand domestic capacity 
while reinforcing relationships abroad.
(18) Currently, foreign firms are severely disadvantaged in 
competing with the resources of the Chinese state, resulting in 
lost sales, under-investment in capacity, diminished ability to 
attract financing, and lost jobs and lower wages.
(19) Foreign companies, including firms based in many 
United States-allied countries purchase 75 percent of the ships 
built at China's dual-use shipyards, funneling billions of 
dollars in revenue and transferring key technologies into the 
People's Liberation Army naval industrial base.
(20) The United States does not have a single agency or 
department charged with designing and implementing industrial 
shipbuilding policy. As a result, there is no single official 
charged with protecting and expanding the domestic shipbuilding 
industry in the United States. This creates inefficiency in 
reinvigorating the United States shipbuilding industry and 
confusion when engaging international partners about joint 
strategies for diversifying shipbuilding supply chains.
(21) The President's Maritime Action Plan outlines a 
strategy for reclaiming America's maritime strength, ensuring 
the Nation can defend its interests and ferry its trade. In 
implementing the Maritime Action Plan, the United States will 
modernize its procurement processes and streamline regulations 
to accelerate shipbuilding and reduce costs.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Allied country.--The term ``allied country'' has the 
meaning given such term in section 2350f(d) of title 10, United 
States Code.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate.
(3) Deck-plate professional.--The term ``deck-plate 
professional'' means a skilled worker who operates directly on 
the production floor as a skilled tradesperson with specialized 
expertise related to a ship's systems and functionality.
(4) Foreign country of concern.--The term ``foreign country 
of concern'' has the meaning given the term ``covered nation'' 
in section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code.
(5) Unreasonable refusal to deal.--The term ``unreasonable 
refusal to deal'' has the meaning given that term for purposes 
of section 7(d) of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 (46 
U.S.C. 41104 note).

TITLE I--MATTERS RELATING TO SHIPBUILDING AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA

SEC. 101. STRATEGIC PORTS; UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE CORPORATION.

The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 
2018 is amended--
(1) in section 1402(3) (22 U.S.C. 9601(3))--
(A) by striking subparagraph (A); and
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) through (G) 
as subparagraphs (A) through (F), respectively; and
(2) in section 1412(f) (22 U.S.C. 9612(f)), by adding at 
the end the following:
``(4) Harbors or ports (as such terms are defined in 
section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153)) 
and related infrastructure.''.

SEC. 102. BRIEFING AND REPORT ON CHINA OCEAN SHIPPING COMPANY SHIPPING 
HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CHINA STATE SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION.

(a) Briefing.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other Federal agencies and departments the Secretary 
determines relevant, shall brief the appropriate congressional 
committees on--
(1) companies or entities with formal or informal financial 
relationships with--
(A) the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy 
Industry; or
(B) the China State Shipbuilding Corporation; and
(2) the business practices of such companies and entities.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the President shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
includes the following:
(1) A description of each current and former subsidiary of 
the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry and 
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation.
(2) Any trading practices of any such entities that are 
subject to review by the United States Trade Representative for 
being unreasonable, discriminatory, or violating trade 
agreements.
(3) The degree and extent of direct involvement by the 
Government of the People's Republic of China in the governance, 
strategic direction, planning, and commercial operations of--
(A) the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy 
Industry;
(B) the China State Shipbuilding Corporation; and
(C) the Chinese shipbuilding industry.
(4) A description of each shipyard in China that is 
producing warships for the People's Liberation Army Navy or 
producing dual-use commercial ships, including ferries and 
barges, that may be used by the People's Liberation Army Navy.
(5) An indication of which such shipyards are conducting 
business with non-People's Republic of China foreign entities 
and potentially thereby facilitating the modernization of the 
People's Liberation Army Navy.

TITLE II--MATTERS RELATING TO SHIPBUILDING AND THE UNITED STATES, ITS 
ALLIES AND PARTNERS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

SEC. 201. STATEMENT OF POLICY TO COUNTER SHIPBUILDING PRACTICES OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

It is the policy of the United States to develop a domestic 
capacity to produce ships for both commercial and military application 
independent of supply chains that include materials sourced from the 
People's Republic of China. Such policy shall be given effect, among 
other things, through a comprehensive effort, in coordination with 
allies and partners of the United States where appropriate, that 
includes--
(1) relevant knowledge transfer to and skillset development 
of a shipbuilding labor force in the United States;
(2) securing direct investment in United States shipyards 
by allies and partners; and
(3) the development of a coherent long-term strategy to 
diversify shipbuilding supply chains and expand domestic 
shipbuilding capacity, incorporating all relevant Federal 
agencies and departments.

SEC. 202. INTERNATIONAL SHIPBUILDING COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITY.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the President shall designate an individual as the primary point of 
contact in the United States Government for purposes of--
(1) attracting international shipbuilding investment 
opportunities in the United States;
(2) leading cooperation with the governments of foreign 
countries on international shipbuilding supply chain 
diversification; and
(3) leading engagement on behalf of the United States 
Government for coordination of international shipbuilding 
industries in a manner that creates supply chain resilience and 
protects the national security interests of the United States.

SEC. 203. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WATER, ENVIRONMENT, AND SPACE 
AFFAIRS.

Section 9 of the Department of State Appropriations Authorization 
Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2655a) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 9. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WATER, ENVIRONMENT, AND SPACE 
AFFAIRS.

``(a) Establishment.--There is authorized to be in the Department 
of State an Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space 
Affairs, who shall be responsible to the Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs for matters pertaining to space, oceans and maritime diplomacy, 
polar affairs, environmental quality, freshwater, fisheries, wildlife 
and wildlife trafficking, conservation, and such other related duties 
as the Secretary may from time to time designate.
``(b) Responsibilities.--In addition to the responsibilities 
described under subsection (a), the Assistant Secretary for Water, 
Environment, and Space Affairs shall maintain continuous observation 
and coordination of all matters pertaining to oceans and maritime 
diplomacy, fisheries, natural resource conservation, and outer space in 
the conduct of foreign policy, including, as appropriate, the 
following:
``(1) Developing United States policy on global 
environmental security issues with respect to oceans, 
fisheries, the Antarctic region, waste and global pollution, 
and water and other natural resource management and 
conservation.
``(2) Representing the Department in bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations involving the law of the sea, 
including--
``(A) freedom of navigation, overflight, and other 
lawful uses of the ocean;
``(B) maritime security;
``(C) United States maritime zones, including the 
United States extended continental shelf;
``(D) marine science;
``(E) the sustainable management and protection of 
marine habitats and resources;
``(F) marine pollution; and
``(G) maritime claims and boundaries.
``(3) Leading United States engagement on Antarctica and in 
international oceans agreements and conventions with foreign 
governments and international organizations, to promote 
solutions that advance United States national security, 
economic, and environmental interests.
``(4) Coordinating the development of policies and programs 
to conserve and manage economically important ecosystems, 
including, forests, wetlands, drylands, and coral reefs.
``(5) Developing policies and programs to address 
international threats to natural resources, such as illicit 
trade, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, wildlife 
trafficking, and illegal logging and associated trade.
``(6) Developing and implementing United States foreign 
policy related to air, water and soil pollution and risks to 
human health and the environment caused by the transboundary 
movement of hazardous chemicals and waste and other forms of 
pollution to promote environmental security, with trade 
partners and in multilateral institutions.
``(7) Representing the Department in bilateral and 
multilateral engagements including organizations, institutions, 
and negotiation of international agreements on related issues.
``(8) Developing policies and programs, in coordination 
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the 
Department of Commerce, and other relevant Federal departments 
and agencies, as appropriate, to support partnerships between 
the United States and international and private industry 
partners in the development of infrastructure and policies that 
expand economic growth in outer space, including--
``(A) countering malign efforts by foreign 
adversaries and other actors that threaten United 
States interests in civil and commercial space; and
``(B) expanding access to foreign markets for 
United States commercial industry, including by 
encouraging reforms that reduce barriers to trade and 
cooperation with United States civil and commercial 
space actors.
``(9) Leading bilateral and multilateral engagements 
related to civil and commercial space activities, resilient 
space services, burden sharing, and other matters related to 
international space law and diplomacy and other United States 
international obligations and commitments.
``(10) Leading United States Government engagement with 
international Global Navigation Satellite Systems providers to 
ensure compatibility and encourage interoperability of civil 
global navigation satellite services on United States-based 
global positioning systems, including through the International 
Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems.
``(11) Leading Department efforts to implement 
international arrangements and promote cooperation on Earth 
observation satellite systems.
``(12) Leading Department engagement in multilateral and 
bilateral forums on international space policy, space law, and 
commercial and civil treaties or agreements.
``(13) Leading Department efforts on transparency in space 
by maintaining the official United States space object registry 
and promoting best practices for safe operations in space, 
preservation of the space environment, space traffic 
coordination, and space situational awareness.
``(14) Leading Department efforts to align foreign space 
law, regulatory, and policy frameworks with United States-
endorsed models, approaches, and best practices.
``(15) At the direction of the Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs and the Secretary of State, represent the United States 
in international maritime diplomacy matters, including--
``(A) the creation and operation of the Allied 
Maritime Framework under section 206 of the FLEETS Now 
Act;
``(B) the development of the report under section 
103; and
``(C) leading United States engagement in the 
Maritime Group of Nations under section 207 of the 
FLEETS Now Act.
``(16) Authoring any reports produced by the Department 
which examine the maritime claims and boundaries of coastal 
countries and assessing their consistency with international 
law.
``(17) Performing such other duties as the Under Secretary 
for Economic Affairs may from time to time designate.
``(c) Appointment.--
``(1) Initial appointment.--On the date of the enactment of 
the FLEETS Now Act, the individual serving as the Assistant 
Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs on the day before such date of enactment 
shall be the Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and 
Space Affairs.
``(2) Subsequent appointment.--Any subsequent appointment 
of an individual to the position of Assistant Secretary for 
Water, Environment, and Space Affairs shall be subject to the 
advice and consent of the Senate.
``(d) Establishment of Bureau of Water, Environment, and Space 
Affairs.--The Secretary shall establish a Bureau of Water, Environment, 
and Space Affairs, which shall perform such functions related to space, 
oceans, environmental quality, fisheries, wildlife, wildlife 
trafficking, and conservation affairs as the Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs may prescribe.
``(e) Assistant Secretary.--The Assistant Secretary for Water, 
Environment, and Space Affairs shall be the head of the Bureau of 
Water, Environment, and Space Affairs.''.

SEC. 204. EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY EXPERTS.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the 
Secretary of State should initiate an exchange visitor program of 
technical shipbuilding expertise to increase shipbuilding knowledge, 
training, experience, and expertise in the American shipbuilding 
workforce.
(b) Authorization To Provide for Exchanges.--Section 102(b) of the 
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2452(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (11), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting 
``; and''; and
(3) by inserting at the end the following:
``(13) interchanges and visits between the United 
States and other countries of marine engineers, naval 
architects, electrical engineers, deck-plate 
professionals, marine surveyors, shipyard 
infrastructure analysts, quality assurance and quality 
control personnel, shipyard project managers, and other 
experts related to the shipbuilding industry until the 
date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of 
this paragraph.''.

SEC. 205. MARITIME INVESTIGATORS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with 
the Chair of the Federal Maritime Commission, detail to countries 
described in subsection (b) personnel from the Division for Trade 
Policy and Negotiations of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 
for the purpose of investigating--
(1) unfair shipping practices, including price-fixing, 
market manipulation, or unreasonable refusal to deal;
(2) specific actions by foreign governments to deny port of 
entry to United States-flagged vessels;
(3) flags of convenience to determine if lower safety, 
labor, and environmental standards in foreign countries create 
unfavorable shipping conditions for United States trade;
(4) anticompetitive agreements between ocean carriers and 
marine terminal operators for potential antitrust issues; and
(5) mapping the financial relationships of shipping 
companies of the People's Republic of China, including the 
Ocean Alliance.
(b) Locations of Investigators.--The personnel described in 
subsection (a) shall be detailed to diplomatic and consular posts in 
countries that meet each of the following criteria:
(1) The country is among the top 5 countries globally by 
ship registry size and maintains an ``open registry'', allowing 
foreign-owned vessels to register under the flag of such 
country without a residency requirement (also known as a ``flag 
of convenience'' policy).
(2) The country is among the top 15 countries globally with 
respect to not less than 2 of the following criteria:
(A) Shipbuilding, as measured by tonnage as a 
percentage of global total.
(B) Number of citizens or nationals who are 
merchant mariners.
(C) Number of commercially owned ships greater than 
1,000 gross weight tonnage.
(c) Inclusion of Findings in Investment Climate Statement.--Section 
707(b) of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 
9903) is amended by inserting after paragraph (11) the following new 
paragraph:
``(12) Information about unfair business practices in the 
maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors in each 
applicable country or region, including--
``(A) price-fixing;
``(B) market manipulation;
``(C) unreasonable refusal to deal (as such term is 
defined for purposes of section 7(d) of the Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act of 2022 (46 U.S.C. 41104 note)); 
and
``(D) anticompetitive agreements between ocean 
carriers and marine terminal operators.''.
(d) Disclosure of Certain Investments by Countries Receiving Aid.--
Section 7031(b)(2) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2014 (Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 510) is amended by inserting 
``and investments in maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors'' 
after ``allocation practices)''.

SEC. 206. ALLIED MARITIME FRAMEWORK.

(a) In General.--The President, acting through the individual 
designated pursuant to section 202 and in coordination with other 
relevant agencies and departments, shall engage allied countries to 
develop a shared framework to enhance collective capacity to design, 
produce, and maintain military and civilian ships, through--
(1) enhancing information exchange between such countries 
regarding such design, production, and maintenance;
(2) expanding procompetitive industrial collaboration with 
respect to such ships; and
(3) strengthening the marine industries and the 
shipbuilding industries in allied countries.
(b) Elements.--The framework required in subsection (a) shall 
include--
(1) the establishment of a mechanism to--
(A) ensure countries participating in the framework 
can access reciprocal ports and shipping support during 
crises and conflicts;
(B) co-develop best-in-class design principles for 
the construction of ships;
(C) collaborate, on a reciprocal basis, on the 
construction, repair, interoperability, and other 
capabilities of new ships to reduce costs;
(D) establish guiding principles for production 
line sequencing and supply chain management;
(E) coordinate Cabinet or Minister-level 
recommendations to drive down the production costs of 
ships and accelerate the delivery of ships, consistent 
with relevant laws in the relevant countries;
(F) establish a process for determining specific 
ship types or industry niches that are best suited for 
allied cooperation, including icebreakers, support 
ships, oilers, tankers, liquified natural gas carriers, 
undersea vessels, research vessels, and dual-fuel 
ships; and
(G) develop a mechanism to incentivize financial 
investments from foreign sources and remove barriers to 
foreign direct investment in shipbuilding;
(2) the establishment of a joint workforce-development 
program between participating shipyards and partner networks 
engaged in the production of ships for the purpose of training, 
information sharing, and the exchange of technical advisors;
(3) the establishment of a mechanism to develop and share 
research and development and leverage innovation to promote 
sustainability and mutual benefit;
(4) an agreement among countries participating in the 
framework to procure ships and ship components from shipyards 
identified by the participants as shipyards with specialized 
capabilities and experience in ship production; and
(5) an agreement among countries participating in the 
framework to prevent leakage of dual-use technologies to 
companies connected to the military of the People's Republic of 
China.

SEC. 207. MARITIME GROUP OF NATIONS.

(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall seek to establish 
a group, to be known as the ``Maritime Group of Nations'', to 
coordinate regulatory and commerce policies to facilitate a new 
maritime multimodalism for commercial shipping.
(b) Participation.--
(1) Inclusion.--The Secretary of State should invite to the 
Maritime Group of Nations appropriate counterparts from the 
governments of countries that meet each of the following 
criteria:
(A) The country is of significant importance for 
the purposes of establishing and advancing the 
objectives of the Maritime Group of Nations, as 
determined by the Secretary of State.
(B) The country additionally is among the top 15 
countries globally with respect to at least two of the 
following criteria:
(i) Shipbuilding, as measured by tonnage as 
a percentage of global total.
(ii) Number of citizens or nationals who 
are merchant mariners.
(iii) Number of commercially owned ships 
greater than 1,000 gross weight tonnage.
(2) Exclusion.--The Maritime Group of Nations established 
under subsection (a) may not include a foreign country of 
concern.
(c) Functions.--The Maritime Group of Nations established under 
subsection (a) should consider the following:
(1) Supporting the establishment of maritime prosperity 
zones across a diverse geography, including areas outside 
traditional coast shipbuilding and ship repair centers, to--
(A) incentivize and leverage national private 
capital and investment by allied countries in the 
maritime industries and waterfront communities; and
(B) strengthen industrial base capacity and 
readiness through shipbuilding, workforce development, 
and expanded manufacturing incentives.
(2) Supporting the implementation of a coordinated, 
reciprocal fee on foreign-built vessels, to--
(A) provide consistent funding to strengthen the 
merchant marine enterprise; and
(B) support investments in commercial shipbuilding, 
fleet expansion, industrial base resilience, and 
maritime workforce development.
(3) Developing standardized reciprocal trade agreements 
that--
(A) would ensure fair competition; and
(B) reduce dependency on adversarial supply chains.
(4) Coordinating a collective position with respect to 
regulations and guidelines issued by the International Maritime 
Organization that protects domestic shipbuilding industries.
(5) Implementing and contributing to the exchange visitor 
program authorized by the amendments made by section 204.

SEC. 208. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION.

The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Ambassador to 
the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
States mission to the United Nations to urge the International Maritime 
Organization of the United Nations, and the members of its Council, 
to--
(1) revise the International Maritime Organization's Net-
Zero Framework, specifically to--
(A) exclude any limits on conventional crude or 
diesel, liquified natural gas, or any other type of 
marine propulsion technology and instead champion an 
``energy all'' approach that does not restrict or 
constrain current or breakthrough fuel types;
(B) remove any financial penalties, carbon taxes, 
or multilateral funds which are used to help nations 
decarbonize;
(C) eliminate penalties on liquified natural gas, 
recognize biofuels as viable marine fuels, and support 
industry-led advances in alternative fuels and other 
technologies without creating undue advantage or 
disadvantage to certain fuels or technologies through 
regulation;
(D) withdraw or phase out of any regional shipping 
emissions reduction schemes, including the Emissions 
Trading System of the European Union;
(E) support an ``opt-in'' model with respect to the 
rules of such organization; and
(F) remove any net-zero 2050 targets the President 
determines unreasonable;
(2) advance the candidacy of United States citizens into 
senior-level positions within the--
(A) International Maritime Organization Assembly;
(B) International Maritime Organization Council; 
and
(C) main committees of the International Maritime 
Organization, including--
(i) the Maritime Safety Committee;
(ii) the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee;
(iii) the Legal Committee;
(iv) the Technical Cooperation Committee;
(v) the Facilitation Committee; and
(vi) any Sub-Committee;
(3) advance the candidacy of a United States citizen to 
fill the position of Secretary-General of the International 
Maritime Organization;
(4) combat the anti-competitive practices of the People's 
Republic of China by investigating and regulating the 
deliberate use of policies and practices to give domestic 
shipbuilding industries a competitive advantage over foreign 
rivals (also known as ``industrial targeting'');
(5) advocate for the consistent enforcement of existing 
safety and technical rules to ensure foreign-flagged vessels 
meet International Maritime Organization standards without 
requiring unilateral United States regulations; and
(6) de-link United States domestic environmental 
requirements from international certificates to reduce 
compliance friction for United States shipyards.
<all>