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Bills/119th Congress · House

H.R. 8982

Introduced

Assuring the Future of Tibet Act of 2026

Sponsor
DJames P. McGovern· Massachusetts
Introduced
May 21, 2026
Policy area
International Affairs
Latest action
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.May 21, 2026
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8982 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8982

To direct the Secretary of State to advocate for the inclusion and 
recognition of the Central Tibetan Administration, and for other 
purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 21, 2026

Mr. McGovern (for himself and Mr. McCaul) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of State to advocate for the inclusion and 
recognition of the Central Tibetan Administration, and for other 
purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Assuring the Future of Tibet Act of 
2026''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) The relationship between the United States Government 
and Tibet began in 1908, when United States diplomat William 
Rockhill met the 13th Dalai Lama to discuss Tibet's relations 
with China and Great Britain and facilitate an exchange of 
gifts between the Dalai Lama and United States President 
Theodore Roosevelt.
(2) The relationship of the United States Government with 
His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama began in 1942 when President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt wrote him to state, ``There are in 
the United States of America, many persons, among them myself, 
who [are] long and greatly interested in your land and people 
...''.
(3) The relationship of the United States Congress with the 
14th Dalai Lama began in 1979 when he first visited Capitol 
Hill and strengthened in 1987 when he presented his Five Point 
Peace Plan to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in the 
United States Capitol building.
(4) The first face-to-face meeting between Presidents of 
the United States and the Dalai Lama began in 1991 when 
President George H.W. Bush hosted him at the White House.
(5) Engagement between the United States Government and the 
Central Tibetan Administration and members of Tibetan 
communities has grown and deepened in recent decades to include 
diverse programming to support health, education, humanitarian 
aid, governance, people-to-people exchanges, as authorized in 
the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (22 U.S.C. 6901 
note), and dialogue on global matters of mutual interest.
(6) The Dalai Lama in 1950 assumed the role of head of 
state of Tibet.
(7) The Dalai Lama continued to serve as the formal head of 
the Tibetan government-in-exile, later known as the Central 
Tibetan Administration, after 1959.
(8) In 2011, the Dalai Lama transferred his political 
authority to the Tibetan government-in-exile, whose executive 
and legislative officials are chosen by democratic election, a 
decision that was codified by the Tibetan parliament-in-exile 
through an amendment to the Tibetan Charter vesting executive 
power of the Central Tibetan Administration in the Sikyong, the 
chief executive.
(9) In 2011, and reaffirmed in 2025, the Dalai Lama 
announced that the determination of his successor will be made 
by the Gaden Phodrang Trust, the Office of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama, which has ``sole authority to recognize the future 
reincarnation; no one else has any such authority to interfere 
in this matter''.
(10) The next Dalai Lama, who will be selected according to 
the process set by the 14th Dalai Lama, will not come of 
majority age for many years after being selected.
(11) It has been the long-standing policy of the United 
States to promote the human rights and distinct religious, 
cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan 
people, as acknowledged and codified by the Tibetan Policy and 
Support Act of 2020 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
(12) The Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute 
Act (Public Law 118-70) characterizes the dispute between Tibet 
and the People's Republic of China as unresolved, states the 
sense of Congress that ``claims made by the People's Republic 
of China that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient 
times are historically inaccurate'', and states that it is 
United States policy to resolve the dispute ``in accordance 
with international law, including the United Nations Charter, 
by peaceful means, through dialogue without preconditions''.
(13) Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provide, ``All peoples 
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development''.
(14) The People's Republic of China's constitution and the 
People's Republic of China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of 
1984 provide for a right of regional autonomy for Tibetans and 
other non-Han Chinese populations, including ``the freedom to 
use and develop their own spoken and written languages'' and 
maintain or change their own cultural practices.
(15) The People's Republic of China's Law on Promoting 
Ethnic Unity and Progress approved by the National People's 
Congress in March 2026 contradicts previous statutory and 
constitutional guarantees of meaningful autonomy for Tibetans 
and other non-Han Chinese populations by statutorily mandating 
that education be conducted in Mandarin, requiring that written 
Chinese be given prominence over alternative scripts in public 
settings, and legally prioritizing national identity over 
distinct ethnic identity.
(16) The Government of the People's Republic of China has 
provided no verifiable evidence that the Tibetan people were 
consulted, much less approved, the diminution of their right to 
autonomy under the People's Republic of China's Law on 
Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China has 
reneged on its legal commitment under the Constitution of the 
People's Republic of China, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, 
and relevant international law to provide a high degree of 
regional autonomy to the Tibetan people, including the right to 
use and develop their own spoken and written languages, through 
the enactment in 2026 of the People's Republic of China's Law 
on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which instead 
facilitates the assimilation of Tibetans and erosion of the 
right of the Tibetan people to exercise their own religious, 
cultural and language rights;
(2) the People's Republic of China has denied the Tibetan 
people the ability to exercise their right to self-
determination as provided by international law;
(3) the United States has expressed support for the Dalai 
Lama's vision of a negotiated agreement through dialogue 
without preconditions between the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives or 
democratically elected leaders of the Tibetan community as one 
means of allowing the Tibetan people to exercise their right to 
self-determination;
(4) the Government of the People's Republic of China has 
not demonstrated sincerity or seriousness in its approach to 
engaging in meaningful dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his 
representatives or to reach a negotiated resolution that 
includes the aspirations of the Tibetan people;
(5) the Gaden Phodrang Trust serves as the legitimate and 
sole authority to identify and recognize Dalai Lamas; and
(6) the Central Tibetan Administration is the legitimate 
representative of the Tibetan people.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to affirm the commitment of the United States to a 
resolution of the dispute between Tibet and the People's 
Republic of China as a matter of strategic interest to the 
United States;
(2) to support the Tibetan people's free exercise of their 
fundamental and universal human rights under international law, 
including the right to self-determination as provided by 
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights;
(3) to maintain engagement with the Tibetan people directly 
and through their democratically elected leadership and through 
their religious and cultural leaders in order to promote their 
aspirations with regard to their distinct historical, cultural, 
religious, and linguistic identity;
(4) that the Central Tibetan Administration represents 
continuity of governance of the Tibetan people as established 
by the Dalai Lama; and
(5) to support the Central Tibetan Administration in its 
effort to carry out the responsibilities for which it has been 
empowered by the Dalai Lama and legitimized by the Tibetan 
people through their exercise of a genuine democratic process.

SEC. 5. ADVOCACY.

In order to carry out the policy under section 4--
(1) the President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to 
advocate for the Central Tibetan Administration's observer 
status within the United Nations General Assembly and relevant 
agencies of the United Nations; and
(2) the Secretary of State shall--
(A) advocate for the inclusion of the Central 
Tibetan Administration in relevant international bodies 
and groupings; and
(B) organize like-minded partners to support 
greater international recognition of the Central 
Tibetan Administration within bodies of the United 
Nations and other multilateral fora.

SEC. 6. HIGH-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT AND DIPLOMATIC PROTOCOL.

In order to carry out the policy under section 4, Secretary of 
State shall--
(1) lead interagency efforts to directly engage at the most 
senior levels with Central Tibetan Administration officials, 
including the Sikyong and the designated representatives of the 
Sikyong;
(2) take steps to ensure the Sikyong of the Central Tibetan 
Administration is extended appropriate diplomatic courtesies, 
including the provision of appropriate security details during 
visits to the United States consistent with a head of 
government;
(3) consider the applicability of diplomatic privileges and 
immunities to officials of the Central Tibetan Administration; 
and
(4) urge partners and allies of the United States to engage 
with and support the Central Tibetan Administration at 
similarly senior levels.

SEC. 7. REPORT.

Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act and 
annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report that describes 
the status of the implementation of section 5 and section 6.
<all>

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