H.R. 8994

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8994 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8994

To empower independent music creator owners to collectively negotiate 
with dominant online platforms regarding the terms on which their music 
may be distributed.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 21, 2026

Ms. Ross (for herself, Mr. Cohen, and Mr. Doggett) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To empower independent music creator owners to collectively negotiate 
with dominant online platforms regarding the terms on which their music 
may be distributed.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Protect Working Musicians Act of 
2026''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) Music is a cultural treasure and a unique source of 
spiritual inspiration, emotional comfort, community connection, 
and joy. It is also a powerful economic driver that directly 
and indirectly supports nearly 2 million American jobs and 
almost $150 billion in annual economic activity.
(2) A healthy music ecosystem is a fundamental bedrock for 
a healthy society.
(3) Fair and competitive markets for the use and licensing 
of recorded music are integral to a healthy music ecosystem.
(4) As music distribution has moved online, the market for 
use and licensing has become distorted and imbalanced. The 
largest Dominant Online Music Distribution Platforms use their 
market power to distort legal requirements and force music 
creators into licensing agreements that do not reflect market 
value. Those agreements essentially dictate a price to music 
creators. If music creators do not agree to licensing terms, 
the online platforms profit from unlicensed uploads of music 
anyway.
(5) These platforms game the system created by the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, which allows dominant online 
platforms to ignore and profit from unlicensed use of music and 
places the responsibility for finding each and every instance 
of unlicensed use of music on music creators. This ``notice and 
takedown'' scheme has been described as a gigabit-speed game of 
whack-a-mole.
(6) The trade association for the major record labels 
spends millions of dollars engaged in this effort which it says 
has grown to be ``largely useless.'' The trade association for 
the independent record labels agrees, calling it a 
``dysfunctional relic''.
(7) An effort that is largely useless for major and 
independent record labels is an exercise in futility for 
Independent Music Creator Owners--those who own the copyrights 
and market their work themselves. Independent Music Creator 
Owners lack the economic, legal, and political resources to 
stand up to the Dominant Online Music Distribution Platforms 
and have no way to meaningfully negotiate fair licensing rates 
for their work.
(8) That power imbalance means that Independent Music 
Creator Owners are forced to take whatever terms dominant 
online platforms offer for their work. If they decline, the 
platforms simply ignore them since in most cases lacking access 
to any single artists' work does not present a threat to the 
platforms' overall attractiveness to consumers.
(9) This imbalance has decimated careers in music at an 
untold cost to our society and culture. Multi Grammy-award 
winning musician Rosanne Cash recently lamented: ``I see young 
musicians give up their missions and dreams all the time 
because they can't make a living.''
(10) The antitrust laws were intended to and do provide 
important economic and civic benefits.
(11) A central purpose of these laws is to promote, 
protect, and strengthen fair and open markets, including those 
for music.
(12) While antitrust exemptions are generally disfavored, 
should the application of the antitrust laws ever be applied in 
a manner that conflicts with their purpose--such as protecting 
the online marketplace for creative works--it is the duty and 
prerogative of the Congress to resolve the conflict.

SEC. 3. SAFE HARBOR FOR CERTAIN COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``antitrust laws'' has the meaning given such 
term in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act 
(15 U.S.C. 12), and includes--
(A) section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section applies 
to unfair methods of competition; and
(B) any State law, rule, or regulation that 
prohibits or penalizes the conduct described in, or is 
otherwise inconsistent with, subsection (b) of this 
section.
(2) The term ``Dominant Online Music Distribution 
Platform'' means any entity that--
(A) operates an app, website or other online 
service that is used by members of the public to listen 
to sound recordings, whether via a digital audio 
transmission, an audio-visual presentation, or any 
other means;
(B) has annual revenues related to the distribution 
of music of more than $100 million; and
(C) is not eligible for a license under section 
114(d)(2) of title 17 of the United States Code.
(3) The term ``generative artificial intelligence'' means 
an artificial intelligence system that is capable of generating 
novel text, video, images, audio, and other media based on 
prompts or other forms of data provided by a person.
(4) The term ``Individual Music Creator Owner'' means any 
musician or group of musician, producers, mixers, and sound 
engineers that--
(A) owns the copyrights to one or more sound 
recordings created by the musician or group of 
musicians, producers, and sound engineers; and
(B) either:
(i) has earned less than $1,000,000 in 
licensing revenues associated with these 
copyrights in the prior year; or
(ii) qualifies as a small business under 
the Office of Management and Budget North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
code 512250.
(b) Limitation of Liability.--An Individual Music Creator Owner 
shall not be held liable under the antitrust laws for agreeing with 
other Individual Music Creator Owners to collectively negotiate music 
licensing terms with a Dominant Online Music Distribution Platform or a 
company engaged in development or deployment of generative artificial 
intelligence, or agreeing with other Individual Music Creator Owners to 
collectively refuse to license their music to a Dominant Online Music 
Distribution Platform or a company engaged in development or deployment 
of generative artificial intelligence, if--
(1) the negotiations are not limited to price, are 
nondiscriminatory as to similarly situated independent creator/
owners;
(2) the coordination among Independent Music Creator Owners 
is directly related to and reasonably necessary for 
negotiations with a Dominant Online Music Distribution Platform 
that are otherwise consistent with the operation of the 
Antitrust laws; and
(3) the negotiations do not involve any person that is not 
an Independent Music Creator Owner or a Dominant Online Music 
Distribution Platform.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Except as provided in this Act, this Act 
shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the operation of 
the antitrust laws.
<all>