S. 2960

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2960 Reported in Senate (RS)]

<DOC>

Calendar No. 245
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2960

To develop economic tools to deter aggression by the People's Republic 
of China against Taiwan.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

October 1, 2025

Mr. Risch (for himself, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Coons, and Mr. Ricketts) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations

October 30, 2025

Reported by Mr. Risch with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To develop economic tools to deter aggression by the People's Republic 
of China against Taiwan.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Deter PRC Aggression 
Against Taiwan Act''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>

<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that the United States must be 
prepared to take immediate action to impose sanctions with respect to 
any military or non-military entities owned, controlled, or acting at 
the direction of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist 
Party that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC or by 
the Chinese Communist Party--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to overthrow or dismantle the governing 
institutions in Taiwan;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to occupy any territory controlled or 
administered by Taiwan;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to violate the territorial integrity of 
Taiwan; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to take significant action against Taiwan, 
including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) conducting a naval blockade of 
Taiwan;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan; 
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) perpetrating a significant physical or 
cyber attack on Taiwan that erodes the ability of the 
governing institutions in Taiwan to operate or provide 
essential services to the citizens of Taiwan.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED> In this Act:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The 
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation of the Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Committee on Finance of the 
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) the Committee on Financial Services of 
the House of Representatives;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
of the House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (H) the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
House of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's 
Republic of China.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) PRC sanctions task force; task force.--The 
terms ``PRC Sanctions Task Force'' and ``Task Force'' mean the 
task force established pursuant to section 4.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE.</DELETED>

<DELETED> (a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Coordinator for Sanctions of the 
Department of State and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control of the Department of the Treasury, in coordination with the 
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other Federal 
agencies, as appropriate, shall establish an interagency task force to 
identify military and non-military entities that could be subject to 
sanctions or other economic actions imposed by the United States 
immediately following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an 
attempt to achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving, the 
physical or political control of Taiwan, including by taking any of the 
actions described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 2.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the 
establishment of the PRC Sanctions Task Force, the Task Force shall 
provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees for 
identifying proposed targets for sanctions or other economic actions 
referred to in subsection (a), which shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) assess how existing sanctions programs could 
be used to impose sanctions with respect to entities identified 
by the Task Force;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) develop or propose, as appropriate, new 
sanctions authorities that might be required to impose 
sanctions with respect to such entities;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) analyze the potential economic consequences to 
the United States, and to allies and partners of the United 
States, of imposing various types of such sanctions with 
respect to such entities;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) assess measures that could be taken to 
mitigate the consequences referred to in paragraph (3), 
including through the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, 
and other approaches;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) include coordination with allies and partners 
of the United States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to leverage sanctions and other 
economic tools including actions targeting the PRC's 
financial and industrial sectors to deter or respond to 
aggression against Taiwan;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to identify and resolve potential 
impediments to coordinating sanctions-related efforts 
or other economic actions with respect to responding to 
or deterring aggression against Taiwan;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) to identify industries, sectors, or 
goods and services where the United States and allies 
and partners of the United States can take coordinated 
action through sanctions or other economic tools that 
will have a significant negative impact on the economy 
of the PRC; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) to coordinate actions with partners 
and allies to provide economic support to Taiwan and 
other countries being threatened by the PRC, including 
measures to counter economic coercion by the 
PRC;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) assess the resource gaps and needs at the 
Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the 
Department of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, 
and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively 
use sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the 
threats posed by the PRC;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) recommend how best to target sanctions and 
other economic tools against individuals, entities, and 
economic sectors in the PRC, which shall take into account--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the role of such targets in supporting 
policies and activities of the Government of the PRC, 
or of the Chinese Communist Party, that pose a threat 
to the national security or foreign policy interests of 
the United States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the negative economic implications of 
such sanctions and tools for the Government of the PRC, 
including its ability to achieve its objectives with 
respect to Taiwan; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the potential impact of such sanctions 
and tools on the stability of the global financial 
system, including with respect to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) state-owned 
enterprises;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) officials of the Government 
of the PRC and of the Chinese Communist 
Party;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) financial institutions 
associated with the Government of the PRC; 
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iv) companies in the PRC that are 
not formally designated by the Government of 
the PRC as state-owned enterprises; 
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) identify any foreign military or non-military 
entities that would likely be used to achieve the outcomes 
specified in section 2, including entities in the shipping, 
logistics, energy (including oil and gas), maritime, aviation, 
ground transportation, and technology sectors.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. ANNUAL REPORT.</DELETED>

<DELETED> Not later than 180 days after the briefing required under 
section 4(b), and annually thereafter, the PRC Sanctions Task Force 
shall submit a classified report to the appropriate congressional 
committees that includes information regarding--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) any entities identified pursuant to section 
4(b)(8);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) any new authorities required to impose 
sanctions with respect to such entities;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) potential economic impacts on the PRC, the 
United States, and allies and partners of the United States 
resulting from the imposition of sanctions with respect to such 
entities;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) mitigation measures that could be employed to 
limit any deleterious economic impacts on the United States and 
allies and partners of the United States of such 
sanctions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) the status of coordination with allies and 
partners of the United States regarding sanctions and other 
economic tools identified under this Act;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) resource gaps and recommendations to enable 
the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to 
use sanctions to more effectively respond to the malign 
activities of the Government of the PRC; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) any additional resources that may be necessary 
to carry out the strategies and recommendations included in the 
report submitted pursuant to section 4(b).</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Deter PRC Aggression Against Taiwan 
Act''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) Sense of Congress Regarding Preparedness to Impose Sanctions in 
the Event of a Taiwan Contingency.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States must be prepared to take immediate action to impose 
sanctions with respect to any military or non-military entities owned, 
controlled, or acting at the direction of the Government of the PRC or 
the Chinese Communist Party that are supporting actions by the 
Government of the PRC or by the Chinese Communist Party--
(1) to overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in 
Taiwan;
(2) to occupy any territory controlled or administered by 
Taiwan;
(3) to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan; or
(4) to take significant action against Taiwan, including--
(A) conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan;
(B) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan; or
(C) perpetrating a significant physical or cyber 
attack on Taiwan that erodes the ability of the 
governing institutions in Taiwan to operate or provide 
essential services to the citizens of Taiwan.
(b) Sense of Congress Regarding United States Policy Toward Taiwan 
and the Government of the PRC.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) planning and recommendations developed by the PRC 
Sanctions Task Force pursuant to section 4 are intended to 
compliment other United States responses to PRC aggression and 
not contravene long-standing United States policy on Taiwan;
(2) The United States remains committed to its ``One 
China'' policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 
3301 et seq.), the three United States-People's Republic of 
China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances;
(3) any attempt by the People's Republic of China to 
resolve Taiwan's status through force, coercion, or other non-
peaceful means is contrary to United States policy and national 
interests; and
(4) the future of Taiwan should be determined peacefully, 
free from the use of military force or any other forms of 
military, economic, or other forms of coercion from the 
People's Republic of China, and in a manner that is acceptable 
to the people of Taiwan.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
House of Representatives;
(G) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives.
(2) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of 
China.
(3) PRC sanctions task force; task force.--The terms ``PRC 
Sanctions Task Force'' and ``Task Force'' mean the task force 
established pursuant to section 4.

SEC. 4. PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE.

(a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Coordinator for Sanctions of the Department 
of State and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of 
the Department of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of 
National Intelligence and the heads of other Federal agencies, as 
appropriate, shall establish an interagency task force to identify 
military and non-military entities that could be subject to sanctions 
or other economic actions imposed by the United States immediately 
following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an attempt to 
achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving, the physical or 
political control of Taiwan, including by taking any of the actions 
described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 2.
(b) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the establishment of 
the PRC Sanctions Task Force, the Task Force shall provide a briefing 
to the appropriate congressional committees for identifying proposed 
targets for sanctions or other economic actions referred to in 
subsection (a), which shall--
(1) assess how existing sanctions programs could be used to 
impose sanctions with respect to entities identified by the 
Task Force;
(2) develop or propose, as appropriate, new sanctions 
authorities that might be required to impose sanctions with 
respect to such entities;
(3) analyze the potential economic consequences to the 
United States, and to allies and partners of the United States, 
of imposing various types of such sanctions with respect to 
such entities;
(4) assess measures that could be taken to mitigate the 
consequences referred to in paragraph (3), including through 
the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, and other 
approaches;
(5) include coordination with allies and partners of the 
United States--
(A) to leverage sanctions and other economic tools 
including actions targeting the PRC's financial and 
industrial sectors to deter or respond to aggression 
against Taiwan;
(B) to identify and resolve potential impediments 
to coordinating sanctions-related efforts or other 
economic actions with respect to responding to or 
deterring aggression against Taiwan; and
(C) to identify industries, sectors, or goods and 
services where the United States and allies and 
partners of the United States can take coordinated 
action through sanctions or other economic tools that 
will have a significant negative impact on the economy 
of the PRC; and
(D) to coordinate actions with partners and allies 
to provide economic support to Taiwan and other 
countries being threatened by the PRC, including 
measures to counter economic coercion by the PRC;
(6) assess the resource gaps and needs at the Department of 
State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of 
Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and other 
Federal agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively use 
sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the threats 
posed by the PRC;
(7) recommend how best to target sanctions and other 
economic tools against individuals, entities, and economic 
sectors in the PRC, which shall take into account--
(A) the role of such targets in supporting policies 
and activities of the Government of the PRC, or of the 
Chinese Communist Party, that pose a threat to the 
national security or foreign policy interests of the 
United States;
(B) the negative economic implications of such 
sanctions and tools for the Government of the PRC, 
including its ability to achieve its objectives with 
respect to Taiwan; and
(C) the potential impact of such sanctions and 
tools on the stability of the global financial system, 
including with respect to--
(i) state-owned enterprises;
(ii) officials of the Government of the PRC 
and of the Chinese Communist Party;
(iii) financial institutions associated 
with the Government of the PRC; and
(iv) companies in the PRC that are not 
formally designated by the Government of the 
PRC as state-owned enterprises; and
(8) identify any foreign military or non-military entities 
that would likely be used to achieve the outcomes specified in 
section 2, including entities in the shipping, logistics, 
energy (including oil and gas), maritime, aviation, ground 
transportation, and technology sectors.

SEC. 5. ANNUAL REPORT.

Not later than 180 days after the briefing required under section 
4(b), and annually thereafter, the PRC Sanctions Task Force shall 
submit a classified report to the appropriate congressional committees 
that includes information regarding--
(1) any entities identified pursuant to section 4(b)(8);
(2) any new authorities required to impose sanctions with 
respect to such entities;
(3) potential economic impacts on the PRC, the United 
States, and allies and partners of the United States resulting 
from the imposition of sanctions with respect to such entities;
(4) mitigation measures that could be employed to limit any 
deleterious economic impacts on the United States and allies 
and partners of the United States of such sanctions;
(5) the status of coordination with allies and partners of 
the United States regarding sanctions and other economic tools 
identified under this Act;
(6) resource gaps and recommendations to enable the 
Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to use 
sanctions to more effectively respond to the malign activities 
of the Government of the PRC; and
(7) any additional resources that may be necessary to carry 
out the strategies and recommendations included in the report 
submitted pursuant to section 4(b).

SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) Rule of Construction Regarding Continued United States Policy 
Toward Taiwan and the Government of the PRC.--Nothing in this Act may 
be construed as a change to the One China Policy of the United States, 
which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), 
the three United States-People's Republic of China Joint Communiques, 
and the Six Assurances.
(b) Rule of Construction Regarding Sanctions Authorities Identified 
or Recommended by the Task Force.--None of the sanctions identified or 
recommended pursuant to this Act are self-executing. Any such sanctions 
may only be imposed on an entity if they are explicitly authorized 
under--
(1) a Federal law that was in effect on the day before the 
date of the enactment of this Act; or
(2) an Act of Congress that is enacted after the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
Calendar No. 245

119th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 2960

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To develop economic tools to deter aggression by the People's Republic 
of China against Taiwan.

_______________________________________________________________________

October 30, 2025

Reported with an amendment