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Bills/119th Congress · Senate

S. 4294

Introduced

Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act

Sponsor
RJohn R. Curtis· Utah
Introduced
April 14, 2026
Policy area
International Affairs
Latest action
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.April 14, 2026
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4294 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4294

To require the Secretary of War to submit an annual report to Congress 
that assesses the capacity of the United States to fully implement the 
Taiwan Relations Act, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

April 14, 2026

Mr. Curtis (for himself and Ms. Cortez Masto) introduced the following 
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To require the Secretary of War to submit an annual report to Congress 
that assesses the capacity of the United States to fully implement the 
Taiwan Relations Act, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Relations Reinforcement 
Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate;
(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives.
(2) Gray zone tactics.--The term ``gray zone tactics'' 
means coercive actions, including military, paramilitary, 
cyber, space, economic, informational, and legal actions and 
other activities conducted below the threshold of armed 
conflict to alter the status quo without triggering a 
conventional military response.
(3) Taiwan contingency.--The term ``Taiwan Contingency'' 
means any attempt--
(A) to overthrow or dismantle the governing 
institutions in Taiwan;
(B) to occupy any territory controlled or 
administered by Taiwan;
(C) to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan; 
or
(D) to take significant action against Taiwan, 
including--
(i) conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan;
(ii) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan; 
or
(iii) perpetrating a significant physical 
or cyber attack on Taiwan that erodes the 
ability of the governing institutions in Taiwan 
to operate or provide essential services to the 
citizens of Taiwan.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CAPACITY TO COMPLY WITH THE TAIWAN 
RELATIONS ACT.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 
years, the Secretary of War, in coordination with the Commander of the 
United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees that assesses the capacity of the 
United States to fully implement sections 2 and 3 of the Taiwan 
Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 and 3302), including--
(1) maintaining the capacity to resist any resort to force 
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security 
or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan;
(2) providing Taiwan with arms of a defensive character in 
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain 
a sufficient self-defense capability; and
(3) preserving peace, security, and stability in the 
Western Pacific as matters of international concern.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--
(1) In general.--The report required under subsection (b) 
shall include--
(A) a detailed assessment of whether the current 
and projected military posture, force structure, 
operational plans, and capabilities of the United 
States are sufficient to credibly deter--
(i) a large-scale amphibious invasion of 
Taiwan;
(ii) a maritime or air blockade of Taiwan; 
and
(iii) major missile or air strike campaigns 
against Taiwan;
(B) an assessment of the United States capacity to 
credibly deter and resist forms of coercion that would 
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic 
system of the people on Taiwan, including sustained 
forms of coercion across air, maritime, cyber, space, 
economic, and information domains;
(C) an assessment of the United States operational 
readiness and sustainability, including--
(i) readiness, posture, basing access and 
overflight, mobility, logistics resilience, 
prepositioned stocks, and munitions sufficiency 
in the Indo-Pacific region;
(ii) projected munitions expenditure rates 
and replenishment timelines under high-
intensity conflict scenarios;
(iii) the ability of the defense industrial 
base to sustain operations in a protracted 
conflict of not less than 1 year; and
(iv) vulnerabilities to supply chain 
disruption, cyber attack, or anti-access/area 
denial strategies across domains;
(D) an assessment of the availability, reliability, 
and sufficiency of allied and partner contributions to 
deterrence and defense in a Taiwan contingency and to 
resist gray zone coercion; and
(E) an assessment of the capacity of the United 
States to comply with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public 
Law 96-8) in a scenario in which the United States is 
simultaneously responding to aggression initiated by 
the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or a 
terrorist organization.
(2) Capability gaps and resource requirements.--For each 
assessment described in paragraph (1), the report shall--
(A) identify current capability gaps, shortfalls, 
and vulnerabilities;
(B) estimate capability gaps during the following 
10 years based on current budget projections;
(C) specify budgetary, force posture, acquisition, 
industrial base, and legislative changes required to 
mitigate the gaps referred to in subparagraph (C); and
(D) include an estimated timeline and costs to 
achieve a level of capability sufficient to credibly 
deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression against 
Taiwan.
(c) Form.--The report required shall be submitted in classified 
form, but may include an unclassified executive summary.

SEC. 4. BRIEFING.

Not later than 30 days after submission of each report pursuant to 
section 3, the Secretary of War shall provide a classified briefing to 
the appropriate congressional committees regarding the findings and 
recommendations contained in such report.

SEC. 5. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act may be construed--
(1) to authorize the use of military force; or
(2) to alter or supersede any existing statutory 
requirement under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 
seq.).
<all>

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