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Bills/119th Congress · Senate

S. 4491

Introduced

Biodefense Diplomacy Enhancement Act

Sponsor
RTim Sheehy· Montana
Introduced
May 12, 2026
Policy area
International Affairs
Latest action
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.May 12, 2026
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4491 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4491

To enhance diplomatic engagement on international biotechnology and 
biosecurity matters.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 12, 2026

Mr. Sheehy (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) introduced the following 
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To enhance diplomatic engagement on international biotechnology and 
biosecurity matters.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Biodefense Diplomacy Enhancement 
Act''.

SEC. 2. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL 
BIODEFENSE, BIOSECURITY, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY MATTERS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall advance United States 
foreign policy goals to improve cooperation in the field of 
international biodefense, biosecurity, and biotechnology matters with 
United States allies and partners, including by carrying out the 
activities described in this section.
(b) Policy Development.--The Secretary of State, acting through the 
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security if the 
Secretary so delegates, in coordination with the Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs and the Permanent Representative of the United States 
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), shall pursue enhanced 
biodefense cooperation within NATO, including by--
(1) advocating for the prioritization of policy development 
within NATO relating to biodefense, including in the areas of 
biotechnology, biosurveillance, and countermeasures in the 
field of biological threats;
(2) identifying and evaluating opportunities to strengthen 
NATO planning, policies, and activities relating to biodefense 
and biotechnology;
(3) pursuing potential revisions or amendments to the NATO 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Policy 
to further enhance biodefense efforts in NATO;
(4) coordinating with NATO member states to prioritize and 
implement measures described in the NATO Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Policy;
(5) strengthening NATO interoperability and allied forces 
capabilities in resilience, detection, attribution, emergency 
response, and recovery in the event of a weaponized biological 
attack;
(6) evaluating opportunities for expanded NATO capabilities 
to research, develop, and deploy biotechnology for 
international security purposes; and
(7) promoting adherence by NATO member states to the 
highest standards of safety and security in biological 
research.
(c) Cooperation With United States Allies and Partners.--The 
Secretary of State, acting through the Under Secretary for Arms Control 
and International Security if the Secretary so delegates, in 
coordination with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, shall 
pursue international biotechnology, biosecurity, and biodefense 
cooperation with United States allies and partners, including--
(1) exploring potential areas of cooperation with countries 
that are major non-NATO allies in biotechnology, biosecurity, 
and biodefense matters;
(2) coordinating with allied and partner countries, 
including NATO countries, on formulation of export control 
policies in the field of biotechnology, including items that 
may be identified as dual-use items that would pose a 
substantial risk to national security if used for military end-
uses, such as items that could enable the development of 
bioweapons;
(3) promoting adherence by United States allies and 
partners to the highest standards of safety and security in 
biological research; and
(4) collaborating on efforts to enforce the Biological 
Weapons Convention.
(d) Strategies.--
(1) NATO biodefense strategy.--The Secretary of State, 
acting through the Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security if the Secretary so delegates, in 
coordination with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
shall develop a strategy, to be known as the ``NATO Biodefense 
Strategy'', which shall include--
(A) an assessment of current cooperation between 
the United States and NATO member states in 
biotechnology, biosurveillance, biological threat 
countermeasures, and other biodefense capabilities;
(B) an identification of strategic planning and 
deployment gaps in NATO relating to biotechnology and 
biodefense;
(C) recommendations to address gaps identified 
under subparagraph (B), including through coordination 
with NATO member states, capability development, and 
coordination mechanisms; and
(D) an assessment of current Department of State 
cooperation with other United States Government 
agencies in biodefense, biotechnology, biosecurity, 
biosurveillance, and biological threat countermeasures.
(2) International biotechnology, biosecurity, and 
biodefense cooperation strategy.--The Secretary of State, 
acting through the Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security if the Secretary so delegates, in 
coordination with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
shall develop a strategy, to be known as the ``International 
Biotechnology, Biosecurity, and Biodefense Cooperation 
Strategy'', which shall include--
(A) proposals for commitments or agreements under 
which the United States and United States allies and 
partners, including countries that are major non-NATO 
allies, may expand cooperation on international 
security matters relating to biotechnology, 
biosecurity, and biodefense;
(B) an assessment of the feasibility and 
effectiveness of coordinating export control efforts, 
in addition to existing export control regimes such as 
the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group, 
related to biotechnology items that may pose national 
security risks if used for military end-uses; and
(C) an overview of nonproliferation, anti-
terrorism, demining, and related (NADR) programs and 
funds for the purposes of enhancing capabilities and 
capacities to address international biosecurity threats 
and recommendations for the use of Department of State 
programs and funds, including NADR programs and funds, 
to expand cooperation outlined in subparagraph (A) and 
increase the effectiveness of export control efforts 
identified in subparagraph (B).
(3) Limitation.--The strategies developed under paragraphs 
(1) and (2) shall be limited to addressing threats posed by 
biological agents and toxins as such terms are defined in 
section 178 of title 18, United States Code.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 270 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting 
through the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security if the Secretary so delegates, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the 
strategies required by subsection (d).
(2) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified 
annex if submitted separately from the unclassified portion.
(f) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 
congressional committees in response to significant developments 
relating to--
(1) the contents of the report required by subsection (e); 
and
(2) other material developments in biotechnology and 
biosecurity globally that may affect United States national 
security interests.
(g) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of the Representatives.
(2) the term ``biodefense'' means actions to counter 
biological threats, reduce risks, and prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from biological incidents;
(3) the term ``biological threat'' means entities involved 
with, or a situation involving, a biological hazard that can 
potentially cause a biological incident;
(4) the term ``Biological Weapons Convention'' means the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 
10, 1972, and entered into force March 26, 1975;
(5) the term ``biosecurity'' means policies, practices, and 
controls that reduce the risk of loss, theft, misuse, diversion 
of, or intentional unauthorized release of biological 
materials;
(6) the term ``biosurveillance'' means the process of 
gathering, integrating, interpreting, and communicating 
essential information and indications related to all-hazard 
threats or disease activity affecting human, animal, plant, and 
environmental health to achieve early detection and provide 
early warning and contribute to overall situational awareness 
of the health aspects of a biological incident to support and 
enhance decisionmaking at all levels;
(7) the term ``biotechnology'' means the use of biological 
processes, organisms, or systems for manufacturing, research, 
or medical purposes, including genetic engineering, synthetic 
biology, and bioinformatics; and
(8) the term ``countries that are major non-NATO allies'' 
means countries designated pursuant to section 517 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321k).
<all>

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