S. 4602

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4602 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4602

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to place reasonable 
limits on contributions to Super PACs which make independent 
expenditures, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 20, 2026

Mr. Sanders introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to place reasonable 
limits on contributions to Super PACs which make independent 
expenditures, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Abolish Super PACs Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds as follows:
(1) Contribution limits to political action committees 
(PACs), including those that make independent expenditures, 
help secure elections by limiting both the risk of corruption 
and the risk that significant contributions will create the 
appearance of corruption.
(2) Since contribution limits on super PACs were lifted in 
2010, the number, influence, and wealth of super PACs have 
exploded. Obtaining millions or billions of dollars in 
contributions to super PACs is now critical to the success of 
Federal candidates' campaigns.
(3) As the influence of super PACs grows, so does the 
likelihood that they will serve as a conduit for corrupt 
agreements between contributor and candidate, whose 
communications are not subject to coordination limitations.
(4) Between 2008 and 2020, the amount of independent 
expenditures increased more than 700 percent, and in 2024, more 
than $4.48 billion in independent expenditures were spent on 
United States elections. The money for these expenditures 
largely came from contributions to 2,459 registered super PACs.
(5) In 2012, the first modern elections for Federal office 
held without contribution limits to super PACs, the top 1 
percent of all individual super PAC contributors contributed 
76.76 percent of all individual super PAC contributions, and 
that percentage rose to 96.94 percent in 2024. Recent elections 
have been influenced by individual contributors who gave more 
than $100 million to super PACs.
(6) As bribery laws have long recognized, unlawful quid pro 
quo exchanges can occur where the bribe is funneled into a 
third party, such as a super PAC. See, e.g., section 201 of 
title 18, United States Code; U.S. v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 
606, 621-23 (D. N.J. 2018). Law enforcement in several States 
have prosecuted cases that involve bribes directed to super 
PACs. However, bribery is notoriously difficult to prosecute, 
and these laws do not adequately protect American voters from 
corruption.
(7) Without reasonable limitations on contributions, super 
PACs create an appearance of corruption. A bipartisan majority 
of Americans believe that large super PAC contributions are 
made in exchange for political favors, and that corruption is 
pervasive in the Federal Government. This is, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, ``disastrous'' to 
``confidence in the system of representative government'' 424 
U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
(8) Placing limits on super PAC contributions will also 
lessen the risk of foreign interference in United States 
elections, making it more difficult for foreign entities to 
funnel contributions to super PACs via third-party 
contributors.
(9) SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
the appellate court case that voided existing contribution 
limits to super PACs, wrongly treated contributions as 
expenditures and wrongly assumed that because uncoordinated 
independent expenditures cannot give rise to quid pro quo 
corruption, that contributions to independent expenditure 
committees similarly cannot give rise to corruption. But they 
can and do.
(10) In the 14 years since SpeechNow unleashed billions of 
dollars in unregulated contributions, super PACs have obtained 
unprecedented wealth and value to candidate campaigns and can 
facilitate vast, nearly untraceable corrupt transactions.
(11) Because Super PACs have become uniquely important to 
candidate campaigns and can accept millions and even hundreds 
of millions of dollars from single entities, candidates and 
contributors have reason and opportunity to guide corrupt 
contributions into super PACs, establishing a significant risk 
of corruption and creating an appearance of corruption that 
undermines the public's faith in their representatives and our 
political system.
(12) Reasonable limits on contributions to super PACs are 
lawful and necessary to protect American democracy and American 
voters.
(b) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this Act--
(1) to limit the risk of corrupt agreements between 
candidates and contributors by placing reasonable limits on 
contributions to political action committees that make 
independent expenditures;
(2) to limit the appearance of corruption created by 
uncapped contributions to political action committees that make 
independent expenditures; and
(3) to restore the public's faith in our elections.

SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE 
COMMITTEES.

(a) Limitations.--Section 315(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C)) is amended by striking 
``to any other political committee'' and inserting ``to an independent 
expenditure committee or any other political committee''.
(b) Definition.--Section 301 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 30101) is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(27) Independent expenditure committee.--
``(A) In general.--The term `independent 
expenditure committee' means a political committee 
which--
``(i) makes independent expenditures 
aggregating $5,000 or more during a calendar 
year; or
``(ii) makes contributions to other 
independent expenditure committees aggregating 
$5,000 or more during a calendar year.
``(B) Treatment of separate accounts.--The term 
`independent expenditure committee' includes an account 
of a political committee which is established for the 
purpose of making independent expenditures or 
contributions to other committees making independent 
expenditures.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply with respect to contributions and independent expenditures made 
during the first calendar year which begins after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and each succeeding calendar year.
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