S. 4615

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4615 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

<DOC>

Calendar No. 420
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4615

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 20, 2026

Mr. Cotton, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, reported the 
following original bill; which was read twice and placed on the 
calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE

Sec. 301. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence and 
Assistant Directors of National 
Intelligence.
Sec. 302. Repeal of National Intelligence Management Council.
Sec. 303. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and 
offices.
Sec. 304. Transfer of National Intelligence University.
Sec. 305. Limitation on domestic activities at the National 
Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 306. Timely provision of security direction to intelligence 
community whistleblowers.
Sec. 307. Notification of certain declassifications.
Sec. 308. No police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal 
security functions for Director of National 
Intelligence.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency authority regarding 
unmanned aircraft systems.
Sec. 402. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule.
Sec. 403. Modification relating to security personnel at certain 
installations.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY

Sec. 501. Authority of National Security Agency to correlate, evaluate, 
and disseminate certain intelligence.
Sec. 502. Prohibition on availability of funds for relocation of Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis to certain 
facilities.
Sec. 503. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and 
by the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 504. Modification of annual report on Federal Bureau of 
Investigation case data.
Sec. 505. Establishment of Office of Counterintelligence.
Sec. 506. Modification of responsibilities of Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis.
Sec. 507. Role of National Security Agency in collection and analysis 
of signals intelligence.
TITLE VI--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 601. Amendments to presidential appointments for intelligence 
community positions.
Sec. 602. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available 
information concerning United States 
persons.
Sec. 603. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence products.
Sec. 604. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management 
Account funds for certain entities.
Sec. 605. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship 
Program.
Sec. 606. Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the 
Department of Commerce.
Sec. 607. Countering hostile foreign cyber actors as a national 
intelligence priority.
Sec. 608. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or 
former intelligence community employees.
Sec. 609. Modification of definitions in National Security Act of 1947 
and scope of intelligence sharing 
responsibilities of Director of National 
Intelligence.
Sec. 610. Prohibition on intelligence community use of adversary 
unmanned ground vehicles.
Sec. 611. China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force.
Sec. 612. Limitations relating to Chinese products and services.
Sec. 613. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive 
cyber operations conducted by 
nongovernmental entities.
Sec. 614. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence 
community.
Sec. 615. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.
Sec. 616. Repeal of certain report and briefing requirements.
Sec. 617. Intelligence community personnel travel, allowances, and 
related expenses regulations.
Sec. 618. Prohibition on sending and receiving objects using entities 
owned or controlled by persons or 
governments of certain countries.
Sec. 619. Enhancing intelligence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific 
region.
Sec. 620. Intelligence activities related to Ukraine.
Sec. 621. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing with countries 
of significant concern to the United 
States.
Sec. 622. United States-Israel intelligence sharing enhancement.
TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY

Sec. 701. Artificial intelligence exploitation guard and intelligence 
sharing.
Sec. 702. Director of National Intelligence review of intelligence 
community use of artificial intelligence to 
support targeting.
Sec. 703. Improvements for artificial intelligence policies, standards, 
and guidance for intelligence community.
Sec. 704. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial 
Intelligence Security Center.
Sec. 705. Reports on novel uses of artificial intelligence technology.
Sec. 706. Clear labeling of artificial intelligence outputs for 
targeting workflows.
Sec. 707. Research on use of artificial intelligence relating to 
inadvertent escalation.
Sec. 708. Research on interaction of adversarial artificial 
intelligence systems with intelligence 
community systems.
Sec. 709. Proliferation assessments regarding the export of artificial 
intelligence-related technologies.
Sec. 710. Review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities 
under Vulnerabilities Equities Process.
Sec. 711. Prohibition on certain artificial intelligence models on 
intelligence community systems.
TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 801. Modification to notification requirements for authorized and 
ordered departures.
Sec. 802. Identification of reallocable frequencies.
Sec. 803. Protection of classified information relating to budget 
functions.
Sec. 804. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States of transactions in real estate near 
intelligence community facilities.
Sec. 805. Intelligence support to the U.S. International Development 
Finance Corporation.
Sec. 806. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting Federal 
Reserve information.
Sec. 807. Amendments to prohibit payments to obtain national security 
information or approvals.
Sec. 808. Offenses involving espionage.
Sec. 809. Parental bereavement leave.
Sec. 810. Definition of foreign instrumentality for purposes of 
economic espionage prohibition.
Sec. 811. Protection of trade secrets.
Sec. 812. Technical amendments.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given 
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2027 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the Federal Government.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be 
appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence 
activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, 
and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, 
within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the 
budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2027 the sum of 
$568,000,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to 
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for 
fiscal year 2027 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 
2027.

TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE

SEC. 301. APPOINTMENT OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Redesignation of Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence as Deputy Director of National Intelligence.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103A of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking 
``Principal''; and
(B) by striking ``Principal'' each place it 
appears.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Subsection (c) of such section 
is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking 
``Principal''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``Principal''.
(3) Additional conforming amendment.--
(A) National security act of 1947.--Such Act is 
further amended--
(i) in section 103(c)(2) (50 U.S.C. 
3025(c)(2)), by striking ``Principal'';
(ii) in section 103I(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 
3034(b)(1)), by striking ``Principal'';
(iii) in section 106(a)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 
3041(a)(2)(A)), by striking ``Principal''; and
(iv) in section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 3053(b)), 
by striking ``Principal''.
(B) Damon paul nelson and matthew young pollard 
intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018, 
2019, and 2020.--Section 6310 of the Damon Paul Nelson 
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 
3351b) is amended by striking ``Principal'' each place 
it appears.
(C) National defense authorization act for fiscal 
year 2022.--Section 1683(b)(3) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 
3373(b)(3)) is amended by striking ``Principal'' both 
places it appears.
(b) Elimination of Deputy Directors of National Intelligence and 
Establishment of Assistant Directors of National Intelligence.--
(1) In general.--Section 103A(b) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026(b)) is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking 
``Deputy'' and inserting ``Assistant'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may'' and all 
that follows through the period at the end and 
inserting the following: ``is an Assistant Director of 
National Intelligence for Mission Integration and an 
Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Policy 
and Capabilities, who shall be appointed by the 
Director of National Intelligence.''; and
(C) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Deputy'' and 
inserting ``Assistant''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--The National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
(A) in section 102A(l)(4)(F) (50 U.S.C. 
3024(l)(4)(F)), as redesignated by section 
402(g)(1)(B), by striking ``a Deputy'' and inserting 
``an Assistant''; and
(B) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)), by 
striking paragraph (3).
(c) References to Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence in Law.--Any reference in law to the Principal Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence shall be treated as a reference to 
the Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(d) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) Section heading.--Section 103A of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
3026) is further amended, in the section heading, by striking 
``deputy directors of national intelligence'' and inserting 
``deputy director of national intelligence and assistant 
directors of national intelligence''.
(2) Table of contents.--The table of contents for such Act, 
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by 
striking the item relating to section 103A and inserting the 
following:

``Sec. 103A. Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant 
Directors of National Intelligence.''.

SEC. 302. REPEAL OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.

(a) In General.--Section 103M of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3034d) is repealed.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is 
amended by striking the item relating to section 103M.

SEC. 303. REPEAL OF VARIOUS POSITIONS, UNITS, CENTERS, COUNCILS, AND 
OFFICES.

(a) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.--
(1) Repeal.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 103K 
(50 U.S.C. 3034b).
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 103G of such Act (50 
U.S.C. 3032) is amended by striking subsection (d).
(3) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act 
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by 
striking the item relating to section 103K.
(b) Intelligence Community Innovation Unit.--
(1) Termination.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and 
wind down the operations of the Intelligence Community 
Innovation Unit before the date specified in paragraph (3).
(2) Repeal.--
(A) In general.--Title I of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended 
by striking section 103L (50 U.S.C. 3034c).
(B) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for 
such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such 
Act, is further amended by striking the item relating 
to section 103L.
(3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
(c) Technical Amendment Regarding Expired Climate Security Advisory 
Council.--
(1) Repeal.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 
120 (50 U.S.C. 3060).
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 331 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-
81; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2) 
and inserting the following:
``(2) The term `climate security' means the effects of 
climate change on the following:
``(A) The national security of the United States, 
including national security infrastructure.
``(B) Subnational, national, and regional political 
stability.
``(C) The security of allies and partners of the 
United States.
``(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, 
including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, 
insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil 
war, and interstate war.''.
(3) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such 
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further 
amended by striking the item relating to section 120.
(d) Framework for Cross-Disciplinary Education and Training.--
(1) Repeal.--Subtitle A of title X of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking 
section 1002 (50 U.S.C. 3192).
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such 
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further 
amended by striking the item relating to section 1002.
(e) Foreign Languages Program.--
(1) Termination.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and 
wind down the operations of the Foreign Languages Program 
before the date specified in paragraph (5).
(2) Repeals.--Subtitle B of such title (50 U.S.C. 3201 et 
seq.) is amended by striking sections 1011 (50 U.S.C. 3201, 
relating to program on advancement of foreign languages 
critical to the intelligence community), 1012 (50 U.S.C. 3202, 
relating to education partnerships), and 1013 (50 U.S.C. 3203, 
relating to voluntary services).
(3) Conforming amendments.--Such subtitle is further 
amended by striking sections 1014 (50 U.S.C. 3204, relating to 
regulations) and 1015 (50 U.S.C. 3205, relating to 
definitions).
(4) Clerical amendments.--The table of contents for such 
Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further 
amended by striking the items relating to subtitle B of title 
X.
(5) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
(f) Joint Intelligence Community Council.--
(1) Termination.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council 
is terminated.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Title I of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking 
section 101A (50 U.S.C. 3022).
(3) Repeal of requirement to consult with joint 
intelligence community council for national intelligence 
program budget.--Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking 
``, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the Joint 
Intelligence Community Council,''.
(4) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act 
in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by 
striking the item relating to section 101A.

SEC. 304. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.

(a) Transfer.--The Director of National Intelligence shall transfer 
the functions of the National Intelligence University to the National 
Defense University described in section 2165 of title 10, United States 
Code.
(b) Repeal.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking subtitle D (50 U.S.C. 3227 
et seq.).
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Title 10.--Section 2151(b) of title 10, United States 
Code, is amended by striking paragraph (3).
(2) Title 17.--Section 105(d)(2) of title 17, United States 
Code, is amended--
(A) by striking subparagraph (M); and
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as 
subparagraph (M).
(3) Damon paul nelson and matthew young pollard 
intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 
2020.--The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020 (division E of Public Law 116-92) is amended by striking 
section 5324 (50 U.S.C. 3334a).
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002 et seq.) is amended, in the matter 
preceding section 2 of such Act, by striking the items relating to 
subtitle D of title X.

SEC. 305. LIMITATION ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES AT THE NATIONAL 
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

(a) Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence.--Subsection (e) of 
section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056) is 
amended to read as follows:
``(e) Limitation on Domestic Activities.--The Center may, 
consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and the 
guidelines referred to in section 102A(b), receive and retain 
intelligence pertaining to domestic terrorism (as defined in section 
2331 of title 18, United States Code) to enable the Center to collect, 
retain, and disseminate intelligence pertaining only to international 
terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States 
Code).''.

SEC. 306. TIMELY PROVISION OF SECURITY DIRECTION TO INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWERS.

(a) Intelligence Community Employees.--Section 
103H(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3033(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting ``, unless the Director 
does not provide such direction not later than 7 calendar days after 
the date on which the employee furnishes the statement required by 
subclause (I)'' after ``practices''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Employees.--Section 
17(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting ``, unless the 
Director does not provide such direction not later than 7 calendar days 
after the date on which the employee furnishes the statement required 
by subclause (I)'' after ``practices''.

SEC. 307. NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DECLASSIFICATIONS.

(a) In General.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 806. NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DECLASSIFICATIONS.

``(a) Notification to Congress by Director of National 
Intelligence.--
``(1) In general.--Immediately upon declassifying, 
downgrading, or directing the declassification or downgrading 
of information or intelligence relating to intelligence 
sources, methods, or activities pursuant to section 3.1(c) of 
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to 
classified national security information), or any successor 
order, the Director of National Intelligence, or the Principal 
Deputy Director of National Intelligence, as delegated by the 
Director of National Intelligence, shall notify the 
congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist of the 
United States in writing of such declassification, downgrading, 
or direction.
``(2) Contents.--Each notification required by paragraph 
(1) shall include a copy of the information that has been, or 
has been directed to be, declassified or downgraded.
``(b) Notification to Congress by Agency Head.--
``(1) In general.--Immediately upon the declassification of 
information pursuant to section 3.1(d) of Executive Order 
13526, or any successor order, the head, or senior official, of 
a relevant element of the intelligence community shall notify 
the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of 
Representatives, and the Archivist of the United States in 
writing of such declassification.
``(2) Contents.--Each notification required by paragraph 
(1) shall include a copy of the information that has been 
declassified.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 805 the following:

``Sec. 806. Notification of certain declassifications.''.

SEC. 308. NO POLICE, SUBPOENA, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OR INTERNAL 
SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(z) No Police, Subpoena, or Law Enforcement Powers or Internal 
Security Functions.--The Director of National Intelligence shall have 
no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security 
functions.''.

TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AUTHORITY REGARDING 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.

Section 15A(m) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 3515a(m)) is amended by striking ``December 31, 2027'' and 
inserting ``the date set forth in section 210G(j)(1) of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n(j)(1))''.

SEC. 402. HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965 SPECIAL RULE.

Section 135 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1015d) 
is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections 
(d) and (e), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
``(c) Special Rule.--With respect to a member of a qualifying 
Federal service who is an officer or employee of an element of the 
intelligence community, the term `permanent duty station', as used in 
this section, shall exclude a permanent duty station that is within 50 
miles of the headquarters facility of such element.''.

SEC. 403. MODIFICATION RELATING TO SECURITY PERSONNEL AT CERTAIN 
INSTALLATIONS.

Section 15(a)(1)(D) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 3515(a)(1)(D)) is amended by inserting ``or the National 
Reconnaissance Office'' after ``Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence''.

TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY

SEC. 501. AUTHORITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE, 
AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 23. AUTHORITY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN 
INTELLIGENCE.

``The Director of the National Security Agency may--
``(1) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to 
national security; and
``(2) disseminate such intelligence to legislative and 
executive branch customers as the Director considers 
appropriate.''.

SEC. 502. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RELOCATION OF OFFICE 
OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS TO CERTAIN FACILITIES.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 for the National 
Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), may be obligated or expended to move or 
relocate the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of 
Homeland Security to any facility other than a facility owned by the 
Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 503. FUNDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED WITH AND 
BY THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United 
States Code, is amended by inserting after section 421 the following:
``Sec. 421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with 
and by the National Reconnaissance Office
``(a) Use of Appropriated Funds.--The Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office may use appropriated funds available to the 
National Reconnaissance Office for intelligence and communications 
purposes to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign countries 
for intelligence activities conducted with and by the National 
Reconnaissance Office.
``(b) Use of Funds Other Than Appropriated Funds.--The Director of 
the National Reconnaissance Office may use funds other than 
appropriated funds to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign 
countries for intelligence activities conducted with and by the 
National Reconnaissance Office without regard for the provisions of law 
relating to the expenditure of United States Government funds, except 
that--
``(1) no such funds may be expended, in whole or in part, 
by or for the benefit of the Department of Defense for a 
purpose for which Congress had previously denied funds;
``(2) proceeds from the sale of items or services may be 
used only to purchase replacement items similar to the items 
that are sold; and
``(3) the authority provided by this subsection may not be 
used to acquire items or services for the principal benefit of 
the United States.
``(c) Reports.--
``(1) Use of appropriated funds.--Any funds expended under 
the authority of subsection (a) shall be reported, pursuant to 
the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), to--
``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and
``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
``(2) Use of funds other than appropriated funds.--Funds 
expended under the authority of subsection (b) shall be 
reported to the committees described in paragraph (1) pursuant 
to procedures jointly agreed upon by such committees and the 
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
such subchapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 421 the following:

``421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by 
the National Reconnaissance Office.''.

SEC. 504. MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION CASE DATA.

Section 512A(b)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3111a(b)(6)) is amended by striking ``country affiliation'' and 
inserting ``terrorist organization''.

SEC. 505. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Section 311 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and 
inserting a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph 
(4); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2), the following 
new paragraph (3):
``(3) identify and mitigate counterintelligence threats to 
the Department of the Treasury; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Office of Counterintelligence.--There is established, within 
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of 
Counterintelligence, which shall be responsible for implementing the 
policies and procedures across the bureaus of the Department of the 
Treasury required to carry out the counterintelligence responsibilities 
described in subsection (a).''.

SEC. 506. MODIFICATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE 
AND ANALYSIS.

Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is 
amended--
(1) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``in support'' 
and all that follows through ``of the homeland.'' and 
inserting ``pertaining to foreign threats to the 
homeland, as determined by the Secretary.'';
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) by striking ``terrorist attacks 
within'' and inserting ``foreign threats to''; 
and
(ii) by striking ``attacks'' each place it 
appears and inserting ``threats'';
(C) in paragraph (3)(A), by striking ``terrorist 
and other'' and inserting ``foreign'';
(D) in paragraph (6), by striking ``terrorist 
attacks against'' and inserting ``foreign threats to'';
(E) by striking paragraphs (7), (17), and (23), and 
redesignating paragraphs (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), 
(13), (14), (15), (16), (18), (19), (20), (21), and 
(22) as paragraphs (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), 
(13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), and (20), 
respectively;
(F) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by 
striking ``threats of terrorism'' and inserting 
``foreign threats'';
(G) in paragraph (9), as so redesignated, by 
striking ``threats of terrorism in'' and inserting 
``foreign threats to''; and
(H) in paragraph (12), as so redesignated, by 
striking ``, other agencies'' and all that follows 
through ``by the Department,''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
``(h) Collection of Intelligence and Information.--In carrying out 
the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary pursuant to this 
section, the personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis shall 
liaise and share intelligence and other information between federal 
agencies (including the components of the Department), State, local, or 
tribal governments, and the private sector.
``(i) Prohibition.--
``(1) United states person defined.--In this subsection, 
the term `United States person' means--
``(A) a United States citizen;
``(B) an alien known by the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien;
``(C) an unincorporated association substantially 
composed of United States citizens or permanent 
resident aliens; or
``(D) a corporation incorporated in the United 
States, except for a corporation directed and 
controlled by 1 or more foreign governments.
``(2) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis may not engage in 
the collection of information or intelligence targeting any 
United States person, or any clandestine collection.
``(j) Intelligence Defined.--In this section, the term 
`intelligence' has the meaning given the terms foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence, as defined paragraphs (2) and (3) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003(2),(3)).''.

SEC. 507. ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 23. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

``The Director of the National Security Agency shall--
``(1) provide overall direction for and coordination of the 
collection and analysis of signals intelligence by elements of 
the intelligence community authorized to undertake such 
collection and analysis; and
``(2) in coordination with other departments, agencies, and 
elements of the United States Government that are authorized to 
undertake such collection, ensure that--
``(A) the most effective use is made of resources; 
and
``(B) appropriate account is taken of the risks to 
the United States and those involved in such 
collection.''.

TITLE VI--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 601. AMENDMENTS TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY POSITIONS.

(a) Appointment of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.--Section 104B(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3037(a)) is amended by inserting ``, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate'' after ``President''.
(b) Appointment of Deputy Director of the National Security 
Agency.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) There is a Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, 
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.''.
(c) Appointment of Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence.--
(1) In general.--Section 215(c) of the Department of Energy 
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b(c)) is amended to read as 
follows:
``(c) Director.--
``(1) Appointment.--The head of the Office shall be the 
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. The Director of the Office shall 
report directly to the Secretary.
``(2) Term.--
``(A) In general.--The Director shall serve for a 
term of 6 years.
``(B) Reappointment.--The Director shall be 
eligible for reappointment for 1 or more terms.
``(3) Qualifications.--The Director shall--
``(A) be an employee in the Senior Executive 
Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior 
National Intelligence Service, or any other Service 
that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director 
of National Intelligence, considers appropriate; and
``(B) have substantial expertise in matters 
relating to the intelligence community, including 
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by this section 
shall take effect on January 21, 2029.
(d) Appointment of Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center.--Section 119(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3056(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``Director of National 
Intelligence''.
(e) Appointment of Director the National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center.--Section 902(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 3382(a)) is amended by striking 
``President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and 
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''.
(f) Appointment of General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence.--Section 103C(a) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3028(a)) is amended by striking ``by the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``by the 
Director of National Intelligence''.
(g) Appointment of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.--Section 20(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 3520(a)) is amended by striking ``by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``by the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.

SEC. 602. PROCEDURES REGARDING DISSEMINATION OF NONPUBLICLY AVAILABLE 
INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES PERSONS.

(a) Procedures.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
the following new section:

``SEC. 519. PROCEDURES REGARDING DISSEMINATION OF NONPUBLICLY AVAILABLE 
INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES PERSONS.

``(a) Procedures.--The head of each element of the intelligence 
community, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 
shall develop and maintain procedures for that element to respond to 
unmasking requests.
``(b) Requirements.--The procedures required by subsection (a) 
shall ensure, at a minimum, the following:
``(1) Each unmasking request submitted to a disseminating 
element shall include, in writing--
``(A) information that identifies the disseminated 
intelligence report containing the United States person 
identifying information requested;
``(B) the date the unmasking request was submitted 
to the disseminating element;
``(C) the name, title, and organization of the 
individual who submitted the unmasking request in an 
official capacity;
``(D) the name, title, and organization of each 
individual who will receive the United States person 
identifying information sought by the unmasking 
request; and
``(E) a fact-based justification describing why 
such United States person identifying information is 
required by each individual who will receive the 
information to carry out the duties of the individual.
``(2) An unmasking request may only be approved by the head 
of the disseminating element or by officers or employees of 
such element to whom the head has specifically delegated such 
authority. When the disseminating element is not the 
originating element of the United States person identifying 
information, the head of the disseminating element shall obtain 
the concurrence of the head or designee of the originating 
element before approving the unmasking request.
``(3) The head of the disseminating element shall retain 
records on all unmasking requests, including the disposition of 
such requests, for not less than 10 years.
``(4) The records described in paragraph (3) shall include, 
with respect to each approved unmasking request--
``(A) the name and title of the individual of the 
disseminating element who approved the request; and
``(B) the fact-based justification for the request.
``(5) The procedures shall include an exception that--
``(A) allows for the immediate disclosure of United 
States person identifying information in the event of 
exigent circumstances or when a delay would likely 
result in the significant loss of intelligence; and
``(B) requires that promptly after such disclosure, 
the recipient of the United States person identifying 
information make a written unmasking request with 
respect to such information.
``(6) If an unmasking request is made during a period 
beginning on the date of a general election for President and 
ending on the date on which such President is inaugurated--
``(A) the documentation required by paragraph (1) 
shall include whether--
``(i) the requesting entity knows or 
reasonably believes that any United States 
person identifying information sought is of an 
individual who is a member of the transition 
team as identified by an apparent successful 
candidate for the office of President or Vice 
President; or
``(ii) based on the intelligence report to 
which the unmasking request pertains, the 
disseminating element or the originating 
element knows or reasonably believes that any 
United States person identifying information 
sought is of an individual who is a member of 
the transition team as identified by an 
apparent successful candidate for the office of 
President or Vice President;
``(B) the approval made pursuant to paragraph (2) 
of an unmasking request that contains United States 
person identifying information described in 
subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the concurrence of 
the general counsel of the disseminating element (or, 
in the absence of the general counsel, the principal 
deputy general counsel, or, as applicable, the senior 
Departmental legal officer supporting the disseminating 
element) that the dissemination of such United States 
person identifying information is in accordance with 
the procedures required by subsection (a); and
``(C) consistent with due regard for the protection 
from unauthorized disclosure of classified information 
relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods 
or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of 
the disseminating element shall notify the chairmen and 
ranking minority members of the congressional 
intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority 
leader of the House of Representatives, and the 
majority leader and minority leader of the Senate of an 
approval described in subparagraph (B) not later than 
14 days after the date of such approval.
``(7) If an unmasking request concerns a nominee for or the 
holder of a Federal office, a member of a transition team as 
identified by an eligible candidate for the office of the 
President, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
or an individual nominated by the President to be a Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, and such unmasking 
request is approved, the head of the disseminating element 
shall submit the documentation for the request to the 
congressional intelligence committees not later than 14 days 
after the date of such approval.
``(c) Annual Reports.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the 
head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report documenting, with 
respect to the year covered by the report--
``(1) the total number of unmasking requests received by 
that element;
``(2) of such total number, the number of requests 
approved;
``(3) of such total number, the number of requests denied; 
and
``(4) for each number calculated under paragraphs (1) 
through (3), the number disaggregated by requesting entity.
``(d) Certain Procedures Regarding Congressional Identity 
Information.--With respect to the dissemination of congressional 
identity information, the head of each element of the intelligence 
community shall carry out this section in accordance with annex A of 
Intelligence Community Directive 112, or successor annex or directive.
``(e) Effect on Minimization Procedures.--The requirements of this 
section are in addition to--
``(1) any minimization procedures established under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
et seq.);
``(2) any procedures governing the collection, retention, 
or dissemination of information concerning United States 
persons established under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 
note; relating to United States intelligence activities) or 
successor order; and
``(3) any other provision of statute or Executive order the 
Director of National Intelligence considers relevant.
``(f) Definitions .--In this section:
``(1) Apparent successful candidate.--The term `apparent 
successful candidate' means any apparent successful candidate 
for the office of President or Vice President as determined 
pursuant to the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 
102 note).
``(2) Candidate; federal office.--The terms `candidate' and 
`Federal office' have the meanings given those terms in section 
301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 
30101).
``(3) Congressional identity information.--The term 
`congressional identity information' means information that 
identifies, by name or by individually identifying titles or 
characteristics--
``(A) any current Member of the Senate or the House 
of Representatives;
``(B) any current staff officer for any Senator or 
Representative, whether paid or unpaid; or
``(C) any current staff officer of any committee of 
the Senate or the House of Representatives, whether 
paid or unpaid.
``(4) Disseminating element.--The term `disseminating 
element' means an element of the intelligence community that 
disseminated an intelligence report subject to an unmasking 
request.
``(5) Eligible candidate.--The term `eligible candidate' 
has the meaning given that term in section 3(h)(4) of the 
Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note).
``(6) Originating element.--The term `originating element' 
means an element of the intelligence community that originated 
information in a disseminated intelligence report subject to an 
unmasking request.
``(7) Requesting entity.--The term `requesting entity' 
means an entity of--
``(A) the United State Government; or
``(B) a State, local, Tribal, or territorial 
government.
``(8) United states person.--The term `United States 
person' means a United States person as defined in section 101 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
1801) or section 3.5 of Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 
note; relating to United States intelligence activities).
``(9) United states person identifying information.--
``(A) In general.--The term `United States person 
identifying information' (commonly referred to as 
`United States Person Information')--
``(i) means information that is reasonably 
likely to identify one or more specific United 
States persons; and
``(ii) includes a single item of 
information and information that, when combined 
with other information, is reasonably likely to 
identify one or more specific United States 
persons.
``(B) Determination.--The determination of whether 
information is reasonably likely to identify one or 
more specific United States persons may require 
assessment by a trained intelligence professional on a 
case-by-case basis.
``(10) Unmasking request.--The term `unmasking request' 
means a request to gain access to nonpublic United States 
person identifying information concerning a known unconsenting 
United States person that was omitted from a disseminated 
intelligence report by the originating element.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents preceding 
section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
relating to section 518 the following new item:

``Sec. 519. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available 
information concerning United States 
persons.''.
(b) Development of Procedures.--The head of each element of the 
intelligence community shall develop the procedures required by section 
519(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection 
(a)(1), by not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
(c) Public Release.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall make 
publicly available the procedures for each element of the intelligence 
community required by section 519(a) of the National Security Act of 
1947, as added by subsection (a)(1).

SEC. 603. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.

(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 1115. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.

``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) All-source intelligence product.--The term `all-
source intelligence product'--
``(A) means any intelligence product published by 
an element of the intelligence community using multiple 
types of intelligence for purposes of providing an 
analytic assessment or situational update; and
``(B) does not include a product containing purely 
law enforcement information.
``(2) Assumption.--The term `assumption' means a 
supposition used to frame or support an argument.
``(3) Judgment.--The term `judgment' means a conclusion 
based on underlying intelligence information, analysis, and 
assumptions.
``(b) Establishment.--
``(1) In general.--The production of any all-source 
intelligence product shall adhere to--
``(A) the analytic standards described in 
subsection (c); and
``(B) any guidance or policy issued under paragraph 
(2).
``(2) Guidance and policy.--The Director of National 
Intelligence or any other head of an element of the 
intelligence community may issue guidance or policy that 
expands upon the standards described in subsection (c) as such 
head considers appropriate, except that any such guidance or 
policy shall not contradict or otherwise circumvent such 
standards.
``(c) Analytic Standards.--The standards described in this 
subsection are the following:
``(1) Objectivity.--In producing any all-source 
intelligence product, an analyst--
``(A) shall--
``(i) perform the analyst's functions with 
objectivity and with awareness of their own 
assumptions and reasoning;
``(ii) employ reasoning techniques and 
practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate 
bias;
``(iii) be alert to influence by existing 
analytic positions or judgments; and
``(iv) consider alternative perspectives 
and contrary information; and
``(B) shall not be unduly constrained by previous 
judgments when new developments indicate a modification 
is necessary.
``(2) Independent of political consideration.--Any all-
source intelligence product shall not be--
``(A) distorted by, or shaped for, advocacy of a 
particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint; or
``(B) influenced by the force of preference for a 
particular policy.
``(3) Timely.--Any all-source intelligence product shall be 
disseminated in time for the product to be actionable by 
customers.
``(4) Based on all relevant information available.--Any 
all-source intelligence product shall be informed by all 
relevant information available.
``(5) Analytic tradecraft standards.--Any all-source 
intelligence product shall adhere to the following analytic 
tradecraft standards:
``(A) Sourcing.--Any all-source intelligence 
product shall--
``(i) identify and properly describe the 
quality and credibility of underlying sources, 
data, and methodologies upon which judgments 
are based; and
``(ii) use source descriptors in accordance 
with sourcing guidance prescribed by the 
Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) Uncertainty.--Any all-source intelligence 
product shall--
``(i) indicate and explain the basis for 
the uncertainties associated with major 
analytic judgments, specifically the likelihood 
of occurrence of an event or development, and 
the analyst's confidence in the basis for the 
judgment;
``(ii) note causes of uncertainty, 
including assumptions and gaps, and explain how 
uncertainties affect analysis; and
``(iii) for expressions of likelihood or 
probability, use one of the sets of terms 
defined in Intelligence Community Directive 
203.
``(C) Distinguishing.--Any all-source intelligence 
product shall--
``(i) clearly distinguish statements that 
convey underlying intelligence information used 
in analysis from statements that convey 
assumptions or judgments;
``(ii) state an assumption explicitly when 
the assumption serves as the linchpin of an 
argument or when the assumption bridges key 
information gaps;
``(iii) explain the implications for 
judgments if assumptions prove to be incorrect; 
and
``(iv) as appropriate, identify indicators 
that, if detected, would alter judgments.
``(D) Incorporate analysis of alternatives.--Any 
all-source intelligence product shall--
``(i) identify and assess plausible 
alternative hypotheses;
``(ii) in discussing alternatives, address 
factors such as associated assumptions, 
likelihood, or implications related to United 
States interests; and
``(iii) identify indicators that, if 
detected, would affect the likelihood of 
identified alternatives.
``(E) Relevance.--Any all-source intelligence 
product shall provide information and insight on United 
States national security issues.
``(F) Argumentation.--Any all-source intelligence 
product shall--
``(i) present a clear main analytic message 
up front;
``(ii) in the case of a product containing 
multiple judgments, have a main analytic 
message that is drawn collectively from those 
judgments; and
``(iii) be effectively supported by 
relevant intelligence information and coherent 
reasoning.
``(G) Analytic line.--Any all-source intelligence 
product shall--
``(i) state how its major judgments on a 
topic are consistent with or represent a change 
from major judgments in previously published 
analysis, or that it represent initial coverage 
of a topic; and
``(ii) fully consider and bring to the 
attention of customers significant differences 
in analytic judgment, such as between two 
analytic elements of the intelligence 
community.
``(H) Accuracy.--Any all-source intelligence 
product shall--
``(i) apply expertise and logic to make the 
most accurate judgments and assessments 
possible, based on the information available 
and known information gaps; and
``(ii) express judgments as clearly and 
precisely as possible, reducing ambiguity by 
addressing the likelihood, timing, and nature 
of the outcome or development.
``(I) Visuals.--Any all-source intelligence product 
shall incorporate effective visual information as 
appropriate. Any content of any all-source intelligence 
product depicted visually shall adhere to the analytic 
standards described in this subsection.
``(d) Required Information.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), any 
all-source intelligence product shall include a section 
dedicated to explaining the tradecraft related to the analytic 
tradecraft standards described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), 
(D), and (G) of subsection (c)(5).
``(2) Exceptions.--The requirement of paragraph (1) shall 
not apply to--
``(A) any all source-intelligence product less than 
300 words; or
``(B) any all-source intelligence product produced 
for the President's Daily Brief.
``(e) Tracking Adherence to Analytic Standards.--The Director of 
National Intelligence and each other head of an element of the 
intelligence community shall--
``(1) develop metrics for evaluating the performance of 
their respective element in adhering to the analytic standards 
described in subsection (c); and
``(2) use such metrics to evaluate individual performance, 
develop analytic workforce training, and inform Congress on 
matters related to analytic performance.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is 
amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 1115. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence 
products.''.

SEC. 604. LIMITATION ON USE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNT FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ENTITIES.

(a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 314. LIMITATION ON USE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNT FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ENTITIES.

``Amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
Account may not be obligated or expended to provide financial or in-
kind support for the purposes of analytic collaboration, including for 
any study, research, or assessment, to--
``(1) an entity that is described in section 501(c)(3) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation 
under section 501(a) of such Code, or otherwise describes 
itself as a think tank in any public document, that has 
received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support 
from a foreign government, except for a foreign government that 
is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance; or
``(2) an entity that is organized for research or for 
engaging in advocacy in areas such as public policy or 
political strategy that has received or expects to receive any 
financial or in-kind support from a government, or an entity 
affiliated with the military or intelligence services, of--
``(A) the People's Republic of China;
``(B) the Russian Federation;
``(C) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
``(D) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
``(E) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; or
``(F) the Republic of Cuba.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103B(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
3027(e)) is amended by inserting ``and subject to section 314'' after 
``control of the Director of National Intelligence''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for such Act, in the 
matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by inserting after 
the item relating to section 313 the following:

``Sec. 314. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management 
Account funds for certain entities.''.

SEC. 605. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY FELLOWSHIP 
PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1002 the 
following:

``SEC. 1003. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY FELLOWSHIP 
PROGRAM.

``(a) In General.--There is established a program (in this section 
referred to as the `Program') under which selected employees of the 
intelligence community may train at certain nongovernmental entities as 
technology fellows.
``(b) Designation.--The program shall be known as the `Ben Sasse 
Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program'.
``(c) Agreements.--
``(1) Nongovernmental entities.--Each head of an element of 
the intelligence community described in paragraph (3) shall 
seek to enter into agreements with nongovernmental entities 
with experience in cutting-edge technology under which such 
entities may host technology fellows under the Program.
``(2) Selected employees.--For each employee of an element 
of the intelligence community selected for participation in the 
Program in accordance with subsection (e), the head of the 
element of the intelligence community that selected the 
employee shall provide for a written agreement among that 
element of the intelligence community, the nongovernmental 
entity concerned, and the employee. The agreement shall--
``(A) require that the employee of the element of 
the intelligence community, upon completion of the 
fellowship, serve in that element, or elsewhere in the 
intelligence community if approved by the head of the 
element that selected the employee, for a period equal 
to twice the length of the fellowship;
``(B) provide that if the employee of the element 
of the intelligence community fails to carry out the 
agreement, the employee shall be liable to the United 
States for payment of all expenses of the fellowship, 
unless that failure was for good and sufficient reason, 
as determined by the head of the element that selected 
the employee; and
``(C) contain language ensuring that the employee 
of the element of the intelligence community does not 
improperly use information that the employee knows 
relates to an acquisition or procurement of the element 
of the intelligence community for the benefit or 
advantage of the nongovernmental entity.
``(3) Elements described.--The elements of the intelligence 
community described in this paragraph are the following:
``(A) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(B) The National Security Agency.
``(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
``(D) The National Reconnaissance Office.
``(E) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(d) Board.--
``(1) In general.--There is established a board for the 
Program (in this section referred to as the `Board').
``(2) Membership.--The Board shall be composed of the 
directors of science and technology, or equivalents, of the 
elements of the intelligence community described in subsection 
(c)(3).
``(3) Co-chairs.--The members of the Board shall serve as 
co-chairs of the Board.
``(4) Selection criteria.--The Board shall establish 
selection criteria for the participation of employees in the 
Program.
``(e) Selection.--Each year, each head of an element of the 
intelligence community described in subsection (c)(3) shall select two 
employees of such element to participate in the Program.
``(f) Term.--An employee selected for participation in the Program 
may serve for one year as a technology fellow at a nongovermental 
entity that has entered into an agreement under subsection (c)(1) with 
the head of the element of the intelligence community concerned.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1002 the 
following:

``Sec. 1003. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship 
Program.''.

SEC. 606. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICE AT THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the 
Department of Commerce.
(2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
of Commerce.
(b) Establishment of Intelligence Community Counterintelligence 
Office.--
(1) Agreement with secretary of commerce.--The Director of 
National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall seek to 
enter into an agreement with the Secretary under which the 
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary shall 
establish within the Department, within the Office of 
Secretary, an office, which shall be known as the 
``Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office'', in 
accordance with this section.
(2) Location.--The Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office established pursuant to this section 
shall be physically located within the headquarters of the 
Department and within reasonable proximity to the offices of 
the leadership of the Department.
(3) Security.--The Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be responsible 
for the protection of classified information and for the 
establishment and enforcement of all security-related controls 
within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.
(c) Personnel.--
(1) Director.--
(A) Appointment.--There shall be at the head of the 
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a 
Director who is appointed by the Director of National 
Intelligence. The Director of the Intelligence 
Community Counterintelligence Office shall--
(i) be supervised and subject to 
performance evaluations by the Director of the 
National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center, in consultation with the Secretary;
(ii) be an employee of the intelligence 
community with significant counterintelligence 
experience; and
(iii) serve for a period of 3 years.
(B) Responsibilities.--The Director of the 
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall 
carry out the following responsibilities:
(i) Serving as the head of the Intelligence 
Community Counterintelligence Office, with 
supervisory responsibility for the Intelligence 
Community Counterintelligence Office and any 
other personnel assigned to the Intelligence 
Community Counterintelligence Office.
(ii) Advising the Secretary on 
counterintelligence and intelligence 
information.
(iii) Ensuring that counterintelligence 
threat information and, as appropriate, 
finished intelligence on topics related to the 
functions of the Department, are provided to 
appropriate personnel of the department or 
agency without delay.
(iv) Ensuring critical intelligence 
relevant to the Secretary is requested and 
disseminated in a timely manner.
(v) Establishing, as appropriate, 
mechanisms for collaboration through which 
Department subject matter experts, including 
those without security clearances, can share 
information and expertise with the intelligence 
community.
(vi) Correlating and evaluating 
counterintelligence threats identified within 
intelligence community reporting, in 
coordination with the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, and 
providing appropriate dissemination of such 
intelligence to officials of the Department 
with a need-to-know.
(vii) Advising the Secretary on methods to 
improve the counterintelligence posture of the 
Department.
(viii) Where appropriate, supporting the 
Department's leadership in engaging with the 
National Security Council.
(ix) In coordination with the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, 
establishing counterintelligence partnerships 
to improve the counterintelligence defense of 
the Department.
(2) Deputy director.--There shall be within the 
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Deputy 
Director who is appointed by the Secretary, in coordination 
with the Director of National Intelligence. The Deputy Director 
shall--
(A) be supervised and subject to performance 
evaluations by the Secretary, in consultation with the 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center;
(B) be a current or former employee of the 
Department with significant experience within the 
Department; and
(C) serve at the pleasure of the Secretary.
(3) Other employees.--
(A) Joint duty assignment.--There shall be within 
the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office 
such other employees as the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary, 
determines appropriate. Employment at the Intelligence 
Community Counterintelligence Office is an intelligence 
community joint duty assignment. A permanent change of 
station to the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office shall be for a period of not 
less than 2 years.
(B) Supervision.--The Director of the Intelligence 
Community Counterintelligence Office shall be 
responsible for the supervision and management of 
employees assigned to the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office, including employees 
assigned by program elements of the intelligence 
community and other Federal departments and agencies, 
as appropriate.
(C) Joint duty or assigned personnel 
reimbursement.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall reimburse a program element of the intelligence 
community or a Federal department or agency for any 
permanent change of station employee assigned to the 
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office from 
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) Operation under authority of director of 
national intelligence.--Employees assigned to the 
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office under 
this paragraph shall operate under the authorities of 
the Director of National Intelligence for the duration 
of their assignment or period of employment within the 
Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, 
except for temporary duty assignment employees.
(E) Incentive pay.--
(i) In general.--An employee who accepts 
employment at the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office during the 120-day 
period after the date of the establishment of 
the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence 
Office shall receive an incentive payment, 
which shall be payable by the Director of 
National Intelligence, in an amount equal to 10 
percent of the base annual pay of the employee. 
Such an employee who completes 2 years of 
service in the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office may receive an 
incentive payment in an amount equal to 10 
percent of the base annual pay of the employee 
if the Director of the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office determines the 
performance of the employee is exceptional.
(ii) Eligibility.--An employee is only 
eligible for an incentive payment under clause 
(i) if the employee enters into an agreement 
with the Director of National Intelligence to 
serve in the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office for a period of at 
least 2 years.
(d) Funding.--To the extent and in such amounts as specifically 
provided in advance in appropriations Acts for the purposes detailed in 
this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may expend such 
sums as are authorized within the National Intelligence Program of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence for--
(1) the renovation, furnishing, and equipping of a Federal 
building, as necessary, to meet the security and operational 
requirements of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence 
Office;
(2) the provision of connectivity to the Intelligence 
Community Counterintelligence Office to enable briefings, 
secure audio and video communications, and collaboration 
between employees of the Department and the intelligence 
community at the unclassified, secret, and top secret levels;
(3) the provision of other information technology systems 
and devices, such as computers, printers, and phones, for use 
by employees of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence 
Office;
(4) the assignment of employees of the intelligence 
community to support the operation of the Intelligence 
Community Counterintelligence Office; and
(5) the provision of other personal services necessary for 
the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence 
Office.
(e) Deadline for Establishment of the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than January 1, 2028, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall seek to establish, in 
accordance with this section, the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office within the Department.
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the 
plan to establish the Intelligence Community 
Counterintelligence Office required under paragraph (1). Such 
report shall include the costs and schedule associated with 
establishing the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence 
Office.

SEC. 607. COUNTERING HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS AS A NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2025, foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, 
such as foreign scam centers that engage in sophisticated 
investment fraud, cyber-enabled extortion activity, and 
impersonation-based fraud, stole at least $7,566,000,000 from 
Americans according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
Internet Crime Complaint Center, which has emphasized that 
these estimates are conservative and only includes losses 
reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2) According to the Consumer Federation of America, 
Americans are losing an estimated $119,000,000,000 each year to 
online scams.
(3) Investigative reporting, Federal indictments, and 
sanctions designations issued by the Department of the Treasury 
have revealed the extent to which foreign malicious 
cybercriminal organizations collaborate with foreign 
governments, illicit finance actors, and foreign militia groups 
whose activities present a threat to the economic and national 
security of the United States.
(4) Foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations rely 
extensively on communications and financial services of United 
States companies, enabling the organizations' targeting of 
vulnerable Americans.
(5) Financial insecurity generated by foreign malicious 
cybercriminal organizations presents a counterintelligence 
threat to the United States intelligence community.
(b) Sense of Congress.--
(1) In general.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, 
and foreign affiliates associated with those 
organizations, constitute hostile foreign cyber actors 
and are valid targets for intelligence operations under 
existing intelligence authorities; and
(B) the Director of National Intelligence should 
treat collection, analysis, and disruption toward 
hostile foreign cyber actors as a national intelligence 
priority as part of the National Intelligence 
Priorities Framework.
(2) Hostile foreign cyber actors.--The hostile foreign 
cyber actors described in paragraph (1) include, at a minimum, 
the following:
(A) Prince Group.
(B) Huione Group.
(C) L.Y.P. Group.
(D) Jin Bei Group.
(E) Funnull Technology Inc.
(F) TransAsia International holding Group Thailand 
Company Limited.
(G) The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army.
(H) HH Bank Cambodia PLC.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to Congress a report on 
hostile foreign cyber actors, such as foreign scam centers.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
include the following:
(A) An identification of the individuals and 
entities operating as hostile foreign cyber actors, 
including foreign scam centers, that pose the most 
significant threat.
(B) An identification of the locations from which 
the individuals and entities identified under 
subparagraph (A) operate.
(C) A description of the infrastructure, tactics, 
and techniques hostile foreign cyber actors, including 
foreign scam centers, commonly use, including reliance 
on any products or services subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States.
(D) A description of any relationships between the 
individuals and entities that operate as hostile 
foreign cyber actors, including foreign scam centers, 
and their governments or countries of origin that could 
impede the ability to counter threats from such 
centers.
(E) An identification of communications and 
financial services providers subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States that provide enabling 
services to individuals and entities identified under 
subparagraph (A).
(F) A description of any relationships that the 
individuals and entities identified under subparagraph 
(A) have with transnational organized crime groups.
(3) Form; public availability.--The report required by 
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. The unclassified form of the report 
shall be made available to the public.

SEC. 608. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING CURRENT OR 
FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.

(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 
U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 519. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING CURRENT OR 
FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.

``If an element of the intelligence community makes a criminal 
referral to the Department of Justice regarding a current or former 
employee of any element of the intelligence community, the general 
counsel of the element of the intelligence community that made the 
referral shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the 
referral on the date such referral is made and provide to the 
congressional intelligence committees a summary of the referral.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 518 the following:

``Sec. 519. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or 
former intelligence community employees.''.

SEC. 609. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 
AND SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Definitions.--Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3003) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``includes'' and 
inserting ``means''; and
(2) in paragraph (5)--
(A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by 
striking ``refer to all'' and inserting ``means'';
(B) by amended subparagraph (B) to read as follows:
``(B) involves foreign threats to the United 
States, its people, property, or interests.''.
(b) Scope of Intelligence Sharing Responsibilities.--Section 
102A(f)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(1)) is amended, in the first 
sentence, by inserting ``, and other Federal agencies as the Director 
considers appropriate,'' after ``community''.

SEC. 610. PROHIBITION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF ADVERSARY 
UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered foreign country.--The term ``covered foreign 
country'' means any of the following:
(A) The People's Republic of China.
(B) The Russian Federation.
(C) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(D) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(2) Covered foreign entity.--The term ``covered foreign 
entity'' means an entity that is domiciled in a covered foreign 
country, or subject to influence or control by the government 
of a covered foreign country as determined by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security or the Secretary of Defense, and any 
subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity.
(3) Covered unmanned ground vehicle system.--The term 
``covered unmanned ground vehicle system''--
(A) means a mechanical device that--
(i) is capable of locomotion, navigation, 
or movement on the ground; and
(ii) operates at a distance from one or 
more operators or supervisors based on commands 
or in response to sensor data, or through any 
combination thereof; and
(B) includes--
(i) remote surveillance vehicles, 
autonomous patrol technologies, mobile 
robotics, and humanoid robots; and
(ii) the vehicle, its payload, and any 
external device used to control the vehicle.
(b) Prohibition on Procurement of Covered Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), 
the head of an element of the intelligence community may not 
procure any covered unmanned ground vehicle system that is 
manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.
(2) Exemption.--The heads of elements of the intelligence 
community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1) 
if the procurement is required in the national interest of the 
United States and--
(A) is for the sole purposes of research, 
evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for 
electronic warfare, information warfare operations, 
cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground 
vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle 
system technology;
(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting 
counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities, 
protective missions, or Federal criminal or national 
security investigations, including forensic 
examinations, or for electronic warfare, information 
warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an 
unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned 
ground vehicle technology; or
(C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as 
procured or as modified after procurement but before 
operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download 
data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses 
no national security cybersecurity risks as determined 
by the exempting official.
(c) Prohibition on Operation of Covered Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.--
(1) Prohibition.--
(A) In general.--Beginning on the date that is one 
year after the date of the enactment of this Act and 
except as provided in paragraph (2), no element of the 
intelligence community may operate a covered unmanned 
ground vehicle system manufactured or assembled by a 
covered foreign entity.
(B) Applicability to contracted services.--The 
prohibition under subparagraph (A) applies to any 
covered unmanned ground vehicle systems that are being 
used by any element of the intelligence community 
through the method of contracting for the services of 
covered unmanned ground vehicle systems.
(2) Exemption.--The heads of the elements of the 
intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under 
paragraph (1) if the operation is required in the national 
interest of the United States and--
(A) is for the sole purposes of research, 
evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for 
electronic warfare, information warfare operations, 
cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground 
vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle 
system technology;
(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting 
counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities, 
protective missions, or Federal criminal or national 
security investigations, including forensic 
examinations, or for electronic warfare, information 
warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an 
unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned 
ground vehicle system technology; or
(C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as 
procured or as modified after procurement but before 
operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download 
data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses 
no national security cybersecurity risks as determined 
by the exempting official.
(d) Prohibition on Use of Federal Funds for Procurement and 
Operation Within the Intelligence Community of Covered Unmanned Ground 
Vehicle Systems Manufactured by Certain Foreign Entities.--
(1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and except as 
provided in paragraph (2), no Federal funds awarded to an 
element of the intelligence community through a contract, 
grant, or cooperative agreement, or otherwise made available 
may be used--
(A) to procure a covered unmanned ground vehicle 
system that is manufactured or assembled by a covered 
foreign entity; or
(B) in connection with the operation of such a 
robot or unmanned ground vehicle system.
(2) Exemption.--The heads of elements of the intelligence 
community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1) 
if the procurement or operation is required in the national 
interest of the United States and--
(A) is for the sole purposes of research, 
evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for 
electronic warfare, information warfare operations, 
cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground 
vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle 
system technology;
(B) is for the sole purposes of conducting 
counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities, 
protective missions, or Federal criminal or national 
security investigations, including forensic 
examinations, or for electronic warfare, information 
warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an 
unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned 
ground vehicle system technology; or
(C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as 
procured or as modified after procurement but before 
operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download 
data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses 
no national security cybersecurity risks as determined 
by the exempting official.

SEC. 611. CHINA-TAIWAN STRATEGIC WARNING TASK FORCE.

(a) Establishment.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall establish 
a task force to be known as the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task 
Force (referred to in this section as the ``Task Force'') to lead the 
efforts of the intelligence community with respect to providing 
indications and warning of any military aggression by the People's 
Republic of China against Taiwan.
(b) Objectives.--The objectives of the Task Force are the 
following:
(1) The synchronization of all intelligence community 
efforts related to China-Taiwan indications and warning, 
including the generation of indicators and development of 
collection requirements related to such indicators.
(2) The coordination of analysis related to China-Taiwan 
indications and warning and the development of analytic 
methodologies for use across the intelligence community in 
conducting analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and 
warning.
(3) The development and implementation of information 
technology solutions to synchronize the access of the 
intelligence community to information relating to indications 
and warning.
(c) Membership.--The Task Force shall be composed of the following 
members (or their designees):
(1) The Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and 
Security.
(3) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(5) The Director for Intelligence for the United States 
Indo-Pacific Command.
(6) The Director of the National-Geospatial Intelligence 
Agency.
(7) The Director of the National Security Agency.
(8) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Intelligence and Analysis.
(9) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research.
(10) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community that the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security 
determine appropriate.
(d) Leadership; Organization; Meetings.--
(1) Co-chairs.--The Director of National Intelligence (or a 
designee of the Director) and the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security (or a designee of the Undersecretary) 
shall be co-chairs of the Task Force.
(2) Working groups.--The Task Force may create subordinate 
working groups as determined by the co-chairs.
(3) Meeting frequency.--The Task Force shall meet regularly 
but not less than quarterly.
(e) Staffing.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force may hire staff and create 
joint duty assignments assigned to the Task Force. The Task 
Force may not exceed 25 full-time equivalent staff in total.
(2) Agency liaison.--Each member listed in subsection (b) 
shall appoint a senior intelligence officer from the agency 
concerned to serve as a liaison to the Task Force. Such liaison 
shall be responsible for coordinating the participation and 
support of the agency concerned to the Task Force.
(f) Initial Reports.--. Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
committees a report on the status of the Task Force, including--
(1) a summary of the efforts of the intelligence community 
with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning;
(2) a summary of efforts by the Task Force to develop a 
common set of indicators and organize collection efforts by the 
intelligence community against such indicators;
(3) a description of the resources provided by each Task 
Force member towards efforts with respect to China-Taiwan 
indications and warning, disaggregated by--
(A) dollars spent or planned to be spent during 
fiscal year 2027 ; and
(B) total full-time equivalent personnel; and
(4) recommendations to improve the collection and analysis 
of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan 
indications and warning.
(g) Sunset.--The provisions of this section shall terminate on the 
date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 612. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO CHINESE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES.

(a) Prohibition on Use by Intelligence Community.--
(1) In general.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) of section 
6604 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 
(50 U.S.C. 3334m note; division F of Public Law 119-60) is 
amended to read as follows:
``(1) Covered application.--The term `covered application' 
means--
``(A) the DeepSeek application or any successor 
application or service; or
``(B) any product or service from any entity of the 
People's Republic of China that is included on--
``(i) the Entity List maintained by the 
Bureau of Industry and Security of the 
Department of Commerce;
``(ii) the list (sometimes known as the 
`Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex 
Companies List') maintained by the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the 
Treasury under Executive Order 13959, as 
amended by Executive Order 14032 (50 U.S.C. 
1701 note; relating to addressing the threat 
from securities investments that finance 
certain companies of the People's Republic of 
China), or any successor order; or
``(iii) the list of Chinese military 
companies required under section 1260H of the 
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 
U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283) and 
maintained by the Department of Defense.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The heading for such section is 
amended by striking ``deepseek'' and inserting ``products and 
services from people's republic of china''.
(b) Limitation on Procurement by Intelligence Community.--Section 
414 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (28 
U.S.C. 532 note; division X of Public Law 117-103) is amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``by federal bureau 
of investigation'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking 
``Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and 
inserting ``head of an element of the intelligence 
community'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Federal Bureau 
of Investigation'' and inserting ``element''; and
(C) in paragraph (3), by striking ``Director (or a 
designee of the Director)'' and inserting ``head'';
(3) in subsection (b), by striking ``the Director (or a 
designee of the Director, as applicable) approves a 
recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the Director 
shall'' and inserting ``the head of an element of the 
intelligence community approves a recommendation pursuant to 
subsection (a)(3), the head shall'';
(4) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (2) to read as 
follows:
``(2) People's republic of china product or service.--The 
term `People's Republic of China product or service' means--
``(A) an information or communication technology 
product manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau and 
designed, developed, or maintained by a firm that is 
domiciled in China, Hong Kong, or Macau; or
``(B) an information or communication technology 
product or service provided or manufactured by--
``(i) an entity that is fully or partially 
owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected 
to, the government of China; or
``(ii) an entity included on the list 
submitted by the Director of National 
Intelligence under section 6706(c) of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2026 (division F of Public Law 119-60; 139 
Stat. 1648).''.

SEC. 613. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR OFFENSIVE 
CYBER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.

(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 1115. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR OFFENSIVE 
CYBER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.

``(a) In General.--An element of the intelligence community may not 
provide intelligence or support for an offensive cyber operation 
conducted by a nongovernmental entity, unless such an entity--
``(1) is conducting the offensive cyber operation on behalf 
of such element and is operating under the authorities and 
supervision of such element; or
``(2) is otherwise authorized by the President of the 
United States to conduct the offensive cyber operation.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Nongovernmental entity.--The term `nongovernmental 
entity' means any entity that is not an entity of the United 
States Government.
``(2) Offensive cyber operation.--The term `offensive cyber 
operation' means any activity carried out in cyberspace, or any 
associated preparatory action, that affects an information 
system, network, or any other computer infrastructure that is 
not owned or lawfully operated by the entity carrying out the 
activity or action.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is 
amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 1115. Limitation on intelligence community support for offensive 
cyber operations conducted by 
nongovernmental entities.''.

SEC. 614. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 124. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY.

``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Biological data.--The term `biological data' means 
multiomic information and other relevant information, including 
associated descriptors, derived from the structure, function, 
or process of a biological system, that is measured, collected, 
or aggregated for analysis, including information from humans, 
animals, plants, or microbes.
``(2) Biological intelligence.--The term `biological 
intelligence' includes the information collected or 
disseminated by the intelligence community concerning 
biological threats through genomic surveillance, immunological 
monitoring, environmental sampling, multiomic analysis, and 
other scientific methodologies.
``(3) Biological threat.--The term `biological threat' 
includes any naturally occurring infectious disease, engineered 
pathogen, toxin, or other biological agent that poses a risk to 
human, animal, or plant health or to the national security of 
the United States.
``(b) Determination; Dissemination.--The Director of National 
Intelligence, in such coordination with the Secretary of Defense as the 
Director considers appropriate, shall, consistent with applicable 
Federal law and Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to 
United States intelligence activities)--
``(1) determine which United States agencies would benefit 
from receiving anonymized biological data and biological 
intelligence in support of detection, characterization, and 
attribution of foreign biological threats; and
``(2) disseminate such anonymized biological data and 
biological intelligence to agencies identified under paragraph 
(1).
``(c) Standards; Databases.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this section, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in such coordination with the Secretary of Defense as the 
Director considers appropriate, shall--
``(1) ensure standards for the collection and data formats 
of anonymized biological data and biological intelligence are, 
to the extent possible, consistent with standards used by other 
United States agencies, including by--
``(A) providing for standardized data 
categorization and tagging of biological data;
``(B) considering standardized scientific and 
laboratory equipment and data collection methodologies; 
and
``(C) minimizing collection of any biological data 
that is likely to contain biological or genomic 
information specific to any United States person, 
including any derived data that is specific to any 
United States person; and
``(2) facilitate the establishment and maintenance of 
streamlined and unified accesses to databases of biological 
intelligence collected by the intelligence community or the 
Department of Defense.
``(d) Priority.--In carrying out subsections (b) and (c), the 
Director of National Intelligence shall prioritize supporting 
capabilities, including the development of technical tools, that enable 
the early detection, characterization, and attribution of naturally 
occurring, novel, or engineered pathogens that could threaten the 
United States.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 123 the 
following:

``Sec. 124. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence 
community.''.

SEC. 615. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.

(a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 304 the 
following:

``SEC. 304A. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.

``(a) In General.--Except as may be necessary to conduct authorized 
intelligence activities, a covered individual may not participate in a 
prediction market on any topic relating to nonpublic information to 
which the covered individual has access by virtue of being a covered 
individual, during--
``(1) the period during which the covered individual is 
employed or contracted by an element of the intelligence 
community; or
``(2) the two-year period beginning on the date on which 
the covered individual ceases to be employed or contracted by 
such an element.
``(b) Policy.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the 
enactment of this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
issue a policy implementing the prohibition in subsection (a), 
including--
``(1) establishing appropriate penalties for violating the 
prohibition; and
``(2) providing notice to all covered individuals.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual' 
means an employee or contractor, or a former employee or 
contractor, of an element of the intelligence community who 
holds a security clearance.
``(2) Prediction market.--The term `prediction market' 
means a platform, company, or service that allows agreements, 
contracts, transactions, or swaps between users over the 
outcome of non-financial future events, such as sports, 
military actions, and elections.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 304 the 
following:

``Sec. 304A. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.''.

SEC. 616. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Oversight of Foreign Influence in Academia.--Section 5713 of 
the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 
3369b) is repealed.
(b) Report on Efforts to Illicitly Acquire Satellites and Related 
Items.--Section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 2778 note; Public Law 112-239) is amended 
by striking subsection (e).
(c) Monitoring Mineral Investments Under Belt and Road Initiative 
of the People's Republic of China.--Section 7003 of the Energy Act of 
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3372) is amended by striking subsection (d).
(d) Briefing on Protocols for Certain Intelligence Community 
Employees and Dependents.--Section 605(g) of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3334k(g)) is amended 
by striking paragraph (3).
(e) Program on Use of Intelligence Resources in Efforts to Sanction 
Foreign Opioid Traffickers.--Section 7231 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act 
(21 U.S.C. 2331) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(f) Periodic Report on Positions in the Intelligence Community That 
Can Be Conducted Without Access to Classified Information, Networks, or 
Facilities.--Section 6610 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352e) is repealed.
(g) Review of Shared Information Technology Services for Personnel 
Vetting.--Section 7701 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1100) is 
repealed.
(h) Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task 
Force.--Section 6306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 
(50 U.S.C. 3370) is amended by striking subsection (e).
(i) Report on Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil Liberties, 
and Civil Rights of Chinese Americans.--Section 620 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3240) is repealed.
(j) Enforcement of Cybersecurity Requirements for National Security 
Systems; Report on Exemptions.--Section 6309(f) of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (44 U.S.C. 3557 note; division F 
of Public Law 117-263) is amended by striking paragraph (3).
(k) Report on Collaboration Between Intelligence Community and 
Department of Commerce to Counter Foreign Commercial Threats.--Section 
6514(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 
U.S.C. 3370b(b)) is amended by striking paragraph (6).
(l) Timeliness Standard for Rendering Determinations of Trust for 
Personnel Vetting; Reviews.--Section 7702(a) of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h(a)) is amended 
by striking paragraph (2).
(m) Briefings on Status of Intelligence Community Innovation 
Unit.--Subsections (c) and (d) of section 7502 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 
1082) are repealed.
(n) Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding Analytic 
Standards.--Section 6312 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note; Public Law 117-263) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections 
(c) and (d), respectively.
(o) Annual Reports Regarding Intelligence Community Public-private 
Talent Exchanges.--Section 6506 of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2497) is amended by 
striking subsection (e).
(p) Software Licensing.--Section 109 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3044) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(q) Review and Update of Position Designation Guidance.--Section 7 
of the SECRET Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-173; 132 Stat. 1294) is 
amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(r) Report on Independent Study on Economic Impact of Military 
Invasion of Taiwan by People's Republic of China.--Section 7407 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 
137 Stat. 1075) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

SEC. 617. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL TRAVEL, ALLOWANCES, AND 
RELATED EXPENSES REGULATIONS.

(a) Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 4 of the Central 
Intelligence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3505) is amended by adding at the 
end the following new subsection:
``(c) Biennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than September 30, 
2027, and not less frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, the 
Director shall--
``(1) review the regulations covered by this section; and
``(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review 
under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees the findings of the Director with respect to the 
review, including identification of any changes to the 
regulations or personnel coverage thereof that the Director 
determines to be necessary for the performance of intelligence 
functions.''.
(b) Office of Director of National Intelligence.--Section 102A of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding 
at the end the following new subsection:
``(z) Biennial Reviews and Reports Regarding Intelligence Community 
Personnel Travel, Allowances, and Related Expenses Regulations.--Not 
later than September 30, 2027, and not less frequently than once every 
2 years thereafter, in order to reflect the requirements of the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence not taken into account in the 
formulation of Government-wide travel procedures covered by this 
section, the Director shall--
``(1) review such requirements; and
``(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review 
under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees the findings of the Director with respect to the 
review, including any regulations that the Director determines 
to be necessary for the performance of intelligence 
functions.''.

SEC. 618. PROHIBITION ON SENDING AND RECEIVING OBJECTS USING ENTITIES 
OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY PERSONS OR GOVERNMENTS OF CERTAIN 
COUNTRIES.

(a) Definition of Covered Nation.--In this section, the term 
``covered nation'' has the meaning given such term in section 4872(f) 
of title 10, United States Code.
(b) In General.--
(1) List required.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, shall develop a list of products, 
intellectual property, technology, and any other objects that 
the Directors determine--
(A) affect the national security of the United 
States; and
(B) if acquired by a covered nation, would pose a 
threat to the national security of the United States.
(2) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) may be in 
classified form.
(c) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (d), no element 
of the intelligence community may send or receive any product, 
intellectual property, technology, or other object as identified 
pursuant to subsection (b) within the United States using an entity, 
including any shipping company, that is owned or substantially 
controlled by a person or a governmental entity domiciled in a covered 
nation.
(d) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence community--
(1) may waive the prohibition in subsection (c) for the 
element on a case by case basis if the head determines that in 
the particular case, sending or receiving any product, 
intellectual property, technology, or other object by an entity 
identified pursuant to subsection (b) is necessary for the 
national security of the United States; and
(2) not later than 3 days after issuing such waiver, shall 
notify the Director of National Intelligence of the waiver.
(e) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the head of an 
element of the intelligence community issues a waiver described in 
subsection (d), such head shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a written notice of the waiver, which shall 
include--
(1) a justification for the waiver, including the product, 
intellectual property, technology, or other object subject to 
the waiver; and
(2) a description of the national security threat 
mitigation measures implemented for permitting the activity 
that otherwise would be prohibited under subsection (c).

SEC. 619. ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
REGION.

(a) Definition of Intelligence Cooperation.--In this section, the 
term ``intelligence cooperation'' means activities authorized under the 
provisions of law administered by the heads of the elements of the 
intelligence community, including the collection, analysis, production, 
and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
consider intelligence cooperation with allies and partners of the 
United States in the Indo-Pacific region a priority national security 
investment that will help deter aggression, reinforce regional 
stability, and reduce the risk of miscalculation, all of which will 
advance the national security and economic prosperity of the United 
States by helping to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
(c) Requirements.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall, acting in close coordination with such heads of elements 
of the intelligence community as the Director considers 
relevant and the members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing 
alliance, undertake efforts to bolster and improve--
(A) the intelligence foundations of alliances 
between the United States and Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and 
Thailand; and
(B) intelligence cooperation between the United 
States and other regional partners, such as India and 
Vietnam.
(2) Priority areas for enhanced cooperation.--Efforts 
undertaken pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include efforts--
(A) to address the speed and complexity of 
potential strategic and operational contingencies in 
the Indo-Pacific region, including any scenarios 
involving adversarial efforts to limit the freedom of 
navigation through critical maritime chokepoints 
threaten supply chain security;
(B) relatedly, to ensure shared situational 
awareness across the full spectrum of potential 
contingencies, including military indications and 
warnings;
(C) to enhance maritime, air, and space domain 
awareness, with the goal of providing decision 
advantage;
(D) to inform collective defense planning and 
response by further integrating intelligence 
cooperation into joint and combined operational 
planning activities, exercises, and wargames focused on 
regional contingencies, including the Rim of the 
Pacific;
(E) to encourage intelligence cooperation with 
Taiwan, consistent with United States law and policy; 
and
(F) to promote multilateral intelligence sharing 
and collaboration among allies and partners of the 
United States, such as through the United States-Japan-
Republic of Korea trilateral mechanism and the United 
States-Japan-Philippines trilateral mechanism.

SEC. 620. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UKRAINE.

(a) Statement of Policy.--
(1) In general.--Section 3 of the Support for the 
Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of 
Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8902) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (16), by striking ``; and'' and 
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (17), by striking the period at 
the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(18) to assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense 
and deterrence capability, including through the provision of 
intelligence support, as a means of advancing the national 
security of the United States, regional stability, and the 
protection of United States interests in Europe.''.
(2) Definition.--Section 2 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8901) is 
amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as 
paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Credible defense and deterrence capability.--The term 
`credible defense and deterrence capability' means the ability 
to defend against and deter any credible conventional military 
threat from the Russian Federation acting unilaterally or in 
concert with partners, through the use of conventional military 
means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons 
platforms and munitions, and command, control, communication, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
``(4) Intelligence support.--The term `intelligence 
support' means activities authorized under the provisions of 
law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community, including the collection, analysis, production, and 
dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.''.
(b) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support Absent an 
Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.--Until Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or 
comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, the Director of 
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
and the heads of any other relevant element of the intelligence 
community, shall continue to ensure the provision of intelligence 
support to the Government of Ukraine for purposes of advancing United 
States policy goals in Ukraine.
(c) Pauses in Intelligence Support.--
(1) In general.--Intelligence support to Ukraine required 
under this section shall not be suspended or limited unless the 
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, identifies a specific and 
identifiable national security concern.
(2) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after making the 
decision to pause, terminate, restrict, or otherwise materially 
downgrade intelligence support to Ukraine, the Director of 
National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the 
elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a notification that 
includes--
(A) a detailed description of the reason for the 
pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade 
of intelligence support;
(B) the expected duration of the pause, 
termination, restriction, or material downgrade; and
(C) the anticipated impact of such decision on the 
ability of Ukraine to conduct effective military 
operations.
(3) Form.--A notification submitted under paragraph (2) 
shall be in unclassified form, but may include an classified 
annex.
(d) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of 
Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.--
(1) In general.--If Ukraine and the Russian Federation 
voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or a 
comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other 
relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall adjust 
the intelligence support to Ukraine to support implementation 
of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement and, 
consistent with the national security interests of the United 
States, support building and sustaining the capacity of Ukraine 
to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack against 
the territory of Ukraine.
(2) Report on modifications to united states intelligence 
support.--Not later than 30 days after an armistice or a 
comprehensive political settlement is entered into force, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination 
with the heads of the other relevant elements of the 
intelligence community, including the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security 
Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report that includes--
(A) a description of the details of the armistice 
or the comprehensive political settlement of the 
conflict in Ukraine, including a description of the 
role of the intelligence community in monitoring the 
adherence by the parties to specific elements of the 
agreement;
(B) an assessment of the vulnerabilities that 
Ukraine will face under the terms of the agreement and 
potential measures that the intelligence community or 
other parties could take to help mitigate such 
vulnerabilities;
(C) a description of the modifications to ongoing 
intelligence support the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency has authorized in light of the 
changed situation on the ground in Ukraine in order to 
help build and sustain the capacity of Ukraine to 
detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack 
against the territory of Ukraine;
(D) an assessment of the implications of the 
armistice or comprehensive political settlement for the 
national security interests of the United States in 
Europe, including the capacity of the United States and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deter future 
aggression by the Russian Federation; and
(E) a description and assessment of any cooperative 
arrangements that Ukraine has with other countries, 
including member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, that the intelligence community assesses 
would contribute to deterring a future attack or act of 
aggression by the Russian Federation aimed at occupying 
or seizing the territory of Ukraine.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (2) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.
(4) Early warning.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements 
of the intelligence community, shall provide to Ukraine and 
member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
intelligence and early warning to allow for an appropriate and 
timely response with respect to any potential attack or act of 
aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
(5) Notification.--
(A) In general.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall promptly notify each Member of the 
congressional intelligence committees not later than 5 
days after any intelligence element provides Ukraine 
any intelligence pursuant to paragraph (4).
(B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to 
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description of the specific 
threatened attack or act of aggression shared 
with Ukraine;
(ii) the date on which the intelligence was 
provided to Ukraine;
(iii) details of the channel through which 
the intelligence was shared, including the 
names and titles of the relevant intelligence 
community officers and Ukrainian government 
officials;
(iv) the response of the Government of 
Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence;
(v) an assessment produced by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, in coordination with other 
relevant elements of intelligence community, as 
to what support Ukraine might require in order 
to deter or repel the threatened attack or act 
of aggression; and
(vi) a summary of subsequent actions that 
the Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, and other heads of 
relevant elements of the intelligence 
community, directed be taken to support Ukraine 
in defending against or otherwise responding to 
the threatened attack or act of aggression.
(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to 
subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex.
(e) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of an 
Armed Attack on Ukraine in Violation of an Armistice or Comprehensive 
Political Settlement.--
(1) In general.--In the event of an armed attack by the 
Russian Federation on Ukraine that violates an armistice or a 
comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, and the heads of other relevant elements of the 
intelligence community, shall immediately resume the provision 
of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine at a level 
the Directors deem necessary to support military operations of 
the Government of Ukraine that are intended, or reasonably 
expected, to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine defend or 
liberate the territory of Ukraine and prevent such territory of 
Ukraine from being occupied or attacked by the Russian 
Federation.
(2) Notification.--
(A) In general.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional 
intelligence committees not later than 5 days after 
resuming intelligence support pursuant to paragraph 
(1).
(B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to 
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description of the specific attack or 
act of aggression against Ukraine;
(ii) a description of any intelligence 
support that Ukraine requested from the United 
States;
(iii) an assessment of the support that 
Ukraine might require in order to deter or 
repel the attack or act of aggression;
(iv) a description of any intelligence 
support that the Director has authorized to be 
provided to Ukraine; and
(v) a description of the response of the 
Government of Ukraine upon receiving the 
intelligence support.
(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to 
subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex.
(3) Sunset.--
(A) In general.--The provision of intelligence 
support for Ukraine under this subsection shall cease 
on the date that is 120 days after the date on which 
the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the 
Russian Federation agree to reinstate the armistice or 
comprehensive political settlement that was violated or 
a new armistice or comprehensive political settlement 
is entered into force.
(B) Recommencement.--Upon the cessation of the 
provision of intelligence support under subparagraph 
(A), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
in coordination with the heads of any other relevant 
elements of the intelligence community, shall resume 
the provision of intelligence support to Ukraine 
pursuant to subsection (d).
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Armistice; comprehensive political settlement.--The 
terms ``armistice'' and ``comprehensive political settlement'' 
mean a formal written agreement between the Government of 
Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation that has 
the effect of permanently ending the armed conflict between 
both nations.
(2) Intelligence support.--The term ``intelligence 
support'' means activities authorized under the provisions of 
law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community, including the collection, analysis, production, and 
dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.
(3) Specific and identifiable national security concern.--
The term ``specific and identifiable national security 
concern'' includes the following:
(A) Credible intelligence that an element of the 
Government of Ukraine has been compromised by the 
Russian Federation or another foreign adversary.
(B) Protection of sources and methods.
(C) A voluntary request from the Government of 
Ukraine to pause intelligence support.
(D) Credible intelligence that an element of the 
Government of Ukraine receiving United States 
intelligence support engaged in a pattern of human 
rights violations, atrocities, or violations of the law 
of armed conflict.
(4) Territory of ukraine.--The term ``territory of 
Ukraine'' means all territory internationally recognized to be 
the sovereign territory of Ukraine on February 19, 2014, 
including Crimea and the territory that the Russian Federation 
claims to have annexed in Kherson and Zaporizhzia.

SEC. 621. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH COUNTRIES 
OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES.

Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3024(j)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Under the direction'' and inserting the 
following:
``(1) In general.--Under the direction''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Notification required.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 48 hours after a 
decision to pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or 
materially downgrade intelligence support or 
intelligence activities (as defined in section 501(f)), 
including information, intelligence, and imagery 
collection authorized under Executive Order 12333 (50 
U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States 
intelligence activities), to the government of a 
country of significant concern to the United States, 
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees a 
notification of such decision.
``(B) Elements.--The notification required in 
subsection (a) shall include--
``(i) a detailed description of the reason 
for the pause, termination, restriction, or 
material downgrade of intelligence support;
``(ii) a description of the change in 
intelligence sharing;
``(iii) the categories of information 
affected;
``(iv) the expected duration of the pause, 
termination, restriction, or material 
downgrade; and
``(v) the anticipated impact of such 
decision on regional security and the national 
security objectives of the United States.
``(C) Country of significant concern to the united 
states defined.--In this subsection, the term `country 
of significant concern to the United States' means--
``(i) Israel;
``(ii) Ukraine;
``(iii) Taiwan; and
``(iv) any other country designated as such 
by the President.''.

SEC. 622. UNITED STATES-ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE SHARING ENHANCEMENT.

(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to maintain and strengthen the strategic security 
partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national 
defense of the United States, regional stability, and the 
protection of United States personnel and interests in the 
Middle East;
(2) to enhance intelligence collaboration through robust 
intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel to 
counter terrorism, proliferation networks, cyber threats, state 
and nonstate aggressors, terror financing, sanctions evasion, 
and other transnational security challenges that threaten both 
Israel and the United States;
(3) to deter and counter destabilizing activities by the 
Government of Iran and Iran-aligned state and nonstate actors 
that threaten Israel, United States forces, and regional 
partners;
(4) to ensure that security assistance and defense 
cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its 
qualitative military edge, consistent with United States law 
and broader regional security considerations;
(5) to encourage and support the expansion of regional 
security architectures that include Israel and willing regional 
partners, with a focus on integrated air and missile defense, 
maritime security, early warning systems, and intelligence-
sharing frameworks; and
(6) to leverage security coordination with Israel to 
enhance force protection, early warning, and crisis response 
capabilities for United States military and diplomatic 
personnel in the region.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Israel remains a critical United States security 
partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a 
strategic advantage that contributes to enhanced operational 
effectiveness and technological superiority;
(2) timely and actionable intelligence sharing between the 
United States and Israel has saved United States personnel and 
property in the region and should remain a central pillar of 
the bilateral security relationship;
(3) the evolving threat environment in the Middle East--
including missile proliferation, unmanned systems, cyber 
operations, terror financing, and proxy warfare--requires 
sustained and adaptive cooperation between the United States 
and Israel;
(4) the United States-Israel security partnership has 
historically benefitted from bipartisan support, which 
strengthens the partnership's credibility, durability, and 
deterrent value; and
(5) expanding normalization and practical security 
cooperation between Israel and regional states can serve as a 
force multiplier for collective deterrence and integrated 
defense.
(c) Requirements Relating to Intelligence Sharing.--
(1) In general.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
the following:

``SEC. 1115. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING.

``(a) Intelligence Sharing With Israel.--
``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the 
Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the 
Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and the 
protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand and 
enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of Israel.
``(2) Scope of intelligence sharing.--Intelligence sharing 
carried out under this subsection shall include the sharing of 
information relating to cybersecurity threats, terrorism, 
sanctions evasion, plans and intentions of state and nonstate 
actors, adversarial technology proliferation, missile threats, 
unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, 
air and space domain awareness, and other aerial threats 
relevant to the defense of Israel, United States forces and 
interests in the region, and regional security partners.
``(3) Limitations on reduction of intelligence sharing.--
``(A) In general.--Intelligence sharing and related 
security information exchanges with the Government of 
Israel shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise 
materially limited except on the basis of a specific 
and identifiable national security concern determined 
by the President, such as the protection of 
intelligence sources and methods, counterintelligence 
risk, or another significant security consideration.
``(B) Documentation requirement.--The President 
shall document any determination to suspend, reduce, or 
otherwise materially limit intelligence sharing or 
related security information exchanges with the 
Government of Israel, including a description of the 
national security rationale supporting the change.
``(4) Congressional notification.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 15 days after the 
date of any decision to materially increase, suspend, 
reduce, or otherwise alter intelligence sharing or 
related security information exchanges with the 
Government of Israel, the President shall notify the 
congressional intelligence committees of such decision.
``(B) Elements.--Each notification required by 
subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
``(i) A description of the change in 
intelligence sharing or security information 
exchange.
``(ii) The categories of information 
affected.
``(iii) The national security objectives 
served by the change.
``(iv) In the case of a suspension or 
reduction, the specific national security 
concern supporting the change.
``(v) An assessment of the anticipated 
impact on regional security, United States 
forces, and integrated air and missile defense 
cooperation.
``(b) Intelligence Sharing and Analytic Cooperation With Abraham 
Accords Countries.--
``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the 
Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the 
Secretary of Defense, shall, consistent with applicable law and 
security agreements, expand and enhance intelligence sharing 
and analytic cooperation with countries that have normalized 
relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords (as 
defined in section 64(k) of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2735a(k)) in order to 
strengthen regional security integration.
``(2) Priority areas.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the 
President shall prioritize the sharing of appropriate 
intelligence and information relating to--
``(A) counterterrorism threats and networks, 
including state and nonstate aggressors, and terror 
financing;
``(B) cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and 
defensive best practices;
``(C) air and missile defense early warning and 
threat tracking;
``(D) geospatial, overhead, and other imaging 
intelligence relevant to shared security concerns; and
``(E) maritime security threats, including threats 
to freedom of navigation, commercial shipping, 
sanctions evasion, and regional maritime stability.
``(3) Safeguards.--
``(A) Adoption of guidelines.--The Director of 
National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall adopt guidelines for 
intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation carried 
out under this subsection that ensure appropriate 
safeguards--
``(i) to protect intelligence sources and 
methods; and
``(ii) to ensure that recipients maintain 
adequate security protections consistent with 
United States requirements.
``(B) Restrictions on access.--If the Director of 
National Intelligence determines that a recipient of 
intelligence sharing or analytic cooperation carried 
out under this subsection has any intelligence, 
defense, or technological information sharing 
relationship with an adversarial nation, the Director 
shall restrict all access of such recipient to such 
intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation.
``(c) Report Required.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 5 
years, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the status of United 
States intelligence sharing with the Government Israel and, as 
appropriate, regional partners.
``(2) Matters to be included.--Each report required by 
paragraph (1) shall include, to the extent consistent with the 
protection of intelligence sources and methods, the following:
``(A) A description of the categories of 
intelligence and security information shared by the 
United States Government with the Government of Israel.
``(B) An assessment of progress toward seamlessly 
integrating Israel into regional air and missile 
defense and early warning architectures with partner 
countries, including those that have normalized 
relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords.
``(C) A description of how such intelligence 
sharing has contributed, if at all, to--
``(i) improved detection, tracking, 
warning, interception, or deterrence of aerial 
threats, including missiles and unmanned 
systems, for Israel, United States forces, or 
regional partners; and
``(ii) the overall stability and 
coordination of security in the region.
``(D) An assessment of progress in improving 
interoperability among technology networks of the 
United States, Israel, and partner countries.
``(E) A description of efforts to secure technology 
networks and data from cyber threats and unauthorized 
access.
``(F) An identification of any legal, policy, 
technical, counterintelligence, or security barriers 
limiting deeper intelligence integration, including 
risks to intelligence sources and methods.
``(G) A summary of any significant increases or 
reductions in intelligence sharing during the reporting 
period and the national security rationale for such 
changes.
``(3) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1) report 
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
classified annex.
``(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In 
this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional 
committees' means--
``(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
and
``(B) to the extent Department of Defense 
information is implicated, the congressional defense 
committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, 
United States Code).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act 
is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 1115. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing.''.

TITLE VII--ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY

SEC. 701. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION GUARD AND INTELLIGENCE 
SHARING.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial 
intelligence model'' means a capability or series of 
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, 
generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or 
decisions without human intervention or input.
(2) Center.--The term ``Center'' means the Artificial 
Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency.
(3) Classified information.--The term ``classified 
information'' has the meaning given such term in section 805 of 
the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3164).
(4) Cleared industry personnel.--The term ``cleared 
industry personnel'' means employees or representatives of a 
covered person who hold an appropriate security clearance and 
have a demonstrated need to know.
(5) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given 
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 
50 U.S.C. 3003).
(6) Covered person.--The term ``covered person'' means a 
non-Federal person who--
(A) is a United States citizen;
(B) develops, deploys, or operates artificial 
intelligence models or critical enabling 
infrastructure; and
(C) provides the services described in subparagraph 
(B) to an element of the intelligence community or 
Department of Defense.
(7) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
the National Security Agency.
(8) Intelligence.--The term ``intelligence'' has the 
meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).
(9) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).
(10) Security clearance.--The term ``security clearance'' 
means an authorization to access classified information.
(11) Threat information.--The term ``threat information'' 
means information on--
(A) efforts by foreign adversary countries to use 
products or research of covered persons or other 
entities or individuals to generate synthetic media for 
foreign-directed influence campaigns, develop and 
manage computer network exploitation campaigns, design 
or develop weapons systems, or enhance surveillance 
capabilities in ways that undermine the privacy or 
threaten the security of citizens of the United States;
(B) threats posed by foreign adversary countries, 
including indications of compromise to networks 
associated with covered persons and other entities and 
individuals, or other technical indicators, indicating 
a compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of an artificial intelligence system, or 
to the supply chain of an artificial intelligence 
system, including training or test data, frameworks or 
software libraries, training or inference computing 
environments, or other components necessary for the 
training, management, or maintenance of an artificial 
intelligence system;
(C) activity of foreign entities of concern to 
clandestinely, fraudulently, or otherwise maliciously 
access the systems of covered persons for purposes of 
illicit technology transfer or otherwise gaining unfair 
economic advantage, including through techniques to 
extract a model's technical capabilities to replicate, 
develop, or improve a foreign artificial intelligence 
model without authorization by the covered person;
(D) activity of foreign entities of concern to 
sabotage or otherwise clandestinely degrade artificial 
intelligence systems or the supply chain of an 
artificial intelligence system, including training or 
test data, frameworks or software libraries, training 
or inference computing environments, or other 
components necessary for the training, management, or 
maintenance of an artificial intelligence system; and
(E) observations, emerging concerns, or other 
inputs from vendors or researchers regarding relevant 
malicious or clandestine activity of foreign entities 
of concern toward an artificial intelligence system, 
its supply chain, or other necessary components.
(b) Establishment of Pilot Program on Sharing of Intelligence and 
Threat Information With Covered Persons.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through 
the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility 
and advisability of facilitating the secure sharing with 
covered persons of intelligence and threat information germane 
to the exploitation of access to United States artificial 
intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in 
intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other 
malicious activities.
(2) Participation.--The Director may not select covered 
persons to participate in the pilot in a manner that provides a 
competitive advantage or procurement preference to any covered 
person, to the detriment of another covered person.
(3) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot 
program established pursuant to paragraph (1) during the 3-year 
period beginning on the date of the establishment of the pilot 
program.
(c) Participation Requirements.--
(1) Criteria.--The Director shall establish criteria 
governing engagement with covered persons under the pilot 
program required by subsection (b), which may include criteria 
relating to the following:
(A) Relevance to national security.
(B) The ability to protect classified or sensitive 
intelligence information.
(C) Cybersecurity and information security 
maturity.
(D) Agreement to comply with intelligence handling, 
use, and nondisclosure requirements.
(E) The availability of cleared personnel of 
covered persons or willingness of covered persons to 
increase the number of cleared personnel.
(2) Nature of participation.--Participation in the pilot 
program shall not be construed as a certification, endorsement, 
or regulatory approval by the United States Government of any 
artificial intelligence system or commercial activity and the 
Director may not exclude a covered person from participating on 
the basis of political or ideological viewpoints of the covered 
person or its employees.
(d) Intelligence Sharing Structure.--
(1) Authorized modes.--Under the pilot program required by 
subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center, 
authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information as 
described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through--
(A) bilateral exchanges between elements of the 
intelligence community and a covered person;
(B) multilateral exchanges among covered persons, 
as determined appropriate by the Director; or
(C) another designated intelligence-sharing 
mechanism operated or overseen by the Director.
(2) Limitation.--Any mechanism established under this 
section shall be limited to the dissemination of intelligence 
and threat information and shall not establish standards, 
requirements, or best practices governing artificial 
intelligence development or deployment.
(e) Tailoring, Handling, and Protection of Intelligence.--
(1) Procedures required.--The Director shall, acting 
through the Center, codify procedures to tailor, sanitize, or 
downgrade the classification level of intelligence shared under 
the pilot program required by subsection (b) to ensure 
usability while protecting intelligence sources and methods.
(2) Examples of procedures.--The procedures developed under 
paragraph (1) may include the following:
(A) The use of tear lines and segregable summaries.
(B) The preparation of classified annexes where 
necessary.
(C) Criteria governing the classification level of 
shared intelligence.
(D) The appropriate use of cleared industry 
personnel.
(3) Handling requirements.--The Director shall, acting 
through the Center, codify policies governing the handling, 
storage, and dissemination of intelligence shared under the 
pilot program required by subsection (b), including audit and 
compliance mechanisms.
(f) Permissible Use and Nondisclosure.--
(1) Permissible use.--Intelligence shared under the pilot 
program required by subsection (b) may be used solely for 
detecting, preventing, or mitigating malicious foreign activity 
exploiting access to United States artificial intelligence 
systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence 
collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious 
activities.
(2) Nondisclosure.--A covered person may not disclose to 
any person who is not a covered person or an element of the 
intelligence community any intelligence shared with the covered 
person under the pilot program required by subsection (b), 
except as expressly authorized by the Director acting through 
the Center.
(g) Privacy and Civil Liberties.--In planning and coordinating the 
pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director shall, acting 
through the Center, consult with the Civil Liberties Protection Officer 
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(h) Evaluation and Reporting.--
(1) Evaluation.--The Director shall, acting through the 
Center, continuously evaluate the effectiveness and risks of 
the pilot program established under subsection (b).
(2) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days before the 
date on which the pilot program required by paragraph 
(1) of subsection (b) terminates pursuant to paragraph 
(2) of such subsection, the Director shall, acting 
through the Center, submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report assessing--
(i) the effectiveness of intelligence 
sharing under the pilot program;
(ii) the adequacy of safeguards for 
sources, methods, and privacy;
(iii) the scope of participation; and
(iv) whether the program should be 
modified, extended, or terminated.
(B) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to 
subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form, but may include a classified annex.
(i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed--
(1) to authorize the collection of intelligence on United 
States persons not authorized by another provision of law;
(2) to require the disclosure of classified information to 
unauthorized persons; or
(3) to establish commercial, competition, or technology 
policy outside the purview of the intelligence community.
(j) Exemption From Disclosure; Protection.--Any information shared 
by a covered person or other entity or individual with the United 
States Government pursuant to this section--
(1) shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without 
discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B) 
of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of 
United States law or law of any State, political subdivision or 
agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of information or 
records; and
(2) shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable 
privilege or protection, including trade secret protection.

SEC. 702. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT 
TARGETING.

(a) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
National Intelligence.
(2) Intelligence.--The term ``Intelligence'' has the 
meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(b) Reviews Related to Intelligence Community Use of Artificial 
Intelligence to Support Targeting.--
(1) Policy and procedure reviews.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall 
review and assess the policies and procedures that 
govern the use by the intelligence community of 
artificial intelligence technologies in the production, 
or review, of intelligence used by the United States to 
inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.
(B) Elements.--In carrying out the review and 
assessment required by subparagraph (A), the Director 
shall--
(i) assess whether policies and procedures 
of the intelligence community that were in 
effect on the day before the date of the 
enactment of this Act adequately address risks 
posed by the use of artificial intelligence 
technologies in the targeting analysis and 
development and civilian harm mitigation 
processes; and
(ii) ensure the review covers all policies 
of the intelligence community that regard the 
production or review of intelligence, 
regardless of which element first produced the 
intelligence.
(2) Workflow reviews.--Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review 
and assess all workflows of the intelligence community that 
incorporate artificial intelligence used by the United States 
to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.
(c) Artificial Intelligence Errors Exploratory Analysis.--In 
carrying out the reviews required by subsection (b), the Director shall 
direct the National Intelligence Council to conduct a structured, 
exploratory analysis that--
(1) assess ways in which frontier artificial intelligence 
models could exhibit bias or cause errors that undermine 
intelligence or other information provided by the intelligence 
community that informs targeting accuracy;
(2) identify the specific point and cause of error; and
(3) provide proposed process mitigations to catch and 
correct such mistakes.
(d) Consultation.--In carrying out the review and assessments 
required by subsection (b), the Director shall consult with the heads 
of the elements of the intelligence community whose intelligence is 
commonly consulted to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects, 
such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, to solicit input on potential negative 
consequences resulting from artificial intelligence supported analysis, 
and possible ways to mitigate such consequences.
(e) Policies and Directives.--The Director shall issue or adjust 
such policies and directives to the intelligence community as the 
Director considers appropriate to improve risk mitigation in light of 
the review carried out under subsection (b).
(f) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the reviews 
and assessments carried out under subsection (b) as well as a 
summary of any new policies and directives issued pursuant to 
subsection (e).
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
include the following:
(A) A description of contributions of the 
intelligence community to targeting workflows, such as 
identification of points of interest, pattern of life 
analysis, review of proposed targets, target selection, 
and civilian impact reviews, as well as the 
understanding of the intelligence community of the 
delineation of roles and responsibilities with the 
Armed Forces where applicable.
(B) Identification of any artificial intelligence 
tools utilized and for what tasks or purposes they are 
used.
(C) The level of autonomy afforded to the tools, 
and whether human review of artificial intelligence 
system outputs is required to be conducted prior to 
dissemination of materials.
(D) The scope of individuals expected to have 
access to the materials described in subparagraph (C).
(E) An explanation of whether and how the 
capability limitations of artificial intelligence tools 
available to personnel of the intelligence community 
are communicated to users, including the cutoff date 
for the tool's training data, databases to which it 
does or does not have access rights, and the tasks the 
model has been trained for or approved for use.
(3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
classified annex.

SEC. 703. IMPROVEMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICIES, STANDARDS, 
AND GUIDANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph 
(4); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Study for tracking data generated or modified by an 
artificial intelligence system.--The Chief Artificial 
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in 
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of 
each element of the intelligence community, shall examine 
whether the intelligence community should identify intelligence 
information generated or materially modified by an artificial 
intelligence system, including determining what methods are 
necessary to preserve such information throughout the 
intelligence lifecycle.'';
(2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Process for review of artificial intelligence testing 
methodologies and benchmarks.--Consistent with applicable 
classification and access policies, the Chief Artificial 
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in 
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of 
each element of the intelligence community, shall--
``(A) establish a process to review artificial 
intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks 
employed within each element; and
``(B) ensure such methodologies and benchmarks 
remain commensurate with the capabilities and impacts 
of systems being evaluated.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(f) Process to Systematically Track and Evaluate Incidents.--Not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, 
the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence 
Community, in coordination with the National Manager for National 
Security Systems, shall establish a process to systematically track and 
evaluate incidents associated with compromises to the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems within 
each element of the intelligence community.
``(g) Policies for Agentic Artificial Intelligence Systems and 
Processes.--
``(1) Definition of agentic artificial intelligence system 
or process.--In this subsection, the term `agentic artificial 
intelligence system or process'--
``(A) means an artificial intelligence system or 
process that, given an objective or instruction--
``(i) determines the action or sequence of 
actions to be taken to accomplish that 
objective; and
``(ii) is capable of executing such actions 
directly on information systems, data, or 
external services; and
``(B) does not include a system or process that 
solely generates informational or advisory output for a 
human operator to act upon.
``(2) Review of the adequacy of existing identity, 
credential, and access management systems for information 
within the intelligence community.--
``(A) In general.--Consistent with authority under 
section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3024(g)), the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the National Manager 
for National Security Systems, shall--
``(i) not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this paragraph, complete a 
review of the adequacy of existing identity, 
credential, and access management systems for 
information within the intelligence community 
used by agentic artificial intelligence systems 
and processes; and
``(ii) not permit access to any information 
within the intelligence community by an 
external department or agency for use in an 
agentic artificial intelligence system or 
process until the review required by clause (i) 
is completed.
``(B) Evaluation of effectiveness of mechanisms for 
agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes 
to authenticate as non-human actors.--The review 
required by subparagraph (A)(i) shall include an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of mechanisms for 
agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes 
to authenticate as non-human actors, including the 
appropriate delegation of clearance entitlements and 
the traceability of any action taken by an agentic 
artificial intelligence system or process to a cleared 
individual on whose behalf the agentic artificial 
intelligence system or process is acting.
``(3) Policy guidance.--Upon completion of the review 
required by paragraph (2), the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National 
Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance 
Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, shall issue appropriate policy guidance 
on--
``(A) the use of agentic artificial intelligence 
systems and processes within the intelligence 
community; and
``(B) the access of agentic artificial intelligence 
systems and processes to information within the 
intelligence community.
``(4) Specific issues relating to agentic artificial 
intelligence systems and processes.--In carrying out paragraph 
(3), the Director of National Intelligence, at a minimum and to 
the extent such requirements are not already replicated in 
existing processes or policies, consider--
``(A) establishing a taxonomy of autonomy and 
security risks associated with agentic artificial 
intelligence systems and processes that operate on, or 
have the possibility of accessing, information within 
the intelligence community; and
``(B) establishing technical controls, processes, 
and other mitigation measures to address the risks 
identified under subparagraph (A), including, at a 
minimum--
``(i) requirements that any element of the 
intelligence community or external department 
or agency incorporating information from an 
intelligence community element as part of an 
agentic artificial intelligence system or 
process provide the relevant element of the 
intelligence community controlling such 
information with documentation of--
``(I) the properties of the agentic 
artificial intelligence system or 
process, including the range of 
additional systems or data sources it 
may access (whether as a system or 
process input or as an agent action), 
the permissions and classification 
entitlements associated with such 
access, as well as any relevant model 
or system documentation, such as model 
and system cards;
``(II) anticipated mission use 
cases for any access to information 
within the intelligence community in 
the context of an agentic artificial 
intelligence system or process, 
including whether any use case 
constitutes a high-impact artificial 
intelligence use as those terms are 
defined under existing Federal 
policies;
``(III) procedures to notify 
relevant intelligence community 
elements controlling such information 
of any changes to the properties of the 
agentic artificial intelligence system 
or process, to permissions and 
classification entitlements, or to 
anticipated use cases of such system or 
process, that might significantly limit 
the utility, confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of such 
information; and
``(IV) procedures for intelligence 
community elements to promptly notify 
external intelligence community 
elements or departments or agencies of 
any material changes to upstream 
classified data or systems that might 
significantly limit or impair the 
utility, confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of any downstream agentic 
artificial intelligence system or 
process maintained by that external 
intelligence community element or 
department or agency;
``(ii) policies and procedures to log any 
actions, as well as associated inputs, taken by 
an agentic artificial intelligence system or 
process to information within the intelligence 
community, including mechanisms to reverse or 
negate unauthorized actions or actions that 
pose a risk to the user intent or 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
such information;
``(iii) policies and procedures for 
safeguards, continuous monitoring, and the 
detection of security incidents or other 
unexpected behavior of an agentic artificial 
intelligence system or process, or failures of 
associated safeguards, that may pose a threat 
to the confidentiality, availability, or 
integrity of information within the 
intelligence community;
``(iv) policies and procedures for system-
level controls of agentic artificial 
intelligence systems and processes, tailored to 
address each system or process component; and
``(v) criteria for the selection of 
interoperability standards for agentic 
artificial intelligence systems and processes, 
with preference, to the extent practicable, for 
standards that are openly specified, governed 
in a vendor-neutral manner, supported by 
multiple model providers, extensible to future 
requirements, and subject to ongoing 
independent security review.''.

SEC. 704. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER.

Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2025 (division F of Public Law 118-159) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph 
(4); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following 
new paragraph (3):
``(3) Making available a research test-bed to private 
sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to 
engage in artificial intelligence security research, including 
through the secure provision of access in a secure environment 
for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary third-party models 
with the consent of the vendors of the models.'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Test-bed Requirements.--
``(1) Access and terms of usage.--
``(A) Researcher access.--The Director shall 
establish terms of usage governing researcher access to 
the test-bed made available under subsection (c)(3), 
with limitations on researcher publication only to the 
extent necessary to protect classified information or 
proprietary information concerning third-party models 
provided through the consent of model vendors.
``(B) Availability to federal agencies.--The 
Director shall ensure that the test-bed made available 
under subsection (c)(3) is also made available to other 
Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis.
``(2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.--
In carrying out subsection (c)(3), the Director shall leverage, 
to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other 
resources provided under section 5.2 of Executive Order 14110 
(88 Fed. Reg. 75191; relating to safe, secure, and trustworthy 
development and use of artificial intelligence).
``(3) Voluntary security guidance.--In order to incentivize 
participation by vendors of leading commercial models and to 
promote the national security of the United States, the 
Director shall share relevant guidance, informed by pre-
deployment testing in the secure test-bed environment 
identified in subsection (c), to inform voluntary vendor 
actions to mitigate against potential security threats to such 
models, or the ability of foreign actors to utilize such models 
for computer network exploitation campaigns, the design or 
development of weapons systems, or to further foreign 
surveillance capabilities.''.

SEC. 705. REPORTS ON NOVEL USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY.

(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``novel use of 
artificial intelligence technology'' means--
(1) an artificial intelligence capability or series of 
capabilities combined that has not previously been included in 
an intelligence community element's inventory of artificial 
intelligence use cases consistent with guidance issued pursuant 
to section 6702(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m(b));
(2) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that 
contravenes a restriction on the use of artificial intelligence 
contained in such an inventory; or
(3) a use of an artificial intelligence capability that 
constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as that 
term is defined under policies of the executive branch.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Director of 
National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other 
elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a consolidated report detailing 
any novel use of artificial intelligence technology that any element of 
the intelligence community is considering employing within the one-year 
period following submission of such report.
(c) Contents.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) 
shall describe the proposed novel use of artificial intelligence 
technology, including--
(1) hardware and software requirements;
(2) the proposed application of the technology;
(3) the risks and advantages assessed with respect to the 
proposed novel use;
(4) any specific risk mitigation measures contemplated, 
including measures specific to the proposed novel use;
(5) any test and evaluation activities conducted in 
conjunction with the proposed novel use;
(6) any additional test and evaluation activity that is 
still needed, and whether the intelligence community has 
resources to conduct and fund such activity; and
(7) any estimated cost increases anticipated in connection 
with the proposed novel use.
(d) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in classified form.
(e) Sunset.--This section shall expire on October 1, 2032.

SEC. 706. CLEAR LABELING OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OUTPUTS FOR 
TARGETING WORKFLOWS.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the 
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the 
intelligence community, establish a policy that applies to elements of 
the intelligence community, which generate intelligence that could 
reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal 
effects, and that requires--
(1) labeling of outputs from any artificial intelligence 
system used in the development of such intelligence are clearly 
marked to indicate--
(A) that artificial intelligence was used;
(B) the artificial intelligence system or model 
used;
(C) the manner in which, or task for which, the 
artificial intelligence was used; and
(D) a point of contact such as the relevant Chief 
Artificial Intelligence Officer, who can address 
questions about data inputs, system access, or 
artificial intelligence system performance; and
(2) the label or indicator that is used pursuant to 
paragraph (1) is attached to the resulting data or work product 
in a manner that remains prominent and visible to any person 
who subsequently interacts with that data on a system of the 
intelligence community, regardless of organizational 
affiliation of the person or the role of the person in 
developing the data.

SEC. 707. RESEARCH ON USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO 
INADVERTENT ESCALATION.

(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of 
appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research 
Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial 
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a 
research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence 
community with respect to specific ways in which the use of artificial 
intelligence systems by the intelligence community could contribute to 
inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors.
(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a) 
shall include--
(1) the identification of scenarios in which artificial 
intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent 
escalation with foreign nations or actors, including--
(A) analytic judgments that fail to properly 
consider or weigh alternative explanations;
(B) automation of imagery classification or signals 
intelligence;
(C) distinguishing between civilians and authorized 
targets;
(D) operational uses of artificial intelligence, 
such as time-constrained uses that do not allow for 
independent verification; and
(E) such other scenarios as identified by the 
Director or participating subject matter experts;
(2) a simulation of select scenarios to discern where 
miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood of 
occurrence; and
(3)(A) an identification of potential mitigations for 
vulnerabilities discovered; or
(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification 
of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the 
intelligence community.
(c) Briefings.--
(1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of 
completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), 
whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence 
Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the 
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence 
Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on the findings and recommendations of the research 
campaign.
(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in 
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of 
the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief 
Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the 
intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of 
the research campaign required by subsection (a), as 
appropriate.

SEC. 708. RESEARCH ON INTERACTION OF ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.

(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of 
appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research 
Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial 
Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a 
research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence 
community with respect to novel dynamics and vulnerabilities that may 
arise when an adversarial artificial intelligence system interacts 
directly with systems of, or contracted by, the intelligence community 
that include artificial intelligence components.
(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a) 
shall--
(1) pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial 
intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to 
uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems, 
infrastructure, or personnel that may result from--
(A) the accelerated development of artificial 
intelligence capabilities by foreign nations;
(B) the increasing access that non-state and 
criminal actors have to commercial artificial 
intelligence tools that can identify vulnerabilities 
and propose or orchestrate attacks; and
(C) the potential for artificial intelligence 
systems to interact directly with each other during an 
attack; and
(2) pursue findings, including--
(A) an identification of potential mitigations for 
unique vulnerabilities discovered; or
(B) if no mitigation could be identified, an 
identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-
up action by the intelligence community.
(c) Briefings.--
(1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of 
completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), 
whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence 
Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the 
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence 
Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on the findings and recommendations of the research 
campaign.
(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in 
coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of 
the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief 
Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the 
intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of 
the research campaign required by subsection (a), as 
appropriate.

SEC. 709. PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENTS REGARDING THE EXPORT OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence technology.--The term 
``artificial intelligence technology'' means--
(A) any United States-origin model weights;
(B) semiconductor manufacturing equipment; and
(C) any other item classified under--
(i) Export Control Classification Number 
3A090 or 4A090 of the Commerce Control List or 
corresponding entries in the Export 
Administration Regulations, as in effect on the 
date of the enactment of this Act; or
(ii) any subsequent revisions to the 
Commerce Control List as amended by the Bureau 
of Industry and Security to impose more 
restrictive parameters.
(2) Commerce control list.--The term ``Commerce Control 
List'' means the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement 
No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations.
(3) United states artificial intelligence stack.--The term 
``United States artificial intelligence stack'' means the 
United States artificial intelligence integrated circuits, 
cloud infrastructure, and models.
(4) Export control terms.--The terms ``export'', ``Export 
Administration Regulations'', ``in-country transfer'', 
``reexport'', and ``United States person'' have the meanings 
given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform 
Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to restrict access to the most sophisticated artificial 
intelligence integrated circuits and models that United States 
adversaries may seek to use against the United States, while also 
exporting the full United States artificial intelligence stack to 
allies and partners who adhere to stringent national security 
standards.
(c) Requirement.--Not fewer than 90 days before the Secretary of 
Commerce grants a license for the export, reexport, or in-country 
transfer of artificial intelligence technology, or before the United 
States joins an agreement on artificial intelligence with a foreign 
government, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the 
National Intelligence Council, and in coordination with the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research, the Director of the National Security 
Agency, and the heads of other appropriate elements of the intelligence 
community, shall provide to the President and the congressional 
intelligence committees a written assessment containing a comprehensive 
analysis regarding the risks associated with such action.
(d) Substance.--Each report submitted under subsection (c) shall 
include the assessment of the intelligence community of the 
consequences of the action concerned for United States national 
security, including assessment of--
(1) the recipient country's export control system with 
respect to artificial intelligence technology, including 
integrated circuits, integrated circuit design software, tools, 
and manufacturing equipment;
(2) information on any past, present, or expected 
interactions, including commercial ties and cooperation, 
between commercial entities or government entities in the 
recipient country and other countries of proliferation concern, 
including the People's Republic of China and the Russian 
Federation;
(3) actual or suspected transfers of artificial 
intelligence technology to such countries, including the 
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
(4) the consequences that onward proliferation of United 
States artificial intelligence technology from the recipient 
would have for United States efforts to both deny adversaries 
access to advanced artificial intelligence technology and 
maintain a significant competitive advantage in frontier 
artificial intelligence development, integrated design, and 
integrated manufacturing, especially relative to the progress 
of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
(5) the capacity of the intelligence community and United 
States commercial entities to have near real-time awareness of 
the any potential technology leakage or export violations by 
the recipient country;
(6) potential measures that the intelligence community 
assesses could reasonably be taken by the recipient country to 
mitigate both the proliferation concerns identified by the 
intelligence community and the consequences of any potential 
onward proliferation as detailed in paragraph (4);
(7) in the case of the grant of a license, specific 
measures that the intelligence community will take to evaluate 
compliance with any associated restrictions or compliance 
requirements;
(8) whether export of artificial intelligence technology 
would reinforce United States artificial intelligence 
dominance;
(9) the intended and likely end-uses, including military, 
intelligence, and domestic surveillance applications, and 
whether such uses are consistent with United States national 
security interests; and
(10) current and planned agreements and arrangements 
between the United States and the government of the recipient 
country.
(e) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (c) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 710. REVIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES 
UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.--The 
term ``artificial intelligence security vulnerability'' means a 
weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be 
exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization, 
the privacy, integrity, or availability of an artificial 
intelligence system, including through techniques such as--
(A) evasion attacks;
(B) poisoning attacks;
(C) privacy-based attacks;
(D) model theft or extraction attacks; and
(E) attacks designed to circumvent or degrade the 
safety, alignment, or access control mechanisms of an 
artificial intelligence system.
(2) Artificial intelligence system.--The term ``artificial 
intelligence system'' means a capability or series of 
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, 
generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or 
decisions without human intervention or input.
(3) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process 
document'' means the executive branch document entitled 
``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United 
States Government'' dated November 15, 2017.
(4) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term 
``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency 
review of vulnerabilities carried out pursuant to the 
Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any 
successor document.
(b) Evaluation; Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency 
shall--
(1) evaluate whether the existing Vulnerabilities Equities 
Process sufficiently accommodates the submission and review of 
artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
report describing the applicability of the Vulnerabilities 
Equities Process to such vulnerabilities, including whether the 
submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the 
Vulnerabilities Equities Process would result in an unduly 
large volume of notifications to affected vendors and, if so, 
an assessment of mechanisms to manage the volume of such 
notifications.
(c) Process.--In carrying out subsection (b), if the Director of 
the National Security Agency determines that the existing 
Vulnerabilities Equities Process does not sufficiently accommodate the 
submission and review of artificial intelligence security 
vulnerabilities identified by elements of the intelligence community, 
and that such vulnerabilities present public interest considerations 
meriting review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, the 
Director shall establish a process for the submission and review of 
such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process not 
later than 30 days after the date of such determination.
(d) Briefing on Vulnerabilities Identified by Artificial 
Intelligence Systems.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency 
shall provide the congressional intelligence committees with a briefing 
on--
(1) the volume of vulnerabilities of information systems 
identified by artificial intelligence systems;
(2) the impact of any change in such volume on the 
functioning of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(3) whether the increasingly rapid discovery and 
exploitation of such vulnerabilities by external cyber actors 
using artificial intelligence systems materially alters the 
equity of disclosure.
(e) Consultation Required.--The Director of the National Security 
Agency shall carry out subsections (b), (c), and (d) in consultation 
with--
(1) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
and
(3) other entities as the Director of the National Security 
Agency considers appropriate.

SEC. 711. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MODELS ON 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial 
intelligence model'' means a capability or series of 
capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, 
generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or 
decisions without human intervention or input.
(2) Child pornography.--The term ``child pornography'' has 
the meaning given that term in section 2256 of title 18, United 
States Code.
(3) Covered application.--The term ``covered application'' 
means any specific artificial intelligence model that has been 
confirmed by a head of an element of the intelligence 
community, or their designee, as--
(A) failing to comply with the National Institute 
of Standard and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk 
Management Framework: Generative Artificial 
Intelligence Profile with respect to ``obscene, 
degrading, and/or abusive content'', or a successor 
standard or framework, to the extent the framework 
applies to synthetic child sexual abuse material or 
non-consensual intimate images of adults;
(B) subject to a Federal court determination that 
such artificial intelligence model has generated 
content depicting child pornography; or
(C) subject to a Federal court determination that 
such artificial intelligence model has generated non-
consensual intimate visual depictions of an 
identifiable adult or a minor.
(4) Intimate visual depiction.--The term ``intimate visual 
depiction'' has the meaning given that term in section 1309 of 
the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022 (15 
U.S.C. 6851).
(b) Prohibition.--
(1) In general.--The acquisition or use of any covered 
application on national security systems operated by an element 
of the intelligence community or by a contractor of such 
element is prohibited unless the appropriate safeguards 
described in subsection (c) can be implemented.
(2) Implementation.--
(A) Initial removal.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, any covered 
application shall be required to be removed from 
national security systems operated by an element of the 
intelligence community or a contractor of such element.
(B) Subsequent removals.--Beginning after the 180-
day period described in subparagraph (A), any 
artificial intelligence model that becomes a covered 
application shall be required to be removed from 
national security systems operated by an element of the 
intelligence community or a contractor of such element 
not later than 180 days after the date that the model 
is confirmed by the head of an element of the 
intelligence community, or their designee, to be a 
covered application.
(c) Safeguards.--
(1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence 
community may implement additional safeguards that prohibit the 
generation of child pornography or non-consensual intimate 
visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a minor.
(2) Certification required.--The head of an element of the 
intelligence community shall certify to the Director of 
National Intelligence that safeguards implemented under 
paragraph (1) are sufficient to prevent misuse of covered 
applications to generate child pornography or intimate visual 
depictions of a minor.
(3) Congressional notification.--The head of an element of 
the intelligence community that issues a certification pursuant 
to paragraph (2) shall notify the congressional intelligence 
committees of such certification not later than 7 days after 
issuing such certification. Such a notification shall identify 
the safeguards implemented pursuant to paragraph (1).
(d) National Security and Research Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence 
community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence 
model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition under 
subsection (b) if the head identifies a national security or 
research justification for such artificial intelligence model 
that benefits the intelligence community.
(2) Congressional notification.--Not later than 7 days 
after issuing a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1), the head of 
the element of the intelligence community that issues such 
waiver shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a notification that includes--
(A) an identification of the national security or 
research justification for such usage;
(B) an estimate of the approximate cost of such 
usage; and
(C) a plan to implement a safeguard in such a way 
as to allow for continued usage consistent with the 
general prohibition described in subsections (b)(1) and 
(c)(1).
(e) Cure.--If a covered application is identified for removal or is 
disqualified from use or acquisition pursuant to this section, the head 
of an element of the intelligence community may offer the provider of 
the covered application an opportunity to cure performance to avoid 
removal pursuant to subsection (b)(2).

TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 801. MODIFICATION TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTHORIZED AND 
ORDERED DEPARTURES.

Section 5173(e) of the Department of State Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2026 (22 U.S.C. 4865 note; division E of Public Law 119-60) 
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,'' 
after ``Foreign Affairs''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, the Select Committee 
on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,'' after 
``Foreign Relations''.

SEC. 802. IDENTIFICATION OF REALLOCABLE FREQUENCIES.

Section 113 of the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923) is amended--
(1) in subsection (h)(7)(A)--
(A) in clause (i), by redesignating subclauses (I) 
and (II) as items (aa) and (bb), respectively, and 
adjusting the margins accordingly;
(B) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as 
subclauses (I) and (II), respectively, and adjusting 
the margins accordingly;
(C) by striking ``If any of the information'' and 
inserting the following:
``(i) In general.--If a portion of the 
information''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) Full classification.--
Notwithstanding paragraphs (5) and (6), if the 
classification of information required to be 
included in the transition plan of a Federal 
entity prohibits even the public release of a 
redacted transition plan, as determined by the 
head of the Federal entity, the Federal entity 
shall--
``(I) notify the NTIA that the 
entire transition plan must be 
classified and that even a redacted 
version cannot be made public; and
``(II) classify the transition plan 
in accordance with the levels of 
materials contained in the transition 
plan.''; and
(2) in subsection (l)--
(A) by striking ``For purposes of'' and inserting 
the following:
``(1) In general.--For purposes of''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Elements of the intelligence community.--
Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any other provision of this 
part, each element of the intelligence community (as defined in 
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3003)) shall be considered a Federal entity and shall be 
eligible to receive payment from the Spectrum Relocation Fund 
for any auction-related relocation or sharing costs incurred by 
the element regardless of the existence of a Government station 
license.''.

SEC. 803. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RELATING TO BUDGET 
FUNCTIONS.

(a) Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 11 of title 31, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
``Sec. 1127. Protection of classified information relating to budget 
functions
``(a) Protection of Classified Information.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, not later than September 30, 2028, each covered 
official shall ensure that the department or agency of the official 
uses secure systems that meet the requirements to protect classified 
information, including with respect to the location at which the system 
is located or accessed, to carry out any of the following activities of 
the department or agency:
``(1) Formulating, developing, and submitting the budget of 
the department or agency (including the budget justification 
materials submitted to Congress) under the National 
Intelligence Program.
``(2) Apportioning, allotting, issuing warrants for the 
disbursement of, and obligating and expending funds under the 
National Intelligence Program.
``(3) Carrying out Federal financial management service 
functions or related activities of the intelligence community.
``(b) Waiver.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may 
issue a waiver to a head of an element of the intelligence community 
with respect to a requirement under subsection (a) if the Director of 
National Intelligence certifies to the congressional intelligence 
committees that--
``(1) one or more of the Federal financial management 
service functions or related activities of the element under 
the National Intelligence Program--
``(A) are appropriately carried out using a system 
that does not meet the requirements to protect 
classified information; and
``(B) such use does not represent a significant 
counterintelligence risk; or
``(2) complying with a specified requirement under 
subsection (a) would result in an increased counterintelligence 
threat to a classified program or activity.
``(c) Display of Information in Public Reports.--Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, in making public a report or other 
information relating to expenditures by an element of the intelligence 
community, a covered official may modify or omit information relating 
to such expenditures in a manner necessary to ensure the protection of 
classified information.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official' means 
the following:
``(A) The Secretary of the Treasury.
``(B) The Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget.
``(C) Each head of an element of the intelligence 
community.
``(D) Any other head of a department or agency of 
the Federal Government carrying out a function 
specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection 
(a).
``(2) Federal financial management service functions.--In 
this section, the term `Federal financial management service 
functions' means standard functions, as determined by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, that departments and agencies of the 
Federal Government perform relating to Federal financial 
management, including budget execution, financial asset 
information management, payable management, revenue management, 
reimbursable management, receivable management, delinquent debt 
management, cost management, general ledger management, 
financial reconciliation, and financial and performance 
reporting.
``(3) Intelligence community terms.--The terms 
`congressional intelligence committees', `intelligence 
community', and `National Intelligence Program' have the 
meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
beginning of chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1126 
the following new item:

``1127. Protection of classified information relating to budget 
functions.''.
(b) Funding Needed To Implement Specified Requirements.--
(1) Reimbursement.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise 
made available to the Director of National Intelligence under 
the Intelligence Community Management Account that are 
available until September 30, 2028, the Director may reimburse 
a covered official for amounts that the official incurred to 
implement section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as 
added by subsection (a).
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of the elements of 
the intelligence community shall jointly submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a detailed cost estimate 
associated with the implementation of the requirements under 
section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as added by 
subsection (a).
(3) Covered official defined.--In this subsection, the term 
``covered official'' has the meaning given that term in section 
1127(d) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection 
(a).
(c) Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006.--
Section 7 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 
2006 (Public Law 109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) information that the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget, determines would result in the 
exposure of classified programs or activities, including such 
information that could, when combined with other publicly 
available information, reveal classified programs or 
activities.''.

SEC. 804. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF TRANSACTIONS IN REAL ESTATE NEAR INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY FACILITIES.

(a) In General.--Section 721(a)(4) of the Defense Production Act of 
1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II)(bb)(AA), by inserting ``, 
facility owned or operated by an element of the intelligence 
community,'' after ``military installation''; and
(2) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by inserting ``, facility 
owned or operated by an element of the intelligence 
community,'' after ``military installation''.
(b) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsection (a) apply 
with respect to transactions proposed or pending on or after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 805. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE CORPORATION.

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, shall 
provide intelligence and analytic support to the U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation to ensure all projects of the 
Corporation are appropriately informed and strategically executed in 
accordance with the purpose of the Corporation as described in section 
1412(b) of the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(b)).

SEC. 806. ESTABLISHING PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING FEDERAL 
RESERVE INFORMATION.

(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and in consultation with the relevant heads of the elements of the 
intelligence community, as determined by the Directors, shall--
(1) brief the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System on foreign threats to the Federal Reserve System; and
(2) work with the Chair of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System to create and implement standardized 
security and classification measures for protecting information 
collected, generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Chair of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall jointly submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the 
status of implementing the security measures described in subsection 
(a).
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on 
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 807. AMENDMENTS TO PROHIBIT PAYMENTS TO OBTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY 
INFORMATION OR APPROVALS.

(a) Export Control Reform Act of 2018.--Section 1756(c) of the 
Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4815(c)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``, collected, or paid'' after 
``charged''; and
(2) by inserting ``or for the award of such license or 
other authorization'' after ``this part''.
(b) Protecting Americans From Foreign Adversary Controlled 
Applications Act.--Section 2(c) of the Protecting Americans from 
Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (15 U.S.C. 9901 note; 
Public Law 118-50) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``; 
Prohibition'' after ``Exemptions''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Prohibition.--No fee may be charged, collected, or 
paid in connection with the execution of a qualified 
divestiture.''.
(c) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 801 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161) is amended by adding at the end 
the following new subsection:
``(c) No fee may be charged, collected, or paid in connection 
access to classified information.''.

SEC. 808. OFFENSES INVOLVING ESPIONAGE.

(a) In General.--Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 3302. Espionage offenses
``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an indictment may be 
found or an information may be instituted at any time without 
limitation for a violation of section 794 or a conspiracy to violate 
such section.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 213 of 
title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
following:

``3302. Espionage offenses.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 19 of the Internal Security Act 
of 1950 (18 U.S.C. 792 note; 64 Stat. 1005) is amended by striking ``, 
793, or 794'' and inserting ``or 793''.

SEC. 809. PARENTAL BEREAVEMENT LEAVE.

Section 6329d(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting ``, including any instance of the natural or spontaneous loss 
of an unborn child (as defined in section 1841(d) of title 18), such as 
through miscarriage, stillbirth, or a loss that occurs due to a medical 
intervention for a pregnancy emergency, such as the treatment of an 
ectopic pregnancy'' after ``of the employee''.

SEC. 810. DEFINITION OF FOREIGN INSTRUMENTALITY FOR PURPOSES OF 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE PROHIBITION.

Section 1839(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``that is substantially owned'' and 
inserting the following: ``that is--
``(A) substantially owned''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following: ``or
``(B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in 
section 4872 of title 10;''.

SEC. 811. PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS.

(a) Requiring Advantage to Foreign Entity or Injury to United 
States Under Economic Espionage Statute.--Section 1831(a) of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), 
by striking ``benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, 
or foreign agent'' and inserting ``provide any advantage to a foreign 
government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, or injure or 
disadvantage in any way the United States, an instrumentality of the 
United States, or an agent of the United States''.
(b) Extending Jurisdiction Over Economic Espionage and Trade Secret 
Offenses.--Section 1837 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) the victim is--
``(A) a natural person who is a citizen or 
permanent resident alien of the United States; or
``(B) a person, including an organization, 
headquartered or incorporated in the United States; or
``(4) an act committed in furtherance of the offense used 
or took place through--
``(A) communications in interstate or foreign 
commerce; or
``(B) financial infrastructure in the United 
States.''.
(c) Criminalizing Unauthorized Transmission of Trade Secrets 
Outside the United States.--Section 1832 of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Transmission of Trade Secrets Outside the United States.--
``(1) Offense.--It shall be unlawful for a person to, 
without authorization, knowingly--
``(A) transmit a trade secret outside the United 
States;
``(B) attempt to commit an offense described in 
subparagraph (A); or
``(C) conspire with one or more other persons to 
commit an offense described in subparagraph (A).
``(2) Penalties.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), any person who violates paragraph (1) 
shall be fined not more than $5,000,000, imprisoned not 
more than 5 years, or both.
``(B) Organizations.--Any organization that commits 
an offense described in paragraph (1) shall be fined 
not less than 3 times the value of the stolen trade 
secret to the victim, including expenses for research 
and design and other costs of reproducing the trade 
secret that the organization has thus avoided.''.
(d) Criminalizing Inciting Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade 
Secrets.--Chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 1831, by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Incitement or Solicitation of Economic Espionage.--
``(1) In general.--It shall be unlawful for a person to 
solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade 
another person to engage in an offense described in subsection 
(a).
``(2) Penalties.--Any person who violates paragraph (1) 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 
years, or both.''; and
(2) in section 1832, as amended by subsection (c), by 
adding at the end the following:
``(d) Incitement or Solicitation of Theft of Trade Secrets.--
``(1) In general.--It shall be unlawful for a person to 
solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade 
another person to engage in an offense described in subsection 
(a) or (c).
``(2) Penalties.--Any person who violates paragraph (1) 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 
years, or both.''.
(e) Definition of Foreign Instrumentality for Purposes of Economic 
Espionage Prohibition.--Section 1839(1) of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``that is substantially owned'' and 
inserting the following: ``that is--
``(A) substantially owned''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following: ``or
``(B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in 
section 4872 of title 10;''.

SEC. 812. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

(a) Definition of Armed Forces in National Security Act of 1947.--
Section 605(8) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(8)) 
is amended by inserting ``Space Force,'' after ``Marine Corps,''.
(b) National Intelligence University.--Section 6801(a)(4) of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) 
is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking 
``3327'' and inserting ``3227''.
Calendar No. 420

119th CONGRESS

2d Session

S. 4615

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

May 20, 2026

Read twice and placed on the calendar