S. 4656

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4656 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4656

To provide for secure and accountable use of artificial intelligence by 
the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

June 2, 2026

Mrs. Gillibrand introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To provide for secure and accountable use of artificial intelligence by 
the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Secure and Accountable Military AI 
Act of 2026''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial 
intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section 5002 
of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 
(15 U.S.C. 9401).
(2) Autonomous weapon system.--The term ``autonomous weapon 
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, can select 
and engage targets without further intervention by an operator, 
including operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems that, 
after activation, can select and engage targets without further 
operator input.
(3) Covered contract.--The term ``covered contract'' means 
a contract, task order, delivery order, or other agreement for 
the development, training, fine-tuning, evaluation, hosting, 
integration, or provision of an artificial intelligence model 
or artificial intelligence system for use by the Department.
(4) Covered contractor.--The term ``covered contractor'' 
means an entity that develops or provides a frontier artificial 
intelligence model to the Department under a covered contract.
(5) Covered incident.--The term ``covered incident'' means 
any of the following:
(A) Theft, unauthorized access, unauthorized 
acquisition, or exfiltration of model weights for an 
artificial intelligence model, including--
(i) instances in which a model autonomously 
attempts to exfiltrate such model weights or 
acquire unauthorized access to systems 
containing such model weights; and
(ii) credible evidence indicating attempts 
or material vulnerabilities, relating to any 
such theft, access, acquisition, or 
exfiltration.
(B) Attempts by a foreign adversary or individual 
acting on behalf of a foreign adversary to obtain 
unauthorized access to, acquire, influence, or 
exfiltrate sensitive information, systems, or 
intellectual property related to an artificial 
intelligence model or artificial intelligence system, 
including through insider threats, compromised 
personnel, covert affiliations, or other deceptive 
means.
(C) A compromise of the software, hardware, cloud, 
data, or other supply chain used to develop, train, 
fine-tune, evaluate, secure, or deploy an artificial 
intelligence model or artificial intelligence system, 
where such compromise could reasonably affect the 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, reliability, 
or security of the model or system provided to the 
Department.
(D) Poisoning, corruption, manipulation, or 
unauthorized alteration of training data, fine-tuning 
data, retrieval corpora, model checkpoints, system 
prompts, safety filters, monitoring systems, evaluation 
pipelines, or model-update mechanisms.
(E) The discovery of a material vulnerability, 
exploit, backdoor, or failure of access controls that 
could permit unauthorized modification, extraction, 
degradation, or misuse of an artificial intelligence 
model or artificial intelligence system.
(F) Any materially concerning model behavior, 
including materially increased capability for cyber 
offense, exploitation, exploitation or evasion of 
safeguards, deceptive behavior, capabilities related to 
chemical or biological weapons, automated research and 
development in national security domains, automated 
research and development toward increasingly powerful 
artificial systems, unauthorized autonomous action, or 
other behavior that poses a significant risk to 
national security or the operations, personnel, or 
systems of the Department, when such behavior was not 
previously disclosed to the Department.
(G) Any incident for which the Secretary determines 
that timely notice is necessary to protect national 
security or operations of the Department.
(6) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the 
Department of Defense.
(7) Frontier artificial intelligence model.--The term 
``frontier artificial intelligence model'' means a general-
purpose model, foundation model, or other large-scale model 
designated by the Secretary, in consultation with the Chief 
Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer and the Secretary 
of Commerce, as appropriate, as presenting significant national 
security relevance due to scale, capability, operational use, 
or potential for misuse.
(8) High-consequence artificial intelligence application.--
The term ``high-consequence artificial intelligence 
application'' means any use by the Department of artificial 
intelligence that the Secretary designates under section 3 as 
presenting heightened national security, operational, safety, 
legal, or civil liberties risk, including any use relating to 
nuclear command, control, and communications, intelligence 
support to lethal targeting, cyber operations, autonomous 
weapon systems, military decision support in time-sensitive 
operations, homeland-facing surveillance or monitoring, or 
mission-critical logistics and sustainment.
(9) Individual.--The term ``individual'' means a natural 
person.
(10) Local defense.--The term ``local defense'' means 
defense within a specifically defined geographic defensive area 
(commonly referred to as ``point defense'') or of a high-value 
physical asset (commonly referred to as ``platform defense'') 
and for a specifically defined period of operation approved for 
the system concerned.
(11) Materiel target.--The term ``materiel target'' --
(A) means a weapon, munition, military vehicle, 
military vessel, military aircraft, unmanned system, or 
other military object; and
(B) does not include an individual.
(12) Pattern-of-life analysis.--The term ``pattern-of-life 
analysis'' means the use of data over time to infer or map the 
habits, movements, associations, or routines of an individual 
or a group of individuals.
(13) Persistent person-centric analytic product.--The term 
``persistent person-centric analytic product'' means a dossier, 
watchlist, score, profile, targeting package, or other record 
organized primarily around an identified or identifiable 
individual.
(14) Operational deployment.--The term ``operational 
deployment'' means use of an artificial intelligence system in 
support of, or as part of, an operational military mission, 
contingency, or real-world military activity other than 
testing, training, evaluation, or experimentation conducted in 
a controlled environment.
(15) Operator-supervised autonomous weapon system.--The 
term ``operator-supervised autonomous weapon system'' means an 
autonomous weapon system that is designed to provide operators 
with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements, 
including in the event of a weapon system failure, before 
unacceptable levels of damage occur.
(16) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
of Defense.
(17) Semi-autonomous weapon system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``semi-autonomous weapon 
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, is 
intended to only engage single targets or specific 
target groups that have been selected by an operator.
(B) Inclusions.--The term ``semi-autonomous weapon 
system'' includes weapon systems that employ autonomy 
for engagement-related functions, including--
(i) acquiring, tracking, and identifying 
potential targets;
(ii) cuing potential targets to operators;
(iii) prioritizing selected targets;
(iv) timing of when to fire;
(v) providing terminal guidance to home in 
on selected targets, provided that operator 
control is retained over the decision to select 
single targets and specific target groups for 
engagement; and
(vi) ``fire and forget'' or lock-on-after-
launch homing munitions that rely on tactics 
techniques and procedures to maximize the 
probability that the only targets within the 
seeker's acquisition basket when the seeker 
activates are those individual targets or 
specific target groups that have been selected 
by an operator.
(18) United states person.--The term ``United States 
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).

SEC. 3. HIGH-CONSEQUENCE MILITARY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.

(a) Designation of High-Consequence Applications.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall establish and 
maintain a process to designate categories of artificial 
intelligence applications of the Department as high-
consequence.
(2) Designations.--The following categories shall be 
designated as high-consequence artificial intelligence 
applications pursuant to paragraph (1):
(A) Artificial intelligence used for the selection 
of targets for, or execution of the launch or 
detonation of, a nuclear weapon.
(B) Artificial intelligence used in support of 
lethal targeting decisions, including intelligence 
fusion or target recommendation for lethal operations.
(C) Artificial intelligence used in support of 
cyber operations that are intended or reasonably likely 
to create effects outside Department-owned or 
Department-controlled information systems.
(D) Autonomous weapon systems and operator-
supervised autonomous weapon systems.
(E) Artificial intelligence used for domestic 
person-based analysis described in section 6(a)(2).
(F) Any other category designated by the Secretary 
as presenting a material risk of death, serious bodily 
harm, unlawful use of force, strategic surprise, major 
mission failure, or substantial violation of law or 
policy if the system malfunctions, is misused, or is 
employed outside approved constraints.
(b) Approval Required Before Operational Deployment.--The Secretary 
shall require that a high-consequence artificial intelligence 
application may not be approved for operational deployment unless a 
senior Department official designated by the Secretary, who may not be 
below the level of the Under Secretary of Defense or the Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines in writing that the 
application satisfies the requirements of subsection (c).
(c) Minimum Requirements.--Before approving a high-consequence 
artificial intelligence application for operational deployment, the 
approving official shall ensure that the Department has completed, as 
appropriate to the application, the following:
(1) Realistic developmental and operational testing and 
evaluation sufficient to assess performance, capability, 
reliability, effectiveness, suitability, and resilience under 
expected operational conditions, including adversarial 
conditions where feasible.
(2) Legal and policy review.
(3) Documentation of intended missions, intended 
operational environments, intended target or decision sets, 
known limitations, failure modes, and assumptions.
(4) Clear procedures for trained operators to activate, 
deactivate, override, or terminate system functions, and the 
circumstances requiring such actions.
(5) Fallback procedures and mission-continuity measures in 
the event of degradation, anomalous behavior, compromise, or 
system failure.
(6) Logging, auditability, and record-retention mechanisms 
sufficient to support oversight, investigation, and after-
action review.
(7) Post-deployment continuous monitoring mechanisms.
(8) Training, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures appropriate to the use of the application.
(d) Congressional Notification.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), not 
later than 15 days before the initial operational deployment of 
a category of high-consequence artificial intelligence 
application, the Secretary shall notify the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and House of Representatives of such 
deployment.
(2) Contents.--A notification required by paragraph (1) 
shall include--
(A) a description of the application;
(B) the mission set, operational environment, and, 
as appropriate, target or decision set for which the 
application is intended;
(C) a summary of the testing and evaluation 
conducted;
(D) a description of key safeguards, limitations, 
and fallback procedures;
(E) an identification of the accountable human 
decision-makers and operators; and
(F) any other matters the Secretary determines 
appropriate.
(3) Exception.--The Secretary may provide a notification 
required by paragraph (1) not later than 48 hours after the 
initial operational deployment if the Secretary--
(A) determines that there are extraordinary 
circumstances affecting the national security of the 
United States; and
(B) provides, with the notification, a statement of 
such circumstances necessitating delayed notice.
(e) Annual Briefing.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of 
Representatives on the implementation of this section.

SEC. 4. HUMAN ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HIGH-CONSEQUENCE MILITARY ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the Department that 
artificial intelligence may support analysis, prioritization, 
recommendations, automation, and other decision-support functions, but 
may not substitute for accountable human judgment in decisions 
involving the use of force, detention, domestic person-based analysis, 
or other high-consequence artificial intelligence applications 
designated pursuant to section 3.
(b) Accountable Human Decision-Maker.--For each high-consequence 
artificial intelligence application approved for operational 
deployment, the Secretary shall ensure that there is a clearly 
identified accountable human decision-maker or accountable chain of 
decision-makers with authority commensurate to the operational risk 
presented by the application.
(c) Required Elements.--The accountable human decision-maker or 
chain of decision-makers under subsection (b) shall have, as 
appropriate to the application--
(1) documented commander intent and mission parameters;
(2) sufficient training on the capabilities, limitations, 
and failure modes of the application;
(3) access to relevant information necessary to understand 
the basis for significant system outputs or recommendations, to 
the extent technically feasible;
(4) authority and practical ability to pause, override, 
deactivate, or terminate use of the application when required 
by law, policy, or operational circumstances; and
(5) procedures for elevating uncertainty, anomalous 
outputs, or significant incidents for further human review.

SEC. 5. REPORTING OF SECURITY INCIDENTS AND CONCERNING MODEL BEHAVIORS 
BY CERTAIN FRONTIER ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTORS.

(a) Requirement for Contract Clause.--The Secretary shall require--
(1) in any covered contract entered into on or after the 
date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, a clause requiring a covered contractor to report to the 
Secretary any covered incident relating to an artificial 
intelligence model or artificial intelligence system developed, 
trained, fine-tuned, hosted, or provided by the contractor; and
(2) in any covered contract entered into prior to the date 
that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
such a clause to be added not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Implementation Guidance and Clarity.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue guidance 
to covered contractors regarding the implementation of this 
section in order to promote clear, predictable, and consistent 
reporting expectations and support good-faith compliance.
(2) Elements.--The guidance required by paragraph (1) shall 
include--
(A) illustrative examples of covered incidents, 
factors relevant to determining whether an incident is 
material or reportable;
(B) reporting procedures and timelines; and
(C) other information the Secretary determines 
appropriate to promote consistent implementation and 
reduce uncertainty for covered contractors.
(3) Updates to guidance.--The Secretary shall update such 
guidance as appropriate to reflect changes in artificial 
intelligence capabilities, deployment practices, threat 
environments, and reporting needs of the Department.
(4) Consultation.--In issuing and updating such guidance, 
the Secretary shall consult with the Chief Digital and 
Artificial Intelligence Officer, the Director of the Artificial 
Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency, 
and the heads of any other Federal agencies or Departments the 
Secretary deems appropriate.
(c) Reporting Timeline for Covered Contractors.--
(1) In general.--A covered contractor shall submit to the 
Under Secretary for Research and Engineering--
(A) an initial report regarding a covered incident 
described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of 
section 2(5) not later than 72 hours after the 
discovery of such covered incident; and
(B) an initial report regarding a covered incident 
described in subparagraph (E) or (F) of section 2(5) 
not later than 7 days after the contractor discovers a 
behavior specified by the implementation guidance 
issued pursuant to subsection (b) or that a reasonable 
person would deem likely to be material.
(2) Supplemental updates.--A covered contractor shall 
submit to the Secretary supplemental updates with respect to 
any covered incident as material new information becomes 
available.
(d) Contents of Contractor Report.--Each report submitted by a 
covered contractor in accordance with this section shall include, to 
the extent known at the time of submission--
(1) a description of the covered incident;
(2) the date or approximate period of occurrence and 
discovery;
(3) the artificial intelligence model, artificial 
intelligence system, or relevant training, fine-tuning, 
evaluation, or deployment environment affected;
(4) the actual or suspected means of compromise, 
exfiltration, manipulation, degradation, or misuse;
(5) whether model weights, training data, system prompts, 
source code, evaluation data, safety systems, or software 
dependencies were accessed, altered, degraded, poisoned, 
exfiltrated, or otherwise compromised;
(6) an assessment of actual or potential impact on 
missions, users, systems, operations, or decision-making of the 
Department;
(7) any actions taken to contain, mitigate, remediate, or 
investigate the covered incident;
(8) whether the covered incident has been reported to any 
other Federal department or agency; and
(9) such other information as the Secretary determines 
appropriate.
(e) Recipients Within the Department.--A report submitted to the 
Secretary under this section shall be transmitted by the Secretary to--
(1) the contracting officer for the covered contract;
(2) the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office;
(3) the Chief Information Officer of the Department of 
Defense;
(4) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment;
(5) the Artificial Intelligence Security Center of the 
National Security Agency;
(6) the Commander of the United States Cyber Command; and
(7) the heads of such other components of the Department 
and other Federal departments or agencies as the Secretary 
determines appropriate.
(f) Congressional Notification by Department.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 7 days after receipt of an 
initial report under subsection (b) regarding a covered 
incident, or the discovery of a covered incident by the 
Department, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on 
Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives 
notice of such covered incident.
(2) Contents.--A notice required by paragraph (1) shall 
include, to the extent known at the time of submission--
(A) a summary description of the covered incident;
(B) the date or approximate period of occurrence 
and discovery;
(C) the artificial intelligence model, artificial 
intelligence system, or relevant training, fine-tuning, 
evaluation, or deployment environment affected;
(D) the actual or suspected means of compromise, 
exfiltration, manipulation, degradation, or misuse;
(E) an initial assessment of actual or potential 
impact on missions, users, systems, or operations of 
the Department; and
(F) any actions taken or planned to contain, 
mitigate, remediate, or investigate the covered 
incident.
(3) Additional updates.--The Secretary shall provide to the 
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of 
Representatives additional briefings or updates on a covered 
incident as material information becomes available.
(g) Protection of Reported Information.--The Secretary shall 
establish procedures for the handling of reports under this section, 
including procedures to protect classified information, proprietary 
information, trade secrets, security-sensitive information, and 
information regarding vulnerabilities that, if disclosed publicly, 
could reasonably be expected to harm national security.
(h) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed--
(1) to require the disclosure of information in a manner 
inconsistent with the protection of classified information, 
sensitive compartmented information, or other information 
protected by law;
(2) to waive any applicable privilege or legal protection; 
or
(3) to limit any other reporting obligation imposed by law, 
regulation, or contract.

SEC. 6. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE 
DEPARTMENT.

(a) In General.--The Department may not--
(1) use artificial intelligence for the selection of 
targets for the use of a nuclear weapon or for the execution of 
launching or detonating a nuclear weapon;
(2) except as provided in subparagraph (b), use artificial 
intelligence to acquire, collect, ingest, retain, query, 
correlate, analyze, or disseminate information concerning a 
United States person located in the United States for the 
purpose of--
(A) identifying or resolving the identity of such 
person across datasets;
(B) tracking or conducting pattern-of-life analysis 
of such person;
(C) conducting link analysis regarding the 
associations, contacts, activities, or movements of 
such person;
(D) assigning a risk score, threat score, or other 
predictive assessment to such person;
(E) creating or maintaining a watchlist, dossier, 
targeting package, or other persistent person-centric 
analytic product regarding such person; or
(F) selecting such person for investigative, 
operational, or law enforcement attention, unless such 
activity is expressly authorized by Federal law and 
supported by a lawful and documented predicate; or
(3) develop, procure, field, or employ an autonomous weapon 
system, except as provided in subsection (d).
(b) Rule of Construction.--Subsection (a) shall not be construed to 
prohibit the use of artificial intelligence--
(1) for cybersecurity, information assurance, threat 
detection, vulnerability management, malware analysis, incident 
response, or defensive cyberspace operations undertaken to 
protect the Department of Defense Information Network, 
information systems, weapons systems, military networks, or 
defense critical infrastructure of the Department from 
malicious cyber activity;
(2) for force protection or counterintelligence purposes to 
identify, assess, or warn of a specific, credible, and 
articulable threat to personnel, installations, facilities, 
operations, activities, or covered assets of the Department; or
(3) with the informed consent of the person concerned.
(c) Additional Limitations on Domestic Uses.--The Department may 
not use artificial intelligence--
(1) solely on the basis of activity protected by the First 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or the 
lawful exercise of any other right secured by the Constitution 
of the United States or the laws of the United States; or
(2) to acquire, correlate, or analyze publicly available 
information, commercially available information, or hacked, 
leaked, or breached data that is posted online or made 
available for sale for the primary purpose of circumventing 
otherwise applicable constitutional, statutory, or regulatory 
protections governing collection, retention, querying, or 
dissemination of information by the Federal Government 
concerning United States persons.
(d) Exceptions for Autonomous Weapon Systems.--Subsection (a)(3) 
shall not apply to the following, provided that any such system 
satisfies the conditions of subsection (e):
(1) Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply lethal or 
non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic force, so long as such semi-
autonomous weapon systems do not include any mode of operation 
in which the semi-autonomous weapon system is intended to 
function as an autonomous weapon system.
(2) Operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems used to 
select and engage materiel targets for local defense to 
intercept attempted time-critical or saturation attacks for--
(A) static defense of installations with personnel, 
including networked defense in which the autonomous 
weapon system is not co-located with the installation; 
or
(B) onboard or networked defense of platforms with 
onboard personnel.
(3) Interception of surface-to-air missiles.
(4) Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-lethal, 
non-kinetic force against materiel targets in accordance with 
Department of Defense Directive 3000.03E.
(e) Conditions on Excepted Systems.--A system described in 
subsection (d) may be developed, procured, fielded, or employed only if 
the Secretary certifies that such system--
(1) has undergone legal review for consistency with the law 
of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and 
applicable rules of engagement;
(2) has completed rigorous verification and validation and 
realistic developmental and operational testing and evaluation 
under conditions that reflect the intended operational 
environment and reasonably anticipated adversary 
countermeasures;
(3) is designed and fielded to permit commanders and 
operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over 
the use of force;
(4) includes human-machine interfaces and controls that--
(A) are readily understandable to trained 
operators;
(B) provide transparent feedback on system status;
(C) provide clear procedures for activation and 
deactivation of system functions; and
(D) for operator-supervised autonomous weapon 
systems, permit operators to intervene and terminate 
engagements before unacceptable levels of damage occur, 
including in the event of weapon system failure;
(5) is approved for use only within defined temporal, 
geographic, environmental, and operational constraints, and, if 
unable to complete an engagement consistent with such 
constraints, is designed to terminate the engagement or obtain 
additional operator input before continuing; and
(6) uses technologies and data sources that are, to the 
maximum extent practicable consistent with military necessity, 
transparent to, auditable by, and explainable to relevant 
personnel.
(f) Certification and Notification.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days before fielding a 
system pursuant to subsection (d), the Secretary shall submit 
to the congressional defense committees a written certification 
that the system falls within one of the exceptions under 
subsection (d) and satisfies the conditions of subsection (e).
(2) Contents.--A certification under paragraph (1) shall 
include--
(A) the exception under subsection (d) on which the 
Department relies;
(B) a summary of the legal review conducted under 
subsection (e)(1);
(C) the intended mission set, target class, and 
operational concept for the system;
(D) the temporal, geographic, environmental, and 
operational constraints approved for the system;
(E) a description of the operator supervision 
concept, including procedures for intervention, 
termination, activation, and deactivation;
(F) a summary of testing, verification, and 
validation conducted for the system; and
(G) any substantial modification to the system's 
algorithms, intended mission set, intended operational 
environment, intended target set, or expected 
adversarial countermeasures since any prior 
certification submitted under this subsection.

SEC. 7. IMPLEMENTATION.

(a) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall revise the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement and issue such regulations, guidance, 
and instructions as are necessary to implement this Act.
(b) Initial Implementation Briefing.--Not later than 240 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall brief the 
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives 
on the implementation plan for this Act, including--
(1) planned regulatory changes;
(2) directive and instruction updates; and
(3) any resource or organizational issues likely to affect 
implementation.

SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION FOR SPECIALIZED AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.

(a) Petition for Authorization.--The Secretary may submit to the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees a formal request for 
authorization to develop, procure, or field a specific autonomous 
weapon system or category of systems that does not meet the exceptions 
under section 6(d).
(b) Required Elements of Request.--Any request submitted under 
subsection (a) shall include a classified annex containing the 
following:
(1) Military necessity statement.--A detailed justification 
of why the mission cannot be accomplished through semi-
autonomous weapon systems or existing human-in-the-loop 
capabilities.
(2) Operational constraints.--The specific operational, 
geographic, temporal, and target-class constraints under which 
the system will operate.
(3) Law of armed conflict compliance certification.--A 
written legal opinion from the General Counsel of the 
Department certifying that the system's intended use complies 
with the Law of Armed Conflict, specifically addressing how the 
system will satisfy the principles of distinction and 
proportionality.
(4) Risk mitigation plan.--A description of the technical 
safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized autonomous action, 
flash wars, or unintended escalation.
(5) Human judgment framework.--A description of the 
appropriate levels of human judgment that will be exercised, 
even if the system operates autonomously during the engagement 
phase.
(c) Congressional Action.--
(1) Joint resolution of approval.--A system requested under 
subsection (a) may only be fielded if Congress enacts a joint 
resolution of approval specifically naming the system and the 
authorized mission set.
(2) Expedited procedures.--For the purposes of this 
section, the term ``joint resolution'' means only a joint 
resolution that is introduced within the 30-day period 
beginning on the date in which the Secretary submits a request 
under subsection (a), and the matter after the resolving clause 
is as follows: ``That Congress approves the operational 
deployment of the autonomous weapon system described in the 
request submitted by the Secretary of Defense on ____.'', with 
the blank space being filled with the date the request was 
submitted to Congress under subsection (a).
(3) Referral.--A joint resolution introduced in the Senate 
shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services. A joint 
resolution in the House of Representatives shall be referred to 
the Committee on Armed Services.
(4) Discharge of committee.--If the committee to which is 
referred a joint resolution has not reported such joint 
resolution (or an identical resolution) at the end of the 20 
calendar days after the introduction of such joint resolution, 
such committee shall be deemed to be discharged from further 
consideration of such resolution, and such joint resolution 
shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the chamber 
involved.
(5) Privileged motion in the senate.--
(A) Motion to proceed.--Notwithstanding Rule XXII 
of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at 
any time after the Committee on Armed Services has 
reported or has been discharged from consideration of a 
joint resolution to move to proceed on the 
consideration of the joint resolution. The motion is 
privileged and is not debatable. The motion to proceed 
is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to 
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or 
disagreed to shall not be in order.
(B) Limits on debate.--Debate on the joint 
resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in 
connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 
10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those 
favoring and those opposing the join resolution. A 
motion further to limit debate is in order and not 
debatable.
(C) No amendments.--An amendment to the joint 
resolution, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to 
proceed to the consideration of other business, or a 
motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in 
order.
(6) Vote on final passage.--Immediately following the 
conclusion of the debate on a joint resolution, and a single 
quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in 
accordance with the rules of the appropriate chamber, the vote 
on final passage of the joint resolution shall occur.
(d) Duration and Renewal.--Any authorization granted under this 
section shall expire 3 years after the date of enactment of the joint 
resolution of approval, but the Secretary may submit a renewed request 
under subsection (a) for expedited consideration under subsection (c). 
The Secretary must certify in such request that system has operated 
within the approved parameters.
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