S. 4682

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4682 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4682

To establish requirements for human judgment in the use of force by 
autonomous weapon systems used by the Department of Defense, and for 
other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

June 4, 2026

Mr. Kelly introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To establish requirements for human judgment in the use of force by 
autonomous weapon systems used by the Department of Defense, and for 
other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Ultimate Human Responsibility in 
Defense Systems Act of 2026''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Autonomous weapon system.--The term ``autonomous weapon 
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, can select 
and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator.
(2) Congressional defense committees.--The term 
``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given that 
term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(3) Ultimate human responsibility.--The term ``ultimate 
human responsibility'', with respect to a weapon system, means 
the ability of a human commander or operator to exercise 
informed human agency--
(A) to understand the operational context of the 
weapon system through training, capacity building, and 
integration of design and testing features that 
strengthen human understanding and effective oversight;
(B) to supervise, intervene in, or terminate the 
use of force by the system, thereby guaranteeing human 
responsibility when appropriate given system design; 
and
(C) to ensure compliance with all applicable United 
States law and international law, including applicable 
treaties, weapon system safety rules, the law of armed 
conflict, and rules of engagement.
(4) Use of force.--The term ``use of force'' means the 
application of kinetic lethal or non-lethal military force 
against a target.

SEC. 3. REQUIREMENT FOR HUMAN JUDGMENT IN AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.

(a) Policy Requirement.--The Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) ensure that any autonomous weapon system or artificial 
intelligence capability developed, acquired, or operated by the 
Department of Defense--
(A) is designed and employed in a manner that 
enables commanders and operators to exercise ultimate 
human responsibility over the use of force; and
(B) is developed, fielded and employed using 
ethical and legal principles that would delineate 
unlawful uses of artificial intelligence; and
(2) develop technical and operational and organizational 
guidelines around the use of artificial intelligence.
(b) Design Requirements.--To meet the requirements under subsection 
(a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that any autonomous weapon 
system or artificial intelligence capability described in such 
subsection, to the maximum extent practicable--
(1) allows human operators to supervise the operation of 
the weapon system during mission execution when appropriate 
given system design;
(2) includes mechanisms that allow commanders or operators 
to intervene in or terminate the use of force by the weapon 
system during mission execution when appropriate given system 
design;
(3) includes fail-safe mechanisms to enable manual control 
when autonomous systems are degraded, jammed, spoofed, or under 
adversarial attack when appropriate given system design;
(4) provides sufficient information regarding weapon system 
status and decision logic to enable operators to understand, 
oversee, and exercise functional control over system behavior;
(5) maintains records of relevant target selection data, 
decision logic, and human operator actions sufficient to enable 
post-engagement review of compliance with the requirements 
under subsection (a); and
(6) operates consistent with applicable United States law 
and international law, rules of engagement, the law of armed 
conflict, applicable treaties, and Department of Defense 
policy.
(c) Operational Oversight.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish 
procedures to ensure that commanders and operators are 
rigorously trained to appropriately supervise autonomous weapon 
systems or artificial intelligence capabilities in operational 
environments, including regular proficiency assessments in 
manual target identification, threat assessment, and engagement 
procedures, to ensure operators can effectively execute 
missions using other capabilities when autonomous systems are 
unavailable or unreliable.
(2) Reporting mechanism.--The procedures established under 
paragraph (1) shall include a mechanism for operators of 
autonomous weapon systems or artificial intelligence capability 
to report, without fear of reprisal, concerns regarding weapon 
system reliability or the adequacy of human-machine interfaces.

SEC. 4. REVIEW AND CERTIFICATION.

(a) Senior-Level Review.--
(1) In general.--Before fielding an autonomous weapon 
system capable of independently selecting and engaging targets 
without human supervision, the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation shall conduct a review to certify that the weapon 
system complies with the requirements of this Act.
(2) Independent assessment.--Each review required under 
paragraph (1) with respect to an autonomous weapon system shall 
include an independent adversarial testing (``red-team'') 
assessment that evaluates the vulnerability of the system to 
adversarial manipulation under operationally realistic 
conditions, including degraded and electronic warfare contested 
environments (such as jamming and spoofing), communication 
disruption, and adversarial manipulation.
(b) Certification Requirement.--No autonomous weapon system 
described in subsection (a) may be fielded by the Department of Defense 
unless the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation certifies that 
the weapon system--
(1) allows for ultimate human responsibility with respect 
to the use of force; and
(2) has been tested to verify secure, safe, and reliable 
operations that meet the reliability standards of the 
Department for weapon systems, including retesting following 
any significant software update or change in operational 
environment.
(c) Testing Standards.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 18 months after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation shall publish on a publicly available website 
standards for the testing and evaluation of artificial 
intelligence components in autonomous weapon systems, including 
benchmarks for reliability, robustness, security, and human-
machine team performance.
(2) Form.--The standards required to be published under 
paragraph (1) shall be published in unclassified form to the 
maximum extent practicable.

SEC. 5. ANNUAL REPORTING TO CONGRESS.

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and semiannually thereafter until the date that is six years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes--
(1) a summary of autonomous weapon systems in development 
or fielded by the Department of Defense;
(2) steps taken by the Secretary to ensure compliance with 
the requirements of this Act; and
(3) such recommendations as the Secretary may have for 
legislative or administrative action relating to human judgment 
in autonomous weapon systems.

SEC. 6. AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEM INCIDENT REPOSITORY.

(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish and 
maintain a centralized repository for reporting, collecting, and 
analyzing incidents involving autonomous weapon systems and artificial 
intelligence capabilities used by the Department of Defense.
(b) Purpose.--The repository established under subsection (a) shall 
be used--
(1) to document operational incidents, weapon system 
failures, unintended weapon system behaviors, or near-miss 
events involving autonomous weapon systems and artificial 
incident capabilities;
(2) to enable the Department to identify systemic risks, 
software errors, or operational vulnerabilities associated with 
such weapon systems and capabilities; and
(3) to promote institutional learning and improvement in 
the design, testing, and operational employment of autonomous 
weapon systems and artificial intelligence capabilities.
(c) Reporting Requirements.--The Secretary shall establish 
procedures requiring the reporting of incidents described in subsection 
(b)(1), including--
(1) operational malfunctions affecting the use of force;
(2) unintended or anomalous weapon system behavior;
(3) instances in which autonomous weapon systems or 
artificial intelligence capabilities selected or engaged 
targets inconsistent with commander intent or rules of 
engagement, regardless of whether engagement was ultimately 
executed;
(4) human-machine interaction failures affecting command or 
operator control; and
(5) other safety-related events determined appropriate by 
the Secretary.
(d) Safety Reporting Model.--In establishing the repository under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall, to the extent practicable, model 
reporting practices on aviation safety reporting systems used to 
identify and mitigate systemic risks in complex operational 
environments.
(e) Analysis and Dissemination.--The Secretary shall ensure that 
information collected through the repository established under 
subsection (a) is analyzed to identify trends and lessons learned, and 
that appropriate findings are disseminated across the Department of 
Defense to improve system design, training, and operational procedures.
(f) Protection of Sensitive Information.--Information contained in 
the repository established under subsection (a) shall be handled in 
accordance with applicable classification, operational security, and 
national security requirements.
(g) Congressional Briefing.--Not less frequently than semiannually, 
the Secretary shall provide to the congressional defense committees a 
classified briefing on trends, systemic risks, and corrective actions 
identified through the repository established under subsection (a).

SEC. 7. TRAINING PIPELINES.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop formal 
training pipelines for autonomous systems of the Department of Defense.
(b) Elements.--The formal training pipelines developed under 
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Specialized training tracks for operators, commanders, 
and system supervisors.
(2) Certification in human-machine teaming, not just system 
operation.
(3) Mandatory training in denied and contested 
environments, such as loss of global positioning system, 
electronic warfare, and degraded communications.
(4) Integration of autonomous systems into Combat Training 
Center rotations.
(5) Continuous retraining tied to software updates and 
system changes.

SEC. 8. CIVILIAN HARM MITIGATION AND RESPONSE OFFICE.

(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish within 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense an office to be known as the 
``Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Office'' (in this section 
referred to as the ``Office'').
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office is to develop, oversee, and 
coordinate Department-wide policies, practices, and capabilities to 
prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm resulting from military 
operations.
(c) Responsibilities.--The Office shall--
(1) develop and implement policies and guidance relating to 
civilian harm mitigation and response;
(2) oversee the integration of civilian harm mitigation 
practices into planning, targeting, and operational processes;
(3) coordinate assessments, investigations, and responses 
to incidents involving civilian harm;
(4) support training and doctrine development across the 
Department; and
(5) provide regular reports to Congress on civilian harm 
mitigation efforts and outcomes.
(d) Leadership.--The Office shall be headed by a senior official 
designated by the Secretary of Defense.

SEC. 9. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the development 
or use of autonomous weapon systems designed to intercept incoming 
threats where human supervision remains part of the operational design.
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