S. 4697

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4697 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4697

To provide for design and safety requirements for autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

June 8, 2026

Mr. Schiff introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To provide for design and safety requirements for autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Human Authority in Lethal Operations 
Act of 2026'' or the ``HALO Act of 2026''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(2) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial 
intelligence'' has the meaning given such term in section 5002 
of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 
(15 U.S.C. 9401).
(3) Autonomous weapon system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``autonomous weapon 
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, 
can identify, select, or engage targets without further 
intervention by or communication with a human operator.
(B) Includes.--The term defined in subparagraph (A) 
includes weapon systems that have human-operated 
supervision with the ability to override complete 
operation of the system, but can select and engage 
targets without further human operator input, 
recalibration, or communication after activation.
(4) Covered artificial intelligence capability.--The term 
``covered artificial intelligence capability'' means an 
artificial intelligence designed, tested, developed, procured, 
deployed, or used by, on behalf of, or shared with the 
Department.
(5) Designated commander.--The term ``designated 
commander'' means the highest ranking commissioned officer 
within the chain of command who exercises operational or 
administrative command authority over an autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapons system.
(6) Department.--The term ``Department'' means Department 
of Defense.
(7) Ethical principles for artificial intelligence.--The 
term ``Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence'' means 
the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence adopted by 
the Department on February 24, 2020, as in effect on January 1, 
2025.
(8) Military departments.--The term ``military 
departments'' has the meaning given such term in section 101(a) 
of title 10, United States Code.
(9) Responsible artificial intelligence strategy and 
implementation pathway.--The term ``Responsible Artificial 
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway'' means the 
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation 
Pathway dated June 2022 and prepared by the Department of 
Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence Working Council in 
accordance with the memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Kathleen Hicks on May 26, 2021, Implementing 
Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Department of 
Defense, as in effect on January 1, 2025.
(10) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
of Defense.
(11) Semi-autonomous weapon system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``semi-autonomous weapon 
system'' means a weapon system that, once activated, is 
intended to only engage individual targets or specific 
target groups that have been previously selected by a 
human operator.
(B) Included.--The term defined in subparagraph (A) 
includes weapon systems that autonomously conduct 
engagement-related functions, including the following:
(i) Acquiring, tracking, and identifying 
potential targets.
(ii) Cuing potential targets to human 
operators.
(iii) Prioritizing selected targets.
(iv) Providing input on timing of when to 
fire.
(v) Providing terminal guidance on how to 
narrowly categorize selected targets, only if 
human operator control is retained for the 
purpose of selecting individual targets and 
specific target groups for engagement.
(12) Specific target group.--
(A) In general.--The term ``specific target group'' 
means a discrete group of potential targets, such as a 
particular flight of enemy aircraft, a particular 
formation of enemy tanks, or a particular flotilla of 
enemy vessels.
(B) Excluded.--The term defined in subparagraph (A) 
does not include a general class of targets or a 
specific type of target, such as a particular model of 
tank or aircraft.
(13) Unintended engagement.--The term ``unintended 
engagement'' means the use of force outcomes resulting in 
damage to persons or objects that human operators did not 
intend to be the targets of United States military operations, 
including levels of collateral damage beyond those consistent 
with the Law of Armed Conflict and relevant laws of the United 
States and international laws, applicable rules of engagement, 
and commander's intent.

SEC. 3. DESIGN AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTONOMOUS AND SEMI-
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.

(a) General Requirement.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, acting through each 
of the Secretaries of the military departments, ensure that 
whenever the Department designs, tests, develops, procures, 
deploys, or uses a system described in paragraph (2), the 
system meets the requirements of this section.
(2) Systems.--A system described in this paragraph is an 
autonomous weapon system or semi-autonomous weapon system that 
uses artificial intelligence to create, generate, prioritize, 
recommend, or engage targets or courses of action in support of 
use of force decisions.
(b) Human Responsibility Over Use of Force.--
(1) Accountable individuals.--For each system described in 
subsection (a)(2)--
(A) not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate 
rules for clear chain of command and command hierarchy 
for military operations involving a system described in 
subsection (a)(2) to mirror the chain of command and 
command hierarchy for military operations that do not 
involve such systems;
(B) the Secretary shall ensure that a designated 
commander is identified as accountable under applicable 
military and international laws for each engagement or 
class of engagements involving a system described in 
subsection (a)(2), regardless of the degree to which 
artificial intelligence contributed to the 
identification, development, recommendation, selection, 
or engagement of the target; and
(C) the designated commander identified under 
subparagraph (B) shall exercise ultimate discretion, 
judgment, and control over the use of force.
(2) System requirements.--Each system described in 
subsection (a)(2) shall incorporate the following:
(A) A system design that incorporates capabilities 
and interfaces that require the designated commander to 
exercise ultimate discretion, judgment and control in 
the envisioned development, planning, deployment, and 
use processes for the weapon system, including 
constraints on each such system's authorized actions, 
targets, and geographic, temporal, and contextual 
scope, which the system may not expand or modify 
without explicit human authorization.
(B) System capabilities, human-machine interfaces, 
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and human 
operator training must require commanders and human 
operators to use the system with deference to their 
discretion regarding care, and to analyze the output, 
in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict and 
relevant laws of the United States and international 
laws, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, 
and rules of engagement that are applicable or 
reasonably expected to be applicable.
(C) The creation and ongoing maintenance of records 
of target selection data, decision logic, and human 
operator actions, including the individual designated 
under subsection (b)(1)(B), sufficiently detailed to 
enable post-engagement review of compliance.
(D) The design, testing, development, procurement, 
deployment, legal analysis and review, and use of 
artificial intelligence capabilities in autonomous and 
semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be consistent 
with, but not limited to, the Ethical Principles for 
Artificial Intelligence and the Responsible Artificial 
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway.
(3) Availability to the public.--The Secretary shall ensure 
that--
(A) the Ethical Principles for Artificial 
Intelligence and the Responsible Artificial 
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway are 
available to the public; and
(B) any revision to the Ethical Principles for 
Artificial Intelligence or the Responsible Artificial 
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway 
adopted by the Secretary is made available to the 
public before the date that is 30 days before the date 
on which the revision goes into effect.
(c) Engagement Constraints and Termination.--
(1) In general.--Each system described in subsection (a)(2) 
shall be designed--
(A) to complete engagements within a designated 
timeframe and designated geographic area and against a 
designated set of potential targets, as well as other 
relevant constraints, consistent with commander and 
human operator intentions;
(B) to require independent review and analysis of a 
designated commander before using force against 
previously unauthorized targets, materially expanding 
target sets or geographic scope, taking actions 
contravening applicable law, rules of engagement, other 
relevant laws of the United States and international 
laws, or taking actions likely to result in unintended 
engagement; and
(C) if unable to complete an engagement consistent 
with the parameters described in paragraph (1), to 
terminate the engagement until additional human 
operator and commander evaluation is completed.
(2) Evaluation criteria.--The evaluation criteria used 
under subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) shall consist of 
assessment of deficiencies and recommendations for changes to 
be compliant with subparagraph (A) of such paragraph before 
restarting preparation for engagement.
(d) Transparency, Auditability, and Explainability.--Consistent 
with the potential consequences of an unintended engagement or 
unauthorized interference with the operation of a system described in 
subsection (a)(2), the physical hardware and software of such system 
shall be designed with--
(1) technologies and data sources that are available to, 
auditable by, and explainable to the greatest extent possible 
by relevant personnel of the Department with the necessary 
clearance level; and
(2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, and 
cybersecurity in accordance with Department instructions and 
military standards governing cybersecurity and system safety.
(e) Activation, Termination, and Human Operator Interface.--Each 
system described in subsection (a)(2) shall be designed so that--
(1) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily 
understandable to trained human operators, including by clearly 
disaggregating which actions human operators need to perform 
and which actions the weapon system will perform;
(2) clear procedures exist for trained human operators to 
activate, terminate, and disable all weapon system functions;
(3) the system provides timely feedback on system status, 
including regarding the quality and sufficiency of the data 
inputs relied upon, to human operators in real time or near-
real time; and
(4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and 
doctrine are available, reviewed on a quarterly basis, by 
weapon system human operators and designated commanders to 
understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of 
the system's autonomy in realistic operational conditions.
(f) Degraded Communications Safeguard.--Any autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapon system that is, or is part of, an unmanned platform 
shall be designed such that, in the event of degraded or lost 
communications, the system does not autonomously select and engage 
individual targets, specific target groups, or general classes or 
specific types of targets that have not been previously selected by an 
authorized human operator.
(g) Continuous Monitoring.--The Secretary shall, in coordination 
with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the appropriate 
Secretary of a military department or Assistant Secretary for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, establish and maintain 
procedures for continuous monitoring of each system, to the greatest 
extent possible, described in subsection (a)(2) to identify and address 
circumstances in which changes to the system design or operational 
environment require additional testing and evaluation or legal review 
to provide sufficient confidence that the system will continue--
(1) to function as intended;
(2) to avoid unintended engagements;
(3) to resist interference by unauthorized parties; and
(4) to remain compliant with relevant laws of the United 
States, the Law of Armed Conflict, and international laws.
(h) Robust Artificial Intelligence Design.--For any system 
described in subsection (a) that incorporates artificial intelligence 
capabilities, such system shall be designed to utilize robust 
artificial intelligence, in accordance with the Responsible Artificial 
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway so that the system is 
resilient in real-world settings and against adversarial attacks and 
spoofing.

SEC. 4. ADVANCED REVIEW AND APPROVAL AUTHORITY.

(a) General Requirement for Advanced Review.--With the exception of 
systems described in subsection (e), the Secretary shall ensure that 
each system described in section 3(a)(2) is approved in accordance with 
this section before formal development and before fielding.
(b) Pre-Development Review.--Before a decision to enter formal 
development of a system described in subsection (a), the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff shall jointly verify that--
(1) the weapon system design incorporates the necessary 
capabilities to allow a designated commander to exercise 
ultimate discretion, judgment, and control over the use of 
force in the envisioned planning, deployment, and use processes 
for the weapon;
(2) the system is designed to complete engagements within a 
designated timeframe and designated geographic area and against 
a designated set of potential targets, as well as other 
applicable parameters, consistent with designated commander 
intentions, and if unable to do so, to terminate use until 
additional human operator and commander evaluation is completed 
before continuing the engagement;
(3) the combination of the system's design and concept of 
use, including its target selection and engagement logic, 
accounts for risks of armed conflict, including to civilians, 
civilian populations, civilian objects, and other protected 
entities, consistent with commander and human operator intent 
and obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict, or other 
relevant laws of the United States and international laws;
(4) the system design, including system safety, anti-tamper 
mechanisms, and cybersecurity, addresses and minimizes the 
probability and consequences of failures;
(5) plans are in place for verification and validation and 
test and evaluation to establish system reliability, 
effectiveness, predictability of effects, and accuracy under 
realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions, 
interference, or unintended consequences;
(6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence 
capabilities, plans are in place to ensure consistency with the 
Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the 
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation 
Pathway; and
(7) a thorough legal analysis, review, and risk assessment 
of a system described in subsection (a) has been completed in 
coordination with the General Counsel of the Department and 
other relevant Department General Counsels and in accordance 
with applicable directives governing the Defense Acquisition 
System, the Department of Defense Law of War Program, the Law 
of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the United States 
and international laws.
(c) Pre-Fielding Review.--Before fielding a system described in 
subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly verify that--
(1) system capabilities, human-machine interfaces, 
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training have 
been demonstrated to allow a designated commander to exercise 
ultimate discretion, control, and judgment over the use of 
force and to use systems whose outcomes are sufficiently 
accurate with thorough legal analysis in accordance with the 
law of war, Law of Armed Conflict, applicable treaties, weapon 
system safety rules, and rules of engagement reasonably 
expected to be applicable;
(2) system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, cyber 
survivability, operational resilience, and cybersecurity 
capabilities have been implemented to minimize the probability 
and consequences of failures, including unpredictable outcomes, 
and a monitoring protocol is in place to identify and address 
changes in operational environment, data inputs, and use that 
could contribute to such failures;
(3) verification and validation and test and evaluation 
have--
(A) assessed system performance, capability, 
reliability, risk margins, effectiveness, and 
suitability under realistic conditions, including 
possible adversary actions, interference, or unintended 
consequences; and
(B) have demonstrated that the system can be 
revised as needed with sufficient rapidity to enable 
timely correction of any unintended system behaviors 
that may be observed or discovered during future system 
operations;
(4) adequate training, tactics, techniques, procedures, and 
doctrine are available, quarterly reviewed, and used by system 
operators and commanders to understand the functioning, 
capabilities, and limitations of the system in real world 
conditions;
(5) system design and human-machine interfaces are readily 
understandable to trained human operators, provide transparent 
feedback on system status, provide secure logging to enable 
traceability, and provide clear procedures for trained human 
operators to activate and terminate system functions;
(6) for systems incorporating artificial intelligence 
capabilities, the deployment and use of such capabilities in 
the weapon system will be consistent with the Ethical 
Principles for Artificial Intelligence, the Responsible 
Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway, 
the Law of Armed Conflict, and other relevant laws of the 
United States and international laws; and
(7) a legal review of the compliance of the weapon system 
with the Defense Acquisition System, the Department of Defense 
Law of War Program, the Law of Armed Conflict, and other 
relevant laws of the United States and international laws has 
been completed in coordination with the General Counsel of the 
Department.
(d) Re-Review of Modified Systems.--A system described in 
subsection (a) that is a variant of an existing weapon system 
previously approved through the review process under this section shall 
not be covered by previous approval if changes to the system 
algorithms, intended mission set, intended operational environments, 
intended target sets, or expected adversarial countermeasures 
materially differ from those applicable to the previously approved 
weapon system. Such systems shall require a new analysis, review, and 
risk assessment before formal development and again before fielding.
(e) Systems Not Requiring Advanced Review.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
advance review described in this section is not required for 
weapon systems intended to be used in the following manners:
(A) Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply 
lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force 
without capability to function as an autonomous weapon 
system.
(B) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon 
systems used to select and engage materiel targets for 
local defense to intercept attempted time-critical or 
saturation attacks for--
(i) static defense of installations with 
personnel, including networked defense where 
the autonomous weapon system is not co-located 
with the installation; or
(ii) onboard or networked defense of 
platforms with onboard personnel.
(C) Human operator-supervised autonomous weapon 
systems used to select and engage materiel targets for 
purpose of protecting remotely piloted or autonomous 
vehicles and vessels.
(D) Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-
lethal, non-kinetic force against materiel targets.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a weapon 
system intended to be used in the manner described in 
subparagraph (B) of such paragraph in a case in which the 
engagement zone for the system encompasses densely populated 
areas or essential civilian infrastructure. In such a case, the 
weapon system shall undergo the advanced review described in 
this section to certify that the system can effectively 
distinguish between military targets and non-combatants or 
civilian objects in high-clutter environments.

SEC. 5. ROLE OF THE CHIEF DIGITAL AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

(a) Monitoring and Evaluation.--The Chief Digital and Artificial 
Intelligence Officer shall monitor and evaluate artificial intelligence 
capabilities in, and cybersecurity for, autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapon systems, and shall advise the Secretary on such matters.
(b) Testable Requirements.--The Chief Digital and Artificial 
Intelligence Officer shall, in collaboration with the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Research and Engineering--
(1) formulate concrete, testable requirements for 
implementing the Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence 
and the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and 
Implementation Pathway;
(2) establish policy and issue guidance on definitions of 
requirements and testability for artificial intelligence-
enabled systems to implement and demonstrate adherence to the 
Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence and the 
Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation 
Pathway; and
(3) issue guidance on test and evaluation practices for 
artificial intelligence capabilities in autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapon systems, which shall include an adversarial 
assessment (known as ``red-team assessment'') that evaluates 
weapon system vulnerability to adversarial manipulation under 
operationally realistic conditions.
(c) Common Tools and Infrastructure.--The Chief Digital and 
Artificial Intelligence Officer shall coordinate with the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation on developing and using common tools 
and infrastructure for test and evaluation and verification and 
validation of artificial intelligence capabilities in autonomous or 
semi-autonomous weapon systems, including assurance benchmarks for 
reliability, robustness, security, and human-machine team performance.

SEC. 6. TESTING AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS.

(a) General Requirement.--The Secretary shall ensure that, 
regardless of the acquisition pathway or testing and evaluation 
oversight status for a weapon system, each system described in section 
3(a)(2) undergoes--
(1) rigorous hardware and software verification and 
validation; and
(2) realistic system developmental and operational test and 
evaluation, including analysis of unanticipated emergent 
behavior.
(b) Specific Considerations.--Testing and evaluation of a system 
under subsection (a)(2) may include testing on how human operators 
respond to ensure they are provided with enough time to exercise 
judgment and can reject or challenge suggestions or recommendations.
(c) Specific Requirements.--Testing and evaluation of a system 
under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Verification that the system functions as anticipated 
in realistic operational environments against adaptive 
adversaries, including with realistic civilian presence, 
activities, actions, and reactions, and are sufficiently robust 
to minimize failures.
(2) For a system incorporating artificial intelligence 
capabilities, rigorous developmental and operational test and 
evaluation to verify and validate that the artificial 
intelligence is robust according to design requirements.
(3) Testing to confirm that autonomy algorithms in systems 
incorporating artificial intelligence capabilities can be 
rapidly reprogrammed on new input data.
(d) Post-Fielding Testing.--The Secretary shall ensure that, after 
initial operational test and evaluation of a system under subsection 
(a), as directed by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation--
(1) system data is collected and any further changes to the 
system undergo appropriate verification and validation and test 
and evaluation to ensure that critical safety features have not 
been degraded;
(2) system software is tested using best-available 
Department means and methods to validate that critical safety 
features have not been degraded, and automated testing tools, 
such as modeling and simulation, are used whenever feasible;
(3) any new or revised operating states or other relevant 
changes in the system are identified and undergoes appropriate 
and tailored additional test and evaluation to characterize the 
system behavior in that new operating state; and
(4) changes to the state transition matrix are evaluated to 
determine whether they require whole system follow-on 
operational test and evaluation.
(e) Iterative Cyber Testing.--The Secretary shall ensure that 
hardware and software verification and validation of a system under 
subsection (a) includes quarterly cyber test and evaluation to verify 
that the system is resilient and survivable in contested cyberspace.
(f) Role of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.--Under 
this section, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation shall--
(1) oversee development of realistic operational test, risk 
assessments, and evaluation standards for autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems, including requirements for data 
collection and standards for test and evaluation of any changes 
to the system following initial operational test and 
evaluation;
(2) evaluate whether autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon 
systems under the Director's oversight have met standards after 
being tested for rigorous verification, validation, and 
evaluation in realistic operational conditions, including 
potential adversary action, to ensure that the system is robust 
to minimize failures;
(3) establish standards for data collection post-fielding 
and monitoring and assessment by programs;
(4) establish and maintain a centralized repository for 
reporting, collecting, and analyzing operational incidents, 
weapon system failures, and unintended weapon system behaviors;
(5) review and approve operational and live fire test plans 
for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems; and
(6) coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering and the appropriate Secretary of a 
military department or Assistant Secretary for Low-Intensity 
Conflict to provide for monitoring to identify and address when 
changes to the system design or operational environment require 
additional testing and evaluation to ensure that the system is 
robust to minimize failures such as unintended engagements with 
civilians and civilian infrastructure, densely populated areas, 
and resist interference by unauthorized parties.

SEC. 7. PROHIBITED USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) General Prohibition.--No covered artificial intelligence 
capability may be used in any manner that violates the Constitution of 
the United States, Federal law, the Law of Armed Conflict, or 
international treaty or other legal obligation of the United States, or 
in any manner that poses an unacceptable level of risk to the safety of 
an individual or the civil liberty of an individual.
(b) Specific Prohibitions.--
(1) In general.--No covered artificial intelligence 
capability may be used with the intent, purpose, or outcome 
of--
(A) profiling, targeting, tracking, monitoring, 
inferring, or concluding based on the data points of 
activity of any individual based solely on the exercise 
of rights protected under the Constitution or Federal 
law, including freedom of expression, association, and 
assembly;
(B) detecting, measuring, or inferring the 
emotional state of any individual from data acquired 
about such individual, including the support of the 
health of consenting personnel of the Federal 
Government;
(C) inferring or determining an individual's 
religion, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, 
immigration status, disability status, gender identity, 
or political identity;
(D) tracking, monitoring, or inferring the past, 
real-time, or anticipated future location of any 
individual in the United States, including using data 
acquired from commercial, data brokers, data 
aggregators, or other third-party sources, unless such 
acquisition and use is authorized pursuant to an 
individualized judicial order, warrant, or otherwise 
required by the Constitution or Federal law;
(E) aggregating or analyzing internal data or data 
acquired from commercial, data brokers, data 
aggregators, or other third-party sources, including 
but not limited to location data, financial transaction 
data, communications metadata, or biometric data, to 
accomplish any purpose prohibited under paragraphs (1) 
through (4);
(F) removing a human from the chain of 
decisionmaking for actions critical to informing and 
executing decisions by the President, including 
initiating or terminating nuclear weapons employment; 
or
(G) obtaining, receiving, or otherwise accessing, 
for a fee or other consideration, any personal data of 
a United States person from a data broker or other 
third-party source, including any other governmental 
entity (including State, local, or Federal entities) if 
such data was obtained by that entity in a manner that 
would violate this subsection if performed by the 
Department.
(2) Personal data.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(G), the 
term ``personal data''--
(A) means data, derived data, or any unique 
identifier that is linked to, or is reasonably linkable 
to, an individual or to an electronic device that is 
linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, one or more 
individuals in a household;
(B) includes anonymized data that, if combined with 
other data, can be linked to, or is reasonably linkable 
to, an individual or to an electronic device that 
identifies, is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to 
one or more individuals in a household; and
(C) does not include data that is lawfully 
available through Federal, State, or local government 
records or through widely distributed media.
(c) Applicability.--The prohibitions in this section shall apply to 
all activities of the Department, including operational planning, 
logistics, intelligence analysis, and operational support to any other 
agencies or military personnel, regardless of status of deployment. In 
any case in which the Department shares systems, data, or analytical 
products derived from a covered artificial intelligence capability or 
protected data (as described in subsection (b)(7)) with another 
department or agency of the Federal Government, the receiving 
department or agency shall be subject to the same prohibitions and 
requirements as the Department with respect to the use, querying, or 
further dissemination of such systems, data, or products. The Secretary 
shall ensure that such department or agency is notified of, and in 
compliance with, the restrictions under this section.
(d) Joint Operations.--The prohibitions of this section shall apply 
to any Departmental participation in joint task forces, fusion centers, 
or interagency working groups, regardless of which agency serves as the 
lead or providing entity.

SEC. 8. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS.

(a) Protections.--The Secretary shall update such whistleblower 
protections as the Secretary considers appropriate to clarify 
procedures for artificial intelligence systems, which shall ensure that 
all personnel who develop, assess, deploy, operate, or use artificial 
intelligence as a component of a National Security System (as defined 
in section 3552(b) of title 44, United States Code) or otherwise for 
military or intelligence purposes can report concerns about artificial 
intelligence, including concerns about improperly harming civil 
liberties, privacy, safety, or compliance with the requirements of this 
Act, to relevant oversight officials.
(b) Compliance With Existing Law.--Updates to whistleblower 
protections under subsection (a) shall be compliant with--
(1) section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, and its 
implementation guidance under Department of Defense Directive 
7050.06 (relating to military whistleblower protection);
(2) section 2302 of title 5, United States Code;
(3) title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 
Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-126; 128 Stat. 1414) and the 
amendments made by such title; and
(4) section 4701 of title 10, United States Code.
(c) Anonymity.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that adequate 
and special procedures exist to receive, investigate, respond 
to, and redress complaints anonymously, when appropriate, and 
that reports may be made confidentially so that personnel may 
raise concerns without fear of reprisal for any disclosures 
related to artificial intelligence.
(2) Exception.--Confidentiality under paragraph (1) shall 
not extend to significant misconduct, including violations of 
law or government ethics, or when otherwise precluded by law.
(d) Investigation and Corrective Action.--The Secretary shall 
ensure that adequate and special procedures exist for reporting 
incidents of artificial intelligence misuse, investigations of reported 
incidents, and processes for taking corrective actions.

SEC. 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Semiannual Report on Artificial Intelligence Use Cases.--Not 
later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report containing the following:
(1) A description of exemplary use cases of artificial 
intelligence within the Department during the preceding year, 
identifying best practices, failure modes, and risk mitigation 
strategies employed.
(2) After-action reports on significant operational use of 
covered artificial intelligence capabilities during the 
preceding year, including--
(A) an assessment of system performance and 
effectiveness of human oversight;
(B) any identified risks or failure modes;
(C) a detailed accounting of any critical 
incidents, including incidents resulting in civilian 
casualties or injuries, damage to civilian objects or 
protected infrastructure, or other unintended effects 
inconsistent with the Law of Armed Conflict; and
(D) recommendations for improvements to human 
oversight, system safeguards, and the mitigation of 
future civilian harm.
(3) A description of training provided to human operators 
of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems and other 
artificial intelligence capabilities covered by this Act, 
including documentation on employment procedures and 
responsible retirement of systems.
(b) Annual Report on Infrastructure and Barriers.--Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report identifying--
(1) any significant barriers to the responsible development 
and deployment of artificial intelligence within the 
Department;
(2) gaps in infrastructure required to support 
traceability, auditability, risk analysis, and forensics for 
artificial intelligence capabilities covered by this Act; and
(3) recommended hardware, software, or other infrastructure 
needs necessary to fulfill the requirements of this Act.
(c) Semiannual Report on Compliance for Fielded Systems.--Not later 
than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report identifying--
(1) each fielded system for which compliance under this Act 
cannot be certified, with a description of the specific 
requirement or requirements with which the system does not 
comply;
(2) the operational or national security legal 
justification, if any, for the continued fielding of each such 
non-compliant system; and
(3) a remediation plan and timeline for bringing each such 
system into compliance or, if compliance is not practicable, a 
plan for the responsible retirement or modification of the 
system.

SEC. 10. EXCEPTIONS.

(a) Cyberspace Capabilities.--The requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, 
and 7 shall not apply to autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace 
capabilities.
(b) Unarmed Platforms.--The requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, and 7 
shall not apply to unarmed platforms, whether remotely operated or 
operated by onboard personnel, and whether autonomous or semi-
autonomous.
(c) Time-Critical Defensive Systems.--In cases where the time 
available between threat detection and required intercept is 
insufficient to allow for individual human authorization of each 
engagement and provided that such operations do not have death or 
serious bodily harm to any person as a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence, the requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, and 7 shall not 
apply to--
(1) systems employed exclusively for the defense against 
incoming munitions, rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles; or
(2) unmanned aircraft systems.
(d) Other Excluded Systems.--The requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, 
and 7 shall not apply to--
(1) unguided munitions;
(2) munitions manually guided by the human operator, such 
as laser- or wire-guided munitions;
(3) mines;
(4) unexploded explosive ordnance; or
(5) autonomous or semi-autonomous systems that are not 
weapon systems.
(e) Identification Systems.--The requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, 
and 7 shall not apply to a system described in section 3(a)(2) with the 
sole purpose and outcome of identifying potential targets without 
further intervention by or communication with a human operator.

SEC. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE; REVIEW OF SYSTEMS CURRENTLY IN USE.

(a) In General.--This Act shall take effect on the date that is 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Review of Systems Currently in Use.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
effective date set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary shall 
conduct a review of all systems described in section 3(a)(2) 
that are in use by the Department as of such effective date.
(2) Attestation.--Upon completion of the review required 
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a written attestation 
identifying, for each reviewed system, whether the system is 
compliant with the requirements of sections 3, 6, and 7.
(3) Noncompliant systems.--For any system that the 
Secretary cannot attest is in compliance with sections 3, 6, 
and 7, the Secretary shall immediately cease all use of such 
system and, concurrent with the attestation required under 
paragraph (2), submit to appropriate committees of Congress a 
remediation plan that includes--
(A) a description of the specific requirement or 
requirements with which the system does not comply;
(B) an operational or national security 
justification, if any, for continued use of the system 
pending remediation; and
(C) a timeline for bringing the system into 
compliance or, if compliance is not practicable, for 
the responsible retirement or modification of the 
system.
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