S. 4708

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4708 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4708

To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

June 8, 2026

Mr. Lee introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Arctic Security and Diplomacy Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) The Arctic is a critical domain for the security and 
sovereignty of the United States and faces elevated risks 
related to the threats of territorial expansion and violation, 
influence operations, sabotage of critical undersea 
infrastructure, and espionage by foreign adversaries, 
particularly the People's Republic of China and the Russian 
Federation.
(2) The Russian Federation holds a significant portion of 
the Arctic, accounting for approximately 53 percent of the 
Arctic Ocean coastline, and has significantly expanded its 
military basing infrastructure and capabilities in the region.
(3) In 2018, the People's Republic of China declared that 
it is a ``Near-Arctic State'' with significant interests in the 
Arctic and is attempting to become a ``polar great power'' 
through economic expansion, scientific investments, and dual-
use civilian and military infrastructure.
(4) The Russian Federation is cooperating with the People's 
Republic of China to establish a ``Polar Silk Road'' in the 
Arctic, and the two countries are working together to 
strengthen cooperation in polar shipbuilding and ship 
technology.
(5) The People's Republic of China has made multiple 
attempts to gain strategic footholds in the Arctic, has 
research stations in Norway's Svalbard archipelago and in 
Iceland, and consistently attempts to co-opt and manipulate 
civilian science and research activities, university 
partnerships, and multilateral science and research initiatives 
throughout the Arctic.
(6) The People's Republic of China has observer status on 
the Arctic Council, has significantly increased diplomatic 
engagement with Nordic countries, and uses investments in 
cooperative marine scientific research as a form of soft power 
in the Arctic.
(7) The People's Republic of China engages in extensive 
marine surveying, much of which has dual-use risk for military 
applications, including seabed mapping, NATO asset monitoring, 
and other espionage-related activity.
(8) In 2022, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service 
reported several attempts at espionage by the People's Republic 
of China against Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.
(9) In 2024, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
warned of espionage activity by the People's Republic of China 
and the Russian Federation, and the Canadian military 
discovered and removed buoys in the Arctic owned by the 
People's Republic of China.
(10) In 2025, the head of the National Police Commission in 
Iceland warned that the China-Iceland Arctic Science 
Observatory poses dual-use risks and may be used for espionage.
(11) The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment by the intelligence 
community describes the Russian Federation as ``our primary 
challenge in the Arctic . . . Moscow is seeking to expand and 
deepen its presence in the Arctic through increased maritime 
trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity,'' 
while warning that the People's Republic of China ``seeks to 
expand its Arctic presence using scientific research, 
investments, and commercial ventures along the Northern Sea 
Route.''
(12) The 2025 NATO Maritime Strategy highlighted the 
Russian Federation's military build-up in the Arctic and use of 
hybrid threats like sabotage against critical undersea 
infrastructure, while warning that the People's Republic of 
China ``is pursuing a military build-up, including rapidly 
expanding its naval capabilities, increasing its use of dual-
use military-scientific vessels and surging its presence in the 
High North and the Arctic, while remaining opaque about its 
intentions.''
(13) According to the Department of Homeland Security, an 
unprecedented number of military and research vessels of the 
People's Republic of China are operating in or near United 
States Arctic waters.
(14) It is in the interests of Arctic countries to 
cooperatively limit the ability of the People's Republic of 
China to conduct further espionage in the Arctic.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the 
term ``Executive agency'' in section 105 of title 5, United 
States Code.
(2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives.
(3) Arctic.--The term ``Arctic'' has the meaning given that 
term in section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 
1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).
(4) Covered activities.--The term ``covered activities'' 
means marine surveys that may pose dual-use risks for civilian 
and military applications, including--
(A) exploration of natural resources;
(B) seabed mapping, hydrographic surveys, and 
oceanographic surveys;
(C) data collection related to subsea assets and 
infrastructure;
(D) operation of unmanned maritime systems; and
(E) any other activity designated by the Secretary 
of State as posing a risk to national security.
(5) Covered vessel.--The term ``covered vessel'' means a 
foreign vessel that--
(A) is a vessel of a foreign adversary; or
(B) the Secretary of State reasonably believes to 
be associated with a foreign adversary in a manner that 
threatens the security of the United States.
(6) Exclusive economic zone.--The term ``exclusive economic 
zone'' means, with respect to the United States, including the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin 
Islands, and any other territory or possession over which the 
United States exercises sovereignty, the zone seaward of and 
adjacent to the territorial sea, including the contiguous zone, 
and extending 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea 
baseline (except where otherwise limited by treaty or other 
agreement recognized by the United States) in which the United 
States has sovereign rights and jurisdiction.
(7) Foreign adversary.--The term ``foreign adversary'' 
means any foreign government or foreign nongovernment person 
engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct 
significantly adverse to the national security of the United 
States or the security and safety of United States persons, 
including--
(A) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(B) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(C) the People's Republic of China; and
(D) the Russian Federation.
(8) Foreign vessel.--The term ``foreign vessel'' means any 
vessel that is--
(A) owned, operated, or chartered by a foreign 
government;
(B) owned or controlled by an entity organized 
under the laws of, headquartered in, or otherwise 
subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign country; or
(C) registered under the flag of a foreign country.
(9) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(10) Marine scientific research.--The term ``marine 
scientific research'' means any activity that is--
(A) undertaken in the ocean to expand knowledge of 
the marine environment and its processes, including 
data collection activities; and
(B) regulated by the United States under the 
Presidential Proclamation on Revision to United States 
Marine Scientific Research Policy of September 2020.
(11) Territorial sea.--The term ``territorial sea'' means 
the waters extending to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of 
the United States.
(12) United states waters.--The term ``United States 
waters'' means--
(A) the territorial sea of the United States;
(B) the exclusive economic zone of the United 
States; and
(C) the continental shelf of the United States, as 
it pertains to marine scientific research and other 
activities on the seabed or subsoil.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to limit espionage and influence operations by foreign 
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters;
(2) to inform allied countries with a presence in the 
Arctic about the espionage and influence operations of foreign 
adversaries in the Arctic, including espionage through covered 
activities;
(3) to condition support from the Federal Government for 
marine surveys on cooperation with counterespionage in the 
Arctic and in United States waters, including limitations on 
information sharing of data obtained through covered activities 
in the Arctic and in United States waters; and
(4) to leverage all appropriate diplomatic means available 
to ensure the security of the Arctic and the sovereignty of 
United States waters through the enforcement of section 6, 
including through--
(A) demarches;
(B) public condemnations;
(C) diplomatic sanctions;
(D) coordination of multilateral diplomatic 
pressure;
(E) motions to remove an offending country from 
Arctic-related multilateral bodies and cooperatives; 
and
(F) any other diplomatic means authorized by law.

SEC. 5. STRATEGY.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, shall produce a strategy to identify and combat 
espionage and influence operations by foreign adversaries in the 
Arctic.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall 
include--
(1) identifying and countering espionage activities in the 
Arctic;
(2) diplomatic methods to enforce section 6; and
(3) as appropriate, enlistment of and coordination with 
allied countries that have a presence in the Arctic to combat 
espionage by foreign adversaries.

SEC. 6. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN UNITED STATES WATERS.

(a) In General.--No foreign scientist may conduct a maritime 
scientific research project in United States waters without prior 
consent from the United States Government provided in accordance with 
this section and with appropriate international customs as determined 
by the Secretary of State.
(b) Requirements; Applications.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall--
(1) require foreign vessels to obtain prior consent to 
conduct maritime scientific research in United States waters; 
and
(2) implement a process for reviewing applications for such 
consent.
(c) Information Sharing.--To facilitate the process for reviewing 
applications to conduct maritime scientific research under this 
section, the head of each agency shall share information related to 
such maritime scientific research with the Department of State unless 
otherwise prohibited by law.
(d) Prohibition on Covered Vessels.--Except as provided in 
subsection (e), the Secretary of State shall not approve any 
application submitted under this section for any covered vessel.
(e) National Interest Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
prohibition in subsection (d) on an individual basis if the 
Secretary determines that doing so is the national interest of 
the United States.
(2) Notice required.--Not later than 5 days after any 
issuance of a waiver under paragraph (1), the Secretary of 
State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
written notice describing the waiver.
(f) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 15 days after the 
date of any violation of subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall 
notify the appropriate committees of Congress of such violation, 
including--
(1) the country affiliation of the foreign scientist;
(2) the nature of the violation; and
(3) subsequent action by the Federal Government to address 
the violation.

SEC. 7. REPORT.

(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report on espionage and influence operations by foreign 
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
(1) An assessment of the extent to which covered activities 
support espionage and influence operations by foreign 
adversaries in the Arctic and in United States waters.
(2) A description of United States Government support for 
covered activities in the Arctic that involve foreign 
adversaries, including--
(A) funding;
(B) public-private partnerships;
(C) maritime security;
(D) technical assistance;
(E) information sharing; and
(F) any other form of material or technical 
support.
(3) A description of efforts by the Secretary of State to 
enlist allied countries with a presence in the Arctic to combat 
espionage in the Arctic by foreign adversaries.
(4) Recommendations for combating such espionage.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Availability.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
made available on request to any Member of Congress.
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