Issue

Mass Surveillance, Tracking, and Flock Safety

Camera and sensor networks that record where ordinary people go without any suspicion of wrongdoing: automated licence-plate readers, led by Flock Safety, together with facial recognition, biometric identification, cell-site simulators, phone-location data bought from brokers, and aerial and drone surveillance. Tracked here as a constitutional question before a public-safety one — who authorised the cameras, how long the record of your movements is kept, which agencies can search it, and whether a warrant is ever required.

explainer citations

primary / official

officials — more surveillance authority

204

officials — more surveillance limits

Sides are counted per OFFICIAL, from the direction of the measures they are recorded on — mapped once per measure, never per person. 25 on record both ways and 18 with no classified position are listed under Politicians and are on neither side.

Explainer citations — source authority

88 of 91 explainer citations (97%) are primary or official analysis — the only kinds that can carry a rating.

Claims checked (22 of 22)

Refuted by the record2

No supporting record1

Not verifiable5

Partially supported11

Supported by the record3

Public opinion polling

Say signs should be visible notifying people that plate readers are in use87%

Agree businesses may use facial recognition to match against a list of known violent offenders79%

Feel safer parking in lots that use automated plate readers78%

The Harris Poll

Sponsor: LiveView Technologies — a commercial security-camera vendor

In short

Automated plate readers photograph a state-mandated identifier on a public road, and under current law that is generally not treated as a search. Knotts holds there is no expectation of privacy in public vehicular movement, though Knotts itself reserved the question of dragnet practices. The one federal appeals court to decide the question found no search, reasoning from a town system of no more than ten cameras. No federal appeals court has yet ruled on a national commercial network. StumpWatch's position is different, and we state it as a position rather than as law. A company running a surveillance network on the government's behalf is acting as an agent of the government. The test is whether the same act would violate the Constitution if an officer carried it out directly. If it would, contracting the work to a private firm does not cure it. These were never only plate readers. The vendor's own policy records the vehicle, its characteristics, the time and the camera's location, and a competitor's patent claims reach tyre-pressure sensors expressly. There is no way to opt out: a driver is not a customer and was offered no terms. The documented failures are administrative rather than constitutional, and they are real. Agencies enabled federal access without knowing it, and one Texas query reached more than 83,000 cameras, a figure the Illinois Secretary of State has now stated in an official record rather than the press. Opinion accepts this surveillance in some settings and rejects it in others, and these records cannot show a trend of their own, because they capture almost every question at a single point — though the pollsters’ own reports sometimes carry earlier readings not ingested here. The nearest thing to a repeated item, concern about how government uses collected data, ran 64 percent in 2019 and 71 percent in 2023, but Pew changed the wording between the two, so it is not a clean like-for-like comparison. The page also measures the vendor's public statements against the documentary record, and reports where the two diverge without asserting anyone's motive. Most of those items remain unresolved, and are labelled as such. Four hundred and seventy-five officials are on record here across 761 positions. Most of that is voting record: 581 are roll-call votes, and 517 of those concern FISA Section 702 rather than plate readers. The remaining 180 come from oversight letters and public statements, and all 180 are from Democratic members — we have not located letters or statements on this issue from Republican members, and we do not know whether that reflects the record or a gap in our collection. Even a constitutional win may produce no remedy. The constraints that bite today are state statutes with audits, purge deadlines and penalties.

Explore the record

Everything behind this page sits in the 7 sections below — the claims, who is on record, what the public thinks, and every citation. Choose one.

Constitutional analysis

This is our assessment of the issue against the Constitution — not a sourced fact and not a court holding. It separates what the law establishes today, what is genuinely contested now, and the argument for where the law should go. Written and adversarially reviewed away from this site, then stored; the page renders it and never generates it. Everything behind the tabs below is that assessment, it is open to dispute, and the counter-arguments that survived review are published in full under Summary.

Does government use of automated licence-plate readers violate the Constitution, and are vendors like Flock Safety acting as agents of the government?

Key points

Almost every enforceable limit on plate-reader networks in the United States today comes from state legislatures, not from the Fourth Amendment.
No federal appellate court has held that querying a plate-reader system is a search; the one decision that reached the question reasoned from a municipal system of no more than ten cameras.
StumpWatch's position is that a company running a surveillance network on the government's behalf is a government agent, so the test is whether the same act would violate the Constitution if an official did it directly.
Courts have not adopted that reasoning on these facts, and this page says so rather than presenting the position as settled law.
These devices were never only plate readers: the vendor's own policy records the vehicle, its characteristics, the time and the camera's location, and a competitor holds a patent whose claim 27 covers tire pressure sensors and other vehicle systems by name.
There is no evidence the largest vendor collects Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular or tyre-sensor signals, and the Minnesota audits often cited against that claim never actually examined the question.
There is no way to opt out. A driver is not a customer, was offered no terms, and the vendor states it cannot process data-subject requests for plates in its footage.
Even winning the constitutional argument may produce nothing: good faith, qualified immunity and standing each defeat a remedy independently of the merits.
The documented failures so far are administrative rather than constitutional, and they are real, including federal access that agencies did not know they had switched on.

What is at stake

WHAT IS AT STAKE

A camera on a pole photographs your license plate as you drive past. By itself that is nothing: a plate is a number the state requires you to display so strangers and police can read it. But thousands of those cameras, wired together, retained for weeks, and searchable after the fact, produce something different in kind, a record of where a particular car has been. Whether the Constitution has anything to say about that is the question, and the honest answer today is: much less than most people assume. Almost every enforceable limit on these systems in the United States right now comes from state legislatures, not from the Fourth Amendment. This page holds two things. First, that a dense, retained, retrospectively searchable plate-reader network is the kind of surveillance the Fourth Amendment should reach. Second, and more fundamentally, that a private company running such a network on the government's behalf is acting as an agent of the government, so the constitutional question is not changed by routing the work through a contractor. Courts have so far largely rejected the first and have set a demanding bar for the second. An earlier draft of this page presented both as settled doctrine. They are not settled, and that was the error worth correcting — not the positions themselves, which we hold, and which we set out and defend below. What follows separates what courts have actually decided, what is genuinely open, and what we hold to be true regardless of how the litigation turns out.

Counter-arguments that survived review

These were argued against the analysis at full strength and were not defeated. They are published here, unfolded, because an assessment that hides its strongest surviving objection is advocacy rather than accountability.

Five independent reviewers were asked to refute this analysis rather than improve it. Across forty load-bearing claims they returned 171 verdicts of "survives" and 29 of "overstated". No claim was refuted outright by a majority. These are the objections that survived, and readers should weigh them. THE KNOWING-EXPOSURE RULE IS THE HARDER OBSTACLE, NOT THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE. The strongest government answer to a plate-reader claim is not Smith v. Maryland but New York v. Class: the exterior of a car is thrust into the public eye, and it is unreasonable to expect privacy in an object the law requires be displayed in plain view. That rule is older than the third-party doctrine and was left untouched by Carpenter. If it controls, no amount of aggregation helps, because nothing private was ever observed. This objection reframes the whole question and the analysis now addresses it directly. THE AGGREGATION THRESHOLD MAY NOT EXIST. The analysis treats "enough cameras, held long enough" as a line that will eventually be crossed. A reviewer argued there may be no such line. The two rationales behind the only federal appellate holding on point, that a plate carries no privacy interest and that a roadside sensor never follows anyone indoors, do not change at ten cameras or ten thousand. The contrary authority is dictum; the authority against is a holding. VIRGINIA'S STATUTE DOES NOT ENLIST THE VENDOR. An earlier draft cited Va. Code 2.2-5517 as evidence that a state had put a vendor in a searching role. Restoring the omitted words reverses it: the vendor may access system data only "for maintenance and quality assurance purposes". Virginia confined the vendor to being a maintenance technician. That claim was withdrawn rather than repaired. SKINNER'S PERMISSIVE HALF WAS QUOTED WITHOUT ITS LIMITS, and both real-world agency examples offered in support produced no relief for anyone. The narrowed agency argument survives only where the government directs the specific act complained of, which is a much smaller target than the original thesis. THERE MAY BE NO REMEDY EVEN IF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT WINS. The first draft never mentioned the exclusionary rule, good faith, qualified immunity, standing or mootness. A reviewer pointed out that the 2026 decision the analysis treats as its best news is the proof against it: a court found the warrant plainly unconstitutional and admitted the evidence anyway on good faith. This produced the remedy section now in the analysis. TWO CITATION DEFECTS WERE CAUGHT BEFORE PUBLICATION AND REMOVED. One cited case did not exist. One quotation attributed to a police department appears in no source. Both were struck. Neither was load-bearing, and the propositions they had been attached to either stand on other authority or were dropped. They are recorded here because a reader is entitled to know that the review found them.

WHAT THE LAW ESTABLISHES TODAY

A person driving on public roads has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. That is United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983), and it has never been overruled. It has, however, been narrowed, and it narrowed itself from the start: Knotts expressly reserved the question of "dragnet-type law enforcement practices" (460 U.S. 283-284), a reservation Carpenter later treated as decisive. In Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (U.S. June 29, 2026), the Court held Knotts "inapt" to two hours of phone location history, said Knotts "does not support the view that accessing two hours of Location History is not a search," and singled out the fact that the surveillance in Knotts "was confined to public roads," calling that fact "crucial." Chatrie is a phone-location case; it does not mention licence plates or plate readers, and its single use of the word "camera" refers to the bank's own security footage, so we do not cite it as deciding anything about plate-reader networks. A motorist has no privacy interest in the plate number itself. The Fifth Circuit said so in United States v. Porter (Mar. 17, 2026), citing Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999); Massachusetts pointed the same way in a footnote: McCarthy observed that the requirement that plates be "displayed conspicuously" supports "the contention that there is no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a license plate number, the very purpose of which is to identify the vehicle to the government" (484 Mass. 493, 502 n.8 (2020)). That is an aside in a decision that held the opposite about the system as a whole. Behind both sits New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986): the exterior of a car "is thrust into the public eye," and it is unreasonable to expect privacy in an object the law requires be displayed in plain view. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), which is the leading case for location privacy, supplies the government's best answers rather than ours. It distinguished cell phones from cars on the ground that a phone "faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor's offices, political headquarters," drawing a contrast with Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion), where "[a] car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny." And it reserved rather than resolved the status of "conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras," saying only that its holding did not call them into question. The federal appellate decision most directly against us is United States v. Porter, No. 25-60163 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2026). It appears to be the first federal court of appeals decision to reach and decide, in a majority holding, whether querying a plate-reader system is a search: the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851 (2020), never reached the merits, because the defendant was driving a rental car six days overdue and failed the threshold expectation-of-privacy test — the case was decided before the question could arise, rather than ducked, and the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Mapson, 96 F.4th 1323 (2024), resolved it on the good-faith exception instead. Porter holds that "the use of an LPR system did not invade any reasonable expectation of privacy and did not constitute a search, so no warrant was required," and that the system "is more analogous to the beeper signals in Knotts than to the CSLI at issue in Carpenter." Two limits matter. Porter concerned a municipal system of no more than ten cameras, and the court reasoned from that scale, stressing that the system yielded only "periodic information about a vehicle's location" and could not capture the "whole of [an individual's] physical movements." Porter is not a case about any named vendor. The two federal appellate decisions that were did not reach the merits: Yang concerned Vigilant Solutions' database, which the Ninth Circuit called "the largest license plate-location database in the country" and which then held "over 6.5 billion license plate scans and affiliated location data," and Mapson concerned reports "created by two third-party companies, Vigilant and ELSAG." So no federal court of appeals has yet decided whether querying a national commercial network is a search — but two have had one in front of them. A federal district court granted the City of Norfolk summary judgment in January 2026, holding that operating 176 cameras in 75 clusters "does not constitute a search" (Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:24-cv-00621, E.D. Va.). And in Rinaldi v. Sylvester (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2025), the court observed that "nearly every court" outside the Second Circuit to consider the question after Carpenter has held that queries of plate-reader databases are not searches — a real headcount, though both of those limits belong with it. On the vendor side, the law is not close. Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 814 (2019): "the fact that the government licenses, contracts with, or grants a monopoly to a private entity does not convert the private entity into a state actor" — a sentence that carries its own exception, "unless the private entity is performing a traditional, exclusive public function" — and the same is true of funding or subsidy. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982), rejected state action for a school drawing nearly all its income from government, comparing it to firms that "build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the government." Courts confronting surveillance vendors have reached for that comparison. Whether it actually describes this industry is a separate question, and we think it does not; we take it up below. What those cases decide is narrow, and the narrowness matters: a contract and a revenue stream, standing alone, do not make a private firm the state. They do not hold, and do not purport to hold, that a firm carrying out a government surveillance programme at the government's direction stands outside the Constitution. That distinction is the whole of our position, and we state it plainly below rather than dressing it up as settled law.

WHAT THE RECORD ACTUALLY SHOWS

The documented failures are administrative, not constitutional, and they are real. On August 25, 2025 the Illinois Secretary of State announced the findings of a sample audit of twelve local law-enforcement agencies: Flock had allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois cameras and surveil drivers, "did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing," and was running a CBP pilot programme "which Flock leadership was unaware of." Eleven days later the same office announced that Forest Park's police department had been giving CBP access through Motorola Solutions technology, and directed that it be shut off. Whatever this is, it is not one company's problem. In July 2026 the Los Angeles Police Commission's Inspector General reported that, asked for the contracts governing the Flock cameras and Flock's access to Axon data, the Department "could not produce documentation establishing the contractual authority that identify applicable data-sharing terms and other governing provisions." The California State Auditor found in February 2020 that none of the four agencies it examined had a policy containing everything the law required, that the agencies "conduct little to no auditing of users' searches", and that Fresno and Marin had each arranged to share images with hundreds of entities and Sacramento with over a thousand — without evidence the agencies had always determined whether a recipient had any right or need to see them, or was even a public agency. What that reach means in a single case is on the congressional record. A Texas officer ran a search giving as the stated reason "had an abortion, search for female." Members of Congress put that query's reach at 6,809 networks and more than 83,000 cameras in a demand letter of their own, footnoting the figures to press reporting rather than to the company — their assertion, not testimony given to them. The figure no longer depends on that letter. The Illinois Secretary of State stated it in an official release of June 12, 2025: "In May, law enforcement authorities in Texas performed a nationwide search of more than 83,000 ALPR cameras to locate a woman they said had a self-administered abortion." One officer, one sentence typed into a box, and the search ran across a substantial fraction of the country. Whatever rule is supposed to prevent that, it did not. A United States Senator put the conclusion bluntly to the company in October 2025, after being told that federal pilots had run without customers being informed: "I now believe that abuses of your product are not only likely but inevitable, and that Flock is unable and uninterested in preventing them." The same letter records the company's own explanation, that "due to internal miscommunication, customers were inaccurately informed that Flock did not have any relationship with DHS," and reports that of 11.4 million searches obtained through public records over six months, more than fourteen percent gave as their reason nothing but the word "investigation," with no case number at all. It is not uniform. An independent audit dated February 5, 2026 found Woodbury, Minnesota's public safety department compliant with the state ALPR statute in every area examined, with no exceptions recorded. Worth noting, though, that these audits are commissioned by the agency being audited. One thing we previously published must be corrected, and one earlier withdrawal can now be lifted. The figure that roughly 75 percent of law-enforcement customers opted into nationwide lookup is what the company told Congress, not an independent finding, and every circulating scale figure is press-derived. The master services agreements we once could not retrieve have since been obtained and read clause by clause; what they actually say is set out below, including where it cuts against us.

WHAT IS GENUINELY CONTESTED

Three things are live. First, whether there is any density, placement, and retention threshold at which a plate-reader network becomes a search. McCarthy said in dictum that "[w]ith enough cameras in enough locations" such a system "would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy," and that a one-year retention period "certainly is long enough to warrant constitutional protection." The Norfolk court, quoting United States v. Sturdivant (N.D. Ohio 2025), acknowledged that plate reader surveillance "could become too intrusive and run afoul of [constitutional privacy standards] at some point. But when?" Its own answer was only that "at least in Norfolk, Virginia, the answer is: not today." But the authority on the other side is a holding, not dictum, and the strongest objection to our position is that the threshold may not exist at all: if the object observed is a state-mandated public identifier on a public road, multiplying observations of what was never private may never manufacture a privacy interest. The answer to that objection is in Porter itself: the court did not reason that scale is irrelevant, it reasoned from the small scale in front of it, emphasising that ten cameras yield only periodic sightings and cannot capture the whole of a person's movements. A network that does capture the whole of a person's movements is a different case, and Porter did not decide it. There is also federal appellate authority that such a threshold exists, and we should have said so earlier: in Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department, 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc), the court held that "because the AIR program enables police to deduce from the whole of individuals' movements, we hold that accessing its data is a search, and its warrantless operation violates the Fourth Amendment." That was aerial wide-area surveillance rather than plate readers, and every plate-reader court to address it has distinguished it on that ground — but it is a holding, it is en banc, and it binds the circuit where the Norfolk appeal is now pending. It is also not true that every court has gone one way. A Virginia circuit court held in 2024 that the collection and storage of plate and location data by this system required a warrant (Bell v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. Cir. 316 (Norfolk Cir. 2024)) — a holding we know only as the Court of Appeals of Virginia rendered it in Church, not from the Bell opinion itself, which we have not obtained. We have found no record of an appeal in that case, and we do not assert one either way. What the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed in October 2025 was a separate suppression order in a different case, in which the same judge had relied on her earlier reasoning; the appellate court held that the system "simply took pictures of the license plate and Church's vehicle as he drove it down public thoroughfares." That decision is an unpublished memorandum opinion, which is not binding precedent. Va. Code 17.1-413(A) provides only that the Court of Appeals reports the opinions it designates as having precedential value or other legal significance; the rule that an unpublished opinion does not bind rests on the Rules of Court and case law, not on that statute. One trial judge looked at these facts and reached the opposite answer, which is worth knowing when the question is described as settled. Second, a narrowed agency question. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), holds that government authorization, removal of legal barriers, and a governmental interest in the fruits can implicate the Fourth Amendment without compulsion. Where police direct specific vendor conduct, or vendor staff run lookups at an officer's request, that argument has force. But state action is act-specific: Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), asks whether the State is responsible for "the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." The right question is never whether a company is a state actor, but whether this placement, this query, this disclosure was the government's. Third, how much of this can be litigated at all. The Norfolk court split the question. On the cameras themselves the plaintiffs had standing and lost on the merits — the network "does not constitute a search." On warrantless database queries they lost earlier, for want of standing, because they "freely concede that their vehicles have never been the subject of a query (outside of this litigation)." That is worth stating precisely: a citizen who cannot show he was queried may be unable to challenge queries at all, which makes the practice difficult to test in court no matter what the right answer is. That ruling is on appeal in the Fourth Circuit, No. 26-1227, fully briefed as of July 23, 2026 after the parties jointly moved for supplemental briefing on Chatrie; no argument has been scheduled and no decision issued. A second case, Tan v. City of San Jose, No. 5:26-cv-03181 (N.D. Cal., filed April 15, 2026), alleges 474 cameras, including on residential streets, on the same block as immigration attorneys' offices, and around "a block that contains a church, hospice facility, and many other healthcare facilities." Those are unproven allegations in a complaint, not findings; a motion to dismiss is set for hearing on December 3, 2026.

THE CONTRACTOR ANALOGY DOES NOT FIT, AND IT IS DOING A LOT OF WORK

The cases that treat a government-funded firm as an ordinary contractor are describing procurement. A company that builds a road, a dam or a submarine delivers a finished thing; the government then owns it, operates it, and answers for how it is used. The builder's role ends at delivery. That is the relationship Rendell-Baker had in mind, and it is not the relationship here. The surveillance vendor builds nothing for public ownership. It owns the cameras. It operates the network. It holds the reads on its own servers, sets the retention period, and controls the software through which anyone searches them. What the government buys is not equipment but access — a subscription to a capability the vendor continues to own and run. Calling that firm a contractor obscures the only fact that matters: when a search happens, it happens inside a system the private company owns and operates, using data the private company holds. The capability is also not one the public shares. Anyone may stand on a roadside and write down a plate. No member of the public can ask where a particular plate has been seen across thousands of cameras run by hundreds of agencies in other jurisdictions, because no member of the public is permitted to. That privileged position is not something the vendor found in the open market. It is built out of government participation: public agencies supply the camera feeds, public agencies grant one another access through the vendor's platform, and public money pays for it. A private firm holding a power the public is denied, granted by and assembled out of government, is not well described as a company that pours concrete. This inverts the argument that private ownership insulates the vendor. If the government had built and run this network itself, the Fourth Amendment question would be squarely presented. Structuring the same capability so that a private firm owns the cameras and sells the government the answers does not make the surveillance less governmental. It makes the constitutional question easier to avoid, which is precisely why it should not be allowed to. When the state can buy from a private holder the very record it would otherwise need a warrant to compel, the warrant requirement becomes a line item rather than a limit. We accept where the real argument lies. The courts' answer is that attribution is act-specific: Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), asks whether the State is responsible for the specific conduct complained of, and mere contracting is not enough. We agree that attribution is the question. Our position is that it is satisfied here — where a public agency defines the programme, pays for it, decides where the cameras point, runs or authorizes the queries, and consumes the output, the surveillance is the government's, and the vendor's private ownership of the servers is an accounting fact rather than a constitutional one. A rule that says otherwise invites governments to buy surveillance they are not permitted to build. No court has adopted that reasoning on these facts, and the section above says so. We think it is right anyway, and we will keep saying so while the question is litigated.

Current legal challenges in progress

No structured legal challenges have been recorded here yet. This section is manual-entry only: cases are filed by a reviewer against a primary docket, never scraped. The prose above is what the analysis argues; the absence of a case card is the absence of a filed record on our side, not evidence that no case exists.

THE REMEDY PROBLEM

Even winning the constitutional argument may produce nothing — a problem an earlier version of this page did not confront. Chatrie shows how far the gap can run: the district court held the warrant "plainly violates the rights enshrined in [the Fourth] Amendment" and admitted the evidence anyway on good faith. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, and expressly declined to reach the good-faith question, leaving it for the Fourth Circuit "to consider anew" — so a finding of unconstitutionality has still produced no suppression in that very case. Damages against officials run into qualified immunity. Injunctions run into Lyons. In the Fifth Circuit, after Porter, a plate-reader query is not a search at all; and were Porter later overruled, officers who had relied on it would be relying on binding circuit precedent, which under Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011), takes the evidence outside the exclusionary rule. A reader should understand that a court could agree with every constitutional proposition on this page and still order no suppression, no damages, and no injunction.

IT WAS NEVER ONLY LICENCE PLATES

Calling these devices licence plate readers understates what is already documented, and it dates quickly. What the largest vendor's own policy says it records is the plate, the plate's state, an image of the plate, an image of the vehicle, the vehicle's characteristics, the date, the time and the camera's location. Characteristics means make, colour, body type and the fittings a car carries; the vendor's own examples are "roof racks, back racks, aftermarket wheels." The company markets searching without a plate at all: its own current copy is "No Plate? No Problem," and it accepts plain-language queries of the kind "white sports car with a racing stripe." It holds a registered service mark (Reg. No. 5,849,820, registered September 3, 2019) covering "Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software that identifies a vehicle from images and/or video based on the vehicle's unique make, model, look, color, marks, license plate, and other information." Reading plates is a subset of what the product does, not a description of it. The same vendor sells acoustic detection that listens for gunshots, fireworks, crashes and street takeovers, and it acquired a drone company in October 2024 so that plate reading can fly. The audio is not a marketing gloss: a county sheriff's signed master services agreement defines the service to include "audio detection" and defines what the hardware captures as "still images, video, audio and other data." That scope grew. Contracts signed with other departments in 2021 defined the same term as "still images and/or video captured by the Hardware," with no audio at all. One episode shows how quickly the boundary moves in both directions: the company piloted scream and distress detection and then withdrew it in July 2026, describing it in its own statement as a "pilot feature" that was "only available to a small number of customers" and "never broadly released." We could not establish from any primary source when that pilot began, so we give no start date. The hardware did not change. What the device listens for is a software setting the company that owns the device can alter. The bracket the primary record supports runs from a Missouri department's records of October 2024, describing a gunshot-only configuration, through an Indiana department's records of May 2026 describing detection of certain sounds of distress, to the feature's removal in July 2026. An earlier version of this page said the setting changed twice inside a year. More than one change is documented, but across roughly twenty-one months rather than twelve, and that page could not date the pilot's start at all — so the tighter claim contradicted its own paragraph. Any assurance about what a sensor does not collect is an assurance about this quarter's configuration. The vendor also sells a product that merges plate reads with records-management and dispatch systems, jail records, public records and open-source material into one search. Its own description is that an officer can "search RMS, CAD, LPR, jail records, public records, and approved open sources without switching tabs." The company's defence is that this "does not expand what agencies are allowed to access," only how efficiently they search it. That defence concedes the point we care about. A dozen records that were separately held, separately governed and separately difficult to assemble become one query. The friction was never an accident; it was most of the protection. Reading device signals rather than plates is no longer hypothetical, but it belongs to a different company and the attribution matters. United States Patent 11,941,716, granted in March 2024 for "systems and methods for electronic signature tracking," records "Selex ES Inc" as its assignee on its face. That entity is now named Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions, LLC, and the change is on the USPTO assignment record: Selex ES Inc. to Selex ES, LLC by change of name effective March 30, 2023 (reel/frame 067779/0917), and Selex ES, LLC to Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions, LLC by change of name effective April 1, 2024 (reel/frame 067765/0921). It is the same company renamed, not a transfer to a parent — and it is the entity whose name appears on the ELSAG SignalTrace page. An earlier version of this page called Leonardo the corporate parent and declined to say who held the patent; both were wrong. Its specification describes an antenna assembly "configured to capture or otherwise receive a plurality of different electronic signal types, such as Bluetooth®, Wifi, RFID, or other radio frequency (“RF”) signals." That is specification text. The claims are the stronger authority, and claim 27 reaches vehicle sensors expressly: the transmitting vehicle components it covers "comprise tire pressure sensors, manufacturer installed or after-market vehicle sensors, vehicle stereo systems, vehicle entertainments systems, vehicle navigation systems, vehicle infotainment systems, self-driving or driver assist vehicle guidance systems, vehicle Wifi hotspots, or combinations thereof." The matching product, SignalTrace, is described on Leonardo's own site: "Electronic devices such as fitness trackers, smartwatches, RFID tags and mobile phones emit signals into the air," and the system "creates an electronic fingerprint for groups of the signals that the system determines are frequently emitted together," to "enhance the records captured by LPR cameras in the area." Its own illustration is a person identifiable because "only one will have an iPhone 13rev2, an Audi radio, a pair of Bose headphones, a Garmin sports watch, a key finder, and the license plate ABC-1234." Leonardo says it works "in off-road areas such as in subways and malls," and lets police "recognize a specific vehicle included in an electronic signature, without the license plate number." Twelve Virginia law-enforcement agencies contracted with Leonardo as an ALPR vendor as of a state commission survey disseminated in November 2025 and reported in January 2026, though that survey does not say any of them bought this particular system, and we found no procurement record showing a deployment anywhere. We want to be exact about one thing, because the opposite claim circulates widely and we cannot support it. There is no evidence that the largest plate-reader vendor collects Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular or tyre-sensor signals. Its published policy does not list them; neither of the two adversarial congressional letters we obtained mentions them, though neither sets out to inventory what the cameras collect, so their silence carries little weight either way; and independent audits conducted under Minnesota's ALPR statute in 2025 found only plate data in storage, one recording that "a review of data stored in Flock confirmed that ALPR Data collected by Plymouth Police Department is limited to license plate numbers; date, time, location of the stationary ALPR camera; and pictures of license plates, vehicles, and areas surrounding the vehicles." Those audits are weaker support than they look, and an earlier version of this page overstated them by saying they checked device signals and reported the opposite. They do not. They put the question as whether data "collected by the ALPR is limited to" the three categories Minn. Stat. 13.824 subd. 2 permits, and answered that it is — but they answered it by reviewing what was STORED, which cannot detect anything captured and never retained. None of the audits we read names Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular or tyre-sensor signals. An earlier version of this page said they never reached the question; that corrected an overstatement by overstating in the other direction. Three of them are also the work of a single auditor using a single template, which makes their identical wording one finding and not three. A related confusion is worth naming: these cameras do emit Bluetooth and Wi-Fi of their own, which is how researchers locate them. The radio runs the other way. The camera is announcing itself, not listening to your phone. That distinction is real today and may not last. Nothing in law stops any vendor from shipping the feature, one competitor has patented it, and the same vendor that says it collects only plates also changed what its microphones listen for more than once across roughly twenty-one months. The point is not which company does what this quarter. It is that a plate is simply the identifier these systems started with. A car already carries several others, a person carries more, and the industry has published its intention to read them. A rule written about licence plates will not reach any of it.

IT IS SOLD TO PRIVATE PARTIES TOO, AND THE DATA CROSSES

This is not only a government system. The same vendor runs sales lines for homeowners' associations, property managers, retail, healthcare, banking, logistics, places of worship and schools, and, in a blog post dated June 23, 2025 but flagged "last updated October 22, 2025," described its "partner base" as spanning more than a thousand businesses, including, in its own words, "4 of the NRF Top 10 Retailers." The two sides are connected, and asymmetrically. Private customers are invited to route their footage to police — the property-management pitch is to "share camera feeds from throughout your properties — whether Flock cameras or not — with your local law enforcement agency." The vendor says data does not travel the other way, that private customers never see law-enforcement data. What a police agency's own contract said, in the template executed with departments in 2021, is that where a private customer had enabled sharing, the agency and that customer "will share all right, title and interest" in that customer's data — which section 1.11 defines as "the Footage, geolocation data, environmental data and/or Notifications," so it reaches well beyond footage. The same template carries a limit that belongs with it: "This Agreement does not by itself make any Non-Agency End User Data the sole property or the Proprietary Information of Agency." The contract never describes how sharing is switched on; it says only that a customer "elected" it, and speaks of "prescribed access." An earlier version of this page called it a checkbox. That was our inference about the interface, not the document's language, and we withdraw it. Two separate licences ran to the vendor, and an earlier version of this page welded them into one sentence that neither clause supports. Section 4.2 granted a "non-exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, fully paid license to use, reproduce, modify and distribute the Agency Data and Non-Agency End User Data as a part of the Aggregated Data" — and said nothing whatever about marketing. Marketing appears in section 4.4, a different and weaker grant: a "non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right and license... to (i) use and distribute such Aggregated Data to improve and enhance the Services and for other marketing, development, diagnostic and corrective purposes." That one is neither irrevocable nor fully paid, and its subject is anonymised or aggregated data. Section 4.4 has a second limb, and that limb is not anonymised: it permits disclosure of raw agency and non-agency data inclusive of footage. The raw-data grant is real; it simply is not the marketing grant. Those clauses do not survive into the current agreement, and that cuts against the way we framed this. In the 2025 master services agreement executed with Siskiyou County, the Non-Agency End User concept and the joint-ownership provision are gone entirely. Section 4.1 now reads that "all right, title and interest in the Customer Data... are retained solely by Customer," and that "Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Data." Marketing was struck from the data licence. Machine-learning training was added in its place, expressly — "including the training of machine learning algorithms." We have read one 2025 agreement and have not surveyed the rest, so we scope the finding to that one. The terms materially improved, and we publish that because it is true, not because it helps. Sharing between agencies works the same way, and the word "default" is doing more work than it can bear. The company told Congress in August 2025 that roughly seventy-five percent of its law-enforcement customers had opted into the national lookup tool, which lets any other enrolled customer search their cameras. The congressional correspondence records why: the company restricts nationwide searching to agencies that have agreed to be searched in return. Access is the payment, and the price is your own data. Two government records suggest agencies did not always understand what they had switched on. Members of a House committee wrote, in a demand letter of their own, that one Illinois department "was not made aware prior to opting into the National Lookup program that doing so would allow other law enforcement agencies who utilize the program to search for Mount Prospect data without a data-sharing agreement" — their assertion, hedged as reported, not testimony given to them. A state constitutional officer put the same department's exposure on the record in figures: the Illinois Secretary of State found that "Mount Prospect's ALPR settings provided a gateway into Illinois' system operated by Flock for an unauthorized use," and that "Between January 14 and April 30, there were 262 searches for immigration related matters in Mount Prospect, alone." And a Colorado police department records on its own city website that "as of June 2025, we deactivated the 'national lookup' feature, so out-of-state agencies can no longer search our system for specific, identified license plate numbers" — which tells you it had been running. Reads are held thirty days by default under the vendor's own policy, longer or shorter as a customer's law or policy directs.

THERE IS NO WAY TO OPT OUT, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE PROBLEM

Every argument that this surveillance is constitutionally unremarkable rests, somewhere, on a choice the person supposedly made. You displayed the plate. You drove in public. You exposed it to anyone who cared to look. Knowing exposure, the third-party doctrine and the public-thoroughfare cases all trace back to the same premise: that the individual did something, and what followed was a consequence he accepted. That premise does not hold here, and the comparison people reach for shows why. A person can decline Google. He can decline every data broker, every loyalty card, every app that monetises his movements, by not using the product. The bargain may be lopsided and the disclosures may be unreadable, but there is an exit, and taking it costs him a service he chose to want. There is no exit from a camera on a public road. He is not a customer and never was. He cannot decline the terms, because no terms were offered to him. He cannot switch providers, because he is not buying anything. This is not rhetorical. The largest vendor's own privacy policy says it "cannot verify the identity of individuals whose effects (i.e., license plates) appear in the Footage and are unable to process data subject requests related to such images" — meaning there is no request you can make of it. There is exactly one opt-out in the entire system, a safe-list for residents of a neighbourhood that buys the cameras, and the company states that being on it "does not preclude that same vehicle from being detected and cataloged on other Flock Safety cameras in the network, once leaving their residential community." No state requires so much as a sign. His only avenue of refusal is to stop using public roads, which is not a choice any adult in this country can actually make. The Supreme Court has already accepted that reasoning about phones. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 315, holds that "in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily assume[] the risk" of the tracking that follows — the Court's own words, themselves quoting Smith v. Maryland — because carrying a phone is indispensable to participation in modern life. Driving is not different in kind. So the consent that the doctrine depends on is missing, and no amount of restating the rule supplies it. A person who cannot refuse has not agreed. Treating his inability to escape as though it were acquiescence gets the moral logic exactly backwards: the more inescapable a surveillance system becomes, the weaker the argument that anyone consented to it, not the stronger.

THE LAW GRADES PRIVACY BY WHO YOU ARE. THIS SYSTEM DOES NOT

American law has never treated everyone's privacy as identical. A person who seeks office, exercises public power, or steps into public controversy accepts scrutiny that a private citizen does not, and our law has built that distinction into defamation, into the privacy torts, and into the ordinary expectation that officials answer for their conduct while private people are left alone. The premise is that the private citizen gets more protection, not less, precisely because he has claimed nothing from the public. An indiscriminate tracking system erases that distinction. It does not know who is a senator and who is a nurse coming off a night shift. It logs the sheriff, the reporter investigating the sheriff, the juror, the woman driving to a shelter, and the man driving to a union meeting on identical terms, and files them in the same searchable index. Whatever one concludes about surveilling officials in their official capacity, a system that affords a private citizen no more protection than a public figure has inverted the settled premise of American privacy law rather than merely testing its edges. This is our position, not a holding. No court has said the Fourth Amendment calibrates to public or private status. We say the design should.

STATEMENTS MEASURED AGAINST THE RECORD

WHAT THIS SECTION IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT

This section records documented gaps between what an actor said publicly and what a primary document records. In several items the primary document is another government body's published account of the actor's conduct. Where that is so, the document establishes what that body stated, not the underlying fact, and the item says so. Each item is built the same way: the statement, quoted with its source and date; the record, quoted from a primary document; the divergence, described plainly; and the innocent explanation, stated honestly, with whether the record rules it out. Where the innocent explanation survives, the item is labelled unresolved and left that way. Where a company has published its own account of a divergence recorded here, that account is quoted in the company's words rather than paraphrased or replaced with reasoning of our own. Most items here are unresolved. The company throughout is Flock Group, Inc., which trades as Flock Safety, referred to below as the company. Company web pages are quoted with the date they were retrieved; live web copy can change after that date. Where the only material is one page of company copy read against another, the matter belongs in the claims ledger for this issue, not here, and readers should look there for statement-versus-evidence checks on marketing language. This section does not impute motive. It makes no claim about intent, plan or bad faith. A company's marketing is evidence of what it claimed, never of what is true. The reader draws the inference.

THE DHS PILOTS AND THE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WAS NO DHS RELATIONSHIP

STATED, AS REPORTED BY AN OVERSIGHT LETTER. No company document containing this assurance was obtained. What was obtained is a Senator's account of it. Sen. Ron Wyden to Garrett Langley, CEO, Flock Group, Inc., October 16, 2025, page 2: "to address concerns that license plate data might be abused by federal immigration authorities, Flock has assured its state and local law enforcement customers that the company does not provide access to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)." RECORD. The same letter, same page, states: "Flock also confirmed that it misled its state and local law enforcement customers, telling my office that 'due to internal miscommunication, customers were inaccurately informed that Flock did not have any relationship with DHS, while pilot programs with sub-agencies of DHS were briefly active.'" The characterisation "confirmed that it misled" is the Senator's, as is the flat sentence on the same page, "With this representation about DHS access to Flock data, Flock deceived its law enforcement customers." The company's own words, as the letter quotes them, are the text inside the inner quotation marks. Same page: "Officials from Flock subsequently confirmed to my office in September that the company provided access to CBP, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Secret Service, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service as part of a pilot earlier this year. Flock told my office that during the pilot, which has now ended, CBP and HSI conducted approximately 200 and 175 searches respectively." GAP. Customers were told there was no DHS relationship. The company's own quoted words place the pilots and the inaccurate assurances in the same period: customers "were inaccurately informed" that there was no DHS relationship "while pilot programs with sub-agencies of DHS were briefly active." Of the four agencies named, CBP, HSI and the Secret Service sit within the Department of Homeland Security, whose own published component list names Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Secret Service; HSI is the investigative arm of ICE. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is not a DHS component: its own service page states that "Within the Department of the Navy, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service is the civilian federal law enforcement agency uniquely responsible for investigating felony crime, preventing terrorism and protecting secrets for the Navy and Marine Corps." WHAT WOULD EXPLAIN IT INNOCENTLY. The company's own account is "internal miscommunication," and no document obtained establishes who authorised the assurances or whether they knew of the pilots. A second government body's account is consistent with that: the Illinois Secretary of State's office stated in a release of August 25, 2025 that its sample audit found the company "did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing, which was compounded by the fact that the company was running a pilot program with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which Flock leadership was unaware of." The record does not rule the miscommunication account out. What the record establishes, because the company said it, is that the statements were made and that they were inaccurate. Whether any customer acted on the assurance is not recorded. The cause is unresolved; the inaccuracy is admitted in the company's own words. WHAT ELSE THE ILLINOIS RECORD SHOWS. The same August 25, 2025 release records executive action and a characterisation stronger than anything asserted here. It states that the office "immediately ordered the company to shut off access to U.S. Customs and Border Protection," that "Flock has also since paused its pilot with CBP and other federal agencies, not only in Illinois but nationwide," and quotes Secretary Alexi Giannoulias directly: "This sharing of license plate data of motorists who drive on Illinois roads is a clear violation of the state law." Note that the Senator's October letter describes the pilot as one "which has now ended" while the Illinois release of two months earlier describes it as paused; the two documents are not reconciled by anything obtained.

A CITY SAYS A SHARING SETTING WAS TURNED ON BY THE VENDOR

STATED. Company Trust Center, Myths vs Facts, retrieved August 4, 2026, answering "Who Can Access Data?": "Data sharing is controlled by the customer agency, not Flock." Company Trust Center, Law Enforcement Access, retrieved the same day: "Each agency controls its own settings and decides if, and when, to share data. Sharing never happens automatically." Same page, answering "Can Flock share an agency's data with other agencies?": "Data is never shared automatically. Sharing only happens if the agency gives clear permission." Garrett Langley, "Keeping Our Customers In Control," published December 3, 2025: "Our position on sharing is black-and-white, no room for interpretation or back doors. Agencies decide how they collaborate with other agencies, and Flock doesn't make those decisions for them." RECORD, ON ONE PARTY'S ACCOUNT. City of Mountain View, California, "City statement on Flock Safety Automated License Plate Reader System," posted January 30, 2026. The City deployed the cameras and is an interested party; the document establishes what the City stated. "During the prior federal administration, from August to November 2024, several federal law enforcement agencies accessed Mountain View's Flock Safety ALPR system for one camera via a 'nationwide' search setting that was turned on by Flock Safety. This setting was enabled without MVPD's permission or knowledge." From a separate passage of the same statement: "Through the audit, MVPD also discovered that a 'statewide' search function was not operating within the system controls we established. This function allowed Flock Safety to enable access to California law enforcement agencies that had not been approved by MVPD for 29 of the City's 30 ALPR cameras." GAP, WITH THE DATES. On the City's account, a sharing setting was enabled by the vendor rather than the customer, and a second function operated outside the access approvals the customer had set. That is inconsistent with the customer-control claim as applied to this customer's cameras in these periods. The nationwide-setting conduct ran from August to November 2024, more than a year before the December 2025 post and between twenty-one and twenty-four months before the Trust Center pages were retrieved. No version of the customer-control claim in force during 2024 was obtained. WHAT WOULD EXPLAIN IT INNOCENTLY. The City records a vendor account, though not the vendor's own words: "Flock Safety has assured us that their systems have been improved and that they no longer enable any access sharing outside of the State of California." No direct vendor statement about these events was obtained. The City also calls the episode "a system failure on Flock Safety's part," though the City plainly means it as a criticism and says in the same statement, "We are upset and disappointed with how our data was accessed." The record establishes what the City reported about those periods. It does not establish that the customer-control statements were inaccurate when they were made, or that they are inaccurate now. Unresolved.

THE 2026 TERMS AGAINST THE COMPANY'S DESCRIPTION OF THEM

STATED. Company blog, "Flock Provides Terms & Conditions Update to Make Definitions Simpler and Provide Customer Clarity," published February 17, 2026: "Nothing in the updated Terms gives Flock ownership of Customer Data. Nothing permits Flock to sell Customer Data. And nothing expands Flock's rights beyond what already existed." A NOTE ON THE COMPARISON. The company's sentence is relative to its own prior Terms, though the same post also speaks of "Flock's agreements" more broadly. The prior published online Terms were not obtained. They are published by the company at an address linked from the current Terms page, help.flocksafety.com, and that address redirects to a SAML sign-in, so they are not publicly retrievable; the Internet Archive returned no snapshot of the Terms page. The comparison below therefore runs one executed customer agreement of June 2025 against the online Terms last updated February 16, 2026 and retrieved August 4, 2026. An executed agreement may carry negotiated or customer-specific language. Differences shown here are differences against that one agreement, not necessarily against the terms the company was describing. RECORD. Executed Master Services Agreement between Flock Group, Inc. and the Siskiyou County Sheriff's Office, signed June 2025, section 4.1: "As between Flock and Customer, all right, title and interest in the Customer Data, belong to and are retained solely by Customer. Customer hereby grants to Flock a limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable, worldwide license to use the Customer Data and perform all acts as may be necessary for Flock to provide the Flock Services to Customer. Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Data." In that agreement the improvement right attached only to Anonymized Data, defined at section 1.1 as "Customer Data permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information, by commercially available standards which irreversibly alters data in such a way that a data subject (i.e., individual person or entity) can no longer be identified directly or indirectly," and section 4.3 grants Flock "a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right to use and distribute such Anonymized Data to improve and enhance the Services and for other development, diagnostic and corrective purposes, and other Flock offerings." RECORD. Online Terms and Conditions, last updated February 16, 2026, retrieved August 4, 2026: "As between Flock and Customer, all right, title, and interest in and to Customer Data belong to and are retained by Customer. Customer hereby grants to Flock a limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable, perpetual, worldwide license to (a) use and disclose Customer Data to provide the Flock Services; and (b) use Customer Data to support and improve Flock's products and services." That document contains no definition of Anonymized Data, the word does not appear in it, and the sentence "Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Data" does not appear in it. GAP. The ownership half of the company's statement holds on the face of both texts; each states that title in Customer Data is retained by the customer. On the two documents compared, the improvement right attaches in 2026 to Customer Data with no anonymisation predicate, where in 2025 it attached only to Anonymized Data as defined. "Perpetual" and "disclose" appear in the 2026 Customer Data grant and not in the corresponding 2025 grant at section 4.1, though "perpetual" does appear in the 2025 Anonymized Data licence at section 4.3. THE COMPANY'S OWN ACCOUNT OF EACH DIFFERENCE. The same February 2026 post addresses all three points directly and is quoted here rather than answered. On the missing sentence: "We removed a sentence that previously stated 'Flock shall not sell Customer Data' because it was redundant, not because our position changed. Flock cannot and does not sell Customer Data." On the word perpetual, in three consecutive passages: "Some have also asked about the use of the term 'perpetual' in connection with Flock's ability to use Customer Data to support and improve products and services." Then: "This is a standard software industry provision." Then: "Importantly, this does not grant ownership of Customer Data. It does not permit the sale of Customer Data. It does not create new rights. It simply ensures continuity in providing and improving services." On the word disclose: "Reference to 'disclosure' in Section 4.1 is limited to standard operational needs, such as working with trusted vendors or subcontractors (e.g., cloud hosting providers) or sharing data with third parties at the customer's direction." WHAT WOULD EXPLAIN IT INNOCENTLY, AND WHAT REMAINS. The company's explanations above are on the record and are not contradicted by any document obtained. The one difference the post does not address is the anonymisation predicate: the post never uses the word anonymized, and it describes consolidating several prior terms, including "customer-generated data" and "training data," into a single "Customer Data" definition that on its own account covers "images, audio, and/or video" captured by Flock hardware. Against the June 2025 executed agreement, an improvement right that ran to data "permanently stripped of identifying details" now runs to Customer Data as consolidated. Whether that is an expansion against the company's prior published online Terms, which were not obtained, is not established. Unresolved.

A CASE-NUMBER OPTION IN JUNE 2025, A CASE-NUMBER SETTING GONE IN AUGUST

STATED. Company post, "Flock Safety's Response to Illinois LPR Data Use and Out-of-State Sharing Concerns," published June 12, 2025, under the heading "Allowing Agencies to Require Case Numbers," which the post labels "(Coming by End of 2025)": "To promote additional accountability, prevent misuse, and make identifying unallowed searches easier, we are also instituting an option for agencies to elect to require a case number for any searches conducted in the system." RECORD. Wyden to Langley, October 16, 2025, page 3, in a passage whose preceding sentence describes a separate setting presenting an agency's own employees with a drop-down menu of predefined reasons: "Additionally, until recently, Flock customers could enable a different opt-in setting to require a case number for searches; if enabled, employees of those agencies would not be required to document any reason at all when submitting searches of other agencies' data. Flock confirmed to my office on August 19, that it removed this option the day before, on August 18, shortly after receiving questions about it from my office." GAP. In June 2025 the company announced a case-number option as an accountability improvement and labelled it as coming by the end of 2025. By August 2025, on the letter's account, a case-number opt-in setting already existed and could be enabled, and the company removed it. The letter's word "different" distinguishes that setting from the drop-down-of-predefined-reasons setting described in the sentence immediately before it, not from the option announced in June; nothing in either document states whether the announced option and the removed setting are the same control. The letter also records that the removed setting had an effect opposite to the accountability rationale given in June: when it was enabled, "employees of those agencies would not be required to document any reason at all when submitting searches of other agencies' data." The letter dates the removal to August 18 and the confirmation to August 19; it does not date the questions. WHAT WOULD EXPLAIN IT INNOCENTLY. An unintended interaction between two independent controls is a plausible cause of the effect the letter describes, and prompt removal is the correct remedy. If the two are different controls, the announced option and the removed one are separate matters, though the announcement of a case-number option as forthcoming while a case-number setting was already available and being removed is itself unexplained by anything obtained. Unresolved.

"YOU CAN'T SEARCH JUST BECAUSE"

STATED. Company Trust Center, Data Security, at the address /trust/data-privacy, retrieved August 4, 2026, under the heading "Purpose Limitation": "Searches require a public-safety reason. That reason is recorded with the search so agencies can review how the system is used." The same block carries the pull-quote "You can't search 'just because.'" Company Trust Center, Law Enforcement Access, retrieved the same day, answering "Can officers search anyone at any time?": "No. Searches must relate to a specific investigation and follow agency rules and the law." RECORD. Wyden to Langley, October 16, 2025, pages 2 to 3: "Flock requires its law enforcement customers to provide a reason for a search, which by default, they are prompted to enter into a text box into which any text can be entered. Flock has confirmed to my office that it does not require its law enforcement users to enter a case-specific reason, nor does Flock prohibit law enforcement customers from entering meaningless, generic reasons such as 'investigation' or 'crime.'" Same letter, page 3, reporting figures supplied to the Senator by the Electronic Frontier Foundation from a public-records dataset of 11.4 million searches over six months: "more than 14% of the search reasons contained just the word 'investigation' without a case number." That figure is an advocacy organisation's analysis reported to the Senator, not a finding of the Senate, the company or any auditor; the underlying dataset was not independently obtained, and it is not an immigration figure. Same page: "Flock customers cannot control the reasons provided for searches of their data by other law enforcement customers." GAP. The requirement to give a reason is real. What the letter records is that the field is free text the company does not require to be case-specific, and that a customer's control over reason quality stops at its own employees. The published claim that searches "must relate to a specific investigation" is broader than what the company confirmed to the Senator's office. WHAT WOULD EXPLAIN IT INNOCENTLY, AND WHAT THE RECORD SETTLES. The obvious defence, that a vendor cannot validate free text typed by an officer of another agency, is not available on this record: the company's own June 12, 2025 post describes a "Proactive Search Term Tool," launched that day, under which "If a search involving Illinois camera data includes terms that indicate an impermissible purpose under Illinois law, the Illinois data will automatically be excluded." The company therefore does inspect the contents of the reason field, at least for one state's data. Whether the field itself has since been constrained is settled the other way by the sequence: the Wyden letter of October 16, 2025 postdates that tool by four months and records the field as still free text with no case-specific requirement. What survives is that the published claim is broader than the record supports.

"EVERY SEARCH IS LOGGED AND REVIEWABLE," AND A GAP IN RETAINED RECORDS

STATED. Company homepage, retrieved August 4, 2026, as a labelled product benefit under "Audit-ready use": "Every search is logged and reviewable." Trust Center, Data Security, retrieved the same day: "Every search is tied to a specific user and recorded in a log. Supervisors can review what happened and who did it." RECORD. City of Mountain View statement, January 30, 2026: "Flock Safety did not retain records for that time period, which means the vendor cannot determine whether searches of Mountain View's data resulted in license plate information being shared." GAP. The instance recorded here concerns August to November 2024, and the City reached it through what it describes as a department-initiated audit; the statement does not record a records request to the vendor or any date for one. The City's statement identifies six federal entities that reached the camera, so records of access existed; what the City reports the vendor could not determine is whether any search resulted in plate information being shared. That is a statement about what was retained, not about whether searches were logged when they were made. WHAT WOULD EXPLAIN IT INNOCENTLY. An ordinary retention window may simply have expired. The vendor's published audit-log retention period was not obtained and does not appear on the Trust Center pages for Data Security, Law Enforcement Access or Rights and Safeguards, nor in the online Terms; the company's license-plate-reader product page states only that Flock "does not maintain records of customer data after the retention period," which addresses camera data rather than search logs. The logging claims quoted above were retrieved roughly two years after the period at issue and state no retention limit. Unresolved.

WHAT "OPT-IN" MEANT IN PRACTICE

STATED. Company Trust Center, Data Security, retrieved August 4, 2026: "Nothing is shared unless our customers turn on sharing." RECORD. Wyden to Langley, October 16, 2025, page 2, which gives reciprocity as the first of two reasons for the enrolment rate it reports: "In August, Flock informed my office that 75% of its law enforcement customers have enrolled in the 'National Lookup Tool,' which permits any other enrolled customer to search data collected through their cameras. There are two likely reasons for the high enrollment rate for such data sharing. First, Flock only permits agencies to access this search tool if those agencies also share data from their own cameras." RECORD, ON ONE PARTY'S ACCOUNT. Village of Mount Prospect, Illinois, "Police Department Response to Flock License Plate Reader Investigation," posted June 12, 2025: "Flock Safety explained that by opting into the 'National Lookup' feature, which Mount Prospect did, it permitted other law enforcement agencies who also utilized this feature to search Mount Prospect ALPR data without a data sharing agreement. MPPD was not made aware of this capability prior to the investigation. Flock has stated a need to increase communications with participating communities around this two-way sharing feature." Same statement: "The Illinois Secretary of State's Office investigation revealed that other law enforcement agencies conducted 262 immigration-related searches on Mount Prospect's ALPR data." The Illinois Secretary of State's release of the same date dates that figure: "Between January 14 and April 30, there were 262 searches for immigration related matters in Mount Prospect, alone." Those searches were conducted by other law enforcement agencies, not by the vendor; the figure is recorded here because it shows what the setting exposed, not as conduct attributed to the vendor. GAP. The default and the opt-in are real. The company pages checked do not state that the opt-in is reciprocal, that an agency which wants to search the network must let the network search its data. The pages checked on August 4, 2026 were the Trust Center pages for Data Security, Law Enforcement Access and Myths vs Facts, the LPR Policy, and the National LPR Network product address, which redirects to the license-plate-reader product page. None of them states the requirement. The in-product enrolment flow is not publicly observable and was not examined. One customer states on its own municipal record that it did not know what the setting exposed. WHAT WOULD EXPLAIN IT INNOCENTLY. Reciprocity is a conventional design for a mutual-aid database, and one department's administrator may have missed documentation that exists outside the public pages checked. The vendor's response, as that customer recorded it, concedes a communications shortfall. Not ruled out. Unresolved as to disclosure.

WHAT THIS SECTION DOES NOT ESTABLISH

Nothing above establishes intent, a plan or bad faith by anyone. It does not establish that any statement was knowingly false when it was made, and in several items the statements quoted were published after the conduct they are set against, which is stated in the item. Where the record consists of a customer agency's own published account, it establishes what that agency stated, not the underlying fact, and a direct vendor account was in most cases not obtained. No court or other adjudicative body is recorded here as having found any violation of law; what the record does contain is an executive finding, the Illinois Secretary of State's audit release of August 25, 2025, in which the Secretary states that the data sharing at issue "is a clear violation of the state law," and that is his office's characterisation rather than a judgment. A gap between a public statement and a document is a gap; it is not a finding, and it is not a verdict. Readers who want more than that should read the primary documents cited and reach their own conclusions.

STUMPWATCH'S POSITION: THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT HIRE OUT WHAT IT MAY NOT DO

This is our position. It is not a description of what courts have held, and we do not present it as one. It does not change if a court rules against it, because it is a claim about what the Constitution is for, not a prediction about litigation. A civilian company or individual acting on behalf of the government is a government agent, directly or by proxy. Constitutional protections against the government extend to its authorized agents by whatever method is used to obscure the government's control. The test we apply is simple, and we apply it to every issue on this site: Would this be a constitutional violation if a government official did it directly? If it would, then it is the same violation when an authorized agent of the government does it instead. The principle is not exotic. The government may not accomplish through a private party what the Constitution forbids it to do itself. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n is the clearest illustration, and it has to be cited to the right half of the regulation. Subpart D authorized railroads to test breath and urine without requiring them to, and the Fourth Amendment applied to those tests anyway, because the government had authorized them, removed the legal barriers to them, and had an interest in the results. For that half, no compulsion was required. Blood and urine testing was the other half, Subpart C, which was mandatory — and there the Court grounded the Amendment in the compulsion itself (489 U.S. 614). An earlier version of this page cited the blood testing for the no-compulsion principle, which inverted the case. It is Subpart D that makes the point. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), asks whether the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state, not whether the actor wears a badge. Take any other right and the point is obvious. The government cannot pay a contractor to search your house without a warrant, to seize a newspaper's presses, to compel a confession, or to bar you from worship, and then answer the claim by saying a private firm did it. Nobody would accept that answer. It should not become acceptable because the subject is a camera and the contractor sells software.

WHERE WE BELIEVE THE LAW SHOULD GO

This section, like the one above it, is our editorial position rather than a description of existing law. It sets out the remedies we think would actually work. We believe dense, retained, retrospectively searchable plate-reader networks should require a warrant. Carpenter's rationale was that cheap, effortless, universal logging lets government "travel back in time to retrace a person's whereabouts," and Chatrie has now rejected the idea that protection attaches only once an intrusion "goes too far." The strongest answer against us is that Carpenter turned on the sensor reaching into homes and doctors' offices, which a roadside camera does not do. We think that distinction should not be decisive when the aggregate record is comparably revealing. We acknowledge no court has agreed. We also think the more promising route is legislative, and the evidence supports that more strongly than it supports any constitutional argument. New Hampshire is the strictest. Reads must be purged within three minutes and destroyed beyond recovery, unless the read produced an arrest, a citation, protective custody, or matched a missing-person or wanted broadcast. Its Department of Justice may audit any device, and may ask a court to enjoin an agency found in repeated violation and order its devices confiscated. The statute once carried a sunset that would have repealed it on January 1, 2027. The 2026 session law we read repeals that sunset outright, which would make the regulation permanent — but the codified statute page still shows the repeal pending, and we could not confirm a public URL that serves the session-law text, so we report the permanence as unconfirmed rather than settled. Minnesota requires an independent, biennial, public audit. If the commissioner of administration — not public safety — finds a pattern of substantial noncompliance, the agency must immediately suspend every device until he authorizes it to resume. That is the strongest administrative enforcement of the group: the state's data-practices office holds a kill switch over police hardware. Virginia, in force since July 1, 2025 — save for subsection C, the vendor-contracting provision, which takes effect July 1, 2026 — makes willful and intentional misuse a Class 1 misdemeanor and bars the Commonwealth from using evidence obtained in violation of its core use and sharing provisions. It also requires system data to be purged within 21 days of capture, destroyed beyond recovery, a retention cap stricter than every state on this page except New Hampshire. There is no good-faith exception anywhere in the section — something a legislature can write and, after United States v. Leon, a court will not. Its limits are worth stating too: the bar reaches four subsections rather than the whole statute, and it runs one way, so a defendant may still introduce the same evidence the state may not. Illinois shows what a duty without a remedy is worth. Its prohibition on sharing plate data for immigration or reproductive-health enforcement states the duty and stops. There is no penalty in the section, no enforcement mechanism and no private right of action, leaving only the Vehicle Code's residual petty-offense default — which nobody is going to use against a police department. The violation surfaced roughly twenty months later, through an audit and a press release. California's much-cited SB 34 sets no retention cap at all: operators choose their own period and need only write it down. Its audit requirement applies to end-users, not to the operators who actually run the cameras and hold the database, which is the asymmetry that matters here. In fairness it does give individuals a private right of action with liquidated damages, which is more than Illinois or Virginia offer. Not more than Minnesota, though, and an earlier version of this page said otherwise: because section 13.824 sits inside the Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. 13.08 already supplies damages, costs and reasonable attorney fees, injunctive relief, and "exemplary damages of not less than $1,000, nor more than $15,000 for each violation" where the violation is willful. But the retention and audit gaps its own auditor identified in 2020 remain unfixed. Statutes bind, get audited, and shut systems off. So far, the Fourth Amendment has not.

This analysis cites its authorities inline. Cases, statutes, official documents and audits are named in the text at the point they are relied on, so a claim and the thing supporting it are never separated by a footnote number.

It also has a checked citation list of its own, below. Nothing here was machine-extracted from the prose — each entry was read out of its own primary document, and carries the passage it rests on and the proposition this analysis uses it for. Where a passage could not be verified against a primary document, the citation was left out rather than listed.

[1]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
Movement over public roads is exposed to public view, so tracking a vehicle's public movements is not a Fourth Amendment search.
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.
[2]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle identifier that the law requires be displayed in plain view from outside the car, and examining a car's exterior is not a search.
In addition, it is unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from the exterior of the automobile. The VIN's mandated visibility makes it more similar to the exterior of the car than to the trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of a car, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a "search."
[3]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
Cardwell is a PLURALITY opinion — announced by Justice Blackmun for four Justices — which is why Knotts and Carpenter both attach the parenthetical every time they cite it. The analysis cites it not as authority it adopts but as the CONTRAST Carpenter drew between a car, which has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny, and a cell phone.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which the CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join. ... One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.
[4]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
A cell phone is constitutionally different from a car because it accompanies its owner into private spaces that public-road surveillance never reaches. Carpenter draws that line by CONTRAST with Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) — a contrast signal, not a proposition Carpenter adopts. Carpenter RESERVED rather than resolved the status of conventional surveillance techniques such as security cameras, saying only that its holding did not call them into question. The retrospective quality of stored location data is a distinct privacy harm. And because carrying a phone is indispensable to participation in modern life and logging is automatic, the Court held that "in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily 'assume[] the risk'" — itself quoting Smith v. Maryland — so the third-party doctrine's voluntary-exposure rationale does not apply.
A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor's offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales. ... contrast Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) ("A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny."). ... We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. ... With access to CSLI, the Government can now travel back in time to retrace a person's whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five years. ... In the first place, cell phones and the services they provide are "such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life" that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society. Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily "assume[ ] the risk" of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.
[5]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
Government licensing, contracting, monopoly grants, or funding of a private entity do not by themselves convert it into a state actor. The same sentence carries its own exception on its face: the rule does not hold where the private entity is performing a traditional, exclusive public function.
But as the Court has long held, the fact that the government licenses, contracts with, or grants a monopoly to a private entity does not convert the private entity into a state actor—unless the private entity is performing a traditional, exclusive public function. ... The same principle applies if the government funds or subsidizes a private entity. See Blum, 457 U. S., at 1011; Rendell-Baker, 457 U. S., at 840.
[6]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
A private entity is not a state actor merely because nearly all of its revenue comes from government contracts.
The school, like the nursing homes, is not fundamentally different from many private corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the government. Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.
[7]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
State-action analysis targets the particular challenged conduct, not the actor's general relationship with the government.
The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.
[8]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
The state-action question is whether the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the State, which can be satisfied by a private party acting jointly with or with significant aid from state officials.
Our cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State. These cases reflect a two-part approach to this question of "fair attribution." First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible. ... Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
[9]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
Courts recognise a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, so a statutory suppression remedy cannot be assumed to survive judicial narrowing.
We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.
[10]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
A past injury does not confer standing to seek injunctive relief; a plaintiff must show a real and immediate threat of repeated future injury.
That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on October 6, 1976, while presumably affording Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual officers and perhaps against the City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his part.
[11]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
Smith is the third-party-doctrine pen-register case holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a third party.
This claim must be rejected. First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.
[12]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
The Supreme Court held Knotts inapt to the acquisition of two hours of cell-phone Location History. Knotts does not establish that acquiring two hours of Location History falls outside the Fourth Amendment. The Chatrie Court singled out that the Knotts surveillance was confined to public roads and called that fact crucial to Knotts. Chatrie does not address licence plates or licence-plate readers; its single reference to a camera is an incidental factual one. The judgment was vacated and remanded, and the Court expressly declined to reach the good-faith question, leaving it for the Fourth Circuit to consider anew. Chatrie rejects the idea that Fourth Amendment protection attaches only once an intrusion goes too far.
And still another feature of Knotts makes it inapt here: that the surveillance there was confined to public roads. ... And contra the Government, Knotts does not support the view that accessing two hours of Location History is not a search. ... That fact was crucial to the Court's decision: "A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy," Knotts explained, because the car is always "in plain view." ... They learned, from witness interviews and surveillance-camera footage, that the robber had approached the credit union from a corner of an adjacent church, while appearing to talk on a cell phone. ... In line with our grant of certiorari, we do not address whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule still allows the admission of the Location History data in this case. That question remains for the Fourth Circuit to consider anew, gleaning anything it thinks relevant from our decision on the substantive Fourth Amendment issues. ... Still more fundamentally, we have never understood Fourth Amendment protections as kicking in only once an intrusion "goes too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922) (adopting that approach for regulatory takings). Where the Fourth Amendment applies, it applies—regardless of "the quality or quantity of information" the government obtains. Kyllo, 533 U. S., at 37.
[13]U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (reproduced as Appendix D to the petition for a writ of certiorari, No. 25-112, on supremecourt.gov)Primary
The district court held that the geofence warrant plainly violated the Fourth Amendment even as it declined to suppress. Having found the warrant unconstitutional, the district court nonetheless admitted the evidence under the good-faith exception.
In the instant case, although the Motion to Suppress must ultimately be denied, the Court concludes that this particular geofence warrant plainly violates the rights enshrined in that Amendment. ... But in light of the complex legal issues that lead to this Court's conclusion, the Court cannot say that Det. Hylton's reliance on the Geofence Warrant was objectively unreasonable.
[14]U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitPrimary
The Fifth Circuit held that use of the LPR system was not a Fourth Amendment search and required no warrant. Porter analogised the LPR system to the Knotts beeper rather than to Carpenter's cell-site location information. Porter's holding reasons expressly from the small scale of the municipal system — no more than ten cameras in one city — and is therefore scale-dependent, not scale-independent. Porter reasoned that the LPR system yields only periodic public-road location hits and cannot capture the whole of an individual's physical movements. Porter relies on Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999) for the proposition that there is no privacy interest in a licence plate number. Porter's LPR holding is a published, unanimous panel holding — not a concurrence and not dictum — with no dissent. Porter concerns a municipal police department's own camera system and does not involve or name any commercial licence-plate-reader vendor.
Contrary to Porter's assertion, the use of an LPR system did not invade any reasonable expectation of privacy and did not constitute a search, so no warrant was required. ... the LPR system is more analogous to the beeper signals in Knotts than to the CSLI at issue in Carpenter. ... But the LPR technology in the instant case provides only periodic information about a vehicle's location when a vehicle passes one of its ten locations where an LPR camera is stationed in Gautier and is much more limited than CSLI and geofence data, which is capable of capturing a greater volume of comprehensive information with a higher degree of quality and precision. ... The LPR system provides periodic information about a vehicle's location on "public streets and highways." A scan occurs when a vehicle passes one of the locations where a camera is stationed. The LPR system is not capable of tracking the "whole of [an individual's] physical movements," much less "for a very long period," to the extent that a cell phone can because the LPR system does not "faithfully follow[]" individuals "beyond public thoroughfares." ... See Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the police did not need probable cause to use an onboard computer to check a stranded motorist's license plate number since "[a] motorist has no privacy interest in their license plate number"). ... Before Smith, Wiener, and Higginson, Circuit Judges. Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge: ... Hoggard stated that the LPR system allowed him to see when a vehicle had passed an LPR camera at a particular location, and he estimated there were no more than ten LPR cameras stationed across Gautier.
[15]U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPrimary
Yang never reached the ALPR merits because the case failed at the THRESHOLD: the defendant was driving a rental car roughly six days overdue and therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy in its historical location data at all. The court was foreclosed from the merits question, not declining a question it could have answered.
he was informed that the vehicle was approximately six days overdue and that Prestige had attempted to repossess the vehicle by activating its Global Positioning System unit ("GPS") and remotely disabling the vehicle. ... We do not address the potential Fourth Amendment privacy interests that may be implicated by the warrantless use of this ALPR technology because we conclude that Yang does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical location data of the Yukon under the facts of this case. ... Because the ALPR camera captured the Yukon's location information well after the close of Prestige's business hours, as clearly advertised on the rental agreement, we need not determine whether a defendant has standing to object to a "search" of a rental vehicle's historical location information that was captured and uploaded to a database prior to the expiration of the rental agreement.
[16]U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh CircuitPrimary
The Eleventh Circuit declined to decide whether ALPR data acquisition is a Fourth Amendment search and resolved the case on the good-faith exception instead.
We need not decide whether Carpenter requires a search warrant for ALPR data because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.
[17]U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitPrimary
The Fifth Circuit held in 1999 that a motorist has no privacy interest in a licence plate number, which is constantly open to plain view.
A motorist has no privacy interest in her license plate number. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1980). Like the area outside the cartilage of a dwelling, a car's license plate number is constantly open to the plain view of passersby.
[18]U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk DivisionPrimary
The Norfolk federal district court held on summary judgment that operating 176 ALPR cameras in 75 clusters across the city is not a Fourth Amendment search. On the camera-collection claim the plaintiffs had Article III standing and lost on the merits; only the database-query claim failed for want of standing, because the plaintiffs "freely concede that their vehicles have never been the subject of a query (outside of this litigation)" — the parenthetical matters, since it concedes only that no query preceded the suit. Quoting United States v. Sturdivant, the court acknowledged the practice could become too intrusive at some point, answering only that in Norfolk the answer is not today.
The undisputed facts before this Court reveal that Defendants' ongoing operation of their 176 ALPR cameras, located in 75 clusters across the City of Norfolk, does not constitute a "search." ... Recapping the above, Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Defendants' operation of the 176 camera ALPR system to the extent that such system is repeatedly photographing Plaintiffs' vehicles and storing the seized images in a searchable database. In contrast, Plaintiffs lack standing (as they largely concede) to challenge the query stage of Defendants' ALPR system. ... Plaintiffs freely concede that their vehicles have never been the subject of a query (outside of this litigation). ... Consistent with Plaintiffs' claims in this case and controlling precedent involving mass surveillance in public spaces, ALPR "surveillance could become too intrusive and run afoul of [constitutional privacy standards] at some point. But when?" ... While a definitive answer to that question is elusive, what is readily apparent to this Court is that, at least in Norfolk, Virginia, the answer is: not today.
[19]U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division (via GPO govinfo)Primary
The source of the 'could become too intrusive ... But when?' language is Sturdivant, which nonetheless denied the motion to suppress.
To illustrate the issues, lower court acceptance of ALPR databases leaves serious doubt about the point, if any, at which governmental use of cameras crosses the line to an impermissible warrantless search and whether linking images to a larger network or enhancing them through the use of artificial intelligence or other emerging technologies leads to a different result. Such surveillance could become too intrusive and run afoul of Carpenter at some point. But when?
[20]U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (PACER docket via CourtListener/RECAP)Primary
The Norfolk summary-judgment ruling is on appeal as Fourth Circuit No. 26-1227. The appellants' reply brief, entered 23 July 2026, is the last entry on the docket — so the appeal was fully briefed as of that date, with no argument scheduled and no decision issued.
BRIEF by City of Norfolk. Type of Brief: SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE. ... BRIEF by Crystal Arrington and Lee Schmidt. Type of Brief: REPLY. ... [1002020372] [26-1227] Michael Soyfer [Entered: 07/23/2026 12:08 PM]
[21]U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitPrimary
Supplemental briefing addressing Chatrie v. United States was added to the Fourth Circuit appeal on the PARTIES' OWN JOINT MOTION, which the court granted — it was not ordered by the court of its own accord.
Upon consideration of the joint motion to adjust the briefing schedule to include a supplemental response brief, and to extend the filing deadline and length limitation for the reply brief, the court grants the motion. Appellee may file a supplemental response brief, not to exceed 1,500 words, no later than July 7, 2026.
[22]U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New YorkPrimary
A federal court in New York observed that nearly every court outside the Second Circuit to address the question after Carpenter has held that queries of plate-reader databases are not searches.
Moreover, nearly every court outside the Second Circuit that has considered the issue post-Carpenter has held that queries of LPR databases do not constitute Fourth Amendment searches.
[23]U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division (plaintiffs' complaint)Primary
The San Jose complaint ALLEGES that the city operates 474 automated licence-plate-reader cameras. The San Jose complaint ALLEGES that cameras are placed on residential streets, on the same block as immigration attorneys' offices, and around healthcare facilities.
The City of San Jose, California (the "City") and the San Jose Police Department ("SJPD") contracted with a technology company called Flock Safety to blanket San Jose with 474 automatic license plate reader ("ALPR") cameras. ... There are cameras monitoring numerous residential streets. Cameras on the same block as immigration attorneys' offices. Cameras surrounding a block that contains a church, hospice facility, and many other healthcare facilities.
[24]U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose DivisionPrimary
The motion to dismiss in the San Jose case is noticed for hearing on December 3, 2026 — not October 1, 2026.
Judge: Hon. Beth Labson Freeman ... Hearing Date: December 3, 2026 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.
[25]Court of Appeals of VirginiaPrimary
What the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed in October 2025 was the suppression order in CHURCH's own case, in which the same circuit judge had relied on her earlier reasoning in Bell v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. Cir. 316 (Norfolk Cir. 2024) — a separate 2024 decision holding that collection and storage of plate and location data by the Flock system required a warrant. The appellate court held the Flock system simply took pictures of the plate and the vehicle on public thoroughfares.
In short, because the Flock system simply took pictures of the license plate and Church's vehicle as he drove it down public thoroughfares in the City of Norfolk, the circuit court erred in ruling that a search warrant was required for police to access the Flock system. ... Relying on a prior case in Norfolk Circuit Court that she had decided on the same issue (Bell v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. Cir. 316 (Norfolk Cir. 2024)), ... In Bell, the circuit court held that "the collection and storage of license plate and location information by the FLOCK system" required a warrant to access that system because the system "collects and records" data about a vehicle's movements in a manner "akin to cellular telephones." Bell, 113 Va. Cir. at 319.
[26]Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (official slip opinion)Primary
The Massachusetts SJC said that a sufficiently dense plate-reader network would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy and constitute a search. The Massachusetts SJC said a one-year retention period is long enough to warrant constitutional protection. The Massachusetts SJC described a licence plate as existing to identify the vehicle to the government. McCarthy himself lost: the SJC affirmed the denial of his motions to suppress the plate-reader evidence.
With enough cameras in enough locations, the historic location data from an ALPR system in Massachusetts would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy and would constitute a search for constitutional purposes. ... The one-year retention period indicated in the EOPSS retention policy certainly is long enough to warrant constitutional protection. ... These requirements support the contention that there is no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a license plate number, the very purpose of which is to identify the vehicle to the government. ... While we recognize that the widespread use of ALPRs in the Commonwealth could implicate constitutional protections against unreasonable searches, the limited use of the technology in this case does not. Order denying motions to suppress affirmed.
[27]New Hampshire General CourtPrimary
New Hampshire requires plate reads to be purged within three minutes and destroyed beyond recovery unless the read produced an arrest, a citation, protective custody, or matched a missing-person or wanted broadcast. The New Hampshire Department of Justice may audit any LPR device, the server storing its data, and the agency's use records. New Hampshire's Department of Justice may ask a court to enjoin an agency found in repeated violation and to order its devices confiscated.
Records of number plates read by each LPR shall not be recorded or transmitted anywhere and shall be purged from the system within 3 minutes of their capture in such a manner that they are destroyed and are not recoverable, unless an alarm resulted in an arrest, a citation, or protective custody, or identified a vehicle that was the subject of a missing person or wanted broadcast, in which case the data on the particular number plate may be retained until final court disposition of the case. Captured license plate data obtained for the purposes described in paragraph V shall not be used or shared for any other purpose. ... To ensure compliance with the provisions of this section or to investigate complaints of misuse of LPR devices, the attorney general or a designee of the department of justice including county attorneys and law enforcement officers acting at the request of the attorney general may examine and audit any LPR device, a server used to store LPR data, and records pertaining to the use of LPR devices maintained by any state, county, or local law enforcement agency ... and the department of justice may seek an injunction banning the use of LPR devices by an agency found to have used an LPR device or devices in repeated violation of this section and requiring the confiscation of LPR devices if the attorney general deems it necessary to prevent ongoing violations or deter future violations of this subdivision.
[28]New Hampshire General CourtPrimary
RSA 261:75-b, not RSA 236:130, is the section that governs the purge, audit, and injunction rules for licence-plate readers.
II. Neither the state of New Hampshire nor its political subdivisions shall engage in surveillance on any public ways of the state or its political subdivisions. III. The prohibition set forth in paragraph II shall not apply where surveillance: (a) Is specifically authorized by statute;
[29]Minnesota Office of the Revisor of StatutesPrimary
Minnesota requires an independent, biennial audit of automated licence-plate reader records, and makes the audit results public. If the Minnesota commissioner of administration finds a pattern of substantial noncompliance, the agency must immediately suspend every automated licence-plate reader device until the commissioner authorises it to resume.
The law enforcement agency shall arrange for an independent, biennial audit of the records to determine whether data currently in the records are classified, how the data are used, whether they are destroyed as required under this section, and to verify compliance with subdivision 7. If the commissioner of administration believes that a law enforcement agency is not complying with this section or other applicable law, the commissioner may order a law enforcement agency to arrange for additional independent audits. ... The results of the audit are public. ... The results of the audit are public. The commissioner of administration shall review the results of the audit. If the commissioner determines that there is a pattern of substantial noncompliance with this section by the law enforcement agency, the agency must immediately suspend operation of all automated license plate reader devices until the commissioner has authorized the agency to reinstate their use. An order of suspension under this paragraph may be issued by the commissioner, upon review of the results of the audit, review of the applicable provisions of this chapter, and after providing the agency a reasonable opportunity to respond to the audit's findings.
[30]Virginia Law — Code of Virginia (Division of Legislative Automated Systems)Primary
Virginia makes wilful and intentional misuse of an automatic licence plate recognition system a Class 1 misdemeanor. Its exclusionary rule reaches four subsections rather than the whole statute, binds only the Commonwealth, and runs one way, so a defendant may still introduce the same evidence the state may not. No good-faith exception appears anywhere in the section. The section was enacted by a single chapter of the 2025 Acts of Assembly, ch. 720.
Any person who willfully and intentionally queries, accesses, or uses a system for a purpose other than set forth in subsection D, or who willfully and intentionally sells, shares, or disseminates system data or audit trail data in violation of subsection F, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. ... Any evidence obtained as the result of a violation of subsection D, F, L, or M is not admissible by the Commonwealth in any criminal or civil proceeding, but such evidence may be admitted by a defendant in a criminal proceeding or a litigant, other than the Commonwealth, in a civil proceeding. ... The vendor certifies that it will not sell or share any system data or audit trail data gathered in the Commonwealth, except upon request of the contracting law-enforcement agency for a purpose set forth in subsection F, and will only access system data or audit trail data upon request of the contracting law-enforcement agency for maintenance and quality assurance purposes; ... Prior to or coincident with the implementation of an automatic license plate recognition system, a local law-enforcement agency shall take measures to promote public awareness on the use of such system. ... 2025, c. 720
[31]Illinois General AssemblyPrimary
Illinois prohibits sharing licence-plate data for immigration or reproductive-health enforcement. The section states the duty and stops: it contains no penalty, no enforcement mechanism and no private right of action.
An ALPR user shall not sell, share, allow access to, or transfer ALPR information to any state or local jurisdiction for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a law that: (1) denies or interferes with a person's right to choose or obtain reproductive health care services or any lawful health care services as defined by the Lawful Health Care Activity Act; or (2) permits the detention or investigation of a person based on the person's immigration status. ... (d) ALPR information shall be held confidentially to the fullest extent permitted by law. (e) Nothing in this Act shall define or limit any rights under the Reproductive Health Act.
[32]Illinois General AssemblyPrimary
With no penalty in the ALPR section itself, only the Illinois Vehicle Code's residual petty-offense default applies.
Every person convicted of a violation of any provision of this Code for which another penalty is not provided shall, for a first or second conviction thereof, be guilty of a petty offense and, for a third or subsequent conviction within one year after the first conviction, be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.
[33]California Legislative InformationPrimary
California's SB 34 sets no retention cap at all: operators choose their own retention period and need only write it down in a published usage and privacy policy. The operator's parallel policy requirement omits any audit obligation, confirming that California imposes no periodic-audit duty on ALPR operators.
An ALPR operator shall do all of the following: ... (b) (1) Implement a usage and privacy policy in order to ensure that the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals' privacy and civil liberties. ... (2) The usage and privacy policy shall, at a minimum, include all of the following: ... (G) The length of time ALPR information will be retained, and the process the ALPR operator will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information. ... (C) A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.
[34]California Legislative InformationPrimary
California's audit requirement binds ALPR end-users, not the ALPR operators who run the cameras and hold the database.
An ALPR end-user shall do all of the following: ... (C) A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information accessed or used, and compliance with all applicable privacy laws and a process for periodic system audits.
[35]California Legislative InformationPrimary
California gives individuals a private right of action with liquidated damages for violations of its licence-plate reader title.
(a) In addition to any other sanctions, penalties, or remedies provided by law, an individual who has been harmed by a violation of this title, including, but not limited to, unauthorized access or use of ALPR information or a breach of security of an ALPR system, may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction against a person who knowingly caused the harm. (b) The court may award a combination of any one or more of the following: (1) Actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). (2) Punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law. (3) Reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. (4) Other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate.
[36]Illinois Secretary of StatePrimary
A twelve-agency sample audit by the Illinois Secretary of State found Flock lacked proper data-sharing safeguards and was running a CBP pilot programme its own leadership did not know about. Illinois' Secretary of State found that Flock had allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois cameras and surveil drivers, and ordered that access shut off. A second government body's audit release is the corroboration the section gives for the company's own "internal miscommunication" account — the Secretary's office states that Flock's own leadership was unaware of the CBP pilot, which is consistent with negligence rather than design and is why the item is left unresolved. The same release supplies the executive action and the state officer's characterisation the closing section quotes: the pilot paused nationwide, and the Secretary's statement that the sharing "is a clear violation of the state law" — recorded as his office's characterisation, not a judgment. It also dates the pilot as PAUSED, against the Senator's October account of a pilot "which has now ended", the discrepancy the section says nothing obtained reconciles.
In June, the Secretary of State's office announced it would conduct a sample audit of Flock Safety data sharing with local law enforcement. As a result of the sample audit that included a sampling of 12 local law enforcement agencies, the office discovered late last week that Flock did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing, which was compounded by the fact that the company was running a pilot program with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which Flock leadership was unaware of. ... During a recent audit, Giannoulias' office found that Flock Safety, which operates the largest automated license plate reader (ALPR) system in the nation, allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate cameras on Illinois roads and surveil drivers. As a result, Giannoulias immediately ordered the company to shut off access to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. ... Flock has also since paused its pilot with CBP and other federal agencies, not only in Illinois but nationwide. ... This sharing of license plate data of motorists who drive on Illinois roads is a clear violation of the state law.
[37]Illinois Secretary of StatePrimary
Eleven days after the Flock findings, the same office announced that Forest Park's police department had been giving CBP access through Motorola Solutions technology, and directed that it be shut off.
In its continued effort to expand the auditing process for automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems, Giannoulias' office discovered that the Motorola Solutions technology was being utilized by the Village of Forest Park's Police Department to give CBP access to its license plate camera data. Motorola has since worked with Forest Park to shut off and disable the data sharing capabilities with CBP and other federal agencies at the direction of the Secretary of State's office.
[38]Office of the Inspector General, Los Angeles Police CommissionOfficial analysis
Asked for the contracts governing the Flock cameras and Flock's access to Axon data, the LAPD could not produce documentation establishing the contractual authority identifying applicable data-sharing terms and other governing provisions.
The OIG requested any contracts or other agreements related to the Flock cameras and Flock's access to Axon data. The Department could not produce documentation establishing the contractual authority that identify applicable data-sharing terms and other governing provisions. The absence of formal agreements is particularly concerning given the growing national concern over third-party access to ALPR data and the limited understanding within law enforcement of how such data is accessed, shared, and used.
[39]California State AuditorPrimary
None of the four California agencies examined had an ALPR policy containing everything state law required, none had audited its own staff's searches, and Fresno and Marin had each arranged to share images with hundreds of entities and Sacramento with over a thousand — without evidence the agencies had always determined whether a recipient had a right or need to see them, or was even a public agency. The audit's own figure puts the counts at Sacramento 1,119, Fresno 982 and Marin 554.
However, none of the four agencies have an ALPR policy that contains all of the required information. In fact, Los Angeles has not developed an ALPR policy at all. The other three agencies did not completely or clearly specify who has system access, who has system oversight, or how to destroy ALPR data. ... For example, none had audited searches of the ALPR images by their staff and thus had no assurance that the searches were appropriate. ... Fresno and Marin have each arranged to share their ALPR images with hundreds of entities and Sacramento with over a thousand entities across the United States. However, we did not find evidence that the agencies had always determined whether an entity receiving shared images had a right and a need to access the images or even that the entity was a public agency. ... Figure 4 Three Agencies Have Authorized Sharing With Entities Located in States Across the Nation SACRAMENTO 1,119 FRESNO 982 MARIN 554
[40]Minnesota Security Consortium, filed with the Minnesota Legislative Reference LibraryPrimary
An independent audit dated February 5, 2026 found Woodbury, Minnesota's public safety department compliant with the state ALPR statute in every area it examined. These Minnesota ALPR audits are commissioned and paid for by the very agency being audited, which the auditor treats as compatible with independence because it does not operate the system.
Based on the results of the Woodbury Public Safety ALPR Audit conducted by Minnesota Security Consortium, we can demonstrate that they were using the ALPR System as an effective law enforcement tool for the purpose of combating auto theft and other crimes linked to vehicle license plates. The Woodbury Public Safety also demonstrated that their security, public accountability, and administration of the program followed MN Statue 13.824. ... Woodbury Public Safety retained Minnesota Security Consortium to audit its agency's use of their new Flock ALPR System against the requirements of MN Statute 13.824. Minnesota Security Consortium does not operate or have access to their ALPR systems, therefore allowing it to audit the systems as an independent auditor.
[41]Lynn Lembcke Consulting, filed with the Minnesota Legislative Reference LibraryPrimary
This audit reviewed the data actually STORED in Flock and found it limited to plate numbers; date, time and camera location; and pictures of plates, vehicles and the areas surrounding the vehicles — the full finding, not the truncated version ending at "license plate numbers". It tests the enumeration in Minn. Stat. 13.824 subd. 2; it does not test for Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular or tyre-pressure collection and so never reaches that question. It is also one of three audits by the same auditor from the same template.
A review of data stored in Flock confirmed that ALPR Data collected by Plymouth Police Department is limited to license plate numbers; date, time, location of the stationary ALPR camera; and pictures of license plates, vehicles, and areas surrounding the vehicles. ... Data Collection: Determine if data collected by the ALPR is limited to license plate numbers; date, time, and location data on vehicles; and pictures of license plates, vehicles, and areas surrounding the vehicles.
[42]Lynn Lembcke Consulting, filed with the Minnesota Legislative Reference LibraryPrimary
A second Minnesota audit reaches a word-for-word identical data-limitation finding — by the SAME auditor working from the SAME template as Plymouth, which is why the three matching findings are one finding and not three independent ones. It likewise never mentions Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular or tyre-pressure collection.
A review of data stored in Flock confirmed that ALPR Data collected by Willmar Police Department is limited to license plate numbers; date, time, location of the stationary ALPR camera; and pictures of license plates, vehicles, and areas surrounding the vehicles.
[43]Virginia State Crime CommissionPrimary
Twelve Virginia law-enforcement agencies reported a contract or subscription with Leonardo as an ALPR vendor. The survey identifies VENDORS ONLY and does not say any Virginia agency deployed Leonardo's SignalTrace system in particular.
Agencies were asked to indicate which ALPR vendors their agency has a contract and/or subscription with. The large majority of responding agencies, 86% (137 of 159), reported Flock Safety as their ALPR vendor. About 30% (47 of 159) of responding agencies reported having two or more ALPR vendors. Table 3 provides a list of ALPR vendors, along with the total number of responding agencies who have a contract and/or subscription with those vendors. ... Table 3: Agency Contracts and/or Subscriptions with ALPR Vendors ALPR Vendor Total Agencies Axon 35 Flock Safety 137 Leonardo 12 Motorola 12 Thomson Reuters/CLEAR LPR 6 Other ALPR Vendors 12
[44]United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government ReformPrimary
A Texas sheriff's deputy ran a nationwide Flock search whose stated reason was the verbatim string "had an abortion, search for female". The 6,809-network / 83,000-camera figure and the Mount Prospect statement are the MEMBERS' OWN ASSERTIONS in a demand letter they wrote — hedged "reportedly" and "[a]ccording to", and footnoted to press reporting (404 Media, Electronic Frontier Foundation) rather than to testimony given to the committee.
On May 9, 2025, an officer from the Johnson County Sheriff's Office in Texas provided "had an abortion, search for female" as his reason for using Flock's "National Lookup" feature to search automatic license plate reader data captured across multiple states. ... This search reportedly covered 6,809 Flock networks, or more than 83,000 cameras. ... According to the Mount Prospect Police Department, it was not made aware prior to opting into the National Lookup program that doing so would allow other law enforcement agencies who utilize the program to search for Mount Prospect data without a data-sharing agreement.
[45]United States SenatePrimary
A sitting United States Senator concluded, after his own oversight, that abuse of Flock's ALPR platform is inevitable and that the company will not prevent it. Flock admitted to a Senate office that it had inaccurately told its law-enforcement customers it had no relationship with DHS while DHS sub-agency pilots were running. Of 11.4 million Flock searches over six months obtained by public records request, more than 14 percent gave only the word 'investigation' as the reason, with no case number. Flock itself told a Senate office in August 2025 that 75 percent of its law-enforcement customers had enrolled in the National Lookup Tool, which lets any other enrolled customer search their camera data.
I now believe that abuses of your product are not only likely but inevitable, and that Flock is unable and uninterested in preventing them. ... Flock also confirmed that it misled its state and local law enforcement customers, telling my office that "due to internal miscommunication, customers were inaccurately informed that Flock did not have any relationship with DHS, while pilot programs with sub-agencies of DHS were briefly active." ... Data recently provided to my office by the Electronic Frontier Foundation -- from a dataset of 11.4 million Flock nationwide searches for a six-month period obtained through a public records request -- reveals that more than 14% of the search reasons contained just the word "investigation" without a case number. ... In August, Flock informed my office that 75% of its law enforcement customers have enrolled in the "National Lookup Tool," which permits any other enrolled customer to search data collected through their cameras.
[46]United States Senate / United States House of RepresentativesPrimary
Members of Congress recorded that Flock told Congress in August 2025 that roughly 75 percent of its law-enforcement customers opted into the National Lookup Tool, and tied that rate to Flock's reciprocity requirement.
Flock informed Congress this August that approximately 75% of Flock's law enforcement customers have opted into the National Lookup Tool, which is likely due to Flock restricting access to nationwide searches to agencies that have agreed to share their data.
[47]City of Boulder, Colorado (municipal government website)Primary
A Colorado police department states on its own city government website that as of June 2025 it deactivated the national lookup feature, so out-of-state agencies can no longer search its system "for specific, identified license plate numbers" — which also tells you the feature had been running until then.
Earlier this year, the Boulder Police Department made a decision to only share data with Colorado law enforcement agencies. As of June 2025, we deactivated the "national lookup" feature, so out-of-state agencies can no longer search our system for specific, identified license plate numbers. This restriction was put in place to ensure that the agencies we share with are governed by the same laws we are.
[48]Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions, LLCUnverified source type
Leonardo states that its SignalTrace system works from the signals that consumer electronic devices emit into the air. Leonardo states that SignalTrace builds an 'electronic fingerprint' from groups of signals that are frequently emitted together. Leonardo states that SignalTrace's device-signal data set is intended to enhance the records captured by licence-plate-reader cameras in the area. Leonardo's own illustration of an 'electronic signature' is a single car distinguished by a specific iPhone, car radio, headphones, watch, key finder and licence plate. Leonardo advertises that SignalTrace works away from roads, including in subways and shopping malls. Leonardo advertises that SignalTrace lets police recognise a specific vehicle from its electronic signature without the licence plate number.
Electronic devices such as fitness trackers, smartwatches, RFID tags and mobile phones emit signals into the air. ... SignalTrace creates an electronic fingerprint for groups of the signals that the system determines are frequently emitted together. ... This system uses strategically placed sensors to collect electronic communication patterns and identities of consumer electronics to create an additional data set to enhance the records captured by LPR cameras in the area. ... For example: while 70 cars in 100 may contain iPhones, only one will have an iPhone 13rev2, an Audi radio, a pair of Bose headphones, a Garmin sports watch, a key finder, and the license plate ABC-1234. The collection of data represented by these specific things is an electronic signature. ... SignalTrace is effective in off-road areas such as in subways and malls ... Allows law enforcement to recognize a specific vehicle included in an electronic signature, without the license plate number
[49]United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR)Primary
Flock Group Inc. (d/b/a Flock Safety) holds a registered, live U.S. service mark filed 2 February 2019 covering SaaS software that identifies a vehicle based on its unique make, model, look, colour, marks, licence plate and other information.
Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software that identifies a vehicle from images and/or video based on the vehicle's unique make, model, look, color, marks, license plate, and other information
[50]Flock Safety (Flock Group Inc.)Unverified source type
Flock Safety's published privacy notice enumerates no collection of Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, RFID or tyre-pressure-sensor signals; its enumerated categories are camera/audio, environmental sensor, device-technical, account and business data. Flock states it cannot verify the identity of the people whose license plates appear in its footage and therefore cannot process data-subject requests about those images. The Privacy Policy's own retention sentence sets thirty days, extended only as applicable law or regulation requires — it contains no 'longer or shorter as the customer directs' language.
Information Input During Setup: When you set up your account, you may be asked for certain basic information, including, but not limited to, your device name, description, and geolocation. ... Environmental Data from Sensors: We collect data from sensors built into some of our devices or products installed. These sensors collect data such as device temperature and ambient light. ... Video, Images and Audio Signals and Data: ... we will capture, process, and store images, video, and/or audio recordings from your device for the duration of your designated retention period. ... Technical Information from the Device: In order to improve your experience over time and help troubleshoot any problems you may encounter with your device, we may record technical information from your device such as software version and cellular signal strength. ... Saved and Shared Content: You may save and choose to share certain content like video/audio clips, images, captions, and comments ... Training Data: We may use a small fraction (less than 1%) of images captured by Flock Services, which are stripped of all metadata and identifying information, for the limited purpose of improving our products and services through machine learning ... Flock’s Footage does not contain Personal Information that connects that image to an identifiable individual. As a result, Flock cannot verify the identity of individuals whose effects (i.e., license plates) appear in the Footage and are unable to process data subject requests related to such images. ... Footage is collected on Flock’s devices and transmitted from devices to Amazon Web Services using encryption in transit and stored within an Amazon’s Simple Storage Service (S3) (organized according to customer lifecycle needs) for thirty (30) days, or as long as required by applicable law or regulation, and then permanently deleted.
[51]Flock SafetyUnverified source type
Flock's own policy enumerates what its LPR system records: an image of the plate, an image of the vehicle, the vehicle's characteristics, the plate number, the plate's issuing state, the date, the time and the camera's location. Flock deletes LPR reads on a rolling 30-day basis by default, and that period may be lengthened or shortened where a customer's law or policy requires a different schedule.
LPR data: Information collected by or stored in the LPR system, which includes the following: License plate image Vehicle image Vehicle characteristics (e.g. color, make) License plate number License plate state Date Time Camera location ... LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default; this may be increased or decreased on a case-by-case basis if a different schedule is required by a customer’s law or policy.
[52]Flock SafetyUnverified source type
Flock states that putting a vehicle on a residential Safe List does not stop that vehicle being detected and catalogued by other Flock cameras in the network once it leaves the community.
Furthermore, a vehicle being placed on a residential Flock Safety HOA Safe List in their community does not preclude that same vehicle from being detected and cataloged on other Flock Safety cameras in the network, once leaving their residential community.
[53]Flock SafetyUnverified source type
Flock markets its cameras as producing usable evidence on vehicles that have no readable licence plate. Flock advertises that its system accepts plain-language vehicle queries such as 'white sports car with a racing stripe'. The nearest thing to a published retention statement the section could find, and the reason it says the innocent explanation is not ruled out: the license-plate-reader product page addresses records of CUSTOMER DATA after the retention period, not search logs. This is also the page the National LPR Network product address redirects to — one of the pages the section records as checked, and found not to state that the National Lookup opt-in is reciprocal.
No Plate? No Problem. Capture more detail with Vehicle Signature and Flock FreeForm™. Turn images into actionable evidence — no plate required. ... Flock FreeForm expands on Vehicle Signature by going beyond preset filters, enabling searches based on everyday language, such as “white sports car with a racing stripe” or “red pickup truck with a dog in the bed.” ... Flock does not own customer data and, as a result, does not maintain records of customer data after the retention period.
[54]Flock SafetyUnverified source type
Flock markets Nova as letting a user query records-management, dispatch, LPR, jail, public-records and open-source data from a single interface. Flock's defence of Nova is that it does not enlarge what agencies are permitted to access, only how efficiently they can search what they already have.
Search RMS, CAD, LPR, jail records, public records, and approved open sources without switching tabs. ... Does Nova expand law enforcement access to my personal information? No. Nova does not expand what agencies are allowed to access. It helps them search existing systems more efficiently, and every search and action is logged for accountability.
[55]Flock SafetyUnverified source type
Flock pitches property managers on piping camera feeds from across their portfolio — including non-Flock cameras — to local police, with real-time alerts and footage access.
Share camera feeds from throughout your properties — whether Flock cameras or not – with your local law enforcement agency, giving them real-time alerts and access to footage the moment an incident occurs.
[56]Flock SafetyUnverified source type
As of June 2025 Flock said its private-sector base exceeded a thousand businesses and included four of the NRF Top 10 retailers.
Flock Safety’s partner base spans more than 1,000 businesses, including 4 of the NRF Top 10 Retailers, 7 of the 10 largest shopping malls, and 10 of the 40 largest U.S. health systems.
[57]Flock SafetyUnverified source type
Flock Safety acquired the drone company Aerodome in October 2024, announced by the company itself.
We're excited to announce the acquisition of Aerodome, a pioneer in Drone as First Responder (DFR) technology. This strategic move brings Aerodome’s best-in-class drone and remote piloting software under the Flock Safety umbrella, enhancing the company’s mission to improve community safety and reduce crime through technology solutions for law enforcement.
[58]Flock SafetyUnverified source type
Flock's own July 2026 statement describes the scream-and-distress detection as a "pilot feature" that was "only available to a small number of customers" and "never broadly released", and says it was removed — so it was never generally available and the withdrawal is the company's own account.
We previously offered a pilot feature that detected sounds of human distress, including screaming. This feature was designed to help identify potential violent incidents in areas where other public safety tools were less effective. The feature was only available to a small number of customers as part of a limited trial, and was never broadly released. After careful consideration and community consultation, we decided to remove the feature.
[59]City of Fort Wayne, IndianaPrimary
A government body's own record shows that as of May 2026 Flock's Raven was described as capable of recognising sounds of distress in addition to gunfire. It brackets the CHANGE without dating its start — no primary source establishes when the distress pilot began.
The Raven system is designed to detect and identify sounds associated with gunfire using advanced acoustic sensors. In addition to gunshots, the system is also capable of recognizing other public safety relevant sounds, including fireworks, street takeovers, and certain sounds of distress.
[60]City of Springfield, MissouriPrimary
A government body's own record shows that as of October 2024 Raven was described as gunshot-only and expressly not recording voices. With the May 2026 record it brackets a change in what the same hardware listens for; it does not establish when that change was made.
The Raven audio detection sensors are designed to detect and identify the sound of gunfire in real time, allowing officers to respond more quickly and effectively. The Raven sensor will save a 5-second audio clip as evidence of the suspected gunshot. All other associated audio is deleted. The Raven does not record voices, and recording is not triggered by anything other than gunshots.
[61]Siskiyou County, California — Board of Supervisors agenda portalPrimary
A county sheriff's executed 2025 Flock master services agreement defines the contracted service to include audio detection and defines the captured data as still images, video, audio and other data. Its section 4.1 retains all right, title and interest in Customer Data SOLELY with the customer and states that Flock does not own and shall not sell it — the Non-Agency End User and joint-ownership provisions of the 2021 template are gone. Marketing was struck from the data licence and the training of machine learning algorithms was added expressly. This is one 2025 agreement; the rest were not surveyed.
1.9 “Flock Services” means the provision of Flock’s software and hardware situational awareness solution, via the Web Interface, for automatic license plate detection, alerts, audio detection, searching image records, video and sharing Footage. ... 1.10 “Footage” means still images, video, audio and other data captured by the Flock Hardware or Customer Hardware in the course of and provided via the Flock Services. ... 4.1 Customer Data. As between Flock and Customer, all right, title and interest in the Customer Data, belong to and are retained solely by Customer. Customer hereby grants to Flock a limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable, worldwide license to use the Customer Data and perform all acts as may be necessary for Flock to provide the Flock Services to Customer. Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Data. ... 4.3 Anonymized Data. Flock shall have the right to collect, analyze, and anonymize Customer Data and Customer Generated Data to the extent such anonymization renders the data non-identifiable to create Anonymized Data to use and perform the Services and related systems and technologies, including the training of machine learning algorithms. Customer hereby grants Flock a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right to use and distribute such Anonymized Data to improve and enhance the Services and for other development, diagnostic and corrective purposes, and other Flock offerings. Parties understand that the aforementioned license is required for continuity of Services. Flock does not own and shall not sell Anonymized Data.
[62]Town of Whitestown, IndianaPrimary
THREE DISTINCT CLAUSES, which an earlier version of the page welded into one. Section 1.11 defines Non-Agency End User Data as the Footage, geolocation data, environmental data and/or Notifications — so the shared ownership reaches beyond footage. Section 4.2 grants a perpetual, irrevocable, fully paid licence over that data as part of the Aggregated Data and says NOTHING about marketing. Section 4.4 is the marketing grant and is weaker — neither irrevocable nor fully paid — and its subject is anonymised or aggregated data; its second limb (ii) is NOT anonymised and permits disclosure of raw agency and non-agency data inclusive of Footage. The contract never describes a checkbox: it says a customer "elected" and speaks of "prescribed access", and it carries its own limit that the agreement does not by itself make that data the agency's sole property.
1.6 “Footage” means still images and/or video captured by the Hardware in the course of and provided via the Services. ... 1.10 “Non-Agency End User” means a Flock's non-Agency customer that has elected to give Agency access to its data in the Flock System. ... 1.11 “Non-Agency End User Data” means the Footage, geolocation data, environmental data and/or Notifications of a Non-Agency End User. ... As between Agency and Non-Agency End Users that have prescribed access of Footage to Agency, each of Agency and Non-Agency End Users will share all right, title and interest in the Non-Agency End User Data. This Agreement does not by itself make any Non-Agency End User Data the sole property or the Proprietary Information of Agency. ... a non-exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, fully paid license to use, reproduce, modify and distribute the Agency Data and Non-Agency End User Data as a part of the Aggregated Data (as defined in Section 4.4 below). ... Agency hereby grants Flock a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right and license (during and after the Service Term hereof) to (i) use and distribute such Aggregated Data to improve and enhance the Services and for other marketing, development, diagnostic and corrective purposes, other Flock offerings, and crime prevention efforts, and (ii) disclose the Agency Data and Non-Agency End User Data (both inclusive of any Footage) to enable law enforcement monitoring against law enforcement hotlists as well as provide Footage search access to law enforcement for investigative purposes only.
[63]Weber County, Utah — County Commission document uploadsPrimary
A second 2021 department agreement uses the same audio-free definition of captured data.
1.6 “Footage” means still images and/or video captured by the Hardware in the course of and provided via the Flock Services.
[64]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
Knotts expressly RESERVED the question of dragnet-type law enforcement practices rather than deciding it, so the no-expectation-of-privacy holding narrowed itself from the start — the reservation Carpenter later treated as decisive.
if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.
[65]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
It is SUBPART D — which authorized railroads to test breath and urine without requiring them to — that carries the no-compulsion principle: government authorization, removal of legal barriers and a governmental interest in the fruits implicated the Fourth Amendment even though no testing was compelled. 489 U.S. 615.
The fact that the Government has not compelled a private party to perform a search does not, by itself, establish that the search is a private one. Here, specific features of the regulations combine to convince us that the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct. ... Nor is a covered employee free to decline his employer's request to submit to breath or urine tests under the conditions set forth in Subpart D. ... The Government has removed all legal barriers to the testing authorized by Subpart D, and indeed has made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such intrusions. In addition, it has mandated that the railroads not bargain away the authority to perform tests granted by Subpart D. These are clear indices of the Government's encouragement, endorsement, and participation, and suffice to implicate the Fourth Amendment.
[66]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
At 489 U.S. 614 the Court grounded the Fourth Amendment in COMPULSION for the Subpart C half — the mandatory testing — expressly distinguishing it from Subpart D, which compels no testing at all. Citing the compelled half for the uncompelled principle inverts the case.
A railroad that complies with the provisions of Subpart C of the regulations does so by compulsion of sovereign authority, and the lawfulness of its acts is controlled by the Fourth Amendment. Petitioners contend, however, that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by Subpart D of the regulations, as nothing in Subpart D compels any testing by private railroads.
[67]Supreme Court of the United StatesPrimary
Blood testing in Skinner belonged to Subpart C, which the Court described as MANDATORY — establishing that the blood half was the compelled half and that Subpart D reached breath or urine only.
Subpart C, which is entitled "Post-Accident Toxicological Testing," is mandatory. It provides that railroads "shall take all practicable steps to assure that all covered employees of the railroad directly involved ... provide blood and urine samples for toxicological testing by FRA,"
[68]Court of Appeals of VirginiaPrimary
The Court of Appeals of Virginia decision in Church is marked UNPUBLISHED on its own face and states in its first footnote that it is not designated for publication under Va. Code § 17.1-413(A) — so it is a memorandum opinion, not binding precedent.
UNPUBLISHED ... MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY ... * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
[69]Virginia Law — Code of Virginia (Division of Legislative Automated Systems)Primary
Va. Code § 17.1-413(A) is the provision under which the Court of Appeals may decide by memorandum opinion, and it reserves reporting for opinions the court designates as having precedential value — which is what makes an undesignated memorandum opinion non-precedential.
Subject to rules promulgated under § 17.1-403 the Court in its discretion may render its decision by order or memorandum opinion. All orders and opinions of the Court of Appeals shall be preserved with the record of the case. Opinions designated by the Court of Appeals as having precedential value or as otherwise having significance for the law or legal system shall be expeditiously reported in separate Court of Appeals Reports
[70]Illinois Secretary of StatePrimary
A state constitutional officer's own release, not a congressional footnote to journalism, puts the Texas abortion-reason search at more than 83,000 ALPR cameras nationwide. The same release finds that Mount Prospect's ALPR settings were the gateway into the Illinois system for an unauthorized use, and records 262 immigration-related searches in Mount Prospect alone between January 14 and April 30.
In May, law enforcement authorities in Texas performed a nationwide search of more than 83,000 ALPR cameras to locate a woman they said had a self-administered abortion. ... Mount Prospect's ALPR settings provided a gateway into Illinois' system operated by Flock for an unauthorized use ... Between January 14 and April 30, there were 262 searches for immigration related matters in Mount Prospect, alone.
[71]Lynn Lembcke Consulting, filed with the Minnesota Legislative Reference LibraryPrimary
The THIRD of the three identically-worded Minnesota audits, and the document that proves the identity is a shared auditor and template rather than three independent confirmations: the same consultant, the same sentence, a different department. Like the others it never mentions Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular or tyre-pressure signals.
A review of data stored in Flock Analytics confirmed that ALPR data collected by West Hennepin Public Safety Department is limited to license plate numbers; date, time, location of the stationary ALPR camera; and pictures of license plates, vehicles, and areas surrounding the vehicles. ... This report was prepared exclusively for the Cities of Maple Plain and Independence, the West Hennepin Public Safety Police Commission, and West Hennepin Public Safety Department by Lynn Lembcke Consulting.
[72]Virginia State Crime CommissionPrimary
The Virginia survey was DISSEMINATED in November 2025 — January 2026 is the date of the report, not of the survey. The same sentence records that Virginia's ALPR legislation took effect on July 1, 2025.
Surveys were disseminated in November 2025 to capture law enforcement use after the ALPR legislation took effect on July 1, 2025.
[73]United States Patent and Trademark Office (text as republished by Google Patents)Unverified source type
The patent's SPECIFICATION, not its claims, is where the antenna assembly is described as receiving Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and RFID signals.
configured to capture or otherwise receive a plurality of different electronic signal types, such as Bluetooth®, Wifi, RFID, or other radio frequency (“RF”) signals.
[74]United States Patent and Trademark Office (text as republished by Google Patents)Unverified source type
Claim 27 reaches vehicle sensors expressly, including tire pressure sensors — so the claims, not only the specification, cover reading device signals off a car.
wherein the one or more transmitting vehicle components comprise tire pressure sensors, manufacturer installed or after-market vehicle sensors, vehicle stereo systems, vehicle entertainments systems, vehicle navigation systems, vehicle infotainment systems, self-driving or driver assist vehicle guidance systems, vehicle Wifi hotspots, or combinations thereof.
[75]United States SenatePrimary
Page 2 of the Senator's letter is the ONLY document obtained containing the assurance the section measures against the record: that Flock told state and local customers it does not provide DHS access. The same page carries the company's own quoted admission of "internal miscommunication", the four agencies given pilot access (CBP, HSI, Secret Service, NCIS) with the CBP/HSI search counts, and the Senator's own characterisation "Flock deceived its law enforcement customers" — which the section attributes to him rather than adopting. The same page also records that the search-reason field is free text the company does not require to be case-specific, which is the record set against the published claim that searches "must relate to a specific investigation"; and it records the reciprocity condition — an agency may use the National Lookup Tool only if it also shares its own camera data — which is the disclosure gap in the opt-in item.
to address concerns that license plate data might be abused by federal immigration authorities, Flock has assured its state and local law enforcement customers that the company does not provide access to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). ... With this representation about DHS access to Flock data, Flock deceived its law enforcement customers. ... Officials from Flock subsequently confirmed to my office in September that the company provided access to CBP, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Secret Service, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service as part of a pilot earlier this year. Flock told my office that during the pilot, which has now ended, CBP and HSI conducted approximately 200 and 175 searches respectively. Flock also confirmed that it misled its state and local law enforcement customers, telling my office that "due to internal miscommunication, customers were inaccurately informed that Flock did not have any relationship with DHS, while pilot programs with sub-agencies of DHS were briefly active." ... Flock requires its law enforcement customers to provide a reason for a search, which by default, they are prompted to enter into a text box into which any text can be entered. Flock has confirmed to my office that it does not require its law enforcement users to enter a case-specific reason, nor does Flock prohibit law enforcement customers from entering meaningless, generic reasons such as ... First, Flock only permits agencies to access this search tool if those agencies also share data from their own cameras.
[76]United States SenatePrimary
Page 3 is the record set against the company's June 2025 announcement of a case-number option: it states that a case-number opt-in setting already existed, that enabling it removed the duty to document any reason for searches of other agencies' data, and that the company removed it on August 18, 2025 and confirmed that on August 19 — the sequence, and the word "different", that the section says neither document reconciles with the announced option. The same page carries the 14%-of-reasons figure the section expressly attributes to the Electronic Frontier Foundation's analysis reported to the Senator rather than to any auditor, and the sentence that a customer's control over reason quality stops at its own employees.
Flock customers can change their default settings to require that their own employees be presented with a drop-down menu of predefined reasons; but importantly, Flock customers cannot control the reasons provided for searches of their data by other law enforcement customers. Additionally, until recently, Flock customers could enable a different opt-in setting to require a case number for searches; if enabled, employees of those agencies would not be required to document any reason at all when submitting searches of other agencies' data. Flock confirmed to my office on August 19, that it removed this option the day before, on August 18, shortly after receiving questions about it from my office. ... reveals that more than 14% of the search reasons contained just the word "investigation" without a case number.
[77]U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityPrimary
The Department's own published component list is what establishes that three of the four agencies named in the Senator's letter — Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Secret Service — sit within the Department of Homeland Security, which is what makes the assurance that there was no DHS relationship measurable against the pilots.
A listing of all Operational and Support Components that currently make up the Department of Homeland Security. ... United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) ... United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ... United States Secret Service (USSS)
[78]U.S. Immigration and Customs EnforcementPrimary
Homeland Security Investigations describes itself, on ICE's own site, as a federal law-enforcement agency within DHS — which places the second of the four agencies given pilot access inside the department the customers were told there was no relationship with. Cited only for that; the page does not use the section's phrase "the investigative arm of ICE".
HSI is a premier federal law enforcement agency within DHS.
[79]Naval Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Department of the NavyPrimary
NCIS's own service page places it within the Department of the Navy, establishing the limit the section draws in the company's favour: of the four agencies given pilot access, NCIS is NOT a DHS component, so the assurance about DHS does not reach it.
Within the Department of the Navy, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service is the civilian federal law enforcement agency uniquely responsible for investigating felony crime, preventing terrorism and protecting secrets for the Navy and Marine Corps.
[80]Illinois Secretary of StatePrimary
The state officer's release of the same date is what DATES the 262 immigration-related searches that the village's own statement reports without a period — the section uses it to fix the window (January 14 to April 30) for what the National Lookup opt-in exposed. Page 2 of the release, where the sentence appears.
Between January 14 and April 30, there were 262 searches for immigration related matters in Mount Prospect, alone.
[81]City of Mountain View, CaliforniaPrimary
The City's own published statement is the record — on one party's account, the customer's — set against the vendor's customer-control claim: a sharing setting enabled by the vendor without the customer's permission or knowledge, and a second function operating outside the access approvals the customer had set, both in August–November 2024. The same statement supplies the retained-records gap set against "every search is logged and reviewable", and it supplies BOTH sides the section is obliged to record: the vendor account the City relays (systems improved, no sharing outside California), the City's own "system failure" framing, and its statement of grievance. The City deployed the cameras and is an interested party; this establishes what the City stated, not the underlying fact.
During the prior federal administration, from August to November 2024, several federal law enforcement agencies accessed Mountain View's Flock Safety ALPR system for one camera via a "nationwide" search setting that was turned on by Flock Safety. This setting was enabled without MVPD's permission or knowledge. ... Flock Safety did not retain records for that time period, which means the vendor cannot determine whether searches of Mountain View's data resulted in license plate information being shared. ... Through the audit, MVPD also discovered that a "statewide" search function was not operating within the system controls we established. This function allowed Flock Safety to enable access to California law enforcement agencies that had not been approved by MVPD for 29 of the City's 30 ALPR cameras. ... This is a system failure on Flock Safety's part. ... We are upset and disappointed with how our data was accessed ... Flock Safety has assured us that their systems have been improved and that they no longer enable any access sharing outside of the State of California.
[82]Village of Mount Prospect, IllinoisPrimary
A customer agency's own municipal record is the record set against the opt-in claim: this customer states it did not know what the National Lookup setting exposed, and records the vendor's own concession of a communications shortfall — the fact on which the section rests "unresolved as to disclosure" rather than a finding. It also records the 262 immigration-related searches conducted BY OTHER AGENCIES, which the section carries to show what the setting exposed and expressly does not attribute to the vendor. This establishes what the Village stated, not the underlying fact.
Flock Safety explained that by opting into the "National Lookup" feature, which Mount Prospect did, it permitted other law enforcement agencies who also utilized this feature to search Mount Prospect ALPR data without a data sharing agreement. MPPD was not made aware of this capability prior to the investigation. Flock has stated a need to increase communications with participating communities around this two-way sharing feature. ... The Illinois Secretary of State's Office investigation revealed that other law enforcement agencies conducted 262 immigration-related searches on Mount Prospect's ALPR data.
[83]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
One of the four company statements of customer control that the Mountain View episode is measured against — the company's own Trust Center answer to "Who Can Access Data?", retrieved August 4, 2026. Quoted as evidence of what the company claimed, never of what is true.
Who Can Access Data? ... Data sharing is controlled by the customer agency, not Flock.
[84]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
Two of the section's measured statements come from this page: the customer-control claim that sharing never happens automatically and only on the agency's clear permission, set against the City of Mountain View's account of a setting the vendor turned on; and the claim that searches "must relate to a specific investigation", which the section finds broader than what the company confirmed to the Senator's office about its free-text reason field. This page is also one of the pages the section records as checked, and found not to state that the National Lookup opt-in is reciprocal, or any audit-log retention period.
Each agency controls its own settings and decides if, and when, to share data. Sharing never happens automatically. ... Can Flock share an agency's data with other agencies? ... Data is never shared automatically. Sharing only happens if the agency gives clear permission. ... Can officers search anyone at any time? ... No. Searches must relate to a specific investigation and follow agency rules and the law.
[85]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
The Trust Center page titled Data Security, published at the address /trust/data-privacy, is the source of three of the statements the section measures: the purpose-limitation claim and its pull-quote "You can't search 'just because'"; the logging claim set against the City of Mountain View's report that the vendor did not retain records for the period at issue; and the opt-in claim "Nothing is shared unless our customers turn on sharing", set against the reciprocity condition the Senator's letter records. The retention sentence is quoted to show what the page DOES state a period for — images and footage — the section's point being that no audit-log retention period appears anywhere on it.
Searches require a public-safety reason. That reason is recorded with the search so agencies can review how the system is used. ... In plain terms: You can't search "just because." ... Every search is tied to a specific user and recorded in a log. Supervisors can review what happened and who did it. ... Nothing is shared unless our customers turn on sharing. ... Images and footage are deleted automatically after a set period. In most communities, that's 30 days unless local law says otherwise.
[86]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
One of the three Trust Center pages the section records as checked for a published audit-log retention period and found not to state one. The page asserts an audit trail in these words and attaches no retention period to it, which is what the section reports; the words "retention" and "retain" do not appear on the page at all.
Every search is recorded and linked to a specific user. Managers can look at how the system is being used and address any breaches of policy.
[87]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
The company's homepage claim, retrieved August 4, 2026, carried as a labelled product benefit — the statement the section measures against the City of Mountain View's report that the vendor did not retain records for the 2024 period and so could not determine whether searches of the City's data resulted in plate information being shared.
Audit-ready use ... Every search is logged and reviewable
[88]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
The 2026 side of the comparison. Its face shows the ownership half of the company's statement holding — title in Customer Data is retained by the customer — while the improvement right attaches to Customer Data with no anonymisation predicate, and the words "perpetual" and "disclose" appear in the grant. The section's negatives are checkable against this same document: it contains no definition of Anonymized Data, the word does not appear in it, the sentence "Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Data" does not appear in it, and no audit-log retention period appears in it.
Last Updated: February 16, 2026 ... As between Flock and Customer, all right, title, and interest in and to Customer Data belong to and are retained by Customer. Customer hereby grants to Flock a limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable, perpetual, worldwide license to (a) use and disclose Customer Data to provide the Flock Services; and (b) use Customer Data to support and improve Flock's products and services.
[89]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
This post is BOTH the statement the section measures and the company's own answer to each difference found — the section quotes it rather than paraphrasing or answering it. It supplies the claim that nothing expands Flock's rights; the company's explanation for the removed no-sell sentence; its three-passage account of the word "perpetual"; and its account of "disclosure" in Section 4.1. The consolidation language quoted here is also what the section relies on for the one difference the post does NOT address: it describes folding prior terms into a single "Customer Data" definition covering images, audio and/or video, and the word anonymized appears nowhere in the post.
Nothing in the updated Terms gives Flock ownership of Customer Data. Nothing permits Flock to sell Customer Data. And nothing expands Flock's rights beyond what already existed. ... We removed a sentence that previously stated "Flock shall not sell Customer Data" because it was redundant, not because our position changed. Flock cannot and does not sell Customer Data. ... Some have also asked about the use of the term "perpetual" in connection with Flock's ability to use Customer Data to support and improve products and services. ... This is a standard software industry provision. ... Importantly, this does not grant ownership of Customer Data. It does not permit the sale of Customer Data. It does not create new rights. It simply ensures continuity in providing and improving services. ... Reference to "disclosure" in Section 4.1 is limited to standard operational needs, such as working with trusted vendors or subcontractors (e.g., cloud hosting providers) or sharing data with third parties at the customer's direction. ... images, audio, and/or video
[90]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
The June 2025 announcement is the statement in the case-number item: a case-number option offered as an accountability improvement and labelled as coming by the end of 2025, set against the Senator's October account that a case-number opt-in setting already existed and was removed on August 18. The same post is what closes the obvious defence in the free-text-reason item: the company's own Proactive Search Term Tool inspects the CONTENTS of search terms for one state's data, so an inability to inspect the reason field cannot be the explanation.
Allowing Agencies to Require Case Numbers ... (Coming by End of 2025) ... To promote additional accountability, prevent misuse, and make identifying unallowed searches easier, we are also instituting an option for agencies to elect to require a case number for any searches conducted in the system. ... Proactive Search Term Tool ... If a search involving Illinois camera data includes terms that indicate an impermissible purpose under Illinois law, the Illinois data will automatically be excluded.
[91]Flock Safety (Flock Group, Inc.)Unverified source type
The CEO's own published statement of customer control, and the one whose date the section uses to fix the gap: it postdates the August–November 2024 conduct the City of Mountain View describes by more than a year, which is why the section says the record does not establish that the customer-control statements were inaccurate when they were made.
Our position on sharing is black-and-white, no room for interpretation or back doors. Agencies decide how they collaborate with other agencies, and Flock doesn't make those decisions for them.
[92]Siskiyou County, California — Board of Supervisors agenda portalPrimary
The anonymisation predicate itself, as the executed June 2025 agreement defined it at section 1.1 — the definition the 2026 online Terms contain no counterpart to. This is the difference the company's February 2026 post does not address, and the reason the terms item is left unresolved. Page 2 of the agreement, where the definition appears.
1.1 "Anonymized Data" means Customer Data permanently stripped of identifying details and any potential personally identifiable information, by commercially available standards which irreversibly alters data in such a way that a data subject (i.e., individual person or entity) can no longer be identified directly or indirectly.
[93]Siskiyou County, California — Board of Supervisors agenda portalPrimary
The 2025 side of the ownership comparison, and the source of the sentence the company says it removed as redundant: "Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Data". Its grant carries neither "perpetual" nor "disclose", which is the difference the section identifies against the 2026 Terms. Section 4.1 begins on page 6 of the agreement and its final sentence carries over to page 7.
4.1 Customer Data. As between Flock and Customer, all right, title and interest in the Customer Data, belong to and are retained solely by Customer. Customer hereby grants to Flock a limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable, worldwide license to use the Customer Data and perform all acts as may be necessary for Flock to provide the Flock Services to Customer. Flock does not own and shall not sell Customer Data.
[94]Siskiyou County, California — Board of Supervisors agenda portalPrimary
In the executed 2025 agreement the improvement-and-enhancement right ran only to Anonymized Data as defined at section 1.1; in the 2026 online Terms the corresponding right runs to Customer Data with no anonymisation predicate. This section is also where "perpetual" DOES appear in the 2025 agreement, which the section states in the company's favour when describing where the word was and was not used. Page 7 of the agreement.
4.3 Anonymized Data. Flock shall have the right to collect, analyze, and anonymize Customer Data and Customer Generated Data to the extent such anonymization renders the data non-identifiable to create Anonymized Data to use and perform the Services and related systems and technologies, including the training of machine learning algorithms. Customer hereby grants Flock a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right to use and distribute such Anonymized Data to improve and enhance the Services and for other development, diagnostic and corrective purposes, and other Flock offerings.

The full citation list for this issue — every source behind the record on this page, not only the ones this analysis leans on — is the page’s own Sources section.

Open the Sources section for this issue

The analysis exactly as it was written, reviewed and stored. The tabs before this one re-cut this same text into sections; the writer refuses to publish a re-cut that does not reproduce it character for character, so nothing here is added, dropped or reworded.

WHAT IS AT STAKE

WHAT THE LAW ESTABLISHES TODAY

WHAT IS GENUINELY CONTESTED

THE REMEDY PROBLEM

WHAT THE RECORD ACTUALLY SHOWS

IT WAS NEVER ONLY LICENCE PLATES

IT IS SOLD TO PRIVATE PARTIES TOO, AND THE DATA CROSSES

STUMPWATCH'S POSITION: THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT HIRE OUT WHAT IT MAY NOT DO

THE CONTRACTOR ANALOGY DOES NOT FIT, AND IT IS DOING A LOT OF WORK

THERE IS NO WAY TO OPT OUT, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE PROBLEM

THE LAW GRADES PRIVACY BY WHO YOU ARE. THIS SYSTEM DOES NOT

STATEMENTS MEASURED AGAINST THE RECORD

WHAT THIS SECTION IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT

THE DHS PILOTS AND THE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WAS NO DHS RELATIONSHIP

A CITY SAYS A SHARING SETTING WAS TURNED ON BY THE VENDOR

THE 2026 TERMS AGAINST THE COMPANY'S DESCRIPTION OF THEM

A CASE-NUMBER OPTION IN JUNE 2025, A CASE-NUMBER SETTING GONE IN AUGUST

"YOU CAN'T SEARCH JUST BECAUSE"

"EVERY SEARCH IS LOGGED AND REVIEWABLE," AND A GAP IN RETAINED RECORDS

WHAT "OPT-IN" MEANT IN PRACTICE

WHAT THIS SECTION DOES NOT ESTABLISH

WHERE WE BELIEVE THE LAW SHOULD GO

How this was reviewed

Assessment · AI analysis · 86% confidence

Claims assessed: 40
Survived review: 38 of 40
Adversarial passes: 5
Confidence: 86%

Version 10 · published 2026-08-10 · every earlier version is retained, never deleted.

"Mass surveillance and tracking" describes a set of commercially supplied technologies that record where vehicles go, what faces and bodies can be matched against stored images, and where mobile devices have been. Everything below is drawn from primary records: Congressional Research Service analysis, federal agency Privacy Impact Assessments, a state audit, a Federal Trade Commission enforcement action, and federal contract records published on USAspending.gov. AUTOMATED LICENCE PLATE READERS ALPRs are "camera systems that capture the license plate data of passing vehicles, along with related information" [1]. They are deployed in fixed positions — light poles, bridges, toll plazas, parking structures — and mounted on vehicles. Adoption among larger US agencies is close to universal: on the Bureau of Justice Statistics' 2020 survey, nearly 90% of sheriffs' offices with 500 or more sworn deputies used the technology, and 100% of police departments serving over a million residents did [4]. What a reader records is not limited to the plate. The Congressional Research Service notes the technology "can also detect additional, related information, including vehicle type and color, global positioning system [GPS] location data, and date and time" [2]. An Immigration and Customs Enforcement Privacy Impact Assessment describes the resulting record — "a read" — as containing the plate number, a digital image of the plate "as well as the vehicle's make and model", the state of registration, camera identification, GPS coordinates, and the date and time of observation [7]. Reads are compared against "hot lists, which contain license plates linked to vehicles of interest", and a match can alert an officer in real time [3]. The scale of retention is the defining feature. A California State Auditor review of four agencies found that "99.9 percent of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made" [11] — the overwhelming majority of stored data concerns people not suspected of anything. The same audit found three of the four agencies "have shared their ALPR images widely, without considering whether the entities receiving them have a right to and need for the images" [12], and that 70 percent of surveyed California agencies operate or plan to operate such a system [13]. Beyond agency-owned cameras there is a commercial aggregation market. ICE's assessment of commercial plate data records that the vendor "compiles LPR records from at least 25 states and 24 of the top 30 most populous metropolitan statistical areas within the United States" [8], and that the contract requires an "alert list" feature letting users save plate numbers "to be automatically queried against new records as they are loaded" [9] — standing surveillance of a named vehicle rather than a one-off lookup. Federal contract records show ICE paying West Publishing (Thomson Reuters) for "ACCESS TO LICENSE PLATE READER DATABASE" [31], and the State Department buying a CLEAR bundle including "LEARN VIA VIGILANT SOLUTIONS FOR UP TO 750 USERS AND LPR VIA CLEAR" [32]. Agency-owned deployments are documented too: Genetec supplied "LPR CAMERA SYSTEMS FOR DEAS NATIONAL LICENSE PLATE READER PROGRAM EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENTS" [29]; Flock Group Inc. contracted with the US Park Police to "ACQUIRE AND DEPLOY A FLOCK SAFETY AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER (ALPR) SYSTEM IN THE GREATER WASHINGTON, DC METROPOLITAN AREA" [28]; and Perceptics has maintained "CBP LICENSE PLATE READERS AND VEHICLE COUNTERS AT US PORTS OF ENTRY" [30]. FACIAL RECOGNITION AND BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION Face matching operates at national scale inside federal identity systems. IDEMIA holds contracts to integrate face-recognition matching "WITH THE DOS VISA AND PASSPORT ISSUANCE PROCESSES" [22] and for "BIOMETRIC ALGORITHM MAINTENANCE FOR NGI" — the FBI's Next Generation Identification system [23]. The DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management procured maintenance for NEC face-matching products "FOR UNLIMITED FACIAL QUANTITIES, ON UNLIMITED HARDWARE PLATFORMS, AND AT UNLIMITED LOCATIONS" [24], alongside a later "ENTERPRISE FACIAL LICENSE O&M" award [25]. Clearview AI — whose model is matching a probe image against images collected from the public web — holds an ICE award that "PROCURES FACIAL RECOGNITION SOFTWARE, WHICH SUPPORTS HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS" [21]. Accuracy is not uniform across populations, and the consequences appear in enforcement records. The FTC found that one retail deployment "generated thousands of false-positive matches" [27] and "was more likely to generate false positives in stores located in plurality-Black and Asian communities than in plurality-White communities" [26]; the resulting order barred that retailer from using facial recognition for surveillance for five years. DEVICE AND PHONE-LOCATION TRACKING Two distinct mechanisms operate here. Cell-site simulators "permit the tracking of mobile telephones in the course of criminal investigations" by impersonating network infrastructure: "By transmitting as a cell tower, cell-site simulators acquire the identifying information from cellular devices" [14][15]. Because a handset cannot distinguish the simulator from a real tower, phones belonging to uninvolved people nearby also respond; ICE policy states that identifiers collected from non-target devices "will be deleted within 24 hours" [16]. The second mechanism needs no radio equipment at all — agencies buy location data generated by mobile apps. A 2018 DHS delivery order purchased "VENNTEL GEOGRAPHIC MARKETING DATA AND SERVICE SUPPORT LICENSE SUBSCRIPTIONS" [17]; the framing of device-location data as "marketing data" is characteristic of this market. A 2026 ICE requirement covers "25 BABEL STREET INSIGHTS LICENSES, LOCATION AND IDENTITY APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES FOR USE IN ICE CASE MANAGEMENT AND ANALYTICS SYSTEMS" [18]. The US Marshals Service purchased from Fog Data Science in 2018 [19], and ICE bought "PENLINKS COBWEB AND TANGLES LICENSES TO GATHER OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION" [20]. OPEN-SOURCE AND IDENTITY-RESOLUTION COLLECTION A parallel industry resolves identities across public and web-scraped data. The Department of Justice holds a delivery order for "SHADOWDRAGON HORIZON/SOCIALNET UNLIMITED QUERY, PER USER LICENSES" [33]; ShadowDragon's own marketing describes automating "OSINT data collection and analysis across billions of public sources" [34]. Babel Street markets identity resolution to "Unmask aliases and resolve identities across systems and languages" [35], and Dataminr markets "earliest warnings on high impact events and critical information far in advance of other sources" [36]. RETENTION, SHARING AND OVERSIGHT Data outlives the encounter that produced it. Where an ICE officer enters plate-derived information into the Enforcement Alien Removal Module, "Records in EARM are maintained for 75 years" [10]. Sharing is structural rather than incidental: the DEA describes its National License Plate Reader Program as a "network of LPR equipment owned by DEA, other federal agencies, and state, local, and tribal police departments", governed by Memoranda of Understanding "detailing the parameters for use and sharing of the LPR information" [5]. Federal oversight is thin — the CRS states plainly that "No specific federal legislative framework exists that governs federal law enforcement use of ALPRs" [6] — and where state law does impose requirements, the California audit found agencies either lacked policies or had deficient ones, with none having audited staff searches of the image database [12][13]. COMPANIES IDENTIFIED IN THE RECORD Each of the following is named in a primary record cited above. This list is what could be substantiated from government sources, not a complete census of the industry. · Automated licence plate readers — Flock Safety (Flock Group Inc) [28]; Genetec [29]; Perceptics [30]; Vigilant Solutions, now part of Motorola Solutions [32]; Thomson Reuters / West Publishing, via the CLEAR platform [31][32]. · Facial recognition and biometrics — Clearview AI [21]; IDEMIA [22][23]; NEC [24][25]. · Device and phone-location data — Venntel [17]; Babel Street [18][35]; Fog Data Science [19]; Pen-Link [20]; Cobwebs Technologies, via the Tangles product [20]. · Open-source collection and identity resolution — ShadowDragon [33][34]; Dataminr [36]. ACCURACY IS NOT UNIFORM, AND THE GOVERNMENT MEASURED IT The most rigorous public measurement of facial recognition is NIST's, which pushed 18.27 million images of 8.49 million people through 189 algorithms from 99 developers [37]. Its headline result concerns the error that matters most for a wrongful stop: "false positive differentials are much larger than those related to false negatives and exist broadly... Across demographics, false positives rates often vary by factors of 10 to beyond 100 times" [38]. On domestic law-enforcement mugshots, "the highest false positives are in American Indians, with elevated rates in African American and Asian populations" [39]. Rates were also higher for women, and for the elderly and children [40]. NIST states the stakes plainly: in identification uses such as surveillance, "a false positive match to another individual could lead to a false accusation, detention or deportation" [41]. NIST's later work separates the two error types by cause: false negatives are substantially a photography problem, fixable at capture, while "the much larger false positive variations, which occur even in high-quality photographs, must be mitigated by algorithm developers" [42]. NIST continues to publish per-algorithm demographic differentials, last refreshed 5 March 2025 [43]. OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL USE The Government Accountability Office surveyed all 42 federal agencies employing law-enforcement officers. Twenty owned or used facial recognition; six ran it on images from the unrest following George Floyd's death, and three on images from 6 January 2021 [44]. The accountability finding is the striking one: of the fourteen agencies using it in criminal investigations, all used systems owned by non-federal entities, and "only one has awareness of what non-federal systems are used by employees" [45]. A later GAO review found seven DHS and DOJ agencies used commercial facial-recognition services with no staff training requirement, six of them running "about 60,000 searches when they did not have training requirements in place" [46]. At the FBI, "only 10 staff completed facial recognition training of 196 staff that accessed the service" [47]. Four of the seven had no facial-recognition policy addressing civil rights and civil liberties [48]. BUYING WHAT A WARRANT WOULD OTHERWISE REQUIRE The DHS Inspector General audited CBP, ICE and Secret Service purchases of commercial telemetry data and found all three "did not adhere to Department privacy policies or develop sufficient policies before procuring and using" it [49] - specifically, proceeding without an approved Privacy Impact Assessment as the E-Government Act requires [50]. CBP "has used CTD since May 1, 2019, without an approved PIA that includes matching AdIDs to individuals" [51], and the Inspector General found the DHS Privacy Office "did not follow or enforce its own privacy policies and guidance" [52]. Note the scope precisely: those findings are about PRIVACY COMPLIANCE, not about whether the purchases were lawful. The report makes no legal-authority finding. Congress has made the warrant point directly. The House Judiciary Committee, reporting the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, found that the IRS, DEA, FBI, DHS and DOD "have all purchased geolocation information from data brokers" [53], named Venntel as a supplier [54], and concluded that "because ECPA does not protect consumers from data brokers that collect their information, the government purchases data as way to avoid seeking a warrant as would otherwise be required by the Fourth Amendment" [55]. The Committee approved the bill unanimously on 19 July 2023 [56]. THE REGULATOR'S VIEW OF THE DATA BROKERS The FTC has brought a series of actions against the location-data market. It barred X-Mode Social and successor Outlogic from selling sensitive location data, finding the data "is not anonymized, and is capable of matching an individual consumer's mobile device with the locations they visited", sold "to hundreds of clients... as well as private government contractors" [57][58]. It banned InMarket from selling precise location data - "a first for the FTC" - over audience segments including "Christian church goers" [59]. It sued Kochava over a sample containing "precise, timestamped location data collected from more than 61 million unique mobile devices in the previous week" [60], settling in 2026 [61]. It acted against Gravy Analytics and Venntel - the same Venntel named in the DHS contract above - which "claimed to collect, process, and curate more than 17 billion signals from around a billion mobile devices daily", for selling without consent "for commercial and government uses" [62][63]. And it alleged Mobilewalla collected "more than 500 million unique consumer advertising identifiers paired with consumers' precise location data" and produced a report analysing George Floyd protesters' racial backgrounds [64][65]. One detail in the Gravy/Venntel order is worth stating rather than glossing: the prohibition on selling sensitive location data carries an express carve-out "except in limited circumstances involving national security or law enforcement" [66]. WHAT REGULATORS AND COURTS HAVE FOUND ABOUT CLEARVIEW AI Clearview's scale is established by four independent primary records, and the figures grow over time rather than conflicting. A United States District Court order records that its database "quickly grew to a staggering three billion images" [67], and that "As of October 29, 2021, Clearview's database contained approximately ten billion images, creating a class that encompassed virtually any individual whose face had been posted on the internet prior to and during the period of Clearview's operation" [68]. Italy's data-protection authority found "oltre 10 miliardi di immagini facciali" - more than 10 billion facial images - gathered by web scraping and subjected to biometric processing [69]. UK tribunal findings put it at "over 20 billion images" by October 2022, "increasing as new images are scraped", with an estimated growth rate of 75 million images per day [70]. The Dutch authority's 2024 decision states plainly: "Clearview built a database consisting of over 30 billion photos" [71]. The Illinois class action settled without a cash fund. Instead the class received a "Settlement Stake" equal to a 23% equity interest in the company, which the court valued at $51.75 million against a January 2024 company valuation of roughly $225 million [72]. Notably, the record shows Clearview responded to that settlement geographically rather than substantively: it blocked Illinois-geolocated photos from search, "Constructed a 'geofence' around Illinois", and stopped collecting facial vectors from images bearing Illinois metadata or from URLs containing keywords such as "Chicago" or "Illinois" [73]. European regulators have fined the company repeatedly. Italy imposed "euro venti milioni" - 20 million euros - and ordered deletion of data on people in Italian territory [74]. Greece imposed 20 million euros and barred collection of data on people in Greek territory [75]. France imposed 20 million euros with an injunction carrying "une astreinte de cent mille euros (100 000 euros) par jour de retard" [76]. The Netherlands imposed the largest, "a total amount of EUR 30,500,000", finding Clearview processed biometric data without any legal basis [77]. One status point must be stated precisely rather than rounded off. The UK Information Commissioner issued a monetary penalty of £7,552,800 [78] - but that penalty is NOT settled or collected. A First-tier Tribunal held the Commissioner lacked jurisdiction; the Upper Tribunal allowed the Commissioner's appeal, holding that decision "was materially in error of law", set it aside, and "remit[ted] this matter to a new FTT for consideration of the substantive appeal" [79]. The breaches and the penalty remain undetermined. WHAT THE COURTS HAVE SAID ABOUT AGGREGATION The legal question running under every system on this page is whether many individually-public observations become something different when combined. The Supreme Court answered it for phone-location records in Carpenter: "A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements" [80], and mapping a phone's location over 127 days "provides an all-encompassing record of the holder's whereabouts" [81]. The Court stressed what retrospective data uniquely enables - "access to a category of information otherwise unknowable", because past attempts to reconstruct movements "were limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection" [82] - and that the reach is universal: "Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance" [83]. The holding was expressly narrow, confined to "the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party" [84]. The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, applied that reasoning to wide-area aerial surveillance and struck down Baltimore's programme: "because the AIR program enables police to deduce from the whole of individuals' movements, we hold that accessing its data is a search, and its warrantless operation violates the Fourth Amendment" [85]. Although each image showed people only as dots, the court held this still yields "a wealth of detail, greater than the sum of the individual trips" [86], and rejected the argument that treating it as one more investigative tool could insulate it: doing so "allows inference to insulate a search" [87]. Closest to the plate readers on this page, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the aggregation principle expressly while finding it not triggered on the facts before it. It described the doctrine as the mosaic theory and reconciled it with existing law by reasoning that "the whole of one's movements, even if they are all individually public, are not knowingly exposed in the aggregate" [88]. Its forward-looking statement is the one that matters for a growing camera network: "With enough cameras in enough locations, the historic location data from an ALPR system in Massachusetts would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy and would constitute a search for constitutional purposes. The one-year retention period indicated in the EOPSS retention policy certainly is long enough to warrant constitutional protection" [89]. On those facts - four cameras at fixed points on two bridges - no search occurred [90], and the court declined a bright-line rule, noting the question "is not merely an exercise in counting cameras" but turns on how substantial a picture is revealed, and on where the cameras sit [91]. WHAT THIS PAGE DOES NOT YET ESTABLISH Some widely reported aspects remain absent because a primary record has not been obtained and verified. These include Flock Safety's "Vehicle Fingerprint" attribute list and its retention defaults beyond what its own policy states, and the geofence-warrant case law. The Illinois state court's own settlement order was not retrieved - the settlement's terms above come from the federal court's order and from UK tribunal findings, both primary records, but not from the state court document itself. Appendix C of the DHS Inspector General report, listing the CBP, ICE and Secret Service commercial-telemetry contracts, is redacted, so no vendor names or contract values are drawn from it. The Massachusetts opinion is cited from a court-opinion repository rather than the court's own domain, because the official slip-opinion file is no longer served. These are recorded as gaps rather than filled in from secondary reporting.

Showing 781 of 781 positions on record — no filters applied

Officials on Mass Surveillance, Tracking, and Flock Safety

A side is derived from the DIRECTION of the measures an official is recorded on — each measure mapped once, from what it would have done, with the primary record cited. It is not a score, not a verdict, and not a statement about what anyone believes. An official recorded on measures pointing both ways is listed as on record both ways, never assigned to a side; 580 of 781 positions here fall on a mapped measure, and the rest are not classified.

Showing 477 of 477 officials — no filters applied

Officials on this issue

DYvette D. Clarke	1	—	5
RKelly Ayotte	0	—	1
DLaura Gillen	0	—	1
RRobert P. Bresnahan, Jr.	0	—	1
RVince Fong	0	—	1
DMarilyn Strickland	0	—	1
DSharice Davids	0	—	2
RPete Stauber	0	—	2
RBrian J. Mast	0	—	2
DAndré Carson	0	—	3
DRick Larsen	0	—	2
RJimmy Patronis	0	—	1
RKimberlyn King-Hinds	0	—	1
RBrad Knott	0	—	1
DShomari Figures	0	—	1
RAddison P. McDowell	0	—	1
DLaura Friedman	0	—	1
DKristen McDonald Rivet	0	—	1
RJeff Hurd	0	—	1
DNellie Pou	0	—	1
DChristopher R. Deluzio	0	—	3
DValerie P. Foushee	0	—	3
RTony Wied	0	—	1
DHillary J. Scholten	0	—	2
DEmilia Strong Sykes	0	—	2
IKevin Kiley	0	—	2
DVal T. Hoyle	0	—	4
RMike Ezell	0	—	2
DPatrick Ryan	0	—	2
RMike Collins	0	—	2
DSeth Moulton	0	—	3
DChris Pappas	0	—	2
RTroy E. Nehls	0	—	2
RJefferson Van Drew	0	—	2
DGreg Stanton	0	—	2
DSalud O. Carbajal	0	—	2
DMark DeSaulnier	0	—	3
DJulia Brownley	0	—	2
DJared Huffman	0	—	3
DDina Titus	0	—	2
RDavid Rouzer	0	—	2
DHenry C. "Hank" Johnson, Jr.	0	—	3
DJerrold Nadler	0	—	3
RDaniel Webster	0	—	2
DEleanor Holmes Norton	0	—	6
RSam Graves	0	—	2
RRobert F. Onder, Jr.	0	—	1
DRobert Garcia	0	—	4
REric Burlison	0	—	2
REric A. "Rick" Crawford	0	—	2
RClay Fuller	0	—	1
RMike Kennedy	0	—	1
DMaxwell Frost	0	—	3
RDavid J. Taylor	0	—	1
RJefferson Shreve	0	—	1
RNicholas J. Begich III	0	—	1
RTom Barrett	0	—	1
RBurgess Owens	0	—	2
RTracey Mann	0	—	2
DJesús G. "Chuy" García	0	—	4
RDusty Johnson	0	—	2
RTim Burchett	0	—	2
RBruce Westerman	0	—	2
RMike Bost	0	—	2
RScott Perry	0	—	2
RBrian Babin	0	—	1
DDarren Soto	0	—	3
DDaniel S. Goldman	0	—	4
DRon Wyden	0	—	6
DAdriano Espaillat	0	—	4
DShri Thanedar	0	—	3
DMaxine Dexter	0	—	3
DGreg Casar	0	—	5
DApril McClain Delaney	0	—	1
DRashida Tlaib	0	—	4
DDebbie Dingell	0	—	2
DMelanie A. Stansbury	0	—	2
DJulie Johnson	0	—	1
DTed Lieu	0	—	3
DRobin L. Kelly	0	—	3
DChellie Pingree	0	—	3
DJonathan L. Jackson	0	—	3
DLateefah Simon	0	—	4
DJohn B. Larson	0	—	2
DJimmy Gomez	0	—	3
DGabe Amo	0	—	2
DGrace Meng	0	—	3
DZoe Lofgren	0	—	3
DMark Takano	0	—	3
DNydia M. Velázquez	0	—	4
DSara Jacobs	0	—	4
DRo Khanna	0	—	4
DLloyd Doggett	0	—	3
DLinda T. Sánchez	0	—	3
DLaMonica McIver	0	—	1
DDelia C. Ramirez	0	—	3
DIlhan Omar	0	—	2
DMark Pocan	0	—	2
DBonnie Watson Coleman	0	—	2
DJudy Chu	0	—	2
DJanice D. Schakowsky	0	—	3
DDanny K. Davis	0	—	3
DYassamin Ansari	0	—	3
DAl Green	0	—	3
DSummer L. Lee	0	—	3
DDeborah K. Ross	0	—	2
DEmily Randall	0	—	2
DDonald S. Beyer, Jr.	0	—	2
DRobert C. "Bobby" Scott	0	—	2
DSylvia R. Garcia	0	—	3
DAlexandria Ocasio-Cortez	0	—	3
DJasmine Crockett	0	—	4
DNanette Diaz Barragán	0	—	3
DBrittany Pettersen	0	—	2
DAngie Craig	0	—	2
DRobert Menendez	0	—	3
DJohn Garamendi	0	—	3
DPramila Jayapal	0	—	3
DJames P. McGovern	0	—	3
DMary Gay Scanlon	0	—	3
DBecca Balint	0	—	3
DPaul Tonko	0	—	3
DGwen Moore	0	—	2
DDoris O. Matsui	0	—	3
DChristian D. Menefee	0	—	1
DElizabeth Warren	0	—	3
DRitchie Torres	0	—	2
DLuz M. Rivas	0	—	1
DJoaquin Castro	0	—	2
DAdelita S. Grijalva	0	—	1
DMike Quigley	0	—	2
DRichard E. Neal	0	—	2
DVeronica Escobar	0	—	2
DKelly Morrison	0	—	1
DMike Levin	0	—	2
DShontel M. Brown	0	—	4
DLori Trahan	0	—	2
DChris Van Hollen	0	—	3
DBrian Schatz	0	—	3
DPeter Welch	0	—	3
DTammy Duckworth	0	—	3
DRaja Krishnamoorthi	0	—	5
DEdward J. Markey	0	—	3
DJeff Merkley	0	—	3
DCory A. Booker	0	—	3
DBen Ray Luján	0	—	3
DJuan Vargas	0	—	2
DAngela D. Alsobrooks	0	—	1
DRaphael G. Warnock	0	—	1
DAdam B. Schiff	0	—	2
DMadeleine Dean	0	—	2
DAndy Kim	0	—	2
DRichard Blumenthal	0	—	3
DAlex Padilla	0	—	3
DStephen F. Lynch	0	—	3
DNorma J. Torres	0	—	2
DSuzanne Bonamici	0	—	2
DAndrea Salinas	0	—	2
DDave Min	0	—	1
DJames R. Walkinshaw	0	—	1
DGavin Newsom	0	—	1
DJacky Rosen	0	—	2
RMike Rounds	0	—	3
DCharles E. Schumer	0	—	2
DJeanne Shaheen	0	—	2
DMark R. Warner	0	—	3
DSheldon Whitehouse	0	—	3
RRoger F. Wicker	0	—	3
RJohn Barrasso	0	—	2
DMichael F. Bennet	0	—	3
RJohn Boozman	0	—	2
RTed Budd	0	—	2
RBill Cassidy	0	—	2
RJohn Cornyn	0	—	2
RTom Cotton	0	—	2
RMike Crapo	0	—	2
RJoni Ernst	0	—	2
DJohn Fetterman	0	—	2
DKirsten E. Gillibrand	0	—	3
RLindsey Graham	0	—	3
RChuck Grassley	0	—	2
DMartin Heinrich	0	—	2
DJohn W. Hickenlooper	0	—	2
RCindy Hyde-Smith	0	—	2
DTim Kaine	0	—	2
DMark Kelly	0	—	3
IAngus S. King, Jr.	0	—	3
RJames Lankford	0	—	3
RMitch McConnell	0	—	2
RJerry Moran	0	—	3
DJon Ossoff	0	—	3
DJack Reed	0	—	2
RPete Ricketts	0	—	2
RJames E. Risch	0	—	2
RRick Scott	0	—	2
DTina Smith	0	—	2
RJohn Thune	0	—	2
RThom Tillis	0	—	2
RTodd Young	0	—	2
RDeb Fischer	0	—	2
DAmy Klobuchar	0	—	3
RLisa Murkowski	0	—	2
DGary C. Peters	0	—	2
RKatie Boyd Britt	0	—	2
RSusan M. Collins	0	—	3
DMargaret Wood Hassan	0	—	2
RTim Scott	0	—	2
DTammy Baldwin	0	—	2
RJosh Hawley	0	—	2
DMazie K. Hirono	0	—	2
RJohn Hoeven	0	—	2
RRon Johnson	0	—	2
RMike Lee	0	—	2
DMaria Cantwell	0	—	2
DChristopher A. Coons	0	—	2
RKevin Cramer	0	—	2
RTed Cruz	0	—	2
DRichard J. Durbin	0	—	2
RJohn Kennedy	0	—	2
RRoger Marshall	0	—	2
RTommy Tuberville	0	—	2
RCynthia M. Lummis	0	—	2
RRand Paul	0	—	2
DPatty Murray	0	—	2
IBernard Sanders	0	—	2
RSteve Daines	0	—	2
DChristopher Murphy	0	—	2
RDan Sullivan	0	—	2
DGreg Landsman	0	—	1
RRobert E. Latta	0	—	1
RMichael Lawler	0	—	1
RFrank D. Lucas	0	—	1
RNicole Malliotakis	0	—	1
DLucy McBath	0	—	1
RMichael T. McCaul	0	—	1
DJennifer L. McClellan	0	—	1
DBetty McCollum	0	—	1
DGregory W. Meeks	0	—	1
RMax L. Miller	0	—	1
RCarol D. Miller	0	—	1
RMariannette Miller-Meeks	0	—	1
RBlake D. Moore	0	—	1
DJared Moskowitz	0	—	1
RJames C. Moylan	0	—	1
DFrank J. Mrvan	0	—	1
DKevin Mullin	0	—	1
RGregory F. Murphy	0	—	1
DJoe Neguse	0	—	1
DDonald Norcross	0	—	1
RZachary Nunn	0	—	1
RJay Obernolte	0	—	1
DJimmy Panetta	0	—	1
DNancy Pelosi	0	—	1
DScott H. Peters	0	—	1
RAugust Pfluger	0	—	1
DJamie Raskin	0	—	1
RMike Rogers	0	—	1
RHarold Rogers	0	—	1
DRaul Ruiz	0	—	1
RJohn H. Rutherford	0	—	1
RMaria Elvira Salazar	0	—	1
RSteve Scalise	0	—	1
DBradley Scott Schneider	0	—	1
DKim Schrier	0	—	1
RAustin Scott	0	—	1
DTerri A. Sewell	0	—	1
DElissa Slotkin	0	—	1
RAdrian Smith	0	—	1
DAdam Smith	0	—	1
RLloyd Smucker	0	—	1
DEric Sorensen	0	—	1
RElise M. Stefanik	0	—	1
DHaley M. Stevens	0	—	1
RDale W. Strong	0	—	1
DThomas R. Suozzi	0	—	1
RClaudia Tenney	0	—	1
DBennie G. Thompson	0	—	1
RMichael R. Turner	0	—	3
RDavid G. Valadao	0	—	1
RDerrick Van Orden	0	—	1
DGabe Vasquez	0	—	1
DMarc A. Veasey	0	—	1
RAnn Wagner	0	—	1
DDebbie Wasserman Schultz	0	—	1
DFrederica S. Wilson	0	—	1
RSteve Womack	0	—	1
RKat Cammack	0	—	1
RLauren Boebert	0	—	1
DSuzan K. DelBene	0	—	1
RScott DesJarlais	0	—	1
RJodey C. Arrington	0	—	1
RBen Cline	0	—	1
RMark E. Amodei	0	—	1
DJ. Luis Correa	0	—	1
RJames Comer	0	—	1
RJulia Letlow	0	—	1
RJake Ellzey	0	—	1
RRandy Feenstra	0	—	1
DJahana Hayes	0	—	1
RAshley Hinson	0	—	1
RThomas H. Kean, Jr.	0	—	1
RYoung Kim	0	—	1
RNick LaLota	0	—	1
DSusie Lee	0	—	1
DSeth Magaziner	0	—	1
DJoseph D. Morelle	0	—	1
DMike Thompson	0	—	1
DLauren Underwood	0	—	1
RRick W. Allen	0	—	1
DDwight Evans	0	—	1
RPat Fallon	0	—	1
RBrad Finstad	0	—	1
RMichelle Fischbach	0	—	1
RJack Bergman	0	—	1
RScott Fitzgerald	0	—	1
RVirginia Foxx	0	—	1
RRussell Fry	0	—	1
RElijah Crane	0	—	1
DDiana DeGette	0	—	1
RTom Emmer	0	—	1
RRuss Fulcher	0	—	1
RPaul A. Gosar	0	—	1
RGlenn Grothman	0	—	1
RMichael Guest	0	—	1
RHarriet M. Hageman	0	—	1
RAndy Harris	0	—	1
RDiana Harshbarger	0	—	1
RKevin Hern	0	—	1
RClay Higgins	0	—	1
DSteven Horsford	0	—	1
RErin Houchin	0	—	1
RRichard Hudson	0	—	1
RWesley Hunt	0	—	1
RDarrell Issa	0	—	1
RJohn James	0	—	1
RJohn Joyce	0	—	1
DSydney Kamlager-Dove	0	—	1
RNicholas A. Langworthy	0	—	1
RLaurel M. Lee	0	—	3
DTeresa Leger Fernandez	0	—	1
RBarry Loudermilk	0	—	1
RAnna Paulina Luna	0	—	1
RMorgan Luttrell	0	—	1
RNancy Mace	0	—	1
RCeleste Maloy	0	—	1
RThomas Massie	0	—	1
RLisa C. McClain	0	—	1
RTom McClintock	0	—	1
DMorgan McGarvey	0	—	1
RDaniel Meuser	0	—	1
DKweisi Mfume	0	—	1
RMary E. Miller	0	—	1
RCory Mills	0	—	1
RBarry Moore	0	—	1
RNathaniel Moran	0	—	1
RDan Newhouse	0	—	1
RAndrew Ogles	0	—	1
RGary J. Palmer	0	—	1
DAyanna Pressley	0	—	1
RGuy Reschenthaler	0	—	1
RChip Roy	0	—	1
RDavid Schweikert	0	—	1
RKeith Self	0	—	1
DBrad Sherman	0	—	1
RMichael K. Simpson	0	—	1
RChristopher H. Smith	0	—	1
RVictoria Spartz	0	—	1
RBryan Steil	0	—	1
RGlenn Thompson	0	—	1
RThomas P. Tiffany	0	—	1
RWilliam R. Timmons IV	0	—	1
DJill N. Tokuda	0	—	1
RBeth Van Duyne	0	—	1
RTim Walberg	0	—	1
DMaxine Waters	0	—	1
RRandy K. Weber, Sr.	0	—	1
DNikema Williams	0	—	1
RJoe Wilson	0	—	1
RRudy Yakym III	0	—	1
RRyan K. Zinke	0	—	1
RWarren Davidson	0	—	1
RJohn R. Curtis	0	—	1
RJuan Ciscomani	0	—	1
RMichael Cloud	0	—	1
RAndrew S. Clyde	0	—	1
DAlma S. Adams	0	—	1
RMark Alford	0	—	1
RJames R. Baird	0	—	1
RJim Banks	0	—	1
RAaron Bean	0	—	1
DJoyce Beatty	0	—	1
RCliff Bentz	0	—	1
RAndy Biggs	0	—	1
RGus M. Bilirakis	0	—	1
RJosh Brecheen	0	—	1
RCharles J. "Chuck" Fleischmann	0	—	1
RLance Gooden	0	—	1
RH. Morgan Griffith	0	—	1
RBill Huizenga	0	—	1
RRonny Jackson	0	—	1
RJim Jordan	0	—	1
RRichard McCormick	0	—	1
RJohn R. Moolenaar	0	—	1
RRalph Norman	0	—	1
DFrank Pallone, Jr.	0	—	1
RJohn W. Rose	0	—	1
RPete Sessions	0	—	1
RJason Smith	0	—	1
RW. Gregory Steube	0	—	1
RRoger Williams	0	—	1
DTroy A. Carter	0	—	1
RJohn R. Carter	0	—	1
DEd Case	0	—	1
DKathy Castor	0	—	1
DKatherine M. Clark	0	—	1
DEmanuel Cleaver	0	—	1
DJames E. Clyburn	0	—	1
DSteve Cohen	0	—	1
RTom Cole	0	—	1
DJim Costa	0	—	1
DJoe Courtney	0	—	1
RRobert B. Aderholt	0	—	1
DPete Aguilar	0	—	1
DJake Auchincloss	0	—	1
RDon Bacon	0	—	1
DAmi Bera	0	—	1
DSanford D. Bishop, Jr.	0	—	1
DLisa Blunt Rochester	0	—	1
RVern Buchanan	0	—	1
DNikki Budzinski	0	—	1
RKen Calvert	0	—	1
RDan Crenshaw	0	—	1
DJason Crow	0	—	1
DHenry Cuellar	0	—	1
DDonald G. Davis	0	—	1
RMonica De La Cruz	0	—	1
DRosa L. DeLauro	0	—	1
RMario Diaz-Balart	0	—	1
RRon Estes	0	—	1
RBrian K. Fitzpatrick	0	—	1
DLizzie Fletcher	0	—	1
RMike Flood	0	—	1
DBill Foster	0	—	1
DLois Frankel	0	—	1
RScott Franklin	0	—	1
RAndrew R. Garbarino	0	—	1
RCarlos A. Gimenez	0	—	1
DJared F. Golden	0	—	1
DVicente Gonzalez	0	—	1
DJosh Gottheimer	0	—	1
RBrett Guthrie	0	—	1
DJosh Harder	0	—	1
RJ. French Hill	0	—	1
DJames A. Himes	0	—	2
DChrissy Houlahan	0	—	1
DSteny H. Hoyer	0	—	1
DGlenn Ivey	0	—	1
DHakeem S. Jeffries	0	—	1
RMike Johnson	0	—	1
RDavid P. Joyce	0	—	1
DMarcy Kaptur	0	—	1
DWilliam R. Keating	0	—	1
RTrent Kelly	0	—	1
RMike Kelly	0	—	1
RJennifer A. Kiggans	0	—	1
RDavid Kustoff	0	—	1
RDarin LaHood	0	—	1
RByron Donalds	0	—	1
RMike Carey	0	—	1
RNeal P. Dunn	0	—	1
REarl L. "Buddy" Carter	0	—	1
DSean Casten	0	—	1
RChuck Edwards	0	—	1
RTroy Balderson	0	—	1
RAndy Barr	0	—	1
RStephanie I. Bice	0	—	1
DBrendan F. Boyle	0	—	1

Positions on record

Kelly AyotteStated position
Signed New Hampshire House Bill 1059 into law on 28 May 2026 as Chapter 88, the act repealing the scheduled 2027 repeal of New Hampshire's regulation of number plate scanning devices, so that the regulation of those devices remains in force.
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Laura GillenRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Vince FongRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Marilyn StricklandRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Sharice DavidsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Pete StauberRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Brian J. MastRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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André CarsonRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Rick LarsenRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Jimmy PatronisRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Kimberlyn King-HindsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Brad KnottRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Shomari FiguresRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Addison P. McDowellRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Laura FriedmanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Kristen McDonald RivetRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Jeff HurdRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Nellie PouRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Christopher R. DeluzioRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Valerie P. FousheeRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Tony WiedRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Hillary J. ScholtenRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Emilia Strong SykesRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Kevin KileyRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Val T. HoyleRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Mike EzellRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Patrick RyanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Mike CollinsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Seth MoultonRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Chris PappasRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Troy E. NehlsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Jefferson Van DrewRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Greg StantonRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Salud O. CarbajalRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Mark DeSaulnierRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Julia BrownleyRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Jared HuffmanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Dina TitusRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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David RouzerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Henry C. "Hank" Johnson, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Jerrold NadlerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Daniel WebsterRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Eleanor Holmes NortonRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Sam GravesRecorded vote
On record voting NAY in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Robert F. Onder, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Robert GarciaRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Eric BurlisonRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Eric A. "Rick" CrawfordRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Clay FullerRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Mike KennedyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Maxwell FrostRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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David J. TaylorRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Jefferson ShreveRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Nicholas J. Begich IIIRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Tom BarrettRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Burgess OwensRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Tracey MannRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Jesús G. "Chuy" GarcíaRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Dusty JohnsonRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Tim BurchettRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Bruce WestermanRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Mike BostRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Scott PerryRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Brian BabinRecorded vote
On record voting YEA in the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on Perry Amendment No. 221 to H.R. 8870, an amendment providing that a recipient of assistance under title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling. The amendment was not agreed to, 20 yeas to 44 nays.
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Darren SotoStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Daniel S. GoldmanStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Ron WydenStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Adriano EspaillatStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Shri ThanedarStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Maxine DexterStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Yvette D. ClarkeStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Greg CasarStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Eleanor Holmes NortonStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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April McClain DelaneyStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Rashida TlaibStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Debbie DingellStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Melanie A. StansburyStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Julie JohnsonStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Ted LieuStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Robin L. KellyStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Chellie PingreeStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Jonathan L. JacksonStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Lateefah SimonStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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John B. LarsonStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Jimmy GomezStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Gabe AmoStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Grace MengStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Greg CasarStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Zoe LofgrenStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Robert GarciaStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Mark TakanoStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Nydia M. VelázquezStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Sara JacobsStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Ro KhannaStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Yvette D. ClarkeStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Lloyd DoggettStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Linda T. SánchezStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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LaMonica McIverStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Delia C. RamirezStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Chellie PingreeStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Christopher R. DeluzioStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Ilhan OmarStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Mark PocanStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Bonnie Watson ColemanStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Lateefah SimonStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Judy ChuStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Daniel S. GoldmanStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Maxine DexterStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Janice D. SchakowskyStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Danny K. DavisStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Yassamin AnsariStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Al GreenStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Summer L. LeeStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Deborah K. RossStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Emily RandallStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Donald S. Beyer, Jr.Stated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Maxwell FrostStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Robert C. "Bobby" ScottStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Sylvia R. GarciaStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Val T. HoyleStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Nydia M. VelázquezStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Alexandria Ocasio-CortezStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Henry C. "Hank" Johnson, Jr.Stated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Sara JacobsStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Jasmine CrockettStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Danny K. DavisStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Nanette Diaz BarragánStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Brittany PettersenStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Angie CraigStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Robert MenendezStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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John GaramendiStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
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Al GreenStated position
On record demanding that DHS and ICE account for their use of Palantir-developed data analytics together with Clearview AI facial recognition, PenLink, L3Harris stingray and Paragon Solutions phone surveillance, and objecting to a mass surveillance ecosystem that has swept in U.S. citizens observing or protesting immigration enforcement.
View position & sources →
Adriano EspaillatStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
View position & sources →
Pramila JayapalStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
View position & sources →
James P. McGovernStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
View position & sources →
Jared HuffmanStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Jerrold NadlerStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Eleanor Holmes NortonStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Mary Gay ScanlonStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Jonathan L. JacksonStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
View position & sources →
Becca BalintStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Paul TonkoStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Jesús G. "Chuy" GarcíaStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Gwen MooreStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Valerie P. FousheeStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Doris O. MatsuiStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Christian D. MenefeeStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Mark DeSaulnierStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Shri ThanedarStated position
On record urging congressional leadership to attach Fourth Amendment protections to FISA Section 702 reauthorization: closing the data broker loophole and requiring a judicial warrant before the government accesses Americans' sensitive information, ending the Section 702 backdoor search loophole, and repealing the Section 702 'visa vetting' provision.
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Seth MoultonStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Elizabeth WarrenStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Lateefah SimonStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Ritchie TorresStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Robert MenendezStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Mark TakanoStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
View position & sources →
Sylvia R. GarciaStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
View position & sources →
Janice D. SchakowskyStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Luz M. RivasStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Joaquin CastroStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Daniel S. GoldmanStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Adelita S. GrijalvaStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Delia C. RamirezStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Mike QuigleyStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Richard E. NealStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Becca BalintStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Darren SotoStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Linda T. SánchezStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Jasmine CrockettStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Veronica EscobarStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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John GaramendiStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Val T. HoyleStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Kelly MorrisonStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Mike LevinStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
View position & sources →
Mary Gay ScanlonStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Zoe LofgrenStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Robin L. KellyStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Ro KhannaStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Pramila JayapalStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
View position & sources →
Alexandria Ocasio-CortezStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Shontel M. BrownStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Yvette D. ClarkeStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Lori TrahanStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Sara JacobsStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Chris Van HollenStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Brian SchatzStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Peter WelchStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Tammy DuckworthStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Adriano EspaillatStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Greg CasarStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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James P. McGovernStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
View position & sources →
Raja KrishnamoorthiStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Grace MengStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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André CarsonStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Nydia M. VelázquezStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
View position & sources →
Jimmy GomezStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Rashida TlaibStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Nanette Diaz BarragánStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Edward J. MarkeyStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Jeff MerkleyStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Cory A. BookerStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Ben Ray LujánStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Juan VargasStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Angela D. AlsobrooksStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Raphael G. WarnockStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Adam B. SchiffStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Madeleine DeanStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Andy KimStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Richard BlumenthalStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Alex PadillaStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Ron WydenStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Jesús G. "Chuy" GarcíaStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Stephen F. LynchStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Paul TonkoStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Lloyd DoggettStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Eleanor Holmes NortonStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Norma J. TorresStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Doris O. MatsuiStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Suzanne BonamiciStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Maxine DexterStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Andrea SalinasStated position
On record asserting that the government ordinarily must obtain a judicial warrant to compel cell phone location data, and urging the DHS Inspector General to open a second investigation into ICE and other DHS components purchasing Americans' location data from commercial data brokers without one.
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Stephen F. LynchStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
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Dave MinStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
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Eleanor Holmes NortonStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Emily RandallStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Shontel M. BrownStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Ro KhannaStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Jasmine CrockettStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Yassamin AnsariStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Rashida TlaibStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Raja KrishnamoorthiStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Greg CasarStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Lateefah SimonStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
James R. WalkinshawStated position
On record objecting to ICE's acquisition of Penlink tools that collect and search cellphone location data across entire neighborhoods, and demanding that DHS identify any legal justification for mass electronic surveillance conducted without a judicial or administrative warrant.
View position & sources →
Raja KrishnamoorthiStated position
On record urging the FTC to investigate Flock Safety and hold it accountable for not requiring multi-factor authentication on law enforcement accounts, characterizing that failure as an unfair business practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act.
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Ron WydenStated position
On record urging the FTC to investigate Flock Safety and hold it accountable for not requiring multi-factor authentication on law enforcement accounts, characterizing that failure as an unfair business practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act.
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Ron WydenStated position
On record stating that abuse of Flock Safety's license-plate surveillance network is inevitable and that the company neither audits nor takes responsibility for law enforcement searches; recommends that communities that installed Flock cameras reevaluate and remove them.
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Shontel M. BrownStated position
On record objecting to ICE activating a contract for Paragon Solutions' Graphite phone-hacking spyware, and questioning whether ICE's use of spyware can be squared with Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless search and seizure.
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Yassamin AnsariStated position
On record objecting to ICE activating a contract for Paragon Solutions' Graphite phone-hacking spyware, and questioning whether ICE's use of spyware can be squared with Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless search and seizure.
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Summer L. LeeStated position
On record objecting to ICE activating a contract for Paragon Solutions' Graphite phone-hacking spyware, and questioning whether ICE's use of spyware can be squared with Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless search and seizure.
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Gavin NewsomStated position
Vetoed California Senate Bill 274 on 1 October 2025, a measure that would have placed a default 60-day limit on how long public entities may retain automated license plate reader data and restricted sharing of it, on the stated ground that the bill did not strike the balance between individual privacy and public safety.
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Raja KrishnamoorthiStated position
On record objecting to the use of Flock's automatic license plate reader network to track people across state lines for abortion-related and immigration enforcement purposes, and demanding transparency and accountability over who accesses that data and how.
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Robert GarciaStated position
On record objecting to the use of Flock's automatic license plate reader network to track people across state lines for abortion-related and immigration enforcement purposes, and demanding transparency and accountability over who accesses that data and how.
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Jacky RosenRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Mike RoundsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Charles E. SchumerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Jeanne ShaheenRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Mark R. WarnerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Sheldon WhitehouseRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Roger F. WickerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John BarrassoRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Michael F. BennetRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Richard BlumenthalRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Cory A. BookerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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John BoozmanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Ted BuddRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Bill CassidyRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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John CornynRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tom CottonRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Mike CrapoRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tammy DuckworthRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Joni ErnstRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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John FettermanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Kirsten E. GillibrandRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Lindsey GrahamRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Chuck GrassleyRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Martin HeinrichRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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John W. HickenlooperRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Cindy Hyde-SmithRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tim KaineRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Mark KellyRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Angus S. King, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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James LankfordRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Ben Ray LujánRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Mitch McConnellRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Jerry MoranRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Jon OssoffRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Alex PadillaRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Jack ReedRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Pete RickettsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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James E. RischRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Jacky RosenRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Mike RoundsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Charles E. SchumerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Rick ScottRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Jeanne ShaheenRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tina SmithRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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John ThuneRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Thom TillisRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Mark R. WarnerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Sheldon WhitehouseRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Roger F. WickerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Todd YoungRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Deb FischerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John W. HickenlooperRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Joni ErnstRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Angus S. King, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Amy KlobucharRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Mitch McConnellRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Lisa MurkowskiRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Gary C. PetersRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Brian SchatzRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John ThuneRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Thom TillisRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Todd YoungRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Katie Boyd BrittRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Susan M. CollinsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Deb FischerRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Mike CrapoRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Margaret Wood HassanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Amy KlobucharRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Gary C. PetersRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Brian SchatzRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tim ScottRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tammy BaldwinRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John BarrassoRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Josh HawleyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Martin HeinrichRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Mazie K. HironoRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John HoevenRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Ron JohnsonRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Tim KaineRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Mike LeeRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Ben Ray LujánRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Ron WydenRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Tammy BaldwinRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Maria CantwellRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Christopher A. CoonsRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Kevin CramerRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Ted CruzRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Richard J. DurbinRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Josh HawleyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Mazie K. HironoRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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John HoevenRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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John KennedyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Mike LeeRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Edward J. MarkeyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Roger MarshallRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tommy TubervilleRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Chris Van HollenRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Elizabeth WarrenRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Ron WydenRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tom CottonRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John CornynRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Roger MarshallRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Susan M. CollinsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Bill CassidyRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Jeff MerkleyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Cynthia M. LummisRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Edward J. MarkeyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Maria CantwellRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Peter WelchRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Jeff MerkleyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Elizabeth WarrenRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Christopher A. CoonsRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Rand PaulRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Kevin CramerRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Patty MurrayRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Bernard SandersRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John FettermanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Ted CruzRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Steve DainesRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Lisa MurkowskiRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Bernard SandersRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Rick ScottRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Tim ScottRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Richard J. DurbinRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Patty MurrayRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Christopher MurphyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Tina SmithRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Dan SullivanRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Tommy TubervilleRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Cory A. BookerRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John KennedyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Alex PadillaRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Rand PaulRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Chris Van HollenRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Steve DainesRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Ron JohnsonRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Cynthia M. LummisRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Christopher MurphyRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Dan SullivanRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Peter WelchRecorded vote
On record voting YEA on Paul Amendment No. 1829 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to append the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act to the bill. The amendment was rejected 31 to 61, a three-fifths majority being required.
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Tammy DuckworthRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Michael F. BennetRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Richard BlumenthalRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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John BoozmanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Katie Boyd BrittRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Ted BuddRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Kirsten E. GillibrandRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Lindsey GrahamRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Chuck GrassleyRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Margaret Wood HassanRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Cindy Hyde-SmithRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Mark KellyRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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James LankfordRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Jerry MoranRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Jon OssoffRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Jack ReedRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Pete RickettsRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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James E. RischRecorded vote
On record voting NAY on Durbin Amendment No. 1841, as modified, to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment whose stated purpose was to prohibit warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons. The amendment was rejected 42 to 50.
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Greg LandsmanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Rick LarsenRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John B. LarsonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Robert E. LattaRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Michael LawlerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Veronica EscobarRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike LevinRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Frank D. LucasRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Stephen F. LynchRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nicole MalliotakisRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lucy McBathRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Michael T. McCaulRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jennifer L. McClellanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Betty McCollumRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Gregory W. MeeksRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Robert MenendezRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Max L. MillerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Carol D. MillerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mariannette Miller-MeeksRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Blake D. MooreRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jared MoskowitzRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Seth MoultonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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James C. MoylanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Frank J. MrvanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Kevin MullinRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Gregory F. MurphyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Joe NeguseRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Donald NorcrossRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Zachary NunnRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jay ObernolteRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jimmy PanettaRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Chris PappasRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nancy PelosiRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Scott H. PetersRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Brittany PettersenRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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August PflugerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike QuigleyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jamie RaskinRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike RogersRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Harold RogersRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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David RouzerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Raul RuizRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John H. RutherfordRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Patrick RyanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Maria Elvira SalazarRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Linda T. SánchezRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Steve ScaliseRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Bradley Scott SchneiderRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Kim SchrierRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Austin ScottRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Terri A. SewellRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Elissa SlotkinRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Adrian SmithRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Adam SmithRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lloyd SmuckerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Eric SorensenRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Darren SotoRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Greg StantonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Elise M. StefanikRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Haley M. StevensRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Dale W. StrongRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Thomas R. SuozziRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Emilia Strong SykesRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Claudia TenneyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Bennie G. ThompsonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Norma J. TorresRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lori TrahanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Michael R. TurnerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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David G. ValadaoRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Derrick Van OrdenRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Gabe VasquezRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Marc A. VeaseyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ann WagnerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Debbie Wasserman SchultzRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Frederica S. WilsonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Steve WomackRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Kat CammackRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lauren BoebertRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Suzan K. DelBeneRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Christopher R. DeluzioRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mark DeSaulnierRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Scott DesJarlaisRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jodey C. ArringtonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ben ClineRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Yvette D. ClarkeStated position
I promise to continue standing beside my colleagues in Congress and behind the American people until we know the necessary answers to how this defective technology can be used for effective law enforcement.
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Lloyd DoggettRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mark E. AmodeiRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Joaquin CastroRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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J. Luis CorreaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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James ComerRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Julia LetlowRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jake EllzeyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Randy FeenstraRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jahana HayesRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ashley HinsonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Thomas H. Kean, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Young KimRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nick LaLotaRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Susie LeeRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ted LieuRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Seth MagazinerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Joseph D. MorelleRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Richard E. NealRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Adam B. SchiffRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike ThompsonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Dina TitusRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Adriano EspaillatRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lauren UnderwoodRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Juan VargasRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Rick W. AllenRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Dwight EvansRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Pat FallonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Becca BalintRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Brad FinstadRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Michelle FischbachRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jack BergmanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Scott FitzgeraldRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Virginia FoxxRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Russell FryRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Eric BurlisonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Elijah CraneRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Diana DeGetteRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Tom EmmerRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Valerie P. FousheeRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Russ FulcherRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Sylvia R. GarciaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Robert GarciaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Paul A. GosarRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Al GreenRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Glenn GrothmanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Michael GuestRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Harriet M. HagemanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Andy HarrisRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Diana HarshbargerRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Kevin HernRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Clay HigginsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Steven HorsfordRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Erin HouchinRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Val T. HoyleRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Richard HudsonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jared HuffmanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Wesley HuntRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Darrell IssaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jonathan L. JacksonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Sara JacobsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John JamesRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Pramila JayapalRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Dusty JohnsonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John JoyceRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Sydney Kamlager-DoveRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ro KhannaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Kevin KileyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nicholas A. LangworthyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Laurel M. LeeRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Summer L. LeeRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Teresa Leger FernandezRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Zoe LofgrenRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Barry LoudermilkRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Anna Paulina LunaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Morgan LuttrellRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nancy MaceRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Celeste MaloyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Tracey MannRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Thomas MassieRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Doris O. MatsuiRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lisa C. McClainRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Tom McClintockRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Morgan McGarveyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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James P. McGovernRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Daniel MeuserRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Kweisi MfumeRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mary E. MillerRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Cory MillsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Barry MooreRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Gwen MooreRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nathaniel MoranRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jerrold NadlerRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Troy E. NehlsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Dan NewhouseRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Eleanor Holmes NortonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Alexandria Ocasio-CortezRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Andrew OglesRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ilhan OmarRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Burgess OwensRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Gary J. PalmerRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Chellie PingreeRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mark PocanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ayanna PressleyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Guy ReschenthalerRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Deborah K. RossRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Chip RoyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mary Gay ScanlonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Janice D. SchakowskyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Hillary J. ScholtenRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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David SchweikertRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Robert C. "Bobby" ScottRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Keith SelfRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Brad ShermanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Michael K. SimpsonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Christopher H. SmithRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Victoria SpartzRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Pete StauberRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Bryan SteilRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mark TakanoRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Shri ThanedarRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Glenn ThompsonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Thomas P. TiffanyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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William R. Timmons IVRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Rashida TlaibRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jill N. TokudaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Paul TonkoRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ritchie TorresRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jefferson Van DrewRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Beth Van DuyneRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nydia M. VelázquezRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Tim WalbergRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Maxine WatersRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Randy K. Weber, Sr.Recorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Daniel WebsterRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Bruce WestermanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nikema WilliamsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Joe WilsonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Rudy Yakym IIIRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ryan K. ZinkeRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Danny K. DavisRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Warren DavidsonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John R. CurtisRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike CollinsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Greg CasarRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Juan CiscomaniRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Michael CloudRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Andrew S. ClydeRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Alma S. AdamsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mark AlfordRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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James R. BairdRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jim BanksRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Aaron BeanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Joyce BeattyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Cliff BentzRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Andy BiggsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Gus M. BilirakisRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Suzanne BonamiciRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike BostRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Josh BrecheenRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Shontel M. BrownRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Tim BurchettRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Debbie DingellRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Charles J. "Chuck" FleischmannRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Maxwell FrostRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jesús G. "Chuy" GarcíaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lance GoodenRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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H. Morgan GriffithRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Bill HuizengaRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ronny JacksonRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jim JordanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Brian J. MastRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Richard McCormickRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Grace MengRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John R. MoolenaarRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ralph NormanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Frank Pallone, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Scott PerryRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Delia C. RamirezRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John W. RoseRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Andrea SalinasRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Pete SessionsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jason SmithRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Melanie A. StansburyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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W. Gregory SteubeRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Bonnie Watson ColemanRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Roger WilliamsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jasmine CrockettRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Troy A. CarterRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John R. CarterRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ed CaseRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Kathy CastorRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Katherine M. ClarkRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Emanuel CleaverRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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James E. ClyburnRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Steve CohenRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Tom ColeRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jim CostaRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Joe CourtneyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Robert B. AderholtRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Pete AguilarRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Gabe AmoRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jake AuchinclossRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Don BaconRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ami BeraRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Donald S. Beyer, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Sanford D. Bishop, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lisa Blunt RochesterRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Vern BuchananRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Nikki BudzinskiRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ken CalvertRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Eric A. "Rick" CrawfordRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Dan CrenshawRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jason CrowRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Henry CuellarRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Donald G. DavisRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Monica De La CruzRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Rosa L. DeLauroRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mario Diaz-BalartRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Ron EstesRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike EzellRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Brian K. FitzpatrickRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lizzie FletcherRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike FloodRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Bill FosterRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Lois FrankelRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Scott FranklinRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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John GaramendiRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Andrew R. GarbarinoRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Carlos A. GimenezRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jared F. GoldenRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Daniel S. GoldmanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Jimmy GomezRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Vicente GonzalezRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Josh GottheimerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Sam GravesRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Brett GuthrieRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Josh HarderRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
J. French HillRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
James A. HimesRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Chrissy HoulahanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Steny H. HoyerRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Glenn IveyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Hakeem S. JeffriesRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Henry C. "Hank" Johnson, Jr.Recorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Mike JohnsonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
David P. JoyceRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Marcy KapturRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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William R. KeatingRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Robin L. KellyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Trent KellyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Mike KellyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Jennifer A. KiggansRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Andy KimRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Raja KrishnamoorthiRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
David KustoffRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Darin LaHoodRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Byron DonaldsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Judy ChuRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
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Mike CareyRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Salud O. CarbajalRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
André CarsonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Neal P. DunnRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Earl L. "Buddy" CarterRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Sean CastenRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Chuck EdwardsRecorded vote
On record voting AYE on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Troy BaldersonRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Andy BarrRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Nanette Diaz BarragánRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Stephanie I. BiceRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Brendan F. BoyleRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Julia BrownleyRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Angie CraigRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Sharice DavidsRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Madeleine DeanRecorded vote
On record voting NO on Biggs of Arizona Amendment No. 1 to H.R. 7888, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, an amendment to prohibit warrantless searches of United States persons' communications in the FISA Section 702 database, with exceptions for imminent threats to life or bodily harm, consent searches, and known cybersecurity threat signatures. The amendment failed on a 212 to 212 tie.
View position & sources →
Laurel M. LeeStated position
Sponsored H.R. 7888 (118th Congress), Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, introduced 2024-04-09. Recorded as the bill's sponsor in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Laurel M. LeeStated position
Sponsored H.R. 7320 (118th Congress), Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, introduced 2024-02-13. Recorded as the bill's sponsor in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Michael R. TurnerStated position
Sponsored H.R. 6611 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, introduced 2023-12-06. Recorded as the bill's sponsor in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
James A. HimesStated position
Cosponsored H.R. 6611 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-12-06. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Sheldon WhitehouseStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Susan M. CollinsStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Angus S. King, Jr.Stated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Kirsten E. GillibrandStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Amy KlobucharStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Mark KellyStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Lindsey GrahamStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Mark R. WarnerStated position
Sponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, introduced 2023-11-28. Recorded as the bill's sponsor in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Michael F. BennetStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Roger F. WickerStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Mike RoundsStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Jerry MoranStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
James LankfordStated position
Cosponsored S. 3351 (118th Congress), FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023, joining as a cosponsor of record on 2023-11-28. Recorded in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
View position & sources →
Michael R. TurnerStated position
Sponsored H.R. 4454 (118th Congress), To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to ensure that politically derived information is not used in an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for an order under title I or III of such Act, introduced 2023-06-30. Recorded as the bill's sponsor in the Congress.gov bill status record published by GovInfo.
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Ted LieuStated position
On record seeking disclosure of the FBI's facial recognition policies and usage, and raising First and Fourth Amendment objections to scanning people engaged in peaceful protest and to arrests resting on facial recognition matches.
View position & sources →
Jon OssoffStated position
On record seeking disclosure of the FBI's facial recognition policies and usage, and raising First and Fourth Amendment objections to scanning people engaged in peaceful protest and to arrests resting on facial recognition matches.
View position & sources →
Yvette D. ClarkeStated position
On record seeking disclosure of the FBI's facial recognition policies and usage, and raising First and Fourth Amendment objections to scanning people engaged in peaceful protest and to arrests resting on facial recognition matches.
View position & sources →

Claims checked against the record

What companies and agencies say about this issue, set beside what the public record shows. The claim and the check are separate records with separate sources — a claim appearing here is not an endorsement of it, and a verdict is an assessment, open to dispute.

Showing 22 of 22 claims — no filters applied

The claim
Flock Safety· Company website — Myths vs Facts page
“Flock clients control their data; no secret federal agency access or "backdoors" exist.”
Answer to 'Do Federal Agencies Have Access?' on Flock's Myths vs Facts page. Retrieved 2026-08-02.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Flock clients control their data; no secret federal agency access or "backdoors" exist.”
What the record shows
Refuted by the record
The Illinois Secretary of State's audit found the opposite as a matter of fact for the period audited: U.S. Customs and Border Protection obtained access to Illinois plate-reader data, Flock lacked adequate data-sharing safeguards, and Flock was running a CBP pilot that its own leadership did not know about. A company whose leadership is unaware of a federal agency's access to customer data cannot at the same time assure customers that no undisclosed federal access exists. Flock's own subsequent disclosure corroborates the pilot, dating it 9 May to 24 August 2025. This refutes the claim as a description of how the system operated through August 2025; whether it holds today, after the remediation Flock describes, is not established either way by the records reviewed.
Evidence
- Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
  “During a recent audit, Giannoulias' office found that Flock Safety, which operates the largest automated license plate reader (ALPR) system in the nation, allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate cameras on Illinois roads and surveil drivers.”
- Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
  “the office discovered late last week that Flock did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing, which was compounded by the fact that the company was running a pilot program with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which Flock leadership was unaware of.”
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “CBP Pilot: May 9, 2025 to August 24, 2025”
Reviewer confidence 80%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company website — Myths vs Facts page
“Flock LPR captures public vehicle info at a single point in time, not continuous movement.”
Answer to 'Are You Being Tracked?' on Flock's Myths vs Facts page. Retrieved 2026-08-02.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Flock LPR captures public vehicle info at a single point in time, not continuous movement.”
What the record shows
Refuted by the record
The statement is true of one camera and false of the system Flock sells. Flock's own product page advertises the 'Largest Fixed LPR Network' with billions of monthly reads, and its vehicle-recognition post puts the platform at more than 20 billion reads per month across 49 states with cross-agency sharing. A network that indexes a plate's appearances across tens of thousands of cameras and retains them for 30 days by default reconstructs movement over time — that is the stated investigative value of the product. Note this verdict rests on Flock's own product documentation; no court ruling holding that Flock's network specifically constitutes long-term tracking was located.
Evidence
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “With billions of monthly plate reads, Flock connects communities, businesses and law enforcement in a shared network built to stop crime.”
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “The platform processes 20B+ vehicle reads per month across 49 states, with thousands of law enforcement agencies participating in controlled sharing.”
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default”
Reviewer confidence 75%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company blog — announcement of company-run study
“Flock technology helps resolve roughly 700,000 crimes a year across law enforcement, businesses, neighborhoods, and schools: about 10% of reported U.S. crime.”
Flock blog post '10% of All Reported U.S. Crime Is Solved Using Flock', announcing a study Flock commissioned and staffed. Published February 2024, still live August 2026.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Flock technology helps resolve roughly 700,000 crimes a year across law enforcement, businesses, neighborhoods, and schools: about 10% of reported U.S. crime.”
What the record shows
No supporting record found
The figure rests on a study Flock itself conducted, and one of the two academic co-authors who provided the independent oversight Flock cited has publicly disavowed the methodology, saying the underlying police data were too varied and incomplete for meaningful statistical analysis. No peer-reviewed replication exists. The strongest independent local test points the other way: Oak Park, Illinois's Citizens Police Oversight Committee found no evidence Flock cameras had played a meaningful role in any local investigation over three years. UNSUPPORTED rather than REFUTED — one village cannot disprove a national estimate, but no independent evidence establishes the 10% figure either.
Evidence
- Institute for Justiceunknown
  “There is no evidence whatsoever that Flock Safety ALPRs have played a meaningful role in any Oak Park crime investigation since their installation in 2022,”
- 404 Mediapress
  “the information that is collected by the police departments are too varied and incomplete for us to do any type of meaningful statistical analysis on them”
Reviewer confidence 80%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company website
“Flock FreeForm expands on Vehicle Signature by going beyond preset filters, enabling searches based on everyday language, such as 'white sports car with a racing stripe' or 'red pickup truck with a dog in the bed.'”
Flock Safety's current product page, describing a natural-language search layer over its stored vehicle records.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Flock FreeForm expands on Vehicle Signature by going beyond preset filters, enabling searches based on everyday language, such as 'white sports car with a racing stripe' or 'red pickup truck with a dog in the bed.'”
What the record shows
Not verifiable from public records
This is a product-capability claim on the vendor's own site. No independent evaluation, government audit or court record describing FreeForm's behaviour or accuracy was located, so it can be recorded as something Flock says but cannot be confirmed or refuted from public records. It is included because the claimed capability — free-text description search across stored vehicle records, including an occupant detail such as a dog in the truck bed — bears directly on what the stored data can be used to find.
Reviewer confidence 50%
The claim
Leonardo (ELSAG)· SignalTrace product page
“SignalTrace creates an electronic fingerprint for groups of the signals that the system determines are frequently emitted together.”
Leonardo's own product page for SignalTrace, an add-on to its ELSAG plate-reader line that identifies vehicles by the radio signals emitted from devices inside them rather than by the licence plate.
Where this was said
- Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions
  “SignalTrace creates an electronic fingerprint for groups of the signals that the system determines are frequently emitted together.”
- Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions
  “Electronic devices such as fitness trackers, smartwatches, RFID tags and mobile phones emit signals into the air.”
What the record shows
Not verifiable from public records
Recorded because of what it describes rather than because it can be checked: a plate-reader vendor marketing identification of a vehicle by the combined radio signatures of the personal devices travelling in it, which does not require a licence plate at all. The capability claim comes solely from Leonardo's own product page; no procurement record, audit or court document describing a SignalTrace deployment at a named agency was located, so it can be neither confirmed nor refuted from public records.
Reviewer confidence 50%
The claim
Axon Enterprise· Company announcement, 23 October 2019
“We have not, and will not ever sell public safety data.”
Axon's announcement of its in-car licence plate reader, committing not to sell data collected through it.
Where this was said
- Axon
  “We have not, and will not ever sell public safety data.”
What the record shows
Not verifiable from public records
A forward-looking commitment about future conduct cannot be established or refuted from the public record. No evidence contradicting it was located, and none confirming ongoing compliance either. It is recorded so the commitment is on the record and can be checked against later conduct.
Reviewer confidence 50%
The claim
Rekor Systems· Product documentation
“Rekor's vehicle recognition utilizes artificial intelligence and machine learning to identify over 2000 unique vehicle characteristics and capture the complete vehicle signature.”
Rekor's own developer documentation, which publishes the most detailed attribute catalogue located for any vendor in this issue.
Where this was said
- Rekor Systems
  “Rekor's vehicle recognition utilizes artificial intelligence and machine learning to identify over 2000 unique vehicle characteristics and capture the complete vehicle signature.”
- Rekor Systems
  “Using custom, shared, and NCIC hotlists; receive alerts on vehicles of interest the moment they are detected.”
What the record shows
Not verifiable from public records
The attribute catalogue is published by the vendor in its own technical documentation, which establishes what Rekor says its software identifies but not its accuracy in the field. No independent evaluation was located. Rekor's related claim to hold a patent covering point-of-collection anonymisation was not checked against the patent record and is not asserted here.
Reviewer confidence 50%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company website — product page statistic
“52% Reduction in robbery in 1 year”
Headline statistic on Flock's licence plate reader product page, above a customer testimonial. No jurisdiction, baseline, time period or methodology is given. Retrieved 2026-08-02.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “52% Reduction in robbery in 1 year”
What the record shows
Not verifiable from public records
The figure is published without a named jurisdiction, date range, comparison group or source, so there is nothing specific to check it against. What can be said is that the rigorous evaluation literature does not support a general deterrent effect of this magnitude: a randomised controlled experiment by George Mason University, funded by the National Institute of Justice, found no crime reduction from plate-reader deployment, and characterised the overall evidence base as weak. That does not disprove a particular agency's result, which could reflect other simultaneous interventions — it means the claim as published cannot be evaluated.
Evidence
- Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason Universityunknown
  “Our randomized controlled experiment mirrored the findings from the PERF experiments in that the use of LPR in autotheft hot spots does not appear to result in a reduction of crime generally or autotheft specifically, during the period of time measured.”
- Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason Universityunknown
  “we also discovered this rapid adoption is occurring in a low-information environment; the evidence-base for the effectiveness and effects of LPR is weak.”
Reviewer confidence 60%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company website
“Using patented Vehicle Fingerprint™ technology, the camera captures the vehicle make, color, type, license plate, state of the license plate, missing plate, covered plate, paper plate, and over 20 unique vehicle details like roof racks and bumper stickers.”
Flock Safety's own marketing page describing what its cameras record about each passing vehicle.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Using patented Vehicle FingerprintTM technology, the camera captures the vehicle make, color, type, license plate, state of the license plate, missing plate, covered plate, paper plate, and over 20 unique vehicle details like roof racks and bumper stickers.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
That a plate reader captures attributes beyond the plate is independently established: the Congressional Research Service records that the technology detects vehicle type and colour, and an ICE Privacy Impact Assessment describes a stored read as including the vehicle's make and model. Capture of the finer attributes Flock advertises — roof racks, bumper stickers, the 'over 20 unique vehicle details' — rests on Flock's own marketing alone; no government audit, court record or independent test confirming that list was located. Note also that Flock's current product pages have largely replaced the 'Vehicle Fingerprint' name with 'Vehicle Signature', so the wording above is from Flock's blog rather than its live product page.
Evidence
- Congressional Research Serviceprimary
  “(ALPR technology can also detect additional, related information, including vehicle type and color, global positioning system [GPS] location data, and date and time.)”
- U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
  “(2) digital image of the license plate as well as the vehicle's make and model;”
Reviewer confidence 70%
The claim
Flock Safety· License Plate Reader Policy
“Customers choose whether to share LPR data with other customers in accordance with their laws and policies.”
Flock Safety's published policy on how data sharing between agencies is governed.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Customers choose whether to share LPR data with other customers in accordance with their laws and policies.”
- Flock Safety
  “to use the service, each Flock Safety partner agency must opt in to either the local or national sharing feature.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
The opt-in mechanism exists as described, but the qualifier 'in accordance with their laws and policies' describes an outcome the vendor does not enforce, and the public record shows it failing. The California Attorney General sued the City of El Cajon in October 2025 over sharing licence plate data with out-of-state agencies contrary to California law. Separately, the California State Auditor found that three of four audited agencies 'have shared their ALPR images widely, without considering whether the entities receiving them have a right to and need for the images', and that none had a policy meeting all legally mandated requirements. Placing the compliance decision with the customer is therefore accurate as a description of the mechanism and unreliable as an assurance of the result.
Evidence
- California Attorney Generalprimary
  “ALPR systems are generally operated through third-party vendors that deploy cameras and collect and store ALPR data.”
- California State Auditorprimary
  “Fresno and Marin have each arranged to share their ALPR images with hundreds of entities and Sacramento with over a thousand entities across the United States.”
- California State Auditorprimary
  “None of the agencies have an ALPR usage and privacy policy that implements all the legally mandated—since 2016—requirements.”
Reviewer confidence 75%
The claim
Motorola Solutions· Company website
“Narrow results by make, model, color, accessories and even unique vehicle features like damage or bumper stickers.”
Motorola Solutions' licence plate recognition product page, describing attribute search beyond the plate number.
Where this was said
- Motorola Solutions
  “Narrow results by make, model, color, accessories and even unique vehicle features like damage or bumper stickers.”
- Motorola Solutions
  “Transform license plates into leads with patented, powerful vehicle location analytics and access to billions of detections beyond your own.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
Attribute capture beyond the plate is independently established in general terms by the Congressional Research Service (vehicle type and colour) and by an ICE Privacy Impact Assessment (make and model). Detection of damage and bumper stickers specifically, and the scale implied by 'access to billions of detections beyond your own', rest on the company's own marketing; no independent test or audit of either was located.
Evidence
- Congressional Research Serviceprimary
  “(ALPR technology can also detect additional, related information, including vehicle type and color, global positioning system [GPS] location data, and date and time.)”
Reviewer confidence 65%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company website — Privacy & Trust FAQ
“No. Flock cameras do not use facial recognition technology. Searches are based on vehicle characteristics, and not identity. Flock cannot recognize, identify, or track individuals. It is purpose built for specific public safety investigations, not to monitor people.”
Answer to 'Do Flock cameras use facial recognition?' on Flock's Privacy & Trust hub. Retrieved 2026-08-02.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “No. Flock cameras do not use facial recognition technology. Searches are based on vehicle characteristics, and not identity. Flock cannot recognize, identify, or track individuals.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
The narrow half holds: no record was found contradicting the statement that Flock's plate readers do not run facial recognition. The broader half — that Flock 'cannot recognize, identify, or track individuals' — is undercut by Flock's own product documentation. Its FreeForm page advertises plain-language search for people by physical description and returns 'person-related video search results'. That is recognition of individuals by attribute, even though it is not biometric face matching. The distinction Flock draws is real; the sentence as written overstates it.
Evidence
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “Type what you're looking for, such as "man in blue shirt and cowboy hat" or "dark SUV with rear bumper damage." Then review relevant visual matches across enabled video feeds, with vehicle results also available from LPR systems.”
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “Review person-related video search results from enabled video feeds alongside vehicle results from video and LPR systems in one interface.”
Reviewer confidence 80%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company blog — official position paper
“No. Flock does not work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Communities control federal data access. ICE does not have direct access to Flock cameras, systems, or data, unless the agencies that control their data expressly and deliberately allow it.”
Opening answer of Flock's blog post 'Does Flock Share Data With ICE?', published 6 January 2026 and updated 24 July 2026.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “No. Flock does not work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Communities control federal data access.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
The narrowest assertion — no ICE contract and no direct ICE login — is not contradicted by any record retrieved, and Flock's own published pilot timeline lists no ICE pilot. But the framing that federal access happens only when local agencies 'expressly and deliberately allow it' is undercut by the Illinois audit, which found CBP access that customer agencies had not authorised. Flock's own post also concedes pilots with CBP, HSI, NCIS, FBI and ATF, and describes disabling National Lookup for all California agencies in March 2025 — a Flock-level control action, not a customer one. Accurate on its literal terms; misleading as a general assurance about federal access.
Evidence
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “In March 2025, Flock disabled National Lookup for all California agencies.”
- Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
  “This sharing of license plate data of motorists who drive on Illinois roads is a clear violation of the state law.”
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “In August of 2025, Flock publicly announced it would no longer conduct pilot projects with federal agencies.”
Reviewer confidence 75%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company legal policy — LPR Usage and Privacy Policy
“LPR data gathered by the Flock Safety system on behalf of Flock Safety customers is owned by the customer.”
Under 'Restrictions on the Sale, Sharing, or Transfer of LPR Data' in Flock's binding LPR Policy, last updated 30 June 2026.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “LPR data gathered by the Flock Safety system on behalf of Flock Safety customers is owned by the customer.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
The ownership statement is a real contractual commitment, and the same policy binds Flock not to sell customer plate data. Two carve-outs in that same document qualify it: Flock reserves the right to disclose the data to government officials and third parties on its own good-faith judgement, and it retains a fraction of customer images for its own machine-learning development. Ownership in the sense of exclusive customer control over disposition is therefore not what the policy establishes. The Illinois audit further shows ownership did not translate into control in practice, since federal access occurred without the owning agencies' authorisation.
Evidence
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “Flock Safety may access, use, preserve and/or disclose the LPR data to law enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or third parties, if legally required to do so or if Flock has a good faith belief that such access, use, preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to comply with a legal process, enforce the agreement between Flock and the customer, or detect, prevent or otherwise address security, privacy, fraud or technical issues.”
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “Additionally, Flock uses a fraction of LPR images (less than one percent), which are stripped of all metadata and identifying information, solely for the purpose of improving Flock Services through machine learning.”
- Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
  “As a result, Giannoulias immediately ordered the company to shut off access to U.S. Customs and Border Protection.”
Reviewer confidence 75%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company website — Myths vs Facts page
“Flock gives customers full data ownership, auto-deleting data after 30 days, and prevents unauthorized sharing.”
Answer to 'How Is Data Protected?' on Flock's Myths vs Facts page. Retrieved 2026-08-02.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Flock gives customers full data ownership, auto-deleting data after 30 days, and prevents unauthorized sharing.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
Flock's own binding policy makes 30 days a DEFAULT that can be lengthened or shortened per customer, so 'auto-deleting data after 30 days' states as a fixed property what the policy states as adjustable. The California State Auditor's review is the closest governmental test of whether retention defaults hold in practice, and found agencies retaining images for one to five years. That audit examined Los Angeles, Fresno, Sacramento County and Marin County programmes — NOT Flock deployments — so it establishes the general pattern rather than a Flock-specific one. The 'prevents unauthorized sharing' element is separately contradicted by the Illinois audit.
Evidence
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default; this may be increased or decreased on a case-by-case basis if a different schedule is required by a customer's law or policy.”
- California State Auditorprimary
  “Fresno's policy is to retain ALPR images for one year; Sacramento's and Marin's policies specify two years.”
- Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
  “Flock did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing”
Reviewer confidence 80%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company website — Myths vs Facts page
“Data sharing is controlled by the customer agency, not Flock.”
Answer to 'Who Can Access Data?' on Flock's Myths vs Facts page. Retrieved 2026-08-02.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Data sharing is controlled by the customer agency, not Flock.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
Customer-level control is genuine in one direction: the California Attorney General sued the City of El Cajon over sharing its own plate data with agencies in more than two dozen states — an enforcement action against the agency, not the vendor, consistent with the agency holding the sharing decision. But control is not exclusive. The Illinois audit found federal access flowing from a Flock-run pilot rather than a customer decision, and Flock itself describes unilaterally disabling National Lookup for all California agencies. Both show Flock exercising sharing control independent of the customer.
Evidence
- California Office of the Attorney Generalprimary
  “the City of El Cajon Police Department continues to share this data with numerous out-of-state law enforcement agencies throughout the country”
- Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
  “Flock did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing”
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “In March 2025, Flock disabled National Lookup for all California agencies.”
Reviewer confidence 75%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company website — Privacy & Trust FAQ
“No. Access is managed by your local agency and limited to authorized users with role-based permissions. Every search is tied to a specific user and recorded automatically. There is no open browsing and no anonymous searches. Access is controlled locally, not by Flock.”
Answer to 'Can anyone access my data at any time?' on Flock's Privacy & Trust hub. Retrieved 2026-08-02.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Every search is tied to a specific user and recorded automatically. There is no open browsing and no anonymous searches.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
The logging mechanism demonstrably exists as described: Flock's policy specifies that every query stores username, date, time, stated purpose and search terms, and the Johnson County, Texas search became public precisely because those audit records were obtainable. What the record does not support is the inference drawn from it — that logging delivers accountability. The stated 'purpose of query' is free text supplied by the searching officer and is not validated, and the California State Auditor found agencies had failed to audit their systems at all, leaving them open to abuse. Logging creates a reviewable record; it does not by itself constrain who searches, or why.
Evidence
- California State Auditorprimary
  “The agencies we reviewed have few safeguards for the creation of ALPR user accounts and have also failed to audit the use of their ALPR systems. Instead of ensuring that only authorized users access ALPR data for appropriate purposes, the agencies have left their systems open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight.”
- Electronic Frontier Foundationadvocacy
  “being searched for as a missing person, not as a suspect of a crime”
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “All queries of the LPR system are stored for auditing purposes, including: Username Date Time Purpose of query License plate and other elements used to query the system”
Reviewer confidence 85%
The claim
Flock Safety· Company blog — product marketing
“Flock's LPR is highly accurate, achieving over 99% capture in clear and rainy conditions and over 98% at dawn and dusk. It also delivers over 96% OCR accuracy and over 97% license plate state accuracy.”
Flock blog post 'Vehicle Recognition Software for Investigation-grade LPR'. Retrieved 2026-08-02.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Flock's LPR is highly accurate, achieving over 99% capture in clear and rainy conditions and over 98% at dawn and dusk.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
Flock's own binding policy is more guarded than its marketing, warning that translation 'may be incomplete or inaccurate' and instructing users to confirm a read before acting on an alert — which sits awkwardly with treating the advertised percentages as operationally reliable. Public records from Roseville, California covering 1,427 alerts were reported to show 71% of alerts tied to stolen or felony vehicles resting on incorrect reads; Flock disputes that characterisation and attributes it to non-standard hardware and placement, and its published rates are scoped to optimal conditions, so the two figures are not strictly contradictory. Separately, the Institute for Justice documented at least 27 mistaken stops since 2018. Note the underlying Roseville records were not obtained directly; that figure rests on reporting.
Evidence
- Flock Safetyunknown
  “Although infrequent, license plate translation may be incomplete or inaccurate. False positives are flagged to continuously improve the system. Users should confirm the computer translation prior to taking any action based on an LPR alert or search.”
- Institute for Justiceunknown
  “in nearly two-thirds of the cases IJ analyzed, officers did not realize their error until after they had drawn and pointed their guns at innocent people.”
- Gizmodopress
  “71% of cases that generated an alert related to vehicles that were stolen or used in a felony”
Reviewer confidence 70%
The claim
Flock Safety· Dan Haley, Chief Legal Officer
“Today's ruling reinforces what courts nationwide have recognized: LPRs are lawful.”
Flock press statement responding to Commonwealth v. Church (Va. Ct. App., 14 October 2025). The same post asserts courts 'have uniformly upheld the constitutionality of LPRs'.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “Today's ruling reinforces what courts nationwide have recognized: LPRs are lawful.”
What the record shows
Partially supported
Flock accurately reports its win in the Virginia Court of Appeals, and that holding is consistent with a line of cases treating plate capture on public roads as outside the Fourth Amendment. But 'uniformly upheld' overstates a moving body of law. The Supreme Court's decision in Chatrie v. United States, issued 29 June 2026, held that acquiring a person's aggregated location data is a Fourth Amendment search and declined to extend the third-party doctrine to it. That reasoning is directed at cell-phone location data, NOT plate readers, but it bears squarely on the aggregation theory underlying challenges to networked plate data. The claim also concerns every court in the country, which could not be exhaustively verified.
Evidence
- Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
  “Held: Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie's location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information.”
- Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
  “Where the Fourth Amendment applies, it applies regardless of "the quality or quantity of information" the government obtains.”
Reviewer confidence 65%
The claim
Flock Safety· License Plate Reader Policy
“LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default; this may be increased or decreased on a case-by-case basis if a different schedule is required by a customer's law or policy.”
Flock Safety's published LPR policy, stating its default retention period.
Where this was said
- Flock Safety
  “LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default; this may be increased or decreased on a case-by-case basis if a different schedule is required by a customer's law or policy.”
What the record shows
Supported by the record
Two independent records confirm the 30-day period in live deployments. The Court of Appeals of Virginia, describing Norfolk's system, found the images 'are saved in a searchable website database for 30 days'. The Village of Wilmette, Illinois states on its own municipal page that 'All ALPR data is only retained for 30 days.' Both are records outside Flock's control and both match the stated default. The claim is about the default only — Flock's own wording allows the period to be lengthened per customer — so this verdict does not establish that 30 days applies everywhere.
Evidence
- Court of Appeals of Virginiaprimary
  “The images are saved in a searchable website database for 30 days and may be accessed by a Norfolk police officer to obtain information pertinent to a crime being investigated.”
- Village of Wilmette, Illinoisprimary
  “All ALPR data is only retained for 30 days.”
Reviewer confidence 85%
The claim
Vigilant Solutions (Motorola Solutions)· LPR Usage and Privacy Policy
“The company retains LPR data as long as it has commercial value.”
Vigilant Solutions' own usage and privacy policy, describing retention of the plate data it collects commercially — as distinct from data collected by a police agency.
Where this was said
- Vigilant Solutions
  “The company retains LPR data as long as it has commercial value.”
- Vigilant Solutions
  “The company reserves the right to revise this policy at any point in the future and such changes will be retroactively applicable to data collected prior to any revision of this policy.”
What the record shows
Supported by the record
The statement is the company's own published policy and is quoted verbatim, so it is established as the stated practice. It is recorded here because it stands in sharp contrast to the 30-day default published by Flock Safety: commercially collected plate data is held on an open-ended commercial-value test rather than a fixed period. The same policy states that revisions apply retroactively to data already collected, meaning the retention terms attached to a past observation can change afterwards. That a federal agency purchases from this commercial pool is independently documented: a Department of State contract covers 'LEARN via Vigilant Solutions for up to 750 users'.
Evidence
- USAspending.govprimary
  “CLEAR INVESTIGATIONS ADVANCED PLATFORM: REAL-TIME INCARCERATION AND ARREST, CLEAR ONLINE ALERTS, LEARN VIA VIGILANT SOLUTIONS FOR UP TO 750 USERS AND LPR VIA CLEAR FOR ALL CLEAR AUTHORIZED USERS.”
Reviewer confidence 80%
The claim
International Association of Chiefs of Police / U.S. Department of Justice· NIJ-funded operational guidance, NCJ 239604
“A total of 40% of respondents retain ALPR data for six months or less (n=16). Five respondents (13%) indicated they retain ALPR data indefinitely, while two indicated that retention is based on the storage capacity of the equipment installed.”
Federally funded guidance surveying how long police agencies actually keep plate reader data — included as the counterpoint to vendors' stated default retention periods.
Where this was said
- U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice
  “A total of 40% of respondents retain ALPR data for six months or less (n=16). Five respondents (13%) indicated they retain ALPR data indefinitely, while two indicated that retention is based on the storage capacity of the equipment installed.”
What the record shows
Supported by the record
This is a federally published survey finding, primary for what agencies reported. It matters here because it shows retention is set by each agency rather than by any vendor default: 13% of responding agencies reported keeping plate data indefinitely, and two set retention by whatever their hardware could store. A vendor's stated default period therefore describes the vendor's configuration, not the life of the data. The California State Auditor reached a compatible conclusion, finding 99.9 percent of the 320 million images held by one agency related to vehicles not on any hot list.
Evidence
- California State Auditorprimary
  “99.9 percent of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made.”
Reviewer confidence 80%

Survey and polling data

Figures are reported exactly as each source published them, and are never averaged or combined across pollsters or across question wordings — differing wording makes such an average meaningless. Nothing in this section affects any promise rating.

What these polls say together

Unverified. This synthesis is written from the polls below, not computed from them, so it can fall behind them. Opinion synthesis: no fingerprint was stored when this value was written, so it cannot be shown to reflect the issue's opinion polls. Rewrite it to bind the two.

Support tracks setting and stated purpose, and moves sharply on both inside one poll. Pew's November 2021 wave (Form 1, n=5,153) found facial recognition scanning acceptable to 31 percent for people walking down the street, 63 percent for people entering large events and 61 percent at public protests; Pew printed the verbatim question wording (item FACEREC11) but no margin of error for that Form 1 subsample. AP-NORC (n=1,729, 12 to 16 August 2021, margin of error 3.2) found opposition to warrantless surveillance from 51 percent on internet searches to 66 percent on domestic phone calls. The same wave found 60 percent favouring cameras in public places watching for suspicious activity, 18 percent opposed. Untargeted collection is not rejected as such. George Mason's 2010 survey of one Virginia county (22.9 percent response, 85.8 percent white, no margin of error, not national) shows a similar internal ordering: 79.9 percent for real-time plate scanning for stolen vehicles (n=448) against 48.1 percent for parking violations (n=449). It also holds the one randomised wording test. Half the sample (n=213) saw the plate-retention question prefixed "If it can help in solving crimes", and open-ended retention rose from 23.5 percent in the plain arm (n=226) to 36.2 percent. Refusal moved 23 to 16.9 percent, within sampling noise at that arm size. Numbers from different houses are not compared here: wording, mode, answer options and dates vary together, so an apparent gap is neither disagreement nor change. No trend is available on facial recognition or plate readers; each item was asked once. The one repeated question is Pew's, on concern about how government uses the data it collects: 64 percent very or somewhat concerned in 2019, 71 percent in 2023 (Wave 127, n=5,101, 15 to 21 May 2023). Opinion is evidence of what people think and of nothing else.

How these were read together

Each poll here is read on its own terms. Every figure keeps the wording, date, sample size and pollster it came from, and nothing is averaged, pooled or blended across pollsters or across differently worded questions, because such an average would not mean anything. Comparisons are made inside one instrument, where the same respondents answered both items. Across polls, only ranges are reported. This shows what people told a particular pollster on a particular day. It does not establish any fact about surveillance itself.

Opinion trends

Nothing on this issue can be charted as a trend yet. A trend needs the same pollster asking identical wording on two different dates; no set of readings here meets that. Nothing is averaged, pooled or adjusted, and no figure from one pollster is ever joined to a figure from another.

Readings shown on their own (21)

These are not drawn as a trend, and they are not averaged into one. Each is a real reading; what is missing is a second reading it can honestly be compared with. The leading response is previewed here — the full breakdown, wording, sample and source are on each poll’s card below.

The only reading of its wording, from its pollster (14)

A line needs at least two readings of identical wording from the same pollster on two different dates. Readings of the same subject taken by different houses — or by one house that changed its wording — are shown side by side rather than connected, because the gap between them would measure method as much as opinion.

Quinnipiac University Poll2026-03-23
Military use of AI in surveillance
“Do you support or oppose the military using AI in surveillance for security purposes?”
Support45%
Pew Research Center2023-05-21
Concern about government use of collected data
“How concerned are you about how the government is using the data it collects about you?”
Somewhat concerned39%
Monmouth University Polling Institute2023-01-30
Facial recognition in public places such as stadiums
“Facial recognition technology that can identify and monitor people who try to enter public places such as stadiums — is that a good idea or bad idea?”
Good idea54%
Pew Research Center5 readings from one study · n=5,153
- 2021-11-07
  Acceptable contexts for police facial recognition scanning
  “Would you consider each of the following uses of facial recognition technology by police to be acceptable or not acceptable? Scanning people [at public protests / as they enter large events like concerts to see who is in the crowd / as they walk down the street]?”
  Scanning people as they walk down the street — NOT acceptable68%
- 2021-11-07
  Regulation of police facial recognition
  “If the use of facial recognition technology by police becomes widespread, which is your greater concern?”
  Government will not go far enough regulating its use51%
- 2021-11-07
  Facial recognition match as evidence for arrest
  “If a facial recognition program said that someone was involved in a crime, should that be good enough evidence for police to arrest them, even if there was a small chance the program was wrong?”
  Should NOT be good enough evidence to arrest70%
- 2021-11-07
  Expected consequences of widespread police facial recognition
  “If the use of facial recognition technology by police becomes widespread, do you think each of the following would happen? The police would…”
  Find more missing persons — probably would happen57%
- 2021-11-07
  Police facial recognition — good or bad idea for society
  “Do you think the widespread use of facial recognition technology by police would be a…”
  Good idea for society46%
AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research2 readings from one study · n=1,729
- 2021-08-16
  Surveillance cameras in public places
  “Now you will read a list of specific policy measures about things happening in public places that some people have suggested the government should take on in response to threats against the United States.”
  Oppose racial and ethnic profiling for tougher airport screening (NET)61%
- 2021-08-16
  Warrantless government surveillance
  “Now you will read a list of specific policy measures that some people have suggested the government should take on in response to threats against the United States. For each one, please select if you favor, oppose or neither favor nor oppose that particular policy.”
  Oppose warrantless listening to any telephone calls made in the U.S.66%
Pew Research Center2019-06-17
Concern about government use of collected data
“How concerned, if at all, are you about how the government is using the data it collects about you?”
Somewhat concerned39%
Pew Research Center2 readings from one study · n=4,272
- 2019-06-17
  Acceptability of police facial recognition in public spaces
  “In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable to use facial recognition technology in the following situations? [item: Law enforcement agencies assessing potential security threats in public spaces]”
  Acceptable — law enforcement assessing security threats in public spaces59%
- 2019-06-17
  Trust in law enforcement to use facial recognition responsibly
  “How much, if at all, do you trust the following groups to use facial recognition technology responsibly? [item: Law enforcement agencies]”
  Trust law enforcement agencies at least somewhat (NET)56%
Ipsos2019-06-07
Government use of AI and facial recognition to maintain order (26-country global total)
“Which of the following best reflects your opinion on the government's use of artificial intelligence and facial recognition to maintain order?”
Should be allowed only under certain circumstances and subject to strict regulations65%

Question wording not recorded (4)

Without the verbatim wording there is no way to establish that any other reading asked the same thing. Comparability cannot be assumed from a topic label, so these are left standing alone.

The Harris Poll2026-03-25
Automated licence-plate readers and AI cameras (VENDOR-COMMISSIONED)
Say signs should be visible notifying people that plate readers are in use87%
YouGov2025-06-03
Government surveillance and privacy
Acceptable to monitor the online activity of suspected terrorists84%
Pew Research Center2023-05-21
Acceptability of law enforcement surveillance tools in investigations
Obtain footage from residential cameras such as video doorbells — acceptable74%
Gallup2013-06-11
Government collection of telephone and internet records
Disapprove of the program53%

No field dates recorded (3)

Neither a field start nor a field end is on file, so there is no point on a time axis to place these at. The reading itself is unaffected and is shown in full below.

George Mason University Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policyno field dates
Public acceptance of police licence-plate readers (Fairfax County, 2010)
Subgroup figures only
U.S. Census Bureau for NTIAno field dates · government
Online privacy and security concerns (2015 NTIA Internet Use Survey)
Named at least one concern about online privacy and security risks84%
U.S. Census Bureau for NTIAno field dates · government
Online privacy and security concerns (2019 NTIA Internet Use Survey)
Had significant concerns about online privacy and security risks (2019)73%

Field dates

Showing 21 of 21 polls — no filters applied

Private opinion polling

Published by private polling organisations, and read here as this section’s primary measure of where public opinion stands — which is the only thing any poll can establish. That standing is local to this section: elsewhere on StumpWatch a poll is never evidence of a fact, never corroborates one, and never moves a promise rating. Each is reported separately, with the pollster’s own question wording wherever it was published, so you can judge it yourself.

The Harris Poll
Automated licence-plate readers and AI cameras (VENDOR-COMMISSIONED)
Sponsor: LiveView Technologies — a commercial security-camera vendor
- Say signs should be visible notifying people that plate readers are in use87%
- Agree businesses may use facial recognition to match against a list of known violent offenders79%
- Feel safer parking in lots that use automated plate readers78%
- Believe non-suspicious licence plate data should be deleted within 30 days67%
- Support AI video cameras in public places to identify suspicious behaviour before it occurs60%
U.S. adults 18+ · n=2,089 · ±2.7 · SPONSORSHIP CAVEAT: commissioned by a company that sells the surveillance cameras the survey asks about, and distributed as a corporate press release. Items are positively-worded agree/disagree statements. The ±2.7 figure is a Bayesian credible interval at 95%, not a classical probability-sample margin of error — The Harris Poll uses an opt-in online panel. The sole citation is the corporate newswire release; no topline or question-wording document was published. · 2026-03-23 – 2026-03-25 · source
Quinnipiac University Poll
Military use of AI in surveillance
“Do you support or oppose the military using AI in surveillance for security purposes?”
- Support45%
- Oppose44%
- Don't know / no answer11%
Subgroups (3)
Gen Z (1997-2008)
- Oppose58%
Millennials (1981-1996)
- Oppose49%
Baby Boomers (1946-1964)
- Support53%
U.S. adults · n=1,397 · ±3.3 · Probability-based random digit dialling with live interviewers. Concerns MILITARY surveillance, not domestic policing · 2026-03-19 – 2026-03-23 · source
YouGov
Government surveillance and privacy
- Acceptable to monitor the online activity of suspected terrorists84%
- Acceptable to monitor the online activity of politicians66%
- Say collecting Americans' phone and internet data is an unnecessary intrusion56%
- Say it is justified as a way to combat terrorism and crime24%
- Concerned surveillance powers could be used to target political opponents or suppress dissent71%
- Say government surveillance makes people less likely to express political views online47%
- Have chosen not to post or send something over monitoring concerns24%
- Say government surveillance has increased in the past 25 years78%
Subgroups (5)
Democrats
- Very concerned surveillance could target political opponents or suppress dissent55%
- Have self-censored online over monitoring concerns33%
Republicans
- Very concerned surveillance could target political opponents or suppress dissent23%
- Have self-censored online over monitoring concerns16%
- Acceptable to monitor the online activity of journalists56%
U.S. adult citizens · n=1,131 · ±4 · NON-PROBABILITY: YouGov opt-in online panel, weighted to be representative of adult U.S. citizens. Verbatim topline wording is not printed in the article · 2025-05-30 – 2025-06-03 · source
Pew Research Center
2 readings · one study
- U.S. adults
- n=2,538–5,101 across readings
- 2023-05-15 – 2023-05-21
These 2 readings are 2 questions from one study, not 2 independent findings, and they are counted once here. Their shared source, sample and field period are stated above; anything that differs between them is stated on the reading it belongs to. source
- Concern about government use of collected data
  “How concerned are you about how the government is using the data it collects about you?”
  - Very concerned31%
  - Somewhat concerned39%
  - Not too concerned24%
  - Not at all concerned5%
  Subgroups (1)
  Republicans and GOP leaners
  Very or somewhat concerned77%
  n=5,101 · ±1.7 · American Trends Panel Wave 127. Pew publishes the combined very/somewhat NET as 71 percent. The June 2019 reading of this question used slightly different wording (it added 'if at all') and is recorded as a separate row, not trended with this one.
- Acceptability of law enforcement surveillance tools in investigations
  - Obtain footage from residential cameras such as video doorbells — acceptable74%
  - Use cellphone tower information to track where someone is — acceptable74%
  - Require third parties to turn over private chats, messages or calls — acceptable55%
  - Break the passcode on a user's phone — acceptable54%
  Subgroups (6)
  Ages 18-29
  Use cellphone tower information to track someone — acceptable57%
  Break the passcode on a user's phone — acceptable35%
  Ages 65+
  Use cellphone tower information to track someone — acceptable86%
  Break the passcode on a user's phone — acceptable68%
  Black
  Use cellphone tower information to track someone — acceptable66%
  White
  Use cellphone tower information to track someone — acceptable77%
  n=2,538 · American Trends Panel Wave 127, split-half design. These items (ACCPTLWF1) were asked only of Form 1 (XFORM=1, n=2,538), so the full-wave margin of ±1.7 does not apply and Pew did not publish a separate margin for this half-sample. Percentages are the very/somewhat acceptable NET as published; verbatim topline wording is not printed for these items.
Monmouth University Polling Institute
Facial recognition in public places such as stadiums
“Facial recognition technology that can identify and monitor people who try to enter public places such as stadiums — is that a good idea or bad idea?”
- Good idea54%
- Bad idea41%
Subgroups (2)
Have heard a lot about recent AI developments
- Good idea45%
Have heard nothing about recent AI developments
- Good idea71%
U.S. adults · n=805 · ±5.7 · Telephone interviews with live interviewers; probability-based national random sample · 2023-01-26 – 2023-01-30 · source
Pew Research Center
5 readings · one study
- U.S. adults
- n=5,153
- 2021-11-01 – 2021-11-07
These 5 readings are 5 questions from one study, not 5 independent findings, and they are counted once here. Their shared source, sample and field period are stated above; anything that differs between them is stated on the reading it belongs to. source
- Acceptable contexts for police facial recognition scanning
  “Would you consider each of the following uses of facial recognition technology by police to be acceptable or not acceptable? Scanning people [at public protests / as they enter large events like concerts to see who is in the crowd / as they walk down the street]?”
  - Scanning people as they enter large events like concerts — acceptable63%
  - Scanning people at public protests — acceptable61%
  - Scanning people as they walk down the street — acceptable31%
  - Scanning people as they walk down the street — NOT acceptable68%
  American Trends Panel, Form 1 only (n=5,153). Verbatim question wording taken from the printed topline (FACEREC11, p.147). Pew did not publish a margin of error for this Form 1 subsample.
- Regulation of police facial recognition
  “If the use of facial recognition technology by police becomes widespread, which is your greater concern?”
  - Government will not go far enough regulating its use51%
  - Government will go too far regulating its use47%
  Subgroups (4)
  Rep/lean Rep
  Government will go too far regulating its use59%
  Government will not go far enough regulating its use40%
  Dem/lean Dem
  Government will go too far regulating its use36%
  Government will not go far enough regulating its use62%
  American Trends Panel, Form 1 only
- Facial recognition match as evidence for arrest
  “If a facial recognition program said that someone was involved in a crime, should that be good enough evidence for police to arrest them, even if there was a small chance the program was wrong?”
  - Should NOT be good enough evidence to arrest70%
  - Should be good enough evidence to arrest27%
  Subgroups (2)
  Say police facial recognition is a good idea for society
  Should be good enough evidence to arrest40%
  Say police facial recognition is a bad idea for society
  Should be good enough evidence to arrest15%
  American Trends Panel, Form 1 only
- Expected consequences of widespread police facial recognition
  “If the use of facial recognition technology by police becomes widespread, do you think each of the following would happen? The police would…”
  - Be able to track everyone's location at all times — definitely would happen27%
  - Be able to track everyone's location at all times — probably would happen42%
  - Monitor Black and Hispanic neighborhoods much more often — definitely would happen26%
  - Monitor Black and Hispanic neighborhoods much more often — probably would happen40%
  - Make more false arrests — definitely would happen16%
  - Make more false arrests — probably would happen38%
  - Solve crimes more quickly and efficiently — probably would happen55%
  - Find more missing persons — probably would happen57%
  Subgroups (5)
  Black adults
  Definitely would monitor Black and Hispanic neighborhoods much more often48%
  Definitely would make more false arrests28%
  Hispanic adults
  Definitely would monitor Black and Hispanic neighborhoods much more often37%
  White adults
  Definitely would monitor Black and Hispanic neighborhoods much more often18%
  Definitely would make more false arrests11%
  American Trends Panel, Form 1 only; items randomised
- Police facial recognition — good or bad idea for society
  “Do you think the widespread use of facial recognition technology by police would be a…”
  - Good idea for society46%
  - Bad idea for society27%
  - Not sure27%
  American Trends Panel, Form 1 only. Pew's published ±1.6 applies to the full 10,260 wave, not this subsample, so no margin of error is shown
AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research
2 readings · one study
Sponsor: The Associated Press and NORC at the University of Chicago
- U.S. adults
- n=1,729
- ±3.2
- 2021-08-12 – 2021-08-16
These 2 readings are 2 questions from one study, not 2 independent findings, and they are counted once here. Their shared source, sample and field period are stated above; anything that differs between them is stated on the reading it belongs to. source
- Surveillance cameras in public places
  “Now you will read a list of specific policy measures about things happening in public places that some people have suggested the government should take on in response to threats against the United States.”
  - Favor surveillance cameras in public places to watch for suspicious activity (NET)60%
  - Neither favor nor oppose21%
  - Oppose (NET)18%
  - Oppose racial and ethnic profiling for tougher airport screening (NET)61%
  Subgroups (3)
  Asian Americans
  Oppose racial and ethnic profiling for tougher airport screening71%
  Black Americans
  Oppose racial and ethnic profiling for tougher airport screening68%
  White Americans
  Oppose racial and ethnic profiling for tougher airport screening59%
  AmeriSpeak probability-based panel. AP-NORC prints 2013 (72% favor) and 2011 (71%) trend rows, but those waves were telephone-only, a different mode
- Warrantless government surveillance
  “Now you will read a list of specific policy measures that some people have suggested the government should take on in response to threats against the United States. For each one, please select if you favor, oppose or neither favor nor oppose that particular policy.”
  - Oppose warrantless listening to any telephone calls made in the U.S.66%
  - Oppose warrantless monitoring of text messages and messaging apps63%
  - Oppose warrantless reading of any emails sent in the U.S.62%
  - Oppose warrantless monitoring of internet searches51%
  - Favor warrantless listening to any telephone calls made in the U.S.14%
  - Favor warrantless monitoring of internet searches27%
  Subgroups (4)
  Republicans
  Oppose warrantless monitoring of domestic phone calls74%
  Oppose warrantless monitoring of internet searches59%
  Democrats
  Oppose warrantless monitoring of domestic phone calls62%
  Oppose warrantless monitoring of internet searches46%
  AmeriSpeak probability-based panel; online and telephone
Pew Research Center
Concern about government use of collected data
“How concerned, if at all, are you about how the government is using the data it collects about you?”
- Very concerned25%
- Somewhat concerned39%
Subgroups (1)
Republicans and GOP leaners
- Very or somewhat concerned63%
U.S. adults · n=4,272 · ±1.9 · American Trends Panel, June 3-17 2019 (Pew Research Center, 'Americans and Privacy', November 2019). Pew publishes the combined very/somewhat NET as 64 percent. The 2023 reading dropped the words 'if at all' (2023 Data Privacy report, footnote 14), so it is a different question and is not trended with this one. · 2019-06-03 – 2019-06-17 · source
Pew Research Center
2 readings · one study
- U.S. adults
- n=4,272
- ±1.9
- 2019-06-03 – 2019-06-17
These 2 readings are 2 questions from one study, not 2 independent findings, and they are counted once here. Their shared source, sample and field period are stated above; anything that differs between them is stated on the reading it belongs to. source
- Acceptability of police facial recognition in public spaces
  “In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable to use facial recognition technology in the following situations? [item: Law enforcement agencies assessing potential security threats in public spaces]”
  - Acceptable — law enforcement assessing security threats in public spaces59%
  - Not acceptable — law enforcement assessing security threats in public spaces15%
  - Acceptable — landlords tracking who enters or leaves their buildings36%
  - Acceptable — companies automatically tracking employee attendance30%
  - Acceptable — advertisers seeing how people respond to public ad displays15%
  Subgroups (4)
  Ages 18-29
  Acceptable (law enforcement, public spaces)42%
  Ages 65+
  Acceptable (law enforcement, public spaces)76%
  Black
  Acceptable (law enforcement, public spaces)47%
  White
  Acceptable (law enforcement, public spaces)64%
  American Trends Panel. Asked only of those who had heard of facial recognition (N=3,722); rebased to all U.S. adults
- Trust in law enforcement to use facial recognition responsibly
  “How much, if at all, do you trust the following groups to use facial recognition technology responsibly? [item: Law enforcement agencies]”
  - Trust law enforcement agencies at least somewhat (NET)56%
  - Trust law enforcement agencies a great deal17%
  - Trust technology companies at least somewhat (NET)36%
  - Trust advertisers at least somewhat (NET)18%
  Subgroups (6)
  Ages 18-29
  Trust law enforcement at least somewhat49%
  Ages 65+
  Trust law enforcement at least somewhat67%
  White
  Trust law enforcement at least somewhat61%
  Black
  Trust law enforcement at least somewhat43%
  Rep/Lean Rep
  Trust law enforcement at least somewhat65%
  Dem/Lean Dem
  Trust law enforcement at least somewhat51%
  American Trends Panel, probability-based online panel. NOTE: asked only of the 3,722 who had heard of facial recognition; percentages are rebased to all U.S. adults, so they do not sum to 100
Ipsos
Government use of AI and facial recognition to maintain order (26-country global total)
Sponsor: World Economic Forum
“Which of the following best reflects your opinion on the government's use of artificial intelligence and facial recognition to maintain order?”
- Should be allowed only under certain circumstances and subject to strict regulations65%
- Should be allowed as much as needed, even at the risk of citizens giving up privacy19%
- Should not be allowed under any circumstances16%
Online adults across 26 countries · n=19,106 · Ipsos Global Advisor. GLOBAL TOTAL ONLY — the U.S. row could not be read unambiguously from the published chart, so no U.S. figure is reported rather than risk misattribution · 2019-05-24 – 2019-06-07 · source
Gallup
Government collection of telephone and internet records
- Disapprove of the program53%
- Approve of the program37%
- Would be very concerned about their own privacy if government held logs of their calls or internet communications35%
- Edward Snowden did the right thing in sharing the information with the press44%
- Edward Snowden did the wrong thing42%
Subgroups (4)
Democrats
- Approve49%
Independents
- Approve34%
Republicans
- Approve32%
- Disapprove63%
U.S. adults · n=1,008 · ±4 · Telephone interviews, landline and cell. Gallup does not print the verbatim topline in this release · 2013-06-10 – 2013-06-11 · source
George Mason University Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy
Public acceptance of police licence-plate readers (Fairfax County, 2010)
Sponsor: National Institute of Justice and SPAWAR Atlantic (U.S. Department of the Navy)
No overall result recorded for this poll — subgroup figures only.
Subgroups (34)
Real-time scanning
- Check all passing vehicles to see if any have been stolen (n=448)79.9%
- Check if registered owners are wanted for a crime (n=449)76.6%
- Investigate all vehicles near important places, to prevent terrorism (n=451)70.1%
- Check if registered owners are sex offenders (n=447)66.7%
- Check all passing vehicles for parking violations and unpaid tickets (n=449)48.1%
Real-time scanning — Stolen-vehicle scanning, rest of the scale (n=448)
- Oppose or strongly oppose10.7%
- Neutral9.4%
Uses of stored data
- Find the last location of a vehicle connected with a crime (n=444)87.6%
- Learn about the past activities of a person suspected of terrorism (n=442)79%
- Learn about the past activities of a suspect under investigation (n=443)71.1%
- Learn about the past activities of sex offenders (n=447)66.7%
- Investigate all vehicles which drive around an important place or building (n=437)53.1%
Retention length
- Yes, saved until the police want to erase it23.5%
- Yes, saved for about six months30.5%
- Yes, but only for a short period (for example, one month)23%
- No, the data should not be saved23%
Retention length — Asked with 'if it can help in solving crimes' (n=213)
- Yes, saved until the police want to erase it36.2%
- Yes, saved for about six months30.5%
- Yes, but only for a short period (for example, one month)16.4%
- No, the data should not be saved16.9%
Awareness & privacy
- Say police should be able to share LPR data with other government agencies74.3%
- Had heard of, read about or seen plate-reader technology before the survey62.8%
- Consider plate number, date, time and exact location private information (n=451)53.4%
- Neutral on whether that data is private (n=451)17.3%
Lessening concerns
- Police must get special permission (such as a court order) to use saved data42.7%
- I don't have concerns about the police using LPR technology35%
- Police consult an attorney about legal or privacy issues before using LPR24.5%
- Police let the public discuss LPR at community meetings22.5%
- Police immediately erase all LPR data13.7%
- None of these actions can lessen my concerns11.2%
Behavioural effect of retention
- Less likely to commit a parking or traffic violation (n=440)26%
- Less likely to associate with particular people (n=438)14.4%
- Less likely to visit particular locations or events (n=437)12.6%
- Less likely to do something else you normally do (n=435)10.4%
Adult residents (18+) of Fairfax County, Virginia · n=457 · One 2010 mail survey of Fairfax County, Virginia — 2,000 households sampled, 457 completed (22.9 percent response), 85.8 percent Caucasian, no margin of error reported, and not national. Funded by the National Institute of Justice and SPAWAR Atlantic (U.S. Department of the Navy). Six question batteries from this single instrument were previously listed as six separate polls; they are consolidated here as one so a single non-national 2010 local survey is not counted six times. Each battery is preserved as a result group; the retention-length battery carried a split-sample wording experiment (n=439), whose two forms are kept distinct. · source

Government survey data — least weight in this section

Collected by federal statistical agencies. Placed last and given the least weight of the tiers shown here (section weighting set 3 August 2026). Where these measure experience rather than belief they remain evidence of what was measured — but they are survey estimates carrying sampling error, not a count of every event, and they are not the reading this section leads with.

U.S. Census Bureau for NTIA
Online privacy and security concerns (2015 NTIA Internet Use Survey)
Sponsor: National Telecommunications and Information Administration
- Named at least one concern about online privacy and security risks84%
- Named identity theft as a major concern63%
- Refrained from an online activity (transactions, purchases, posting, expressing opinions) due to privacy/security concerns45%
- Reported being affected by a breach, identity theft or similar in the prior 12 months19%
Subgroups (2)
Affected by a breach in the prior year
- Concerned about data collection or tracking by online services30%
Not affected by a breach
- Concerned about data collection or tracking by online services21%
U.S. households with at least one internet user · Computer and Internet Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey; open-ended concern question, multiple answers allowed — a U.S. Census Bureau probability survey of tens of thousands of households. The cited NTIA summary states no sample size, and no single margin of error is published for these estimates, so neither is recorded here rather than inventing one. · source
U.S. Census Bureau for NTIA
Online privacy and security concerns (2019 NTIA Internet Use Survey)
Sponsor: National Telecommunications and Information Administration
- Had significant concerns about online privacy and security risks (2019)73%
- Held back from some online activities as a result (2019)35%
- Concerned about data collection by online services (2019)26%
- Concerned about data collection by online services (2015)23%
U.S. households with at least one internet user · Biennial Computer and Internet Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey — a U.S. Census Bureau probability survey of tens of thousands of households. The cited NTIA summary states no sample size, and no single margin of error is published for these estimates, so neither is recorded here rather than inventing one. · source

Sources

Every citation behind this page — 160 in total, grouped by the job it does. On the Citations and Evidence sides each is labelled with the authority it carries, because on this platform only primary records and official analysis can establish a fact; journalism may corroborate one, never create it. A claim’s own sources carry no such label — they mark where a claimant said something, and an evidentiary stamp on a party’s own words would ask the wrong question of it.

Cited in the explainer (91)

Showing 91 of 91 citations — no filters applied

[12] California State Auditorprimary
“Furthermore, three of the four agencies have shared their ALPR images widely, without considering whether the entities receiving them have a right to and need for the images.”
[32] USAspending.govprimary
“CLEAR INVESTIGATIONS ADVANCED PLATFORM: REAL-TIME INCARCERATION AND ARREST, CLEAR ONLINE ALERTS, LEARN VIA VIGILANT SOLUTIONS FOR UP TO 750 USERS AND LPR VIA CLEAR FOR ALL CLEAR AUTHORIZED USERS.”
[33] USAspending.govprimary
“SHADOWDRAGON HORIZON/SOCIALNET UNLIMITED QUERY, PER USER LICENSES (BASE YEAR) POP: 08/28/2023-08/27/2024”
[34] ShadowDragonunknown
“Automate OSINT data collection and analysis across billions of public sources to dramatically reduce investigation time.”
[35] Babel Streetunknown
“Unmask aliases and resolve identities across systems and languages to review the full picture.”
[36] Dataminrunknown
“earliest warnings on high impact events and critical information far in advance of other sources.”
[37] NIST (U.S. Dept. of Commerce)primary
“Together these datasets allowed us to process a total of 18.27 million images of 8.49 million people through 189 mostly commercial algorithms from 99 developers.”
[56] U.S. House Committee on the Judiciaryprimary
“On July 19, 2023, the Committee unanimously approved H.R. 4639, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act.”
[72] U.S. District Court, N.D. Illinois (via CourtListener RECAP)primary
“As of January 2024, Clearview's value was estimated to be approximately $225 million dollars, making the Settlement Stake worth $51.75 million dollars.”
[1] Congressional Research Serviceprimary
“ALPRs are camera systems that capture the license plate data of passing vehicles, along with related information.”
[2] Congressional Research Serviceprimary
“(ALPR technology can also detect additional, related information, including vehicle type and color, global positioning system [GPS] location data, and date and time.)”
[3] Congressional Research Serviceprimary
“After they capture and catalog license plate information, ALPR systems can compare these data against various databases, including what are known as hot lists, which contain license plates linked to vehicles of interest.”
[4] Congressional Research Serviceprimary
“nearly 90% of sheriffs' offices with 500 or more sworn deputies reported using the technology, and of police departments serving over 1 million residents, 100% used ALPRs.”
[5] Congressional Research Serviceprimary
“network of LPR equipment owned by DEA, other federal agencies, and state, local, and tribal police departments. All law enforcement agencies involved have Memorandums of Understanding with DEA detailing the parameters for use and sharing of the LPR information.”
[6] Congressional Research Serviceprimary
“No specific federal legislative framework exists that governs federal law enforcement use of ALPRs, though there are federal laws and policies broadly governing law enforcement investigations and intelligence gathering.”
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
“This computer-readable format, also known as “a read,” contains some or all of the following information: (1) license plate number; (2) digital image of the license plate as well as the vehicle's make and model; (3) state of registration; (4) camera identification (i.e., camera owner and type); (5) Global Positioning Satellites coordinates or other location information recorded at the time the information was captured; and (6) date and time of observation.”
[8] U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
“The vendor compiles LPR records from at least 25 states and 24 of the top 30 most populous metropolitan statistical areas within the United States, to the extent that collection of LPR data is authorized by law in those jurisdictions.”
[9] U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
“The Contract for the commercial LPR service requires the vendor to provide an “alert list” feature that enables users to save license plate numbers to be automatically queried against new records as they are loaded into the vendor's LPR data service.”
[10] U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
“Records in EARM are maintained for 75 years.”
[11] California State Auditorprimary
“All four agencies have accumulated a large number of images in their ALPR systems, yet most of the images do not relate to their criminal investigations—99.9 percent of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made.”
[13] California State Auditorprimary
“The statewide survey of law enforcement agencies we conducted found that 70 percent operate or plan to operate an ALPR system, and this raises concerns that these agencies may share the deficiencies we identified at the four agencies we reviewed.”
[14] U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
“Cell-site simulators permit the tracking of mobile telephones in the course of criminal investigations.”
[15] U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
“By transmitting as a cell tower, cell-site simulators acquire the identifying information from cellular devices.”
[16] U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
“During a target development mission, all mobile identifiers will be captured and processed afterward to identify the target number. Non-target data in the area will be deleted within 24 hours.”
[17] USAspending.govprimary
“THE PURPOSE OF THIS DELIVERY ORDER IS TO PURCHASE VENNTEL GEOGRAPHIC MARKETING DATA AND SERVICE SUPPORT LICENSE SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR THE DHS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) DIRECTORATE, HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (HSARPA), DATA ANALYTICS ENGINE (DA-E).”
[18] USAspending.govprimary
“THIS REQUIREMENT IS FOR 25 BABEL STREET INSIGHTS LICENSES, LOCATION AND IDENTITY APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES FOR USE IN ICE CASE MANAGEMENT AND ANALYTICS SYSTEMS.”
[19] USAspending.govprimary
“IGF::OT::IGF - 2018 TOG FOG DATA LES (LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE) $60K”
[20] USAspending.govprimary
“THIS AWARD PROVIDES ICE HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS WITH PENLINKS COBWEB AND TANGLES LICENSES TO GATHER OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION FOR HSI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.”
[21] USAspending.govprimary
“THIS AWARD PROCURES FACIAL RECOGNITION SOFTWARE, WHICH SUPPORTS HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS WITH CAPABILITIES OF IDENTIFYING VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS IN CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION CASES AND ASSAULTS AGAINST LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS.”
[22] USAspending.govprimary
“THE FR SYSTEM WITH THE LATEST STATE-OF-THE-ART FR MATCHING CAPABILITY, INTEGRATE THE FR CAPABILITY WITH THE DOS VISA AND PASSPORT ISSUANCE PROCESSES, TRANSITION FROM THE LEGACY FR SYSTEM INTERFACE, AND PROVIDE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEW FR SYSTEM.”
[23] USAspending.govprimary
“IDEMIA BIOMETRIC ALGORITHM MAINTENANCE FOR NGI”
[24] USAspending.govprimary
“OBIM IS PROCURING THE MAINTENANCE FOR THE DHS PERPETUAL LICENSE FOR THE NEC AIM-XM AND AIM-ES PRODUCTS FOR UNLIMITED FACIAL QUANTITIES, ON UNLIMITED HARDWARE PLATFORMS, AND AT UNLIMITED LOCATIONS.”
[25] USAspending.govprimary
“ENTERPRISE FACIAL LICENSE O&M”
[26] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“Rite Aid's facial recognition technology was more likely to generate false positives in stores located in plurality-Black and Asian communities than in plurality-White communities”
[27] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“The system generated thousands of false-positive matches, the FTC says.”
[28] USAspending.govprimary
“THE UNITED STATES PARK POLICE (USPP) HAS A REQUIREMENT TO ACQUIRE AND DEPLOY A FLOCK SAFETY AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER (ALPR) SYSTEM IN THE GREATER WASHINGTON, DC METROPOLITAN AREA (WMA).”
[29] USAspending.govprimary
“LPR CAMERA SYSTEMS FOR DEAS NATIONAL LICENSE PLATE READER PROGRAM EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENTS”
[30] USAspending.govprimary
“REPAIR, PREVENTATIVE, REMEDIAL, AND ACCIDENTAL MAINTENANCE FOR CBP LICENSE PLATE READERS AND VEHICLE COUNTERS AT US PORTS OF ENTRY”
[31] USAspending.govprimary
“IGF::CL::IGF ACCESS TO LICENSE PLATE READER DATABASE”
[38] NIST (U.S. Dept. of Commerce)primary
“Our main result is that false positive differentials are much larger than those related to false negatives and exist broadly, across many, but not all, algorithms tested. Across demographics, false positives rates often vary by factors of 10 to beyond 100 times.”
[39] NIST (U.S. Dept. of Commerce)primary
“With domestic law enforcement images, the highest false positives are in American Indians, with elevated rates in African American and Asian populations; the relative ordering depends on sex and varies with algorithm.”
[40] NIST (U.S. Dept. of Commerce)primary
“We found false positives to be higher in women than men, and this is consistent across algorithms and datasets.”
[41] NIST (U.S. Dept. of Commerce)primary
“In identification applications such as visa or passport fraud detection, or surveillance, a false positive match to another individual could lead to a false accusation, detention or deportation.”
[42] NIST (U.S. Dept. of Commerce)primary
“At the same time, it is also clear that the much larger false positive variations, which occur even in high-quality photographs, must be mitigated by algorithm developers.”
[43] NIST (U.S. Dept. of Commerce)primary
“The table, last updated on 2025-03-05, includes summary indicators for how the two fundamental error rates vary by age, sex, and race.”
[44] U.S. Government Accountability Officeofficial analysis
“Six agencies reported using the technology on images of the unrest, riots, or protests following the death of George Floyd in May 2020. Three agencies reported using it on images of the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.”
[45] U.S. Government Accountability Officeofficial analysis
“All fourteen agencies that reported using the technology to support criminal investigations also reported using systems owned by non-federal entities. However, only one has awareness of what non-federal systems are used by employees.”
[46] U.S. Government Accountability Officeofficial analysis
“GAO found that six agencies had available data and cumulatively conducted about 60,000 searches when they did not have training requirements in place.”
[47] U.S. Government Accountability Officeofficial analysis
“across the FBI, only 10 staff completed facial recognition training of 196 staff that accessed the service.”
[48] U.S. Government Accountability Officeofficial analysis
“The other four agencies-three in DOJ and one in DHS-did not have such policies or guidance.”
[49] DHS Office of Inspector Generalprimary
“U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) did not adhere to Department privacy policies or develop sufficient policies before procuring and using commercial telemetry data (CTD).”
[50] DHS Office of Inspector Generalprimary
“the components did not adhere to DHS' privacy policies and the E-Government Act of 2002, which require certain privacy-sensitive technology or data obtained from that technology, such as CTD, to have an approved Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) before such technology is developed or procured.”
[51] DHS Office of Inspector Generalprimary
“As a result, CBP has used CTD since May 1, 2019, without an approved PIA that includes matching AdIDs to individuals.”
[52] DHS Office of Inspector Generalprimary
“the DHS Privacy Office did not follow or enforce its own privacy policies and guidance.”
[53] U.S. House Committee on the Judiciaryprimary
“the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD) have all purchased geolocation information from data brokers.”
[54] U.S. House Committee on the Judiciaryprimary
“In recent years, the government has turned to data brokers like Venntel to purchase location data from Americans' smartphones.”
[55] U.S. House Committee on the Judiciaryprimary
“Because ECPA does not protect consumers from data brokers that collect their information, the government purchases data as way to avoid seeking a warrant as would otherwise be required by the Fourth Amendment.”
[57] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“The raw location data that X-Mode/Outlogic has sold is associated with mobile advertising IDs, which are unique identifiers associated with each mobile device. This raw location data is not anonymized, and is capable of matching an individual consumer's mobile device with the locations they visited.”
[58] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“The company sells consumer location data to hundreds of clients in industries ranging from real estate to finance, as well as private government contractors for their own purposes, such as advertising or brand analytics.”
[59] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“InMarket has maintained nearly 2,000 such audience segment lists that have included such categories as parents of preschoolers, Christian church goers, and wealthy and not healthy.”
[60] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“The data sample the FTC examined included precise, timestamped location data collected from more than 61 million unique mobile devices in the previous week.”
[61] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“Kochava and its subsidiary, Collective Data Solutions (CDS), which has taken over Kochava's data broker business, will be prohibited from selling, licensing, transferring, sharing or disclosing sensitive location data in any products or services unless they obtain a consumer's affirmative express consent”
[62] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“Virginia-based Gravy Analytics and Venntel allegedly obtained consumer location information from other data suppliers and claimed to collect, process, and curate more than 17 billion signals from around a billion mobile devices daily.”
[63] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“The FTC's complaint alleges that Gravy Analytics and Venntel violated the FTC Act by unfairly selling sensitive consumer location data, and by collecting and using consumers' location data without obtaining verifiable user consent for commercial and government uses.”
[64] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“The FTC's complaint alleges that from January 2018 to June 2020, Mobilewalla collected more than 500 million unique consumer advertising identifiers paired with consumers' precise location data.”
[65] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“It also used audience segments to create a June 2020 report analyzing people who protested the death of George Floyd and determined the protesters' racial backgrounds and whether they lived in the cities in which they protested.”
[66] Federal Trade Commissionprimary
“Under the proposed order, Gravy Analytics and Venntel will be prohibited from selling, licensing, transferring, sharing, disclosing, or using sensitive location data except in limited circumstances involving national security or law enforcement.”
[67] U.S. District Court, N.D. Illinois (via CourtListener RECAP)primary
“Through its internet scraping efforts, Clearview's database quickly grew to a staggering three billion images.”
[68] U.S. District Court, N.D. Illinois (via CourtListener RECAP)primary
“As of October 29, 2021, Clearview's database contained approximately ten billion images, creating a class that encompassed virtually any individual whose face had been posted on the internet prior to and during the period of Clearview's operation.”
[69] Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy)primary
“dall'istruttoria condotta e emerso che Clearview ha creato un database di oltre 10 miliardi di immagini facciali che, raccolte in Internet attraverso tecniche di web scraping, vengono sottoposte ad un processo di elaborazione biometrica”
[70] Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), UKprimary
“In October 2022 it was estimated that the Database included over 20 billion images and increasing as new images are scraped. We were provided with an estimate of a growth rate of 75 million images per day.”
[71] Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (Netherlands)primary
“Clearview built a database consisting of over 30 billion photos (hereinafter: the database).”
[73] Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), UKprimary
“Blocked all photos in the database that were geolocated in Illinois from being searched; b. Constructed a 'geofence' around Illinois; c. Decided that it will not collect facial vectors from images that contain metadata associated with Illinois”
[74] Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy)primary
“di pagare la somma di euro venti milioni a titolo di sanzione amministrativa pecuniaria per le violazioni indicate in motivazione”
[75] Hellenic Data Protection Authority (Greece)primary
“the company, which markets facial recognition services, violated the principles of lawfulness and transparency (art. 5 paragraphs 1(a), 6, 9 GDPR) and its obligations under Articles 12, 14, 15 and 27 of the GDPR, imposing a fine of twenty million euros (20 000 000).”
[76] CNIL (France), via Legifranceprimary
“assortir l'injonction d'une astreinte de cent mille euros (100 000 euros) par jour de retard a l'issue d'un delai de deux mois suivant la notification de la presente deliberation”
[77] Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (Netherlands)primary
“The Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (hereinafter: AP) has decided to fine Clearview AI Inc. (hereinafter: Clearview) a total amount of EUR 30,500,000.”
[78] Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), UKprimary
“The ICO imposed a monetary penalty administrative fine on Clearview of GBP 7,552,800 (equivalent to EUR 9 million, using the exchange rate applicable at 25 April 2022).”
[79] Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), UKprimary
“That decision was materially in error of law and we set it aside. On a proper construction of the GDPRs the ICO had jurisdiction to issue the Notices. We therefore remit this matter to a new FTT for consideration of the substantive appeal in accordance with our Directions.”
[80] Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
“A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.”
[81] Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
“Mapping a cell phone's location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder's whereabouts.”
[82] Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
“Moreover, the retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable. In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person's movements were limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection.”
[83] Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
“Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”
[84] Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
“We hold only that a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.”
[85] U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (en banc)primary
“On the merits, because the AIR program enables police to deduce from the whole of individuals' movements, we hold that accessing its data is a search, and its warrantless operation violates the Fourth Amendment.”
[86] U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (en banc)primary
“That is enough to yield a wealth of detail, greater than the sum of the individual trips.”
[87] U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (en banc)primary
“Regarding AIR data as just one more investigative tool does exactly what the Supreme Court has admonished against; it allows inference to insulate a search.”
[88] Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (via CourtListener)primary
“This aggregation principle or mosaic theory is wholly consistent with the statement in Katz that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection, because the whole of one's movements, even if they are all individually public, are not knowingly exposed in the aggregate.”
[89] Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (via CourtListener)primary
“With enough cameras in enough locations, the historic location data from an ALPR system in Massachusetts would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy and would constitute a search for constitutional purposes. The one-year retention period indicated in the EOPSS retention policy certainly is long enough to warrant constitutional protection.”
[90] Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (via CourtListener)primary
“While we cannot say precisely how detailed a picture of the defendant's movements must be revealed to invoke constitutional protections, it is not that produced by four cameras at fixed locations on the ends of two bridges.”
[91] Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (via CourtListener)primary
“Of course, the constitutional question is not merely an exercise in counting cameras; the analysis should focus, ultimately, on the extent to which a substantial picture of the defendant's public movements are revealed by the surveillance. For that purpose, where the ALPRs are placed matters too.”

Evidence behind the checks (42)

Showing 42 of 42 citations — no filters applied

Congressional Research Serviceprimary
“(ALPR technology can also detect additional, related information, including vehicle type and color, global positioning system [GPS] location data, and date and time.)”
U.S. Department of Homeland Securityprimary
“(2) digital image of the license plate as well as the vehicle's make and model;”
Court of Appeals of Virginiaprimary
“The images are saved in a searchable website database for 30 days and may be accessed by a Norfolk police officer to obtain information pertinent to a crime being investigated.”
Village of Wilmette, Illinoisprimary
“All ALPR data is only retained for 30 days.”
California Attorney Generalprimary
“ALPR systems are generally operated through third-party vendors that deploy cameras and collect and store ALPR data.”
California State Auditorprimary
“Fresno and Marin have each arranged to share their ALPR images with hundreds of entities and Sacramento with over a thousand entities across the United States.”
California State Auditorprimary
“None of the agencies have an ALPR usage and privacy policy that implements all the legally mandated—since 2016—requirements.”
USAspending.govprimary
“CLEAR INVESTIGATIONS ADVANCED PLATFORM: REAL-TIME INCARCERATION AND ARREST, CLEAR ONLINE ALERTS, LEARN VIA VIGILANT SOLUTIONS FOR UP TO 750 USERS AND LPR VIA CLEAR FOR ALL CLEAR AUTHORIZED USERS.”
Congressional Research Serviceprimary
“(ALPR technology can also detect additional, related information, including vehicle type and color, global positioning system [GPS] location data, and date and time.)”
California State Auditorprimary
“99.9 percent of the 320 million images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list when the image was made.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“Type what you're looking for, such as "man in blue shirt and cowboy hat" or "dark SUV with rear bumper damage." Then review relevant visual matches across enabled video feeds, with vehicle results also available from LPR systems.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“Review person-related video search results from enabled video feeds alongside vehicle results from video and LPR systems in one interface.”
Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
“During a recent audit, Giannoulias' office found that Flock Safety, which operates the largest automated license plate reader (ALPR) system in the nation, allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois license plate cameras on Illinois roads and surveil drivers.”
Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
“the office discovered late last week that Flock did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing, which was compounded by the fact that the company was running a pilot program with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which Flock leadership was unaware of.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“CBP Pilot: May 9, 2025 to August 24, 2025”
Flock Safetyunknown
“In March 2025, Flock disabled National Lookup for all California agencies.”
Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
“This sharing of license plate data of motorists who drive on Illinois roads is a clear violation of the state law.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“In August of 2025, Flock publicly announced it would no longer conduct pilot projects with federal agencies.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“Flock Safety may access, use, preserve and/or disclose the LPR data to law enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or third parties, if legally required to do so or if Flock has a good faith belief that such access, use, preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to comply with a legal process, enforce the agreement between Flock and the customer, or detect, prevent or otherwise address security, privacy, fraud or technical issues.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“Additionally, Flock uses a fraction of LPR images (less than one percent), which are stripped of all metadata and identifying information, solely for the purpose of improving Flock Services through machine learning.”
Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
“As a result, Giannoulias immediately ordered the company to shut off access to U.S. Customs and Border Protection.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default; this may be increased or decreased on a case-by-case basis if a different schedule is required by a customer's law or policy.”
California State Auditorprimary
“Fresno's policy is to retain ALPR images for one year; Sacramento's and Marin's policies specify two years.”
Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
“Flock did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing”
California Office of the Attorney Generalprimary
“the City of El Cajon Police Department continues to share this data with numerous out-of-state law enforcement agencies throughout the country”
Illinois Secretary of Stateprimary
“Flock did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing”
Flock Safetyunknown
“In March 2025, Flock disabled National Lookup for all California agencies.”
California State Auditorprimary
“The agencies we reviewed have few safeguards for the creation of ALPR user accounts and have also failed to audit the use of their ALPR systems. Instead of ensuring that only authorized users access ALPR data for appropriate purposes, the agencies have left their systems open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight.”
Electronic Frontier Foundationadvocacy
“being searched for as a missing person, not as a suspect of a crime”
Flock Safetyunknown
“All queries of the LPR system are stored for auditing purposes, including: Username Date Time Purpose of query License plate and other elements used to query the system”
Institute for Justiceunknown
“There is no evidence whatsoever that Flock Safety ALPRs have played a meaningful role in any Oak Park crime investigation since their installation in 2022,”
404 Mediapress
“the information that is collected by the police departments are too varied and incomplete for us to do any type of meaningful statistical analysis on them”
Flock Safetyunknown
“Although infrequent, license plate translation may be incomplete or inaccurate. False positives are flagged to continuously improve the system. Users should confirm the computer translation prior to taking any action based on an LPR alert or search.”
Institute for Justiceunknown
“in nearly two-thirds of the cases IJ analyzed, officers did not realize their error until after they had drawn and pointed their guns at innocent people.”
Gizmodopress
“71% of cases that generated an alert related to vehicles that were stolen or used in a felony”
Flock Safetyunknown
“With billions of monthly plate reads, Flock connects communities, businesses and law enforcement in a shared network built to stop crime.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“The platform processes 20B+ vehicle reads per month across 49 states, with thousands of law enforcement agencies participating in controlled sharing.”
Flock Safetyunknown
“LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default”
Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
“Held: Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie's location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information.”
Supreme Court of the United Statesprimary
“Where the Fourth Amendment applies, it applies regardless of "the quality or quantity of information" the government obtains.”
Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason Universityunknown
“Our randomized controlled experiment mirrored the findings from the PERF experiments in that the use of LPR in autotheft hot spots does not appear to result in a reduction of crime generally or autotheft specifically, during the period of time measured.”
Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason Universityunknown
“we also discovered this rapid adoption is occurring in a low-information environment; the evidence-base for the effectiveness and effects of LPR is weak.”

Where claims were made (27)

Showing 27 of 27 citations — no filters applied

Flock Safety
“Using patented Vehicle FingerprintTM technology, the camera captures the vehicle make, color, type, license plate, state of the license plate, missing plate, covered plate, paper plate, and over 20 unique vehicle details like roof racks and bumper stickers.”
Flock Safety
“Flock FreeForm expands on Vehicle Signature by going beyond preset filters, enabling searches based on everyday language, such as 'white sports car with a racing stripe' or 'red pickup truck with a dog in the bed.'”
Flock Safety
“LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default; this may be increased or decreased on a case-by-case basis if a different schedule is required by a customer's law or policy.”
Flock Safety
“Customers choose whether to share LPR data with other customers in accordance with their laws and policies.”
Flock Safety
“to use the service, each Flock Safety partner agency must opt in to either the local or national sharing feature.”
Vigilant Solutions
“The company retains LPR data as long as it has commercial value.”
Vigilant Solutions
“The company reserves the right to revise this policy at any point in the future and such changes will be retroactively applicable to data collected prior to any revision of this policy.”
Motorola Solutions
“Narrow results by make, model, color, accessories and even unique vehicle features like damage or bumper stickers.”
Motorola Solutions
“Transform license plates into leads with patented, powerful vehicle location analytics and access to billions of detections beyond your own.”
Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions
“SignalTrace creates an electronic fingerprint for groups of the signals that the system determines are frequently emitted together.”
Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions
“Electronic devices such as fitness trackers, smartwatches, RFID tags and mobile phones emit signals into the air.”
Axon
“We have not, and will not ever sell public safety data.”
Rekor Systems
“Rekor's vehicle recognition utilizes artificial intelligence and machine learning to identify over 2000 unique vehicle characteristics and capture the complete vehicle signature.”
Rekor Systems
“Using custom, shared, and NCIC hotlists; receive alerts on vehicles of interest the moment they are detected.”
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice
“A total of 40% of respondents retain ALPR data for six months or less (n=16). Five respondents (13%) indicated they retain ALPR data indefinitely, while two indicated that retention is based on the storage capacity of the equipment installed.”
Flock Safety
“No. Flock cameras do not use facial recognition technology. Searches are based on vehicle characteristics, and not identity. Flock cannot recognize, identify, or track individuals.”
Flock Safety
“Flock clients control their data; no secret federal agency access or "backdoors" exist.”
Flock Safety
“No. Flock does not work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Communities control federal data access.”
Flock Safety
“LPR data gathered by the Flock Safety system on behalf of Flock Safety customers is owned by the customer.”
Flock Safety
“Flock gives customers full data ownership, auto-deleting data after 30 days, and prevents unauthorized sharing.”
Flock Safety
“Data sharing is controlled by the customer agency, not Flock.”
Flock Safety
“Every search is tied to a specific user and recorded automatically. There is no open browsing and no anonymous searches.”
Flock Safety
“Flock technology helps resolve roughly 700,000 crimes a year across law enforcement, businesses, neighborhoods, and schools: about 10% of reported U.S. crime.”
Flock Safety
“Flock's LPR is highly accurate, achieving over 99% capture in clear and rainy conditions and over 98% at dawn and dusk.”
Flock Safety
“Flock LPR captures public vehicle info at a single point in time, not continuous movement.”
Flock Safety
“Today's ruling reinforces what courts nationwide have recognized: LPRs are lawful.”
Flock Safety
“52% Reduction in robbery in 1 year”

Explainer citations — source authority

Claims checked (22 of 22)

Public opinion polling

In short

Constitutional analysis

Key points

What is at stake

WHAT IS AT STAKE

Counter-arguments that survived review

WHAT THE LAW ESTABLISHES TODAY

WHAT THE RECORD ACTUALLY SHOWS

WHAT IS GENUINELY CONTESTED

THE CONTRACTOR ANALOGY DOES NOT FIT, AND IT IS DOING A LOT OF WORK

Current legal challenges in progress

THE REMEDY PROBLEM

IT WAS NEVER ONLY LICENCE PLATES

IT IS SOLD TO PRIVATE PARTIES TOO, AND THE DATA CROSSES

THERE IS NO WAY TO OPT OUT, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE PROBLEM

THE LAW GRADES PRIVACY BY WHO YOU ARE. THIS SYSTEM DOES NOT

STATEMENTS MEASURED AGAINST THE RECORD

WHAT THIS SECTION IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT

THE DHS PILOTS AND THE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WAS NO DHS RELATIONSHIP

A CITY SAYS A SHARING SETTING WAS TURNED ON BY THE VENDOR

THE 2026 TERMS AGAINST THE COMPANY'S DESCRIPTION OF THEM

A CASE-NUMBER OPTION IN JUNE 2025, A CASE-NUMBER SETTING GONE IN AUGUST

"YOU CAN'T SEARCH JUST BECAUSE"

"EVERY SEARCH IS LOGGED AND REVIEWABLE," AND A GAP IN RETAINED RECORDS

WHAT "OPT-IN" MEANT IN PRACTICE

WHAT THIS SECTION DOES NOT ESTABLISH

STUMPWATCH'S POSITION: THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT HIRE OUT WHAT IT MAY NOT DO

WHERE WE BELIEVE THE LAW SHOULD GO

WHAT IS AT STAKE

WHAT THE LAW ESTABLISHES TODAY

WHAT IS GENUINELY CONTESTED

THE REMEDY PROBLEM

WHAT THE RECORD ACTUALLY SHOWS

IT WAS NEVER ONLY LICENCE PLATES

IT IS SOLD TO PRIVATE PARTIES TOO, AND THE DATA CROSSES

STUMPWATCH'S POSITION: THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT HIRE OUT WHAT IT MAY NOT DO

THE CONTRACTOR ANALOGY DOES NOT FIT, AND IT IS DOING A LOT OF WORK

THERE IS NO WAY TO OPT OUT, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE PROBLEM

THE LAW GRADES PRIVACY BY WHO YOU ARE. THIS SYSTEM DOES NOT

STATEMENTS MEASURED AGAINST THE RECORD

WHAT THIS SECTION IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT

THE DHS PILOTS AND THE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WAS NO DHS RELATIONSHIP

A CITY SAYS A SHARING SETTING WAS TURNED ON BY THE VENDOR

THE 2026 TERMS AGAINST THE COMPANY'S DESCRIPTION OF THEM

A CASE-NUMBER OPTION IN JUNE 2025, A CASE-NUMBER SETTING GONE IN AUGUST

"YOU CAN'T SEARCH JUST BECAUSE"

"EVERY SEARCH IS LOGGED AND REVIEWABLE," AND A GAP IN RETAINED RECORDS

WHAT "OPT-IN" MEANT IN PRACTICE

WHAT THIS SECTION DOES NOT ESTABLISH

WHERE WE BELIEVE THE LAW SHOULD GO

How this was reviewed

Officials on Mass Surveillance, Tracking, and Flock Safety

Positions on record

Claims checked against the record

Survey and polling data

What these polls say together

How these were read together

Opinion trends

Readings shown on their own (21)

Private opinion polling

Government survey data — least weight in this section

Issues connected to this one

Measured overlap

Government Reform, Ethics & Democracy

Foreign Policy, Defense & Wars

Guns & the Second Amendment

Health Care & Prescription Drugs

Economy, Taxes & Inflation

Climate, Environment & Energy

Sources